Bookmark and Share

Naive and Direct Realism

Edited by Benj Hellie (University of Toronto, University of Toronto at Scarborough)
Related categories
Siblings:See also:
263 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Order:
1 — 50 / 263
  1. Robert Merrihew Adams (1987). Berkeley and Epistemology. In Ernest Sosa (ed.), Essays on the Philosophy of George Berkeley. D. Reidel
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2. Evandro Agazzi (1989). Naive Realism And Naive Antirealism. Dialectica 43 (1‐2):83-98.
    SummaryScientific realism is here made equivalent to the referentiality of scientific language. A clear distinction of meaning and reference is advocated and certain ‘symptoms' of referentiality in scientific language are stressed. It is then shown that contemporary scholars stressing the contextual determination of meaning, the meaning variance and theory‐ladenness of all terms in scientific theories, often fail to recognize that an independent ‘stable’ core of the meaning still exists. This allows for theory comparison and is witness that science investigates reality, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. Dominic Alford-Duguid & Michael Arsenault (forthcoming). On the Explanatory Power of Hallucination. Synthese:1-21.
    Pautz has argued that the most prominent naive realist account of hallucination—negative epistemic disjunctivism—cannot explain how hallucinations enable us to form beliefs about perceptually presented properties. He takes this as grounds to reject both negative epistemic disjunctivism and naive realism. Our aims are two: First, to show that this objection is dialectically ineffective against naive realism, and second, to draw morals from the failure of this objection for the dispute over the nature of perceptual experience at large.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4. Marco Aurelio Sousa Alves (2012). Content, Object, and Phenomenal Character. Principia, an International Journal of Epistemology 16 (3):417-449.
    The view that perceptual experience has representational content, or the content view, has recently been criticized by the defenders of the so-called object view. Part of the dispute, I claim here, is based on a lack of grasp of the notion of content. There is, however, a core of substantial disagreement. Once the substantial core is revealed, I aim to: (1) reject the arguments raised against the content view by Campbell (2002), Travis (2004), and Brewer (2006); (2) criticize Brewer’s (2006, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5. Louise Antony (2011). The Openness of Illusions. Philosophical Issues 21 (1):25-44.
    Illusions are thought to make trouble for the intuition that perceptual experience is "open" to the world. Some have suggested, in response to the this trouble, that illusions differ from veridical experience in the degree to which their character is determined by their engagement with the world. An understanding of the psychology of perception reveals that this is not the case: veridical and falsidical perceptions engage the world in the same way and to the same extent. While some contemporary vision (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  6. Richard E. Aquila (1992). The Circle of Acquaintance: Perception, Consciousness, and Empathy, by David Woodruff Smith. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):994-997.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7. Ari Armstrong (2005). Rejoinder to Michael Huemer's "How to Be a Perceptual Realist" (Fall 2005): Direct Realism and Causation. Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 7 (1):239 - 245.
    Armstrong disagrees with Huemer over the proper interpretation of the Objectivist theory of concepts. Huemer worries that Objectivists empty perception of content, while Armstrong argues mat Objectivists recognize some content. However, Huemer attempts to inject conceptual content into perception, which explains why his treatment of illusions differs from that of Objectivists.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8. Ari Armstrong (2005). Direct Realism and Causation. Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 7 (1).
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9. Ari Armstrong (2004). A Direct Realist's Challenge to Skepticism. [REVIEW] Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 5 (2):421 - 440.
    Armstrong reviews Michael Huemer's Skepticism and the Veil of Perception and finds in it strong support for the perceptual theory of direct realism. However, Huemer incorrectly assumes perceptual experiences can contain conceptual—and thus causal —information. Regardless, Huemer's theory of "phenomenal conservatism" serves to justify our perceptual judgments and refute skepticism in a way compatible with the preliminary work of Objectivist philosophers, such as David Kelley and Leonard Peikoff.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. David M. Armstrong (1959). Mr Arthadeva and Naive Realism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 37 (May):67-70.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11. David M. Armstrong (1955). Illusions of Sense. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 33 (August):88-106.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  12. B. M. Arthadeva (1961). Naive Realism and the Problem of Color-Seeing in Dim Light. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 21 (June):467-478.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  13. B. M. Arthadeva (1959). Naive Realism and Illusions: The Elliptical Penny. Philosophy 34 (October):323-330.
    How can naïve realism defend itself in face of the illusion of the penny which looks elliptical when it is seen obliquely? Of late many philosophers have tried to deny that a penny looks elliptical when viewed obliquely: they have claimed that it still looks round. It may be true to say this of a small object like a penny, but it cannot be denied that the surfaces of objects in general do look different in shape when viewed from different (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14. B. M. Arthadeva (1959). Naive Realism and Illusions of Refraction. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 37 (August):118-137.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15. M. Arthadeva (1959). Naïve Realism and Illusions of Refraction. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 37 (2):118-137.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16. M. Arthadeva (1957). Naive Realism and Illusions of Reflection. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 35 (3):155 – 169.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17. A. J. Ayer & Graham Macdonald (eds.) (1979). Perception and Identity: Essays Presented to A. J. Ayer, with His Replies. Cornell University Press.
