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Naive and Direct Realism

Edited by Benj Hellie (University of Toronto, University of Toronto at Scarborough)
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  1. Robert Merrihew Adams (1987). Berkeley and Epistemology. In Ernest Sosa (ed.), Essays on the Philosophy of George Berkeley. D. Reidel.
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  2. Evandro Agazzi (1989). Naive Realism And Naive Antirealism. Dialectica 43 (1‐2):83-98.
    SummaryScientific realism is here made equivalent to the referentiality of scientific language. A clear distinction of meaning and reference is advocated and certain ‘symptoms' of referentiality in scientific language are stressed. It is then shown that contemporary scholars stressing the contextual determination of meaning, the meaning variance and theory‐ladenness of all terms in scientific theories, often fail to recognize that an independent ‘stable’ core of the meaning still exists. This allows for theory comparison and is witness that science investigates reality, (...)
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  3. Marco Aurelio Sousa Alves (2012). Content, Object, and Phenomenal Character. Principia, an International Journal of Epistemology 16 (3):417-449.
    The view that perceptual experience has representational content, or the content view, has recently been criticized by the defenders of the so-called object view. Part of the dispute, I claim here, is based on a lack of grasp of the notion of content. There is, however, a core of substantial disagreement. Once the substantial core is revealed, I aim to: (1) reject the arguments raised against the content view by Campbell (2002), Travis (2004), and Brewer (2006); (2) criticize Brewer’s (2006, (...)
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  4. Louise Antony (2011). The Openness of Illusions. Philosophical Issues 21 (1):25-44.
    Illusions are thought to make trouble for the intuition that perceptual experience is "open" to the world. Some have suggested, in response to the this trouble, that illusions differ from veridical experience in the degree to which their character is determined by their engagement with the world. An understanding of the psychology of perception reveals that this is not the case: veridical and falsidical perceptions engage the world in the same way and to the same extent. While some contemporary vision (...)
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  5. Richard E. Aquila (1992). The Circle of Acquaintance: Perception, Consciousness, and Empathy, by David Woodruff Smith. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):994-997.
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  6. Ari Armstrong (2005). Rejoinder to Michael Huemer's "How to Be a Perceptual Realist" (Fall 2005): Direct Realism and Causation. Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 7 (1):239 - 245.
    Armstrong disagrees with Huemer over the proper interpretation of the Objectivist theory of concepts. Huemer worries that Objectivists empty perception of content, while Armstrong argues mat Objectivists recognize some content. However, Huemer attempts to inject conceptual content into perception, which explains why his treatment of illusions differs from that of Objectivists.
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  7. Ari Armstrong (2005). Direct Realism and Causation. Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 7 (1).
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  8. Ari Armstrong (2004). A Direct Realist's Challenge to Skepticism. [REVIEW] Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 5 (2):421 - 440.
    Armstrong reviews Michael Huemer's Skepticism and the Veil of Perception and finds in it strong support for the perceptual theory of direct realism. However, Huemer incorrectly assumes perceptual experiences can contain conceptual—and thus causal —information. Regardless, Huemer's theory of "phenomenal conservatism" serves to justify our perceptual judgments and refute skepticism in a way compatible with the preliminary work of Objectivist philosophers, such as David Kelley and Leonard Peikoff.
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  9. David M. Armstrong (1959). Mr Arthadeva and Naive Realism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 37 (May):67-70.
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  10. David M. Armstrong (1955). Illusions of Sense. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 33 (August):88-106.
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  11. B. M. Arthadeva (1961). Naive Realism and the Problem of Color-Seeing in Dim Light. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 21 (June):467-478.
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  12. B. M. Arthadeva (1959). Naive Realism and Illusions: The Elliptical Penny. Philosophy 34 (October):323-330.
    How can naïve realism defend itself in face of the illusion of the penny which looks elliptical when it is seen obliquely? Of late many philosophers have tried to deny that a penny looks elliptical when viewed obliquely: they have claimed that it still looks round. It may be true to say this of a small object like a penny, but it cannot be denied that the surfaces of objects in general do look different in shape when viewed from different (...)
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  13. B. M. Arthadeva (1959). Naive Realism and Illusions of Refraction. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 37 (August):118-137.
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  14. M. Arthadeva (1959). Naïve Realism and Illusions of Refraction. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 37 (2):118-137.
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  15. M. Arthadeva (1957). Naive Realism and Illusions of Reflection. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 35 (3):155 – 169.
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  16. A. J. Ayer & Graham Macdonald (eds.) (1979). Perception and Identity: Essays Presented to A. J. Ayer, with His Replies. Cornell University Press.
  17. Erik C. Banks (2013). Williams James' Direct Realism: A Reconstruction. History of Philosophy Quarterly 30 (3):271-291.
