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  1. M. Alvarez (2012). Action, Ethics, and Responsibility * Edited by Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke and Harry S. Silverstein * Causing Human Actions: New Perspectives on the Causal Theory of Action * Edited by Jesus H. Aguilar and Andrei A. Buckareff. [REVIEW] Analysis 72 (1):190-193.
  2. Michael Brent (2012). The Power of Agency. Dissertation, Columbia University
    I present an alternative account of action centered around the notion of effort. I argue that effort has several unique features: it is attributed directly to agents; it is a causal power that each agent alone possesses and employs; it enables agents causally to initiate, sustain, and control their capacities during the performance of an action; and its presence comes in varying degrees of strength. After defending an effort-based account of action and criticizing what is known as the standard story (...)
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  3. Peter Chau (2010). Temptations, Social Deprivation and Punishment. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 30 (4):775-785.
    Andrew von Hirsch and Andrew Ashworth recently argued that there is generally a reason to punish a socially deprived offender less than his non-deprived counterpart (ie someone who is not socially deprived but is otherwise similar to the deprived offender in that he committed the same crime, caused the same harm, with the same degree of foresight, etc), because deprived offenders generally face stronger temptations to offend than their non-deprived counterparts. In reply, I will argue that we should draw a (...)
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  4. Ryan Cox (2012). Book Note: 'New Waves in Philosophy of Action', Edited by Jes's H. Aguilar, Andrei A. Buckareff, and Keith Frankish. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (2):411-411.
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 0, Issue 0, Page 1, Ahead of Print.
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  5. Yuval Eylon (2009). Virtue and Continence. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (2):137 - 151.
    John McDowell argued that the virtuous person (VP) knows no temptation: her perception of a situation silences all competing motivations – be it fear in the face of danger or a strong desire. The VP cannot recognize any reason to act non-virtuously as a reason, and is never inclined to act non-virtuously. This view rests on the requirement that the VP rationally respond, and not merely react, to the environment – it rests on the requirement that the relation between the (...)
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  6. Patricia Greenspan (2011). Craving the Right: Emotions and Moral Reasons. In Carla Bagnoli (ed.), Morality and the Emotions. Oxford University Press. 39.
    I first began working on emotions as a project in philosophy of action, without particular reference to moral philosophy. My thought was that emotions have a distinctive role to play in rationality that tends to be underappreciated by philosophers. Bringing this out was meant to counter a widespread tendency to treat emotions as “blind” causes of action (for the general picture, see Greenspan 2009.) Instead, I thought that emotions could be seen as providing reasons. I took their significance as moral (...)
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  7. Patricia S. Greenspan (2004). Practical Reasoning and Emotion. In Alfred R. Mele & Piers Rawling (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    The category of emotions covers a disputed territory, but clear examples include fear, anger, joy, pride, sadness, disgust, shame, contempt and the like. Such states are commonly thought of as antithetical to reason, disorienting and distorting practical thought. However, there is also a sense in which emotions are factors in practical reasoning, understood broadly as reasoning that issues in action. At the very least emotions can function as "enabling" causes of rational decision-making (despite the many cases in which they are (...)
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  8. David Hume (2000). A Treatise of Human Nature: Being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning Into Moral Subjects. Oup Oxford.
    A Treatise of Human Nature , David Hume's comprehensive attempt to base philosophy on a new, observationally grounded study of human nature, is one of the most important texts in Western philosophy. It is also the focal point of current attempts to understand 18th-century western philosophy. The Treatise addresses many of the most fundamental philosophical issues: causation, existence, freedom and necessity, and morality. The volume also includes Humes own abstract of the Treatise, a substantial introduction, extensive annotations, a glossary, a (...)
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  9. Clarence Sholé Johnson (1992). Yet Another Look at Cognitive Reason and Moral Action in Hume's Ethical System. Journal of Philosophical Research 17:225-238.
    But for a very recent exception, Hume has generally been thought to deny that cognitive reason plays a distinctive role in morality. The cornerstone of this view has been his notorious remark that reason is and ought only to be the slave of passion and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey passion. But, this remark notwithstanding, Hume’s view about the significance of intention in moral processes suggests that he does assign to cognitive reason a (...)
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  10. Marion Ledwig, Human Motivation in Thomas Reid.
    According to Reid (1969, 283) motives are an ens rationis. Because of that they may influence to action, but they do not act as causes or as agents, that is motives are only advisory (cf. Seebaß 1993, 329; Lehrer 1989, 210). Instead motives presuppose an efficient cause, namely an agent (cf. Rowe 1991, chapter 4), and the agent"s freedom (Reid 1969, 284). In opposition to Leibniz (1994, 84-85) who defends subtle reasons Reid (1969) claims that motives have to be conscious (...)
