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  1. Ken Aizawa (2009). Neuroscience and Multiple Realization: A Reply to Bechtel and Mundale. Synthese 167 (3):493 - 510.
    One trend in recent work on topic of the multiple realization of psychological properties has been an emphasis on greater sensitivity to actual science and greater clarity regarding the metaphysics of realization and multiple realization. One contribution to this trend is Bechtel and Mundale’s examination of the implications of brain mapping for multiple realization. Where Bechtel and Mundale argue that studies of brain mapping undermine claims about the multiple realization, this paper challenges that argument.
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  2. Kenneth Aizawa & Carl Gillett, Multiple Realization and Methodology in the Neurological and Psychological Sciences.
    The reigning picture of special sciences, what we will term the ‘received’ view, grew out of the work of writers, such as Jerry Fodor, William Wimsatt, and Philip Kitcher, who overturned the Positivist’s jaundiced view of these disciplines by looking at real cases from the biological sciences, linguistics, psychology, and economics, amongst other areas.1 Central to the received view is the ontological claim that the ‘multiple realization’ of properties is widespread in the special sciences which we may frame thus.
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  3. Kenneth Aizawa & Carl Gillett, Multiple Realization and Methodology.
    ABSRACT: An increasing number of writers (for example, Kim ((1992), (1999)), Bechtel and Mundale (1999), Keeley (2000), Bickle (2003), Polger (2004), and Shapiro ((2000), (2004))) have attacked the existence of multiple realization and wider views of the special sciences built upon it. We examine the two most important arguments against multiple realization and show that neither is successful. Furthermore, we also defend an alternative, positive view of the ontology, and methodology, of the special science. In contrast to the claims of (...)
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  4. Kenneth Aizawa & Carl Gillett (2009). The (Multiple) Realization of Psychological and Other Properties in the Sciences. Mind and Language 24 (2):181-208.
    Abstract: There has recently been controversy over the existence of 'multiple realization' in addition to some confusion between different conceptions of its nature. To resolve these problems, we focus on concrete examples from the sciences to provide precise accounts of the scientific concepts of 'realization' and 'multiple realization' that have played key roles in recent debates in the philosophy of science and philosophy of psychology. We illustrate the advantages of our view over a prominent rival account ( Shapiro, 2000 and (...)
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  5. Louise M. Antony (2008). Multiple Realization : Keeping It Real. In Jakob Hohwy & Jesper Kallestrup (eds.), Being Reduced: New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation. Oxford University Press.
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  6. Louise M. Antony (2003). Who's Afraid of Disjunctive Properties? Philosophical Issues 13 (1):1-21.
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  7. Louise M. Antony (1999). Multiple Realizability, Projectibility, and the Reality of Mental Properties. Philosophical Topics 26 (1/2):1-24.
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  8. Andrew R. Bailey, Multiple Realizability, Qualia, and Natural Kinds.
    Are qualia natural kinds? In order to give this question slightly more focus, and to show why it might be an interesting question, let me begin by saying a little about what I take qualia to be, and what natural kinds. For the purposes of this paper, I shall be assuming a fairly full-blooded kind of phenomenal realism about qualia: qualia, thus, include the qualitative painfulness of pain (rather than merely the functional specification of pain states), the qualitative redness in (...)
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  9. David Barrett (2013). Multiple Realizability, Identity Theory, and the Gradual Reorganization Principle. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (2):325-346.
    In the literature on multiple realizability and the identity theory, cases of neural plasticity have enjoyed a very limited role. The present article attempts to remedy this small influence by arguing that clinical and experimental evidence of quite extensive neural reorganization offers compelling support for the claim that psychological kinds are multiply realized in neurological kinds, thus undermining the identity theory. In particular, cases are presented where subjects with no measurable psychological deficits also have vast, though gradually received, neurological damage. (...)
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  10. David Barrett (2013). Multiple Realizability, Identity Theory, and the Gradual Reorganization Principle. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (2):325-346.
    In the literature on multiple realizability and the identity theory, cases of neural plasticity have enjoyed a very limited role. The present article attempts to remedy this small influence by arguing that clinical and experimental evidence of quite extensive neural reorganization offers compelling support for the claim that psychological kinds are multiply realized in neurological kinds, thus undermining the identity theory. In particular, cases are presented where subjects with no measurable psychological deficits also have vast, though gradually received, neurological damage. (...)
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  11. RW Batterman (2000). Multiple Realizability and Universality. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (1):115-145.
