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  1. A. W. Center (1932). Alfonsus Vargas Toletanus Und Seine Theologische Einleitungslehre. New Scholasticism 6 (2):167-167.
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  2. T. S. Champlin (1994). Hyman on Naturalism and the Ram Jug. British Journal of Aesthetics 34 (2):146-150.
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  3. David Charles (2010). Weakness and Impetuosity. In John Cottingham & Peter Hacker (eds.), Mind, Method, and Morality: Essays in Honour of Anthony Kenny. Oup Oxford.
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  4. Dehai Chen (2009). Dong Scotch From God's Point of View to Talk About the Impact of the Existence of Human Freedom. Philosophy and Culture 36 (9):41-56.
    The existence of God will have the freedom of people affected? Between the two is another conflict? Faith in God and human free will is compatible with consistent? God is omniscient and omnipotent threat to human freedom? This is what students in the tenth century, with a high degree of scientific observation and sense of mission of the people, or is this just an extra backward thinking? This article is based on the late thirteenth century philosopher John Dong Scotch divine (...)
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  5. Jengchung V. Chen & Yangil Park (2005). The Differences of Addiction Causes Between Massive Multiplayer Online Game and Multi User Domain. International Review of Information Ethics 4 (5):53-60.
    This paper proposes research propositions to study on MMOG and MUD addictions based on their causes – flow state and social interaction. Though previous studies relate MMOG addictions to Internet addictions based on social interactions, this study after examining the underlying theories of Use and Gratification The-ory and Flow Theory concludes that what cause MMOG addiction is flow experience not social interaction. On the other hand, the cause of MUD addiction is social interaction. After proposing the propositions of MUD and (...)
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  6. Andrea Chmitorz, Karin Metz, Carolin Donath, Stephanie Flöter, Daniela Piontek, Sabine Gradl & Christoph Kröger, Effectiveness of a Multi-Level Intervention to Improve Tobacco Policy in Alcohol Addiction Treatment Centers.
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  7. J. Christman (1988). Strawson, G., "Freedom and Belief". [REVIEW] Mind 97:481.
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  8. Michelle Ciurria (2014). Moral Responsibility and Mental Health: Applying the Standard of the Reasonable Person. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 21 (1):1-12.
    It is contested whether and to what extent moral responsibility can be ascribed to persons with mental health disabilities. Will Cartwright (2006) evaluates two prevalent theories of responsibility in terms of their suitability for morally appraising sociopathic personality disorder, particularly as embodied in the famous homicidal bank robber Robert Harris. Cartwright argues that our intuitions about Harris conflict because we are instantly horrified by Harris’ actions, but we are forced to reconsider our initial moral reaction when we reflect on Harris’ (...)
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  9. Shawn M. Clankie (2001). Domain Names, Cybersquatters, and the Law: Who's to Blame? Journal of Information Ethics 10 (1):27-34.
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  10. Andy Clark, Julian Kiverstein & Tillmann Vierkant (eds.) (2013). Decomposing the Will. OUP USA.
    There is growing evidence from the science of human behavior that our everyday, folk understanding of ourselves as conscious, rational, responsible agents may be mistaken. The new essays in this volume display and explore this radical claim. folk concept of the responsible agent after abandoning the image of a central executive and "decomposing" the notion of the conscious will into multiple interlocking aspects and functions.
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  11. John A. Clark (1939). The Structure of Responsibility. Ethics 49 (4):466-483.
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  12. Thomas Clark (2006). Holding Mechanisms Responsible. Lahey Clinic Medical Ethics Journal 13 (3):10-11.
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  13. Randolph Clarke (2010). Willing, Wanting, Waiting * by Richard Holton. [REVIEW] Analysis 71 (1):191-193.
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
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  14. Randolph Clarke (1992). Deliberation and Beliefs About Ones Abilities. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 73 (2):101-113.
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  15. D. Justin Coates & Neal A. Tognazzini (2012). The Nature and Ethics of Blame. Philosophy Compass 7 (3):197-207.