  18. Erik C. Banks (2013). Williams James' Direct Realism: A Reconstruction. History of Philosophy Quarterly 30 (3):271-291.
    William James' Radical Empiricist essays offer a unique and powerful argument for direct realism about our perceptions of objects. This theory can be completed with some observations by Kant on the intellectual preconditions for a perceptual judgment. Finally James and Kant deliver a powerful blow to the representational theory of perception and knowledge, which applies quite broadly to theories of representation generally.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19. Garrett Barden (2003). On Intellectual Conversion. Journal of Macrodynamic Analysis 3:117-141.
    This essay focusses on two questions: What is intellectual conversion? Why is naive realism attractive?
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20. David James Barnett (forthcoming). Perceptual Justification and the Cartesian Theater. Oxford Studies in Epistemology.
    According to a traditional Cartesian epistemology of perception, perception does not provide one with direct knowledge of the external world. Instead, when you look out to see a red wall, what you learn first is not a fact about the color of the wall—i.e., that it is red—but instead a fact about your own visual experience—i.e., that the wall looks red to you. If you are to justifiably believe that the wall is red, you must be in a position to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21. Benjamin Bayer (2012). Internalism Empowered: How to Bolster a Theory of Justification with a Direct Realist Theory of Awareness. Acta Analytica 27 (4):383-408.
    Abstract The debate in the philosophy of perception between direct realists and representationalists should influence the debate in epistemology between internalists and externalists about justification. If direct realists are correct, there are more consciously accessible justifiers for internalists to exploit than externalists think. Internalists can retain their distinctive internalist identity while accepting this widened conception of internalistic justification: even if they welcome the possibility of cognitive access to external facts, their position is still quite distinct from the typical externalist position. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22. Benjamin Bayer (2011). A Role for Abstractionism in a Direct Realist Foundationalism. Synthese 180 (3):357-389.
    Both traditional and naturalistic epistemologists have long assumed that the examination of human psychology has no relevance to the prescriptive goal of traditional epistemology, that of providing first-person guidance in determining the truth. Contrary to both, I apply insights about the psychology of human perception and concept-formation to a very traditional epistemological project: the foundationalist approach to the epistemic regress problem. I argue that direct realism about perception can help solve the regress problem and support a foundationalist account of justification, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  23. M. Beaton (2016). Sensorimotor Direct Realism: How We Enact Our World. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):265-276.
    Context: Direct realism is a non-reductive, anti-representationalist theory of perception lying at the heart of mainstream analytic philosophy, where it is currently generating a lot of interest. For all that, it is widely held to be both controversial and anti-scientific. On the other hand, the sensorimotor theory of perception initially generated a lot of interest within enactive philosophy of cognitive science, but has arguably not yet delivered on its initial promise. Problem: I aim to show that the sensorimotor theory and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24. M. Beaton (2016). Author’s Response: The Personal Level in Sensorimotor Theory. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):289-297.
    Upshot: I offer responses to the commentaries on my target article in five short sections. The first section, about the plurality of lived worlds, concerns issues of quite general interest to readers of this journal. The second section presents some reasons for rejecting “enabling” as well as “constitutive” representational approaches to understanding the mind. In the remaining three sections, I clarify aspects of sensorimotor direct realism relating to the self, qualia, counterfactuals, and the notion of “mastery.”.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25. M. Beaton (2013). Phenomenology and Embodied Action. Constructivist Foundations 8 (3):298-313.
    Context: The enactivist tradition, out of which neurophenomenology arose, rejects various internalisms – including the representationalist and information-processing metaphors – but remains wedded to one further internalism: the claim that the structure of perceptual experience is directly, constitutively linked only to internal, brain-based dynamics. Problem: I aim to reject this internalism and defend an alternative analysis. Method: The paper presents a direct-realist, externalist, sensorimotor account of perceptual experience. It uses the concept of counterfactual meaningful action to defend this view against (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  26. Jacob Berger & Bence Nanay (forthcoming). Relationalism and Unconscious Perception. Analysis:anw060.
    Relationalism holds that perceptual experiences are relations between subjects and perceived objects. But much evidence suggests that perceptual states can be unconscious. We argue here that unconscious perception raises difficulties for relationalism. Relationalists would seem to have three options. First, they may deny that there is unconscious perception or question whether we have sufficient evidence to posit it. Second, they may allow for unconscious perception but deny that the relationalist analysis applies to it. Third, they may offer a relationalist explanation (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27. Ivana Bianchi & Ugo Savardi (2014). Grounding Naïve Physics and Optics in Perception. Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 9 (1).
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28. Tim Black (2011). Review of John McDowell, Perception as a Capacity for Knowledge. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
  29. Laurence BonJour (2004). In Search of Direct Realism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):349-367.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   13 citations  
  30. Stephen J. Boulter (2004). Metaphysical Realism as a Pre-Condition of Visual Perception. Biology and Philosophy 19 (2):243-261.