    This paper concerns what Jerry Fodor calls a 'metaphysical mystery': How can there by macroregularities that are realized by wildly heterogeneous lower level mechanisms? But the answer to this question is not as mysterious as many, including Jaegwon Kim, Ned Block, and Jerry Fodor might think. The multiple realizability of the properties of the special sciences such as psychology is best understood as a kind of universality, where 'universality' is used in the technical sense one finds in the physics literature. (...)
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  12. William P. Bechtel & Jennifer Mundale (1999). Multiple Realizability Revisited: Linking Cognitive and Neural States. Philosophy of Science 66 (2):175-207.
    The claim of the multiple realizability of mental states by brain states has been a major feature of the dominant philosophy of mind of the late 20th century. The claim is usually motivated by evidence that mental states are multiply realized, both within humans and between humans and other species. We challenge this contention by focusing on how neuroscientists differentiate brain areas. The fact that they rely centrally on psychological measures in mapping the brain and do so in a comparative (...)
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  13. John Bickle, Multiple Realizability. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  14. John Bickle (1995). Connectionism, Reduction, and Multiple Realizability. Behavior and Philosophy 23 (2):29-39.
    I sketch a theory of cognitive representation from recent "connectionist" cognitive science. I then argue that (i) this theory is reducible to neuroscientific theories, yet (ii) its kinds are multiply realized at a neurobiological level. This argument demonstrates that multiple realizability alone is no barrier to the reducibility of psychological theories. I conclude that the multiple realizability argument, the most influential argument against psychophysical reductionism, should be abandoned.
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  15. John Bickle (1992). Multiple Realizability and Psychophysical Reduction. Behavior and Philosophy 20 (1):47-58.
    The argument from multiple realizability is that, because quite diverse physical systems are capable of giving rise to identical psychological phenomena, mental states cannot be reduced to physical states. This influential argument depends upon a theory of reduction that has been defunct in the philosophy of science for at least fifteen years. Better theories are now available.
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  16. Ned Block (2008). Anti-Reductionism Slaps Back. Noûs 31:107-132.
    For nearly thirty years, there has been a consensus (at least in English-speaking countries) that reductionism is a mistake and that there are autonomous special sciences. This consensus has been based on an argument from multiple realizability. But Jaegwon Kim has argued persuasively that the multiple realizability argument is flawed.1 I will sketch the recent history of the debate, arguing that much --but not all--of the anti-reductionist consensus survives Kim's critique. This paper was originally titled "Anti-Reductionism Strikes Back", but in (...)
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  17. John Bolender (1995). Is Multiple Realizability Compatible with Antireductionism? Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (2):129-42.
    Jaegwon Kim attempts to pose a dilemma for anyone who would deny mind/body reductionism, namely that one must either advocate the wholesale reduction of psychology to physical science or the sundering of psychology into distinct fields each one of which is reducible to physical science. Supposedly, the denial of mind/body reduction is not an option. My aim is to show that this is not a genuine dilemma, and that antireductionism is an option, if one recognizes that natural-kind individuation is not (...)
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  18. D. Borchert (ed.) (2005). Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd Edition. Thomson Gale, Macmillan Reference.
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  19. Robert Boyd (1999). Kinds, Complexity, and Multiple Realization. Philosophical Studies 95 (1-2):67-98.
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  20. Leonard J. Clapp (2001). Disjunctive Properties: Multiple Realizations. Journal of Philosophy 98 (3):111-136.
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  21. Antonella Corradini & Timothy O'Connor (eds.) (2010). Emergence in Science and Philosophy. Routledge.
  22. Mark Couch (2009). Functional Explanation in Context. Philosophy of Science 76 (2):253-269.
    The claim that a functional kind is multiply realized is typically motivated by appeal to intuitive examples. We are seldom told explicitly what the relevant structures are, and people have often preferred to rely on general intuitions in these cases. This article deals with the problem by explaining how to understand the proper relation between structural kinds and the functions they realize. I will suggest that the structural kinds that realize a function can be properly identified by attending to the (...)
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  23. Mark B. Couch (2009). Multiple Realization in Comparative Perspective. Biology and Philosophy 24 (4):505-519.
    Arguments for multiple realization depend on the idea that the same kind of function is realized by different kinds of structures. It is important to such arguments that we know the kinds used in the arguments have been individuated properly. In the philosophical literature, though, claims about how to individuate kinds are frequently decided on intuitive grounds. This paper criticizes this way of approaching kinds by considering how practicing researchers think about the matter. I will consider several examples in which (...)
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  24. Mark B. Couch (2004). Discussion: A Defense of Bechtel and Mundale. Philosophy of Science 71 (2):198-204.
    Kim claims that Bechtel and Mundale's case against multiple realization depends on the wrong kind of evidence. The latter argue that neuroscientific practice shows neural states across individuals and species are type identical. Kim replies that the evidence they cite to support this is irrelevant. I defend Bechtel and Mundale by showing why the evidence they cite is relevant and shows multiple realization does not occur.