    Blame is usually discussed in the context of the free will problem, but recently moral philosophers have begun to examine it on its own terms. If, as many suppose, free will is to be understood as the control relevant to moral responsibility, and moral responsibility is to be understood in terms of whether blame is appropriate, then an independent inquiry into the nature and ethics of blame will be essential to solving (and, perhaps, even fully understanding) the free will problem. (...)
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  16. E. J. Coffman (2009). Does Luck Exclude Control? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (3):499-504.
    Many philosophers hold that luck excludes control-more precisely, that an event is lucky for you only if that event lies beyond your control. Call this the Lack of Control Requirement (LCR) on luck. Jennifer Lackey [2008] has recently argued that there is no such requirement on luck. Should such an argument succeed, it would (among other things) disable a main objection to the "libertarian" position in the free will debate. After clarifying the LCR, I defend it against both Lackey's argument (...)
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  17. Daniel Cohen & Toby Handfield (2011). Rational Capacities, Resolve, and Weakness of Will: Articles. Mind 119 (476):907-932.
    In this paper we present an account of practical rationality and weakness of will in terms of rational capacities. We show how our account rectifies various shortcomings in Michael Smith’s related theory. In particular, our account is capable of accommodating cases of weak-willed behaviour that are not ‘akratic’, or otherwise contrary to the agent’s better judgement. Our account differs from Smith’s primarily by incorporating resolve: a third rational capacity for resolute maintenance of one’s intentions. We discuss further two ways to (...)
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  18. Michael Cohen (2004). Metaddiction: Addiction at Work in Martin Amis’ Money. Janus Head 7 (1).
    This paper aims to explore the complex manner in which Martin Amis defines the state of addiction–as the sustained collapse of objectivity and subjectivity for any inhabitant of a social system–as well as how the systemic patterns of life impose, imprint, and perpetuate themselves upon the individual.
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  19. Stephen Cohen (1977). Distinctions Among Blame Concepts. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 38 (2):149-166.
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  20. James Collins (1949). Freedom and Experience. Modern Schoolman 26 (3):257-261.
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  21. Paul Coones (1982). The Necessity for Determinism in a Geographical Study of the Ussr.
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  22. David Copp (2006). On the Agency of Certain Collective Entities: An Argument From "Normative Autonomy". Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (1):194–221.
  23. David Copp (1984). What Collectives Are: Agency, Individualism and Legal Theory. Dialogue 23 (02):249-269.
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  24. J. Angelo Corlett (2003). Responsibility in Law and Morality. Mind 112 (446):328-331.
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  25. J. Angelo Corlett (2003). Review: Responsibility in Law and Morality. [REVIEW] Mind 112 (446):328-331.
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  26. Neta C. Crawford (2014). War “In Our Name” and the Responsibility to Protest: Ordinary Citizens, Civil Society, and Prospective Moral Responsibility. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 38 (1):138-170.
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  27. Enrique F. Bocardo Crespo (1999). Akrasía. Thémata: Revista de Filosofía 21:227-242.
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  28. Keith Culver (1999). Duff, Antony, Ed. Philosophy and the Criminal Law: Principle and Critique. Review of Metaphysics 53 (2):442-443.
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  29. Randall Rex Curren (1985). Towards a Theory of Moral Responsibility. Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
    This work consists of three connected essays on moral agency and responsibility. The first focuses on the Kantian conception of moral agency, in investigating the origins of the notion that moral responsibility presupposes radical freedom, or what Kant calls the freedom of absolute spontaneity. I argue that the need to postulate radical freedom was created by the problem of evil and by an associated difficulty for moral theory, which I call "the problem of moral license." I also attempt to show (...)
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  30. Charles F. D'arcy (1916). God and Freedom in Human Experience. Mind 25 (100):533-537.
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  31. Neal A. Tognazzini D. Justin Coates (2012). The Nature and Ethics of Blame. Philosophy Compass 7 (3):197-207.
