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  1. Matthew C. Altman (2007). The Decomposition of the Corporate Body: What Kant Cannot Contribute to Business Ethics. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 74 (3):253 - 266.
    Kant is gaining popularity in business ethics because the categorical imperative rules out actions such as deceptive advertising and exploitative working conditions, both of which treat people merely as means to an end. However, those who apply Kant in this way often hold businesses themselves morally accountable, and this conception of collective responsibility contradicts the kind of moral agency that underlies Kant's ethics. A business has neither inclinations nor the capacity to reason, so it lacks the conditions necessary for constraint (...)
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  2. Roman Altshuler (2013). Practical Necessity and the Constitution of Character. In Alexandra Perry & Chris Herrera (eds.), The Moral Philosophy of Bernard Williams. Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
    Deliberation issues in decision, and so might be taken as a paradigmatic volitional activity. Character, on the other hand, may appear pre-volitional: the dispositions that constitute it provide the background against which decisions are made. Bernard Williams offers an intriguing picture of how the two may be connected via the concept of practical necessities, which are at once constitutive of character and deliverances of deliberation. Necessities are thus the glue binding character and the will, allowing us to take responsibility for (...)
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  3. Kenneth M. Amaeshi, Onyeka K. Osuji & Paul Nnodim (2008). Corporate Social Responsibility in Supply Chains of Global Brands: A Boundaryless Responsibility? Clarifications, Exceptions and Implications. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 81 (1):223 - 234.
    Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is increasingly becoming a popular business concept in developed economies. As typical of other business concepts, it is on its way to globalization through practices and structures of the globalized capitalist world order, typified in Multinational Corporations (MNCs). However, CSR often sits uncomfortably in this capitalist world order, as MNCs are often challenged by the global reach of their supply chains and the possible irresponsible practices inherent along these chains. The possibility of irresponsible practices puts global (...)
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  4. Lydia B. Amir (2009). Rethinking Philosophers' Responsibility. In Jinfen Yan & David E. Schrader (eds.), Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy. Edwin Mellen Press. 19-29.
    Should philosophers address the needs of their societies? If the answer is affirmative, and if today's needs are being inadequately answered within the New Age movement for lack of viable alternatives, philosophers' minimal response could be teaching critical thinking outside the academe, and maximal response would be providing relevant wisdom for the world. The first option requires construing logic and epistemology as practical fields. The second requires reforming part of Philosophy as social thinking which provides relevant wisdom for the world. (...)
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  5. Holly Andersen, Two Causal Mistakes in Wegner's Illusion of Conscious Will.
    Daniel Wegner argues that our feelings of conscious will are illusory: these feelings are not causally involved in the production of action, which is rather governed by unconscious neural processes. I argue that Wegner's interpretation of neuroscientific results rests on two fallacious causal assumptions, neither of which are supported by the evidence. Each assumption involves a Cartesian disembodiment of conscious will, and it is this disembodiment that results in the appearance of causal inefficacy, rather than any interesting features of conscious (...)
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  6. John Anderson & Jacky Baltes (forthcoming). Agent-Based Control in a Global-Vision Robotic Soccer Team. Proceedings of the Agents Meet Robots Workshop, 17th Conference of the Canadian Society for the Computational Studies of Intelligence (Ai-04).
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  7. Páll S. Árdal (1965). Motives, Intentions and Responsibility. Philosophical Quarterly 15 (59):146-154.
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  8. Nomy Arpaly (2006). Merit, Meaning, and Human Bondage: An Essay on Free Will. Princeton University Press.
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  9. Nomy Arpaly (2004). Review: Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes From Harry Frankfurt. [REVIEW] Mind 113 (452):744-747.
  10. Koki Asano (2008). A Counterargument to Skepticism of Akrasia. Kagaku Tetsugaku 41 (2):17-29.
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  11. Thomas Atwater (1980). Theory of Action. New Scholasticism 54 (1):111-115.
  12. John E. Atwell (1980). Schopenhaurer's Account of Moral Responsibility. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 61 (4):396.
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  13. Robert Audi (1988). Deliberative Intentions and Willingness to Act: A Reply to Professor Mele. Philosophia 18 (2-3):243-245.