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  25. J. Dinsmore (ed.) (1992). The Symbolic and Connectionist Paradigms: Closing the Gap. Lawrence Erlbaum.
    This book records the thoughts of researchers -- from both computer science and philosophy -- on resolving the debate between the symbolic and connectionist...
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  26. Ronald P. Endicott (2005). Multiple Realizability. In D. Borchert (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd edition. Thomson Gale, Macmillan Reference.
    Multiple realizability has been at the heart of debates about whether the mind reduces to the brain, or whether the items of a special science reduce to the items of a physical science. I analyze the two central notions implied by the concept of multiple realizability: "multiplicity," otherwise known as property variability, and "realizability." Beginning with the latter, I distinguish three broad conceptual traditions. The Mathematical Tradition equates realization with a form of mapping between objects. Generally speaking, x realizes (or (...)
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  27. Ronald P. Endicott (2001). Post-Structuralist Angst - Critical Notice: John Bickle, Psychoneural Reduction: The New Wave. Philosophy of Science 68 (3):377-393.
    I critically evaluate Bickle’s version of scientific theory reduction. I press three main points. First, a small point, Bickle modifies the new wave account of reduction developed by Paul Churchland and Clifford Hooker by treating theories as set-theoretic structures. But that structuralist gloss seems to lose what was distinctive about the Churchland-Hooker account, namely, that a corrected theory must be specified entirely by terms and concepts drawn from the basic reducing theory. Set-theoretic structures are not terms or concepts but the (...)
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  28. Ronald P. Endicott (1998). Many-Many Mappings and World Structure. American Philosophical Quarterly 35 (3):267-280.
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  29. Ronald P. Endicott (1994). Constructival Plasticity. Philosophical Studies 74 (1):51-75.
    Some scientists and philosophers have claimed that there is a converse to multiple realizability. While a given higher-level property can be realized by different lower-level properties (multiple realizability), a given lower-level property can in turn serve to realize different higher-level properties (this converse I dubbed the unfortunately obscure "constructival plasticity" to emphasize the constructive metaphysics involved when realizing properties generate realized properties in the stated way). I begin by defining multiple realizabilty in a formal way, then turn to the relation (...)
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  30. Ronald P. Endicott (1993). Species-Specific Properties and More Narrow Reductive Strategies. Erkenntnis 38 (3):303-21.
  31. Ronald P. Endicott (1991). MacDonald on Type Reduction Via Disjunction. Southern Journal of Philosophy 29 (2):209-14.
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  32. Ronald P. Endicott (1989). On Physical Multiple Realization. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 70 (3):212-24.
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  33. Carrie Figdor (2010). Neuroscience and the Multiple Realization of Cognitive Functions. Philosophy of Science 77 (3):419-456.
    Many empirically minded philosophers have used neuroscientific data to argue against the multiple realization of cognitive functions in existing biological organisms. I argue that neuroscientists themselves have proposed a biologically based concept of multiple realization as an alternative to interpreting empirical findings in terms of one‐to‐one structure‐function mappings. I introduce this concept and its associated research framework and also how some of the main neuroscience‐based arguments against multiple realization go wrong. *Received October 2009; revised December 2009. †To contact the author, (...)
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  34. Jerry A. Fodor (1997). Special Sciences: Still Autonomous After All These Years. Philosophical Perspectives 11:149-63.
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  35. Robert Francescotti (1997). What Multiple Realizability Does Not Show. Journal of Mind and Behavior 18 (1):13-28.
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  36. Eric Funkhouser (2007). A Liberal Conception of Multiple Realizability. Philosophical Studies 132 (3):467-494.
    While the concept of multiple realizability is widely used, it is seldom rigorously characterized. This paper defends a liberal conception of multiple realizability as sameness of type through _any_ differences in the (lower-level) conditions that give rise to instances of that type. This kind of “sameness through difference” is contrasted with another type of asymmetric dependency relation between properties, multiple _specification_. This liberal conception is then defended from objections, and it is augmented by a concept of relativized multiple realizability. The (...)
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  37. Eric Funkhouser (2007). Multiple Realizability. Philosophy Compass 2 (2):303–315.
    b>: This article explains the concept of multiple realizability and its role in the philosophy of mind. In particular, I consider what is required for the multiple realizability of psychological kinds, the relevance of multiple realizability to the reducibility and autonomy of psychology, as well as further refinements of the concept that would prove helpful.
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  38. Carl Gillett (2009). On the Implications of Scientific Composition and Completeness: Or, the Troubles, and Troubles, of Non-Reductive Physicalism. In T. O'connor & A. Corradini (eds.), Emergence in Science and Philosophy. Routledge.