    William James' Radical Empiricist essays offer a unique and powerful argument for direct realism about our perceptions of objects. This theory can be completed with some observations by Kant on the intellectual preconditions for a perceptual judgment. Finally James and Kant deliver a powerful blow to the representational theory of perception and knowledge, which applies quite broadly to theories of representation generally.
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  18. Garrett Barden (2003). On Intellectual Conversion. Journal of Macrodynamic Analysis 3:117-141.
    This essay focusses on two questions: What is intellectual conversion? Why is naive realism attractive?
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  19. Benjamin Bayer (2012). Internalism Empowered: How to Bolster a Theory of Justification with a Direct Realist Theory of Awareness. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 27 (4):383-408.
    Abstract The debate in the philosophy of perception between direct realists and representationalists should influence the debate in epistemology between internalists and externalists about justification. If direct realists are correct, there are more consciously accessible justifiers for internalists to exploit than externalists think. Internalists can retain their distinctive internalist identity while accepting this widened conception of internalistic justification: even if they welcome the possibility of cognitive access to external facts, their position is still quite distinct from the typical externalist position. (...)
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  20. Benjamin Bayer (2011). A Role for Abstractionism in a Direct Realist Foundationalism. Synthese 180 (3):357-389.
    Both traditional and naturalistic epistemologists have long assumed that the examination of human psychology has no relevance to the prescriptive goal of traditional epistemology, that of providing first-person guidance in determining the truth. Contrary to both, I apply insights about the psychology of human perception and concept-formation to a very traditional epistemological project: the foundationalist approach to the epistemic regress problem. I argue that direct realism about perception can help solve the regress problem and support a foundationalist account of justification, (...)
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  21. M. Beaton (2013). Phenomenology and Embodied Action. Constructivist Foundations 8 (3):298-313.
    Context: The enactivist tradition, out of which neurophenomenology arose, rejects various internalisms – including the representationalist and information-processing metaphors – but remains wedded to one further internalism: the claim that the structure of perceptual experience is directly, constitutively linked only to internal, brain-based dynamics. Problem: I aim to reject this internalism and defend an alternative analysis. Method: The paper presents a direct-realist, externalist, sensorimotor account of perceptual experience. It uses the concept of counterfactual meaningful action to defend this view against (...)
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  22. Ivana Bianchi & Ugo Savardi (2014). Grounding Naïve Physics and Optics in Perception. Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 9 (1).
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  23. Tim Black (2011). Review of John McDowell, Perception as a Capacity for Knowledge. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
  24. Laurence BonJour (2004). In Search of Direct Realism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):349-367.
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  25. Stephen J. Boulter (2004). Metaphysical Realism as a Pre-Condition of Visual Perception. Biology and Philosophy 19 (2):243-261.
    In this paper I present a transcendental argument based on the findings of cognitive psychology and neurophysiology which invites two conclusions: First and foremost, that a pre-condition of visual perception itself is precisely what the Aristotelian and other commonsense realists maintain, namely, the independent existence of a featured, or pre-packaged world; second, this finding, combined with other reflections, suggests that, contra McDowell and other neo-Kantians, human beings have access to things as they are in the world via non-projective perception. These (...)
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  26. Bob Brandom (1996). Perception and Rational Constraint: McDowell's "Mind and World". Philosophical Issues 7:241 - 259.
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  27. Robert B. Brandom (2002). Non-Inferential Knowledge, Perceptual Experience, and Secondary Qualities: Placing McDowell's Empiricism. In Reading McDowell: On Mind and World. New York: Routledge.
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  28. Robert B. Brandom (2002). Reading McDowell: On Mind and World. New York: Routledge.
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  29. Robert B. Brandom (1996). Perception and Rational Constraint: McDowell's Mind and World. Philosophical Issues 7:241-259.
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  30. Philip Bretzel (1974). Cornman, Sensa, and the Argument From Hallucination. Philosophical Studies 26 (5-6):443-445.
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  31. Bill Brewer (2013). Attention and Direct Realism. Analytic Philosophy 54 (4):421-435.
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  32. Bill Brewer (2006). Perception and Content. European Journal of Philosophy 14 (2):165-181.
    It is close to current orthodoxy that perceptual experience is to be characterized, at least in part, by its representational content, roughly, by the way it represents things as being in the world around the perceiver. Call this basic idea the content view (CV).
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  33. Bill Brewer (2004). Realism and the Nature of Perceptual Experience. Philosophical Issues 14 (1):61-77.
    Realism concerning a given domain of things is the view that the things in that domain exist, and are as they are, quite independently of anyone.
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  34. Frederick Broadie (1977). Epistemological Direct Realism in Descartes' Philosophy. Philosophical Books 18 (1):17-18.
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  35. Harold I. Brown (1992). Direct Realism, Indirect Realism, and Epistemology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (2):341-363.