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  14. Flor Emilce Cely Ávila (2009). Reseña de "Effective Intentions: The Power of Conscious Will" de Mele, Alfred R. Ideas Y Valores 58 (141):246-250.
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  15. Annette Baier (1979). Action Theory. Grazer Philosophische Studien 9:185-198.
  16. Annette C. Baier (1993). How Can Individualists Share Responsibility? Political Theory 21 (2):228-248.
  17. Kurt Baier (1965). Acting and Producing. Journal of Philosophy 62 (21):645-648.
  18. A. Bandura, G. -V. Caprara & L. Zsolnai (2000). Corporate Transgressions Through Moral Disengagement. Journal of Human Values 6 (1):57-64.
    Corporate transgression is a well-known phenomenon in today's business world. Some corporations are involved in violations of law and moral rules that produce organizational practices and products that take a toll on the public. Social cognitive theory of moral agency provides a conceptual framework for analyzing how otherwise pro-social managers adopt socially injurious corporate practices. This is achieved through selective disengagement of moral self-sanctions from transgressive conduct. This article documents moral disengagement practices in four famous cases of corporate transgressions and (...)
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  19. Winston H. F. Barnes (1941). Action. Mind 50 (199):243-257.
  20. Winston H. F. Barnes, W. D. Falk & A. E. Duncan-Jones (1945). Symposium: Intention, Motive and Responsibility. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 19:230 - 288.
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  21. Winston Barnes, W. D. Falk & A. E. Duncan-Jones (1945). Intention, Motive and Responsibility. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 19:230-288.
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  22. David Barnett (2012). Future Conditionals and DeRose's Thesis. Mind 121 (482):407-442.
    In deciding whether to read this paper, it might seem reasonable for you to base your decision on your confidence (i) that, if you read this paper, you will become a better person. It might also seem reasonable for you to base your decision on your confidence (ii) that, if you were to read this paper, you would become a better person. Is there a difference between (i) and (ii)? If so, are you rationally required to base your decision on (...)
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  23. Tomas Barrero (2010). Reason, Action, and Weakness of the Will: A Semantic Approach. Ideas Y Valores 59 (143):161-187.
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  24. B. Barry (1997). The Politics of Free Will. Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 59 (4):615 - 630.
    It is widely believed that, if human behaviour is subject to universal causation, people cannot be responsible for their actions. However, the excuses that are normally accepted do not invoke causation, so they would still be limited in scope even if all action had causal antecedents. Diminished responsibility due to (temporary or permanent) mental defect does involve reference to causation, but not to the fact of causation — rather, to the kind of causation. Again, therefore, universal causation does not threatenresponsibility (...)
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  25. Melissa Barry (2007). Realism, Rational Action, and the Humean Theory of Motivation. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (3):231-242.
    Realists about practical reasons agree that judgments regarding reasons are beliefs. They disagree, however, over the question of how such beliefs motivate rational action. Some adopt a Humean conception of motivation, according to which beliefs about reasons must combine with independently existing desires in order to motivate rational action; others adopt an anti-Humean view, according to which beliefs can motivate rational action in their own right, either directly or by giving rise to a new desire that in turn motivates the (...)
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  26. Harry H. Bash (1964). Determinism and Avoidability in Sociohistorical Analysis. Ethics 74 (3):186-200.
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  27. Charles A. Baylis (1950). Rational Preference, Determinism, and Moral Obligation. Journal of Philosophy 47 (3):57-63.
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  28. Robert W. Beard (1967). James and the Rationality of Determinism. Journal of the History of Philosophy 5 (2):149-156.
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  29. E. L. Beardsley (1958). 'Excusing Conditions' and Moral Responsibility. In Sidney Hook (ed.), Determinism and Freedom in the Age of Modern Science. Collier-Macmillan. 133--137.
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  30. Monroe C. Beardsley (1980). Motives and Intentions. Bowling Green Studies in Applied Philosophy 2:71-79.
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  31. James R. Beebe, The Folk Conception of Weakness of Will.
    Philosophers have long puzzled over the phenomenon of weakness of will. Some (e.g., Socrates in the Protagoras ; Hare, 1952, 1963; Watson, 1977) have questioned whether weak-willed action is genuinely possible, since it requires that agents do one thing while sincerely believing they ought to do something else. Others have been skeptical about whether weak-willed actions can be free, since agents who display weakness of will sometimes seem to be overcome or enslaved by their desires or passions (cf. Watson 1977; (...)