  39. Carl Gillett (2003). The Metaphysics of Realization, Multiple Realizability, and the Special Sciences. Journal of Philosophy 100 (11):591-603.
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  40. Carl Gillett & Aizawa Kenneth (2009). Levels, Individual Variation and Massive Multiple Realization in Neurobiology. In John Bickle (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience. oxford university press.
  41. Simone Gozzano (2009). Multiple Realizability and Mind-Body Identity. In Marcelo Suarez, Miklos Redei & Mauro Dorato (eds.), Epistemology and Methodology of Science: Launch of the a European Philosophy of Science Association. Kluwer.
    In this paper it is argued that the multiple realizability argument and Kripke's argument are based on schemas of identifications rather than identification. In fact, "heat = molecular motion" includes a term "molecular motion" that does not capture a natural kind, nor has a unique referent. Is properly framed, this schema suits also for the type identity theory of mind. Some consequences of this point are evaluated.
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  42. Stevan Harnad (1995). Grounding Symbols in Sensorimotor Categories with Neural Networks. Institute of Electrical Engineers Colloquium on "Grounding Representations.
    It is unlikely that the systematic, compositional properties of formal symbol systems -- i.e., of computation -- play no role at all in cognition. However, it is equally unlikely that cognition is just computation, because of the symbol grounding problem (Harnad 1990): The symbols in a symbol system are systematically interpretable, by external interpreters, as meaning something, and that is a remarkable and powerful property of symbol systems. Cognition (i.e., thinking), has this property too: Our thoughts are systematically interpretable by (...)
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  43. John Heil (2003). Multiply Realized Properties. In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic.
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  44. John Heil (1999). Multiple Realizability. American Philosophical Quarterly 36 (3):189-208.
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  45. Terence E. Horgan (2001). Reality and Humean Supervenience: Essays on the Philosophy of David Lewis. Lanham: Rowman &Amp; Littlefield.
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  46. Terence E. Horgan (2001). Multiple Reference, Multiple Realization, and the Reduction of Mind. In Reality and Humean Supervenience: Essays on the Philosophy of David Lewis. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
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  47. W. Jaworksi (2002). Multiple-Realizability, Explanation, and the Disjunctive Move. Philosophical Studies 108 (3):298-308.
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  48. William Jaworski (2002). Multiple-Realizability, Explanation and the Disjunctive Move. Philosophical Studies 108 (3):289 - 308.
    The multiple-realizability argument has been the mainstay ofanti-reductionist consensus in philosophy of mind for the past thirty years. Reductionist opposition to it has sometimes taken the form of the Disjunctive Move: If mental types are multiply-realizable, they are not coextensive with physical types; they might nevertheless be coextensive with disjunctionsof physical types, and those disjunctions could still underwrite psychophysical reduction. Among anti-reductionists, confidence is high that the Disjunctive Move fails; arguments to this effect, however, often leave something to be desired. (...)
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  49. Todd Jones (2004). Reduction and Anti-Reduction: Rights and Wrongs. Metaphilosophy 25 (5):614-647.
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  50. Todd Jones (2004). Special Sciences: Still a Flawed Argument After All These Years. Cognitive Science 28 (3):409-432.
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  51. Todd Jones (2003). The Virtues of Non-Reduction, Even When Reduction is a Virtue. Philosophical Forum 34 (4):121-140.
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  52. Brian L. Keeley (2000). Shocking Lessons From Electric Fish: The Theory and Practice of Multiple Realization. Philosophy Of Science 67 (3):444-465.
    This paper explores the relationship between psychology and neurobiology in the context of cognitive science. Are the sciences that constitute cognitive science independent and theoretically autonomous, or is there a necessary interaction between them? I explore Fodor's Multiple Realization Thesis (MRT) which starts with the fact of multiple realization and purports to derive the theoretical autonomy of special sciences (such as psychology) from structural sciences (such as neurobiology). After laying out the MRT, it is shown that, on closer inspection, the (...)
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  53. Jaegwon Kim (1992). Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1):1-26.
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  54. Sungsu Kim (2002). Testing Multiple Realizability: A Discussion of Bechtel and Mundale. Philosophy of Science 69 (4):606-610.
    Bechtel and Mundale (1999) argue that multiple realizability is not plausible. They point out that neuroscientists assume that psychological traits are realized similarly in homologous brain structures and contend that a biological aspect of the brain that is relevant to neuropsychological state individuation provides evidence against multiple realizability. I argue that Bechtel and Mundale adduce the wrong sort of evidence against multiple realizability. Homologous traits do not provide relevant evidence. It is homoplasious traits of brains that can provide evidence for (...)