    Blame is usually discussed in the context of the free will problem, but recently moral philosophers have begun to examine it on its own terms. If, as many suppose, free will is to be understood as the control relevant to moral responsibility, and moral responsibility is to be understood in terms of whether blame is appropriate, then an independent inquiry into the nature and ethics of blame will be essential to solving the free will problem. In this article we first (...)
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  32. C. D. (1964). Aristotle's Conception of Moral Weakness. Review of Metaphysics 18 (1):186-186.
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  33. J. P. D. (1972). On Academic Freedom. Review of Metaphysics 25 (4):749-750.
  34. R. D. (1968). The Concept of Willing. Review of Metaphysics 22 (1):159-160.
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  35. R. D. (1968). The Concept of Willing. Review of Metaphysics 22 (1):159-160.
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  36. Norman O. Dahl (1967). `Ought' and Blameworthiness. Journal of Philosophy 64 (13):418-428.
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  37. Kevin Timpe Dan Speak (ed.) (forthcoming). Free Will and Theism: Connections, Contingencies, and Concerns. Oxford University Press.
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  38. Jonathan Dancy (1999). Motivation, Dispositions And Aims. Theoria 65 (2-3):212-224.
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  39. Charles B. Daniels (1999). A Theism-Free Cartesian Analysis of Knowledge. Noûs 33 (2):201-213.
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  40. Anthony Dardis (2001). Hilary Bok, Freedom and Responsibility Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 21 (1):13-15.
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  41. Anthony Dardis (2001). Hilary Bok, Freedom and Responsibility. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 21:13-15.
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  42. Koyeli Dastidar (1984). Can There Be A Freedom Without Responsibility? Indian Philosophical Quarterly 11 (3):333.
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  43. T. F. Daveney (1961). Wanting. Philosophical Quarterly 11 (April):135-144.
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  44. John Davenport (2006). The Deliberative Relevance of Refraining From Deciding: A Response to McKenna and Pereboom. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 21 (4):62 - 88.
    Readers familiar with Harry Frankfurt’s argument that we do not need leeway-liberty (or the power to bring about alternative possible actions or intentions) to be morally responsible will probably also know that the most famous and popular response on behalf of leeway-libertarianism remains a dilemma posed in similar forms by David Widerker, Robert Kane, and Carl Ginet: either the agent retains significant residual leeway in Frankfurt-style cases, or these cases beg the question by presupposing causal determinism. In the last few (...)
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  45. John J. Davenport (2007). Augustine on Liberty of the Higher-Order Will. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 81:67-89.
    I have argued that like Harry Frankfurt, Augustine implicitly distinguishes between first-order desires and higher-order volitions; yet unlike Frankfurt, Augustineheld that the liberty to form different possible volitional identifications is essential to responsibility for our character. Like Frankfurt, Augustine recognizes that we can sometimes be responsible for the desires on which we act without being able to do or desire otherwise; but for Augustine, this is true only because such responsibility for inevitable desires and actions traces (at least in part) (...)
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  46. John Joseph Davenport (1998). Self and Will: An Existential Theory of Motivation and Frankfurt's Theme of Identification. Dissertation, University of Notre Dame
    This dissertation develops a new account of the will as a motivational power of commitment or resolve, which contrasts with volition in the 'thin' sense as a mere decision to form an intention. After tracing the historical background of these concepts in Chapter I, Chapter II argues that will involves the capacity to motivate oneself "projectively" in devotion to causes and purposes for which one did not necessarily have an antecedent "desire." "Projective motivation" differs from three types of "desire"-- inarticulate (...)
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  47. Arnold B. Davidson & Dixon J. Davis (1975). Appetitive Control of Responding in the Presence of Free Food: Effects of D-Amphetamine and Fenfluramine. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 6 (1):16-18.
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  48. Jane M. Day (1983). Necessity, Cause and Blame. Philosophical Books 24 (1):8-11.
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  49. Charles Decruydt de Koninck (1936). Thomism and Scientific Indeterminism. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 12:58-76.
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  50. Tim De Mey & Tom Claes (2012). Moral Responsibility – Analytic Approaches. Philosophica 85:5-9.
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