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  32. W. Benett (1914). Religion and Free Will: A Contribution to the Philosophy of Values. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 11 (23):639-641.
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  33. P. Benson (1996). R. Jay Wallace: Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments. Journal of Philosophy 93:574-577.
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  34. Paul Benson (1996). Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments by R.Jay Wallace. Journal of Philosophy 93 (11):574-578.
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  35. Paul Benson (1990). The Moral Importance of Free Action. Southern Journal of Philosophy 28 (1):1-18.
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  36. Paul H. Benson (1984). Freedom and Criticism: An Account of Free Action. Dissertation, Princeton University
    This essay attempts to develop an account of the abilities which free action involves. I argue that the notion of ability which is especially relevant for the purpose of understanding free action is correctly given a compatibilist interpretation. More importantly, it turns out that persons who act freely have the ability to do otherwise than they do. Acting with the ability to do otherwise is not a distinctive mark of free action, however, since anyone who merely acts intentionally possesses that (...)
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  37. Timothy Berard (1998). Attributions and Avowals of Motive in the Study of Deviance: Resource or Topic? Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 28 (2):193–213.
    In explaining human actions, scholars and laypeople alike employ explanatory devices such as ‘motives’. This paper critically reevaluates the relationship between ‘professional’ and ‘lay’ invocations of motive, proposing a general reorientation of theory and research. This reorientation emphasizes the mundane ‘practical grammar’ of motives, and argues that motive deployment is inextricably tied to deviance, and therefore irremediably moral. It is argued, therefore, that motives should serve as a topic for scholarship, not a resourcefor scholarly use. Several landmark theories of motives, (...)
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  38. Steven Berg (2001). The Argument of the Action. Review of Metaphysics 55 (1):119-121.
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  39. Don Berkich (2007). A Puzzle About Akrasia. Teorema: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 26 (3):59-72.
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  40. Virginia Berridge (1979). Morality and Medical Science: Concepts of Narcotic Addiction in Britain, 1820–1926. Annals of Science 36 (1):67-85.
    This paper examines the evolution of ideas about narcotic addiction. In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, addiction was not viewed as a medical condition, but as a ‘bad habit’. The contemporary reaction to De Quincey's Confessions demonstrates the general lack of medical involvement. The question of opium eating and longevity, first generated by the Mar case, brought increased medical interest and an embryo connection with the anti-opium crusade. In the second half of the century, addiction was more fully ‘medicalised’ (...)
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  41. Monika Betzler (2009). Weakness of the Will as Furtive Irrationality. Ideas Y Valores 58 (141):191-215.
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  42. Monika Betzler (2001). How Can an Agent Rationally Guide His Actions? Grazer Philosophische Studien 61 (1):159-177.
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  43. Renée Bilodeau (2006). The Motivational Strength of Intentions. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 9:129-135.
    According to the early versions of the causal theory of action, intentional actions were both produced and explained by a beliefdesire pair. Since the end of the seventies, however, most philosophers consider intentions as an irreducible and indispensable component of any adequate account of intentional action. The aim of this paper is to examine and evaluate some of the arguments that gave rise to the introduction of the concept of intention in action theory. My contention is that none of them (...)
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  44. Dieter Birnbacber (2001). Philosophical Foundations of Responsibility. In Ann Elisabeth Auhagen & Hans Werner Bierhoff (eds.), Responsibility: The Many Faces of a Social Phenomenon. Routledge.
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  45. John Bishop (1991). Natural Agency. Mind 100 (2):287-290.
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  46. Ole Bjerg (2008). Drug Addiction and Capitalism: Too Close to the Body. Body and Society 14 (2):1-22.
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  47. Petersson Björn (forthcoming). Co-Responsibility and Causal Involvement. Philosophia.
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  48. Brand Blanshard (1966). Reflections on Economic Determinism. Journal of Philosophy 63 (7):169-178.
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  49. Charles V. Blatz (1972). Accountability and Answerability. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 2 (2):101–120.
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  50. David Blumenfeld (1972). Free Action and Unconscious Motivation. The Monist 56 (3):426-443.
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