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  55. Max Kistler (1999). Multiple Realization, Reduction and Mental Properties. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 13 (2):135 – 149.
    This paper tries to remove some obstacles standing in the way of considering mental properties as both genuine natural kinds and causally efficacious rather than epiphenomena. As the case of temperature shows, it is not justified to conclude from a property being multiply realizable to it being irreducible. Yet Kim's argument to the effect that if a property is multiply realizable with a heterogeneous reduction base then it cannot be a natural kind and possesses only derivative “epiphenomenal” causal efficacy is (...)
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  56. Colin Klein (2013). Multiple Realizability and the Semantic View of Theories. Philosophical Studies 163 (3):683-695.
    Multiply realizable properties are those whose realizers are physically diverse. It is often argued that theories which contain them are ipso facto irreducible. These arguments assume that physical explanations are restricted to the most specific descriptions possible of physical entities. This assumption is descriptively false, and philosophically unmotivated. I argue that it is a holdover from the late positivist axiomatic view of theories. A semantic view of theories, by contrast, correctly allows scientific explanations to be couched in the most perspicuous, (...)
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  57. Colin Klein (2008). An Ideal Solution to Disputes About Multiply Realized Kinds. Philosophical Studies 140 (2):161 - 177.
    Multiply realizable kinds are scientifically problematic, for it appears that we should not expect discoveries about them to hold of other members of that kind. As such, it looks like MR kinds should have no place in the ontology of the special sciences. Many resist this conclusion, however, because we lack a positive account of the role that certain realization-unrestricted terms play in special science explanations. I argue that many such terms actually pick out idealizing models. Idealizing explanation has many (...)
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  58. Kevin Lynch (2012). A Multiple Realization Thesis for Natural Kinds. European Journal of Philosophy 20 (3):389-406.
    Abstract: Two important thought-experiments are associated with the work of Hilary Putnam, one designed to establish multiple realizability for mental kinds, the other designed to establish essentialism for natural kinds. Comparing the thought-experiments with each other reveals that the scenarios in both are structurally analogous to each other, though his intuitions in both are greatly at variance, intuitions that have been simultaneously well received. The intuition in the former implies a thesis that prioritizes pre-scientific over scientific indicators for identifying mental (...)
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  59. Holger Lyre (2009). The “Multirealization” of Multiple Realizability. In A. Hieke & H. Leitgeb (eds.), Reduction - Abstraction - Analysis. Ontos.
    Multiple Realizability (MR) must still be regarded as one of the principal arguments against type reductionist accounts of higher-order properties and their special laws. Against this I argue that there is no unique MR but rather a multitude of MR categories. In a slogan: MR is itself “multi-realized”. If this is true then we cannot expect one unique reductionist strategy against MR as an anti-reductionist argument. The main task is rather to develop a taxonomy of the wide variety of MR (...)
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  60. Cynthia Macdonald (1992). Psychological Type-Type Reduction Via Disjunction. Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (1):65-69.
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  61. Ron McClamrock (1994). Kim on Multiple Realizability and Causal Types. Analysis 54 (4):248-252.
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  62. Ron McClamrock (1993). Emergence Unscathed: Kim on Non-Reducible Types. Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy 3.
    Jaegwon Kim has recently argued that the widespread assumption of the multiple realizability of higher-level kinds -- and in particular, psychological kinds -- conflicts with some fundamental constraints on both materialistic metaphysics and scientific taxonomy. Kim concludes that the multiple realizability of psychological kinds would leave them "disqualified as proper scientific kinds" (Kim 1992: 18), and that search for a scientific psychology should focus instead on more reductive or type- materialist possibilities. If correct, this would strikingly undermine a widespread assumption (...)
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  63. Kevin Morris (forthcoming). On Two Arguments for Subset Inheritance. Philosophical Studies.
    A physicalist holds, in part, that what properties are instantiated depends on what physical properties are instantiated; a physicalist thinks that mental properties, for example, are instantiated in virtue of the instantiation of physical “realizer” properties. One issue that arises in this context concerns the relationship between the “causal powers” of instances of physical properties and instances of dependent properties, properties that are instantiated in virtue of the instantiation of physical properties. After explaining the significance of this issue, I evaluate (...)
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  64. Laurence F. Mucciolo (1974). The Identity Thesis and Neuropsychology. Noûs 8 (November):327-42.
  65. Jennifer Mundale & William P. Bechtel, Multiple Realizability Revisited.
    The claim of the multiple realizability of mental states by brain states has been a major feature of the dominant philosophy of mind of the late 20th century. The claim is usually motivated by evidence that mental states are multiply realized, both within humans and between humans and other species. We challenge this contention by focusing on how neuroscientists differentiate brain areas. The fact that they rely centrally on psychological measures in mapping the brain and do so in a comparative (...)
