This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
5 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Order:
  1. Ned Block (2000). Sexism, Racism, Ageism and the Nature of Consciousness. In Richard Moran, Alan Sidelle & Jennifer E. Whiting (eds.), Philosophical Topics. University of Arkansas Press 71--88.
    Everyone would agree that the American flag is red, white and blue. Everyone should also agree that it looks red, white and blue to people with normal color vision in appropriate circumstances. If a philosophical theory led to the conclusion that the red stripes cannot look red to both men and women, both blacks and whites, both young and old, we would be reluctant (to say the least) to accept that philosophical theory. But there is a widespread philosophical view about (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
    Export citation  
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  2. Lawrence Blum (2007). Racial Virtues. In Rebecca L. Walker & P. J. Ivanhoe (eds.), Working Virtue: Virtue Ethics and Contemporary Moral Problems. Oxford University Press
  3. Luc Faucher & Edouard Machery (2009). Racism: Against Jorge Garcia's Moral and Psychological Monism. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 39 (1):41-62.
    In this article, we argue that it can be fruitful for philosophers interested in the nature and moral significance of racism to pay more attention to psychology. We do this by showing that psychology provides new arguments against Garcia's views about the nature and moral significance of racism. We contend that some scientific studies of racial cognition undermine Garcia's moral and psychological monism about racism: Garcia disregards (1) the rich affective texture of racism and (2) the diversity of what makes (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
    Export citation  
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  4. J. L. A. Garcia (2011). Racism, Psychology, and Morality: Dialogue with Faucher and Machery. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 41 (2):250-268.
    I here respond to several points in Faucher and Machery’s vigorous and informative critique of my volitional account of racism (VAR). First, although the authors deem it a form of "implicit racial bias," a mere tendency to associate black people with "negative" concepts falls short of racial "bias" or prejudice in the relevant sense. Second, such an associative disposition need not even be morally objectionable. Third, even for more substantial forms of implicit racial bias such as race-based fear or disgust, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
    Export citation  
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  5. Adam Hochman (2013). Do We Need a Device to Acquire Ethnic Concepts? Philosophy of Science 80 (5):994-1005.
    Francisco Gil-White argues that the ubiquity of racialism—the view that so-called races have biological essences—can be explained as a by-product of a shared mental module dedicated to ethnic cognition. Gil-White’s theory has been endorsed, with some revisions, by Edouard Machery and Luc Faucher. In this skeptical response I argue that our developmental environments contain a wealth, rather than a poverty of racialist stimulus, rendering a nativist explanation of racialism redundant. I also argue that we should not theorize racialism in isolation (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
    Export citation  
    My bibliography