    In this paper I present a transcendental argument based on the findings of cognitive psychology and neurophysiology which invites two conclusions: First and foremost, that a pre-condition of visual perception itself is precisely what the Aristotelian and other commonsense realists maintain, namely, the independent existence of a featured, or pre-packaged world; second, this finding, combined with other reflections, suggests that, contra McDowell and other neo-Kantians, human beings have access to things as they are in the world via non-projective perception. These (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  31. Bob Brandom (1996). Perception and Rational Constraint: McDowell's "Mind and World". Philosophical Issues 7:241 - 259.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  32. Robert B. Brandom (2002). Reading McDowell: On Mind and World. New York: Routledge.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  33. Robert B. Brandom (2002). Non-Inferential Knowledge, Perceptual Experience, and Secondary Qualities: Placing McDowell's Empiricism. In Reading McDowell: On Mind and World. New York: Routledge
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  34. Robert B. Brandom (1996). Perception and Rational Constraint: McDowell's Mind and World. Philosophical Issues 7:241-259.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  35. Philip Bretzel (1974). Cornman, Sensa, and the Argument From Hallucination. Philosophical Studies 26 (5-6):443-445.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36. Bill Brewer (2013). Attention and Direct Realism. Analytic Philosophy 54 (4):421-435.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37. Bill Brewer (2006). Perception and Content. European Journal of Philosophy 14 (2):165-181.
    It is close to current orthodoxy that perceptual experience is to be characterized, at least in part, by its representational content, roughly, by the way it represents things as being in the world around the perceiver. Call this basic idea the content view.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   43 citations  
  38. Bill Brewer (2004). Realism and the Nature of Perceptual Experience. Philosophical Issues 14 (1):61-77.
    Realism concerning a given domain of things is the view that the things in that domain exist, and are as they are, quite independently of anyone.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  39. Frederick Broadie (1977). Epistemological Direct Realism in Descartes' Philosophy. Philosophical Books 18 (1):17-18.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  40. Harold I. Brown (1992). Direct Realism, Indirect Realism, and Epistemology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (2):341-363.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  41. Jackson Todd Buras (2004). Thomas Reid's Direct Realism. Dissertation, Yale University
    This dissertation develops and defends an interpretation of Thomas Reid's direct realism, a view Reid expresses in his own words as follows: "something which is extended and solid...is the immediate object of my touch and sight. And this object I take to be matter, and not an idea." ;My central interpretive thesis is about what the "immediacy" of perception consists in for Reid. I distinguish two options: the no intermediary thesis, and the no analysis thesis. The first option takes the (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42. Todd Buras (2002). The Problem with Reid's Direct Realism. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (209):457-477.
    There is a problem about the compatibility of Reid's commitment to both a sign theory of sensations and also direct realism. I show that Reid is committed to three different senses of the claim that mind independent bodies and their qualities are among the immediate objects of perception, and I then argue that Reid's sign theory conflicts with one of these. I conclude by advocating one proposal for reconciling Reid's claims, deferring a thorough development and defence of the proposal to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  43. Panayot Butchvarov (1994). Direct Realism Without Materialism. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1):1-21.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44. John Campbell (2008). Sensorimotor Knowledge and Naïve Realism. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):666 - 673.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  45. Keith Campbell (1969). Direct Realism and Perceptual Error. In The Business of Reason. Routledge & K Paul
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46. Lawrence Richard Carleton (1978). Toward a Defense of Direct Realism. Auslegung 5 (February):101-111.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47. Iris Carlton-LaNey & Janice Andrews (1998). Direct Practice. In Josefina Figueira-McDonough, Ann Nichols-Casebolt & F. Ellen Netting (eds.), The Role of Gender in Practice Knowledge: Claiming Half the Human Experience. Garland Pub. 1086--93.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48. Dan Cavedon‐Taylor (2015). Kind Properties and the Metaphysics of Perception: Towards Impure Relationalism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (4):487-509.
    A central debate in contemporary philosophy of perception is between those who hold that perception is a detection relation of sensory awareness and those who hold that it is representational state akin to belief. Another key debate is between those who claim that we can perceive natural or artifactual kind properties, e.g. ‘being a tomato’, ‘being a doorknob’, etc. and those who hold we cannot. The current consensus is that these debates are entirely unrelated. I argue that this consensus is (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  49. Marc Champagne (2015). Poinsot Versus Peirce on Merging with Reality by Sharing a Quality. Versus: Quaderni di Studi Semiotici 120:31–43.
    C. S. Peirce introduced the term “icon” for sign-vehicles that signify their objects in virtue of some shared quality. This qualitative kinship, however, threatens to collapse the relata of the sign into one and the same thing. Accordingly, the late medieval philosopher of signs John Poinsot held that, “no matter how perfect, a concept [...] always retains a distinction, therefore, between the thing signified and itself signifying.” Poinsot is touted by his present-day advocates as a realist, but I believe that, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  50. P. Rowntree Clifford (1964). Direct, Referential Realism : A Comment. Dialogue 2 (4):452-453.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 263