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  66. Mehdi Nasrin (2000). Multiple Realizability: Also a Difficulty for Functionalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (7):25-34.
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  67. Alvin F. Nelson (1985). Physical Properties. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 66 (July-October):268-82.
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  68. Michael Pauen (2002). Is Type Identity Incompatible with Multiple Realization? Grazer Philosophische Studien 65 (1):37-49.
    It is commonly believed that there is a fundamental incompatibility between multiple realization and type identity in the philosophy of mind. This claim can be challenged, however, since a single neural type may be realized by different microphysical types. In this case, the identity statement would connect the psychological and the neural type, while the neural type, in turn, could be multiply realized by different microphysical types. Such a multiple realization of higher level types occurs quite frequently even within physics (...)
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  69. Thomas Polger (2004). Natural Minds. MIT Press.
    In Natural Minds Thomas Polger advocates, and defends, the philosophical theory that mind equals brain—that sensations are brain processes—and in doing so brings the mind-brain identity theory back into the philosophical debate about consciousness. The version of identity theory that Polger advocates holds that conscious processes, events, states, or properties are type- identical to biological processes, events, states, or properties— a "tough-minded" account that maintains that minds are necessarily indentical to brains, a position held by few current identity theorists. Polger's (...)
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  70. Thomas Polger (2002). Putnam's Intuition. Philosophical Studies 109 (2):143 - 170.
    Multiple realizability has recently attracted renewed attention, for example Bickle, 1998; Bechtel and Mundale, 1999; Bechtel and McCauley, 1999; Heil, 1999; and Sober, 1999. Many of these writers revisit the topic of multiple realizability in order to show that some version of a mind-brain identity theory is viable. Although there is much of value in these recent explorations, they do not address the underlying intuitions that have vexed philosophers of mind since Hilary Putnam introduced the concern (1967). I argue that (...)
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  71. Thomas W. Polger, Review of Shapiro's The Mind Incarnate. [REVIEW]
    To what degree must the brains and bodies of creatures with minds have to be similar to the brains and bodies of human beings? Since the late 1960’s, most philosophers and cognitive scientists have supposed that there a relatively few constraints on what sorts of brains and bodies can realize minds. It is widely believed that minds are multiply realizable. Of course there were always dissenters, and in recent years their grumbling has grown harder to dismiss. In _The Mind_ _Incarnate_, (...)
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  72. Thomas W. Polger (2013). Realization and Multiple Realization, Chicken and Egg. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (1).
    A common view is that the truth of multiple realization—e.g., about psychological states—entails the truth of functionalism. This is supposed to follow because what is multiply realized is eo ipso realized. I argue that view is mistaken by demonstrating how it misrepresents arguments from multiple realization. In particular, it undermines the empirical component of the arguments, and renders the multiplicity of the realization irrelevant. I suggest an alternative reading of multiple realizability arguments, particularly in philosophy of psychology. And I explain (...)
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  73. Thomas W. Polger (2009). Evaluating the Evidence for Multiple Realization. Synthese 167 (3):457 - 472.
    Consider what the brain-state theorist has to do to make good his claims. He has to specify a physical–chemical state such that any organism (not just a mammal) is in pain if and only if (a) it possesses a brain of suitable physical–chemical structure; and (b) its brain is in that physical–chemical state. This means that the physical–chemical state in question must be a possible state of a mammalian brain, a reptilian brain, a mollusc’s brain (octopuses are mollusca, and certainly (...)
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  74. Thomas W. Polger (2008). Two Confusions Concerning Multiple Realization. Philosophy of Science 75 (5):537-547.
    Forthcoming in Philosophy of Science. Despite some recent advances, multiple realization remains a largely misunderstood thesis. Consider the dispute between Lawrence Shapiro and Carl Gillett over the application of Shapiro’s recipe for deciding when we have genuine cases of multiple realization. I argue that Gillett follows many philosophers in mistakenly supposing that multiple realization is absolute and transitive. Both of these are problematic. They are tempting only when we extract the question of multiple realization from the explanatory context in which (...)
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  75. Thomas W. Polger (2002). Putnam's Intuition. Philosophical Studies 109 (2):143-70.
    Multiple realizability has recently attractedrenewed attention, for example Bickle, 1998;Bechtel and Mundale, 1999; Bechtel and McCauley,1999; Heil, 1999; and Sober, 1999. Many of thesewriters revisit the topic of multiplerealizability in order to show that someversion of a mind-brain identity theory isviable. Although there is much of value inthese recent explorations, they do not addressthe underlying intuitions that have vexedphilosophers of mind since Hilary Putnamintroduced the concern (1967). I argue that thestandard way of construing multiplerealizability is a much stronger claim thanthat (...)