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  11. Lawrence Lengbeyer (2007). Situated Cognition: The Perspect Model. In David Spurrett, Don Ross, Harold Kincaid & Lynn Stephens (eds.), Distributed Cognition and the Will: Individual Volition and Social Context. MIT Press. 227.
    The standard philosophical and folk-psychological accounts of cognition and action credit us with too much spontaneity in our activities and projects. We are taken to be fundamentally active rather than reactive, to project our needs and aims and deploy our full supporting arsenal of cognitive instruments upon an essentially passive environment. The corrected point of view presented here balances this image of active agency with an appreciation of how we are also continually responding to the world, that is, to the (...)
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  12. Lawrence A. Lengbeyer (2005). Selflessness & Cognition. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (4):411 - 435.
    What are the cognitive mechanisms that underlie selfless conduct, both ‘thinking’ and unthinking? We first consider deliberate selflessness, a manner of selecting acts in which, in evaluating options, one expressly chooses not to weigh the potential consequences for oneself (though this formulation is seen as needing some qualification). We then turn to unthinking behavior in general, and whether we are responsible for it, as the foundation for analyzing the unthinking variety of selflessness. Using illustrative cases (Grenade Gallantry, The Well-Meaning Miner, (...)
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  13. Duncan MacIntosh (2001). Prudence and the Reasons of Rational Persons. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (3):346 – 365.
    Hume said that the reasons that determine the rationality of one's actions are the desires one has when acting: one's actions are rational iff they advance these desires. Thomas Nagel says this entails calling rational, actions absurdly conflicting in aims over time. For one might have reason, in one's current desires, to begin trying to cause states one foresees having reason, in one's foreseen desires, to prevent. Instead, then, real reasons must be timeless, so that current and foreseen reasons cannot (...)
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  14. Elijah Millgram, Practical Reason and the Structure of Actions. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    A wave of recent philosophical work on practical rationality is organized by the following implicit argument: Practical reasoning is figuring out what to do; to do is to act; so the forms of practical inference can be derived from the structure or features of action. Now it is not as though earlier work, in analytic philosophy, had failed to register the connection between action and practical rationality; in fact, practical reasoning was usually picked out as, roughly, reasoning directed toward action. (...)
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  15. Joe Mintoff (2004). Rule Worship and the Stability of Intention. Philosophia 31 (3-4):401-426.
    David Gauthier and Edward McClennen have claimed that it could be rational to form an intention to A because it maximizes utility to intend to A, and that acting on such an intention could be rational even if it maximizes utility not to A. Michael Bratman has objected to this way of thinking, claiming that it is equivalent to the familiar rule-utilitarian mistake of rule-worship. The purpose of this paper is to argue that, so long as one is aware at (...)
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  16. Charles R. Pigden (2009). If Not Non-Cognitivism, Then What? In , Hume on Motivation and Virtue. Palgrave Macmillan.
    Taking my cue from Michael Smith, I try to extract a decent argument for non-cognitivism from the text of the Treatise. I argue that the premises are false and that the whole thing rests on a petitio principi. I then re-jig the argument so as to support that conclusion that Hume actually believed (namely that an action is virtuous if it would excite the approbation of a suitably qualified spectator). This argument too rests on false premises and a begged question. (...)
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  17. Elizabeth S. Radcliffe (2008). Reason, Morality, and Hume's "Active Principles" : Comments on Rachel Cohon's Hume's Morality: Feeling and Fabrication. Hume Studies 34 (2):267-276.
    Rachel Cohon's Hume is a moral sensing theorist, who holds both that moral qualities (virtue and vice) are mind-dependent and that there is such a thing as moral knowledge. He is an anti-rationalist about motivation, arguing that reason alone does not motivate, but allows that both beliefs and passions are motivating. (That is, some beliefs cause passions and some passions cause action.) And he is both a descriptive and a normative moral theorist who, despite having resources for putting checks on (...)
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  18. Lubomira Radoilska (2013). Autonomy and Depression. In K. W. M. Fulford, Martin Davis, George Graham, John Sadler, Giovanni Stanghellini & Tim Thornton (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry. Oxford University Press. 1155-1170.
    In this paper, I address two related challenges the phenomenon of depression raises for conceptions according to which autonomy is an agency concept and an independent source of justification. The first challenge is directed at the claim that autonomous agency involves intending under the guise of the good: the robust though not always direct link between evaluation and motivation implied here seems to be severed in some instances of depression; yet, this does not seem to affect the possibility of autonomous (...)