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  36. Jackson Todd Buras (2004). Thomas Reid's Direct Realism. Dissertation, Yale University
    This dissertation develops and defends an interpretation of Thomas Reid's direct realism, a view Reid expresses in his own words as follows: "something which is extended and solid...is the immediate object of my touch and sight. And this object I take to be matter, and not an idea." ;My central interpretive thesis is about what the "immediacy" of perception consists in for Reid. I distinguish two options: the no intermediary thesis, and the no analysis thesis. The first option takes the (...)
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  37. Todd Buras (2002). The Problem with Reid's Direct Realism. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (209):457-477.
    There is a problem about the compatibility of Reid's commitment to both a sign theory of sensations and also direct realism. I show that Reid is committed to three different senses of the claim that mind independent bodies and their qualities are among the immediate objects of perception, and I then argue that Reid's sign theory conflicts with one of these. I conclude by advocating one proposal for reconciling Reid's claims, deferring a thorough development and defence of the proposal to (...)
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  38. John Campbell (2008). Sensorimotor Knowledge and Naïve Realism. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):666 - 673.
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  39. Keith Campbell (1969). Direct Realism and Perceptual Error. In The Business of Reason. Routledge & K Paul.
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  40. Lawrence Richard Carleton (1978). Toward a Defense of Direct Realism. Auslegung 5 (February):101-111.
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  41. Iris Carlton-LaNey & Janice Andrews (1998). Direct Practice. In Josefina Figueira-McDonough, Ann Nichols-Casebolt & F. Ellen Netting (eds.), The Role of Gender in Practice Knowledge: Claiming Half the Human Experience. Garland Pub.. 1086--93.
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  42. M. D. Conduct (2011). Naïve Realism and Extreme Disjunctivism. Philosophical Explorations 13 (3):201-221.
    Disjunctivism about sensory experience is frequently put forward in defence of a particular conception of perception and perceptual experience known as naïve realism. In this paper I present an argument against naïve realism that proceeds through a rejection of disjunctivism. If the naïve realist must also be a disjunctivist about the phenomenal nature of experience, then naïve realism should be abandoned.
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  43. M. D. Conduct (2008). Naïve Realism, Adverbialism and Perceptual Error. Acta Analytica 23 (2):147-159.
    My paper has three parts. First I will outline the act/object theory of perceptual experience and its commitments to a relational view of experience and a view of phenomenal character according to which it is constituted by the character of the objects of experience. I present the traditional adverbial response to this, in which experience is not to be understood as a relation to some object, but as a way of sensing. In the second part I argue that acceptance of (...)
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  44. M. D. Conduct (2008). Naïve Realism, Adverbialism and Perceptual Error. Acta Analytica 23 (2):147-159.
    My paper has three parts. First I will outline the act/object theory of perceptual experience and its commitments to (a) a relational view of experience and (b) a view of phenomenal character according to which it is constituted by the character of the objects of experience. I present the traditional adverbial response to this, in which experience is not to be understood as a relation to some object, but as a way of sensing. In the second part I argue that (...)
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  45. Rebecca Copenhaver (forthcoming). Thomas Reid on Aesthetic Perception. In Todd Buras & Rebecca Copenhaver (eds.), Mind, Knowledge and Action: Essays in Honor of Reid’s Tercentenary.
  46. Rebecca Copenhaver (2010). Thomas Reid on Acquired Perception. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (3):285-312.
    Thomas Reid's distinction between original and acquired perception is not merely metaphysical; it has psychological and phenomenological stories to tell. Psychologically, acquired perception provides increased sensitivity to features in the environment. Phenomenologically, Reid's theory resists the notion that original perception is exhaustive of perceptual experience. James Van Cleve has argued that most cases of acquired perception do not count as perception and so do not pose a threat to Reid's direct realism. I argue that acquired perception is genuine perception and (...)
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  47. James W. Cornman (1975). Perception, Common Sense And Science. Yale University Press.
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  48. D. R. Cousin (1955). Naive Realism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 55:179.
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  49. Mark Crooks (2002). Four Rejoinders: A Dialogue in Continuation. Journal of Mind and Behavior 23 (3):249-278.
    Defenses of realist reductionism may involve petitio principii by a tacit and inadvertent reintroduction of naïve realism through continued supposition of stimulus and sensory fields' conflation. The legitimate meaningfulness of identity statements involving scientific discoveries is examined, as are their illicit or gratuitous expressions. While experimental psychological data has a role to play in refutation of direct realism, we should not underestimate the ingenuity of its proponents' extenuations , hence the need for emphasizing the logic of perceptual processes for conclusive (...)
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  50. Adrian Cussins (2012). Environmental Representation of the Body. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (1):15-32.
    Much recent cognitive neuroscientific work on body knowledge is representationalist: “body schema” and “body images”, for example, are cerebral representations of the body (de Vignemont 2009). A framework assumption is that representation of the body plays an important role in cognition. The question is whether this representationalist assumption is compatible with the variety of broadly situated or embodied approaches recently popular in the cognitive neurosciences: approaches in which cognition is taken to have a ‘direct’ relation to the body and to (...)
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