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  76. William Ramsey (2006). Multiple Realizability Intuitions and the Functionalist Conception of the Mind. Metaphilosophy 37 (1):53-73.
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  77. Robert C. Richardson (2009). Multiple Realization and Methodological Pluralism. Synthese 167 (3):473 - 492.
    Multiple realization was once taken to be a challenge to reductionist visions, especially within cognitive science, and a foundation of the “antireductionist consensus.” More recently, multiple realization has come to be challenged on naturalistic grounds, as well as on more “metaphysical” grounds. Within cognitive science, one focal issue concerns the role of neural plasticity for addressing these issues. If reorganization maintains the same cognitive functions, that supports claims for multiple realization. I take up the reorganization involved in language dysfunctions to (...)
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  78. Robert C. Richardson (2008). Autonomy and Multiple Realization. Philosophy of Science 75 (5):526-536.
    Multiple realization historically mandated the autonomy of psychology, and its principled irreducibility to neuroscience. Recently, multiple realization and its implications for the reducibility of psychology to neuroscience have been challenged. One challenge concerns the proper understanding of reduction. Another concerns whether multiple realization is as pervasive as is alleged. I focus on the latter question. I illustrate multiple realization with actual, rather than hypothetical, cases of multiple realization from within the biological sciences. Though they do support a degree of autonomy (...)
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  79. Alex Rosenberg, Comments and Criticism on Multiple Realization and the Special Sciences.
    It is widely held that disciplines are autonomous when their taxonomies are “substrate neutral” and when the events, states and processes that realize their descriptive vocabulary are heterogeneous. This will be particularly true in the case of disciplines whose taxonomy consists largely in terms that individuate by function. Having concluded that the multiple realization of functional kinds is far less widespread than assumed or argued for, Shapiro cannot avail himself of the argument for the autonomy of the special sciences which (...)
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  80. Alex Rosenberg (2001). On Multiple Realization: Comments and Criticism and the Special Sciences. Journal of Philosophy XCVIII ( 7.
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  81. Alex Rosenberg (2001). On Multiple Realization and the Special Sciences. Journal of Philosophy 98 (7):365-373.
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  82. Patricia A. Ross (1999). The Limits of Physicalism. Philosophy of Science 66 (1):94-116.
    Mark Wilson, in his 1985 paper entitled "What Is This Thing Called 'Pain'?: The Philosophy of Science Behind the Contemporary Debate," proposed an account of physicalism that departs significantly from standard approaches. One of the main points of his paper was to explain the flaws in arguments claiming that psychological properties cannot be shown to be physical because of their functional nature. However, the positive proposal that Wilson makes in this article bears further examination. I argue that it not only (...)
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  83. J. Schwartz (1992). Who's Afraid of Multiple Realizability?: Functionalism, Reductionism, and Connectionism. In J. Dinsmore (ed.), The Symbolic and Connectionist Paradigms: Closing the Gap. Lawrence Erlbaum.
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  84. Oron Shagrir (1998). Multiple Realization, Computation and the Taxonomy of Psychological States. Synthese 114 (3):445-461.
    The paper criticizes standard functionalist arguments for multiple realization. It focuses on arguments in which psychological states are conceived as computational, which is precisely where the multiple realization doctrine has seemed the strongest. It is argued that a type-type identity thesis between computational states and physical states is no less plausible than a multiple realization thesis. The paper also presents, more tentatively, positive arguments for a picture of local reduction.
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  85. Lawrence A. Shapiro (2008). How to Test for Multiple Realization. Philosophy of Science 75 (5):514-525.
    When conceived as an empirical claim, it is natural to wonder how one might test the hypothesis of multiple realization. I consider general issues of testability, show how they apply specifically to the hypothesis of multiple realization, and propose an auxiliary assumption that, I argue, must be conjoined to the hypothesis of multiple realization to ensure its testability. I argue further that Bechtel and Mundale (1999) go astray because they fail to appreciate the need for this auxiliary assumption. †To (...)
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  86. Lawrence A. Shapiro (2004). The Mind Incarnate. MIT Press.
    Shapiro tests these hypotheses against two rivals, the mental constraint thesis and the embodied mind thesis. Collecting evidence from a variety of sources (e.g., neuroscience, evolutionary theory, and embodied cognition) he concludes that the multiple realizability thesis, accepted by most philosophers as a virtual truism, is much less obvious than commonly assumed, and that there is even stronger reason to give up the separability thesis. In contrast to views of mind that tempt us to see the mind as simply being (...)