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  19. Lubomira Radoilska (2012). Akrasia and Ordinary Weakness of Will. Tópicos 43:25-50.
    In this article, I develop an Aristotelian account of akrasia as a primary failure of intentional agency in contrast to a phenomenon I refer to as ‘ordinary weakness of will’: I argue that ordinary weakness of will is best understood as a secondary failure of intentional agency, that to tackle akrasia.
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  20. David-Hillel Ruben (2013). Trying in Some Way. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):719-733.
    Does 'Person P tried to A' entail that there is some particular, whether a mental act or a brain state or whatever, that is a trying? Most discussions of trying assume that this entailment holds. There is no good reason for holding that this is a valid inference. In particular, I examine one 'Davidsonian' argument that might be used to justify the validity of such an inference and argue that the argument is not sound. See: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/IxsuPqt7rvdzqMxpFiTv/full.
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  21. J. L. Stocks (1939/1970). Reason & Intuition, and Other Essays. Freeport, N.Y.,Books for Libraries Press.
    Note, by Sir D. Ross.--Reason and intuition.--The kinds of belief.--Religious belief.--Conflicts of belief.--The eclipse of cause.--Materialism in politics.--On the need for a social philosophy.--Can philosophy determine what is ethically and socially valuable?--The philosophy of democracy.--The principles and limitations of state action.--Leisure.--Locke's contribution to political theory.--Jeremy Bentham.--The empiricism of J. S. Mill.--Is a science of theology possible?--Will and action in ethics.
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  22. Kyle Swan (2009). Hell and Divine Reasons for Action. Religious Studies 45 (1):51-61.
    Escapism, a theory of hell proposed by Andrei Buckareff and Allen Plug, explicitly relies on claims about divine reasons for action. However, they say surprisingly little about the general account of reasons for action that would justify the inferences in the argument for escapism. I provide a couple of plausible interpretations of such an account and argue that they help revive the ‘Job objection’ to escapism that Buckareff and Plug had dismissed.
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  23. J. S. Swindell Blumenthal-Barby (2010). Ambivalence. Philosophical Explorations 13 (1):23 – 34.
    The phenomenon of ambivalence is an important one for any philosophy of action. Despite this importance, there is a lack of a fully satisfactory analysis of the phenomenon. Although many contemporary philosophers recognize the phenomenon, and address topics related to it, only Harry Frankfurt has given the phenomenon full treatment in the context of action theory - providing an analysis of how it relates to the structure and freedom of the will. In this paper, I develop objections to Frankfurt's account, (...)
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  24. Jih-Hsin Tang & Cheng-Kiang Farn (2005). The Effect of Interpersonal Influence on Softlifting Intention and Behaviour. Journal of Business Ethics 56 (2):149 - 161.
    The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of interpersonal influence on personal software piracy, also known as softlifting. A laboratory experiment with 54 subjects was conducted, in which each subject was told to participate in a software quality evaluation exercise. However, a ploy was carried out to measure the subjects intention in software piracy under different levels of group pressure and financial gains. The results are interesting. On the intention of softlifting, both group pressure and financial gains (...)
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  25. Mariam Thalos (2012). Solidarity: A Motivational Conception. Philosophical Papers 41 (1):57-95.
    Abstract This essay offers a motivational conception of solidarity that can be employed across the entire range of sciences and humanities, while also filling a gap in the motivational spectrum conceived by decision theorists and economists?and expanding the two-part division between altruistic and selfish motivations into a tripartite analysis that suggests a spectrum instead. According to the present proposal, solidarity is a condition of action-readiness on behalf of a group or its interests. The proposal will admit of measuring the extent (...)
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  26. Markos Valaris (2012). Instrumental Rationality. European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):443-462.
    Does rationality require us to take the means to our ends? Intuitively, it seems clear that it does. And yet it has proven difficult to explain why this should be so: after all, if one is pursuing an end that one has decisive reason not to pursue, the balance of reasons will presumably speak against one's taking the means necessary to bring that end about. In this paper I propose a novel account of the instrumental requirement which addresses this problem. (...)
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  27. Christopher Yeomans (2013). Talents and Interests: A Hegelian Moral Psychology. Hegel Bulletin 34 (1):33-58.
    One of the reasons why there is no Hegelian school in contemporary ethics in the way that there are Kantian, Humean and Aristotelian schools is because Hegelians have been unable to clearly articulate the Hegelian alternative to those schools’ moral psychologies, i.e., to present a Hegelian model of the motivation to, perception of, and responsibility for moral action. Here it is argued that in its most basic terms Hegel's model can be understood as follows: the agent acts in a responsible (...)
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