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  87. Lawrence A. Shapiro, Neural Plasticity and Multiple Realizability.
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  88. Lawrence A. Shapiro, The Metaphysics of Multiple Realizability: It's Like Apples and Oranges.
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  89. Lawrence A. Shapiro (2000). Multiple Realizations. Journal of Philosophy 97 (12):635-654.
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  90. Elliott Sober (1999). The Multiple Realizability Argument Against Reductionism. Philosophy of Science 66 (4):542-564.
    Reductionism is often understood to include two theses: (1) every singular occurrence that the special sciences can explain also can be explained by physics; (2) every law in a higher-level science can be explained by physics. These claims are widely supposed to have been refuted by the multiple realizability argument, formulated by Putnam (1967, 1975) and Fodor (1968, 1975). The present paper criticizes the argument and identifies a reductionistic thesis that follows from one of the argument's premises.
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  91. Anders Strand (2007). Immense Multiple Realization. Metaphysica 8 (1):61-78.
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  92. Jacqueline A. Sullivan (2010). Realization, Explanation and the Mind-Body Relation Editor's Introduction. Synthese 177 (2):151-164.
    This volume brings together a number of perspectives on the nature of realization explanation and experimentation in the ‘special’ and biological sciences as well as the related issues of psychoneural reduction and cognitive extension. The first two papers in the volume may be regarded as offering direct responses to the questions: (1) What model of realization is appropriate for understanding the metaphysics of science? and (2) What kind of philosophical work is such a model ultimately supposed to do?
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  93. Brandon N. Towl, The Subset View of Realization: Five Problems.
    The Subset View of realization, though it has some attractive advantages, also has several problems. In particular, there are five main problems that have emerged in the literature: Double-Counting, The Part/Whole Problem, The “No Addition of Being” Problem, The Problem of Projectibility, and the Problem of Spurious Kinds. Each is reviewed here, along with solutions (or partial solutions) to them. Taking these problems seriously constrains the form that a Subset view can take, and thus limits the kinds of relations that (...)
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  94. Brandon N. Towl (2011). Laws and Constrained Kinds: A Lesson From Motor Neuroscience. Synthese 189 (3):433-450.
    In this paper, I want to explore the question of whether or not there are laws in psychology. Jaegwon Kim has argued (Supervenience and mind. MIT press, Cambridge; 1993; Mind in a physical world. MIT press, Cambridge 1998) that there are no laws in psychology that contain reference to multiply realized kinds, because statements about such kinds fail to be projectible. After reviewing Kim’s argument for this claim, I show how his conclusion hinges on a hidden assumption: that a kind (...)
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  95. Raphael van Riel (forthcoming). Pains, Pills, and Properties. Functionalism and the First-Order/Second-Order Distinction. Dialectica.
    Among philosophers of mind, it is common to assume that at least some mental properties are functional in nature, and that functional properties are second-order properties. In the functionalist literature, the notion of being a second-order property is cashed out in three different ways: (i) in terms of semantic features of characterizations or definitions of properties, (ii) in terms of syntactic features of second-order quantification, and (iii) in terms of a metaphysical criterion, according to which properties are second order if (...)
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  96. Sven Walter (2006). Multiple Realizability and Reduction: A Defense of the Disjunctive Move. Metaphysica 7 (1):43-65.
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  97. Sven Walter (2002). Need Multiple Realizability Deter the Identity-Theorist? Grazer Philosophische Studien 65 (1):51-75.
    I will discuss two possible options how a defender of the type identity-theory with respect to mental properties can avoid the conclusion of Putnam's Multiple Realizability Argument. I begin by offering a rigorous formulation of Putnam's argument, which has been lacking so far in the literature (section 2). This rigorous formulation shows that there are basically two possible options for avoiding the argument's conclusion. Contrary to current mainstream, I reject the first option?Kim's 'local reductionism'?as untenable (section 3). I endorse the (...)
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  98. Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.) (2003). Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic.
  99. Daniel A. Weiskopf (2011). The Functional Unity of Special Science Kinds. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (2):233-258.
    The view that special science properties are multiply realizable has been attacked in recent years by Shapiro, Bechtel and Mundale, Polger, and others. Focusing on psychological and neuroscientific properties, I argue that these attacks are unsuccessful. By drawing on interspecies physiological comparisons I show that diverse physical mechanisms can converge on common functional properties at multiple levels. This is illustrated with examples from the psychophysics and neuroscience of early vision. This convergence is compatible with the existence of general constraints on (...)
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  100. G. Witmer (2003). Multiple Realizability and Psychological Laws: Evaluating Kim's Challenge. In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic.
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