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  1. Barbara Abbott (2002). Discussion Note: Definiteness and Proper Names: Some Bad News for the Description Theory. Journal of Semantics 19 (2):191-201.
    This paper addresses some data put forward by Geurts (1997) in support of his metalinguistic or quotation theory of proper names, according to which a name N means ‘the individual named N’. The data illustrate ten linguistic behaviours claimed to be shared by proper names and definite descriptions. I argue that in some cases the behaviours have a common explanation which is based on a property independent of Geurts' analysis, and that in the remaining cases the behaviours are not actually (...)
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  2. Diana Ackerman (1979). Proper Names, Essences and Intuitive Beliefs. Theory and Decision 11 (1):5-26.
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  3. Diana Ackerman (1979). Proper Names, Propositional Attitudes and Non-Descriptive Connotations. Philosophical Studies 35 (1):55 - 69.
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  4. Diana F. Ackerman (1976). Plantinga, Proper Names and Propositions. Philosophical Studies 30 (6):409 - 412.
    The view of names that plantinga advances in "the nature of necessity" seems to have unacceptable consequences for names in propositional attitude contexts. In this paper, I argue that he is unsuccessful in his attempt to avoid these consequences.
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  5. David W. Agler (2010). Peirce's Direct, Non-Reductive Contextual Theory of Names. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 46 (4):611-640.
    One dimension of a comprehensive semantic and semiotic theory is its explanation of how a wide-variety of linguistic expressions designate singular objects (e.g., pronouns, demonstratives, definite descriptions, etc.). The bulk of scholarship on Peirce's theory of proper names has aligned his theory with the so called new theory of reference by drawing connections between proper names qua rhematic indexical legisigns (a kind of sign in Peirce's 10-sign typology) and various aspects of Kripke's theory of names.2 Recent scholarship has navigated away (...)
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  6. Philip Alexander (2004). The Etymology of Proper Names as an Exegetical Device in Rabbinic Literature. The Studia Philonica Annual 16:169-187.
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  7. Fabrizio Amerini (2008). The Semantics of Substantial Names. Recherches de Theologie Et Philosophie Medievales 75 (2):395-440.
    Aristotle begins the third chapter of book VIII of the Metaphysics by claiming that sometimes it is not clear whether a name refers to the composite substance or to the actuality and the form, for instance whether «animal» refers to the soul in a body or simply to the soul. In solving this problem, Aristotle states that the name «animal» can refer to both, not, however, in one and the same sense but rather by expressing two different senses which are (...)
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  8. John M. Anderson (2008). The Grammar of Names. Oxford University Press Uk.
    This book is the first systematic account of the syntax and semantics of names. Drawing on work in onomastics, philosophy, and linguistics the author examines the distribution and subcategorization of names within a framework of syntactic categories and considers how the morphosyntactic behaviour of names connects to their semantic roles in a range of languages.
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  9. John H. Andreae (1978). Descriptive and Prescriptive Names. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (1):11.
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  10. Robin Attfield (1995). The Meaning of Names and Their Propositional Context. Cogito 9 (2):153-157.
    Michael Durrant’s rejection is examined of Frege’s and Wittgenstein’s thesis that a name has meaning only in the context of a proposition (the Context Principle). Durrant argues that in two ways the Context Principle makes it impossible for a hearer to determine the meaning of a name, for such identification would involve both an infinite regress and a vicious circle of reasoning. I reply that a finite (rather than infinite) set of propositions could suffice; and that making corrigible assumptions allows (...)
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  11. Kent Bach (2015). The Predicate View of Proper Names. Philosophy Compass 10 (11):772-784.
    The Millian view that the meaning of a proper name is simply its referent has long been popular among philosophers of language. It might even be deemed the orthodox view, despite its well-known difficulties. Fregean and Russellian alternatives, though widely discussed, are much less popular. The Predicate View has not even been taken seriously, at least until fairly recently, but finally, it is receiving the attention it deserves. It says that a name expresses the property of bearing that name. Despite (...)
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  12. Kent Bach (2002). Giorgione Was so-Called Because of His Name. Philosophical Perspectives 16 (s16):73-103.
    Proper names seem simple on the surface. Indeed, anyone unfamiliar with philosophical debates about them might wonder what the fuss could possibly be about. It seems obvious why we need them and what we do with them, and that is to talk about particular persons, places, and things. You don't have to be as smart as Mill to think that proper names are simply tags attached to individuals. But sometimes appearances are deceiving.
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  13. Lynne Rudder Baker (1982). Underprivileged Access. Noûs 16 (2):227-241.
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  14. Kenneth T. Barnes (1976). Proper Names, Possible Worlds, and Propositional Attitudes. Philosophia 6 (1):29-38.
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  15. Rachel Barney (2001). Names and Nature in Plato's Cratylus. Routledge.
    This study offers a comprehensive new interpretation of one of Plato's most enigmatic and controversial dialogues, the Cratylus , showing it to present a complex and unified argument for a positive conclusion. Throughout, the book combines analysis of Plato's arguments with attentiveness to his philosophical method, including its "dramatic" or "literary" features; in particular, Socrates' extended etymological discourse, long an interpretive puzzle, is explained in terms of the various Platonic genres to which it belongs.
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  16. George Barton (1915). Religious Conceptions Underlying Sumerian Proper Names. Journal of the American Oriental Society 34:315-320.
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  17. Pierre Baumann (2010). Are Proper Names Rigid Designators? Axiomathes 20 (2-3):333-346.
    A widely accepted thesis in the philosophy of language is that natural language proper names are rigid designators, and that they are so de jure, or as a matter of the “semantic rules of the language.” This paper questions this claim, arguing that rigidity cannot be plausibly construed as a property of name types and that the alternative, rigidity construed as a property of tokens, means that they cannot be considered rigid de jure; rigidity in this case must be viewed (...)
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  18. Ermanno Bencivenga (1989). Adding a Few Names. Logique Et Analyse 32 (25):157.
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  19. Rod Bertolet (2001). Recanati, Descriptive Names, and the Prospect of New Knowledge. Journal of Philosophical Research 26:37-41.
    The immediate purpose of this note is to provide counterexamples to François Recanati’s claim in Direct Reference that descriptive names (a name whose reference is fixed by an attributive definite description) are created with the expectation that we will be able to think of the referent nondescriptively at some point in the future. The larger issue is how to reconcile the existence of descriptive names with the theoretical commitments Recanati takes direct reference to have. The point of the claim about (...)
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  20. Visvabandhu Bhattacharya (1994). Proper Names and Individuals. In A. Chakrabarti & B. K. Matilal (eds.), Knowing From Words. Kluwer 325--346.
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  21. Thomas Scott Blackburn (1982). Proper Names and Linguistic Authority. Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
    This dissertation is addressed to the question of proper name reference, a topic prominent in contemporary philosophy of language. My aim here is not to defend nor to endorse any particular "theory" of reference. Rather, my purpose is to initiate a calling into question of the project of arriving at such a "theory"--at least as this project most commonly has been conceived. ;Recent attacks, by Kripke and others, upon "description" theories of name reference have forced the recognition that names commonly (...)
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  22. Chen Bo (2012). A Descriptivist Refutation of Kripke's Modal Argument and of Soames's Defence. Theoria 78 (3):225-260.
    This article systematically challenges Kripke's modal argument and Soames's defence of this argument by arguing that, just like descriptions, names can take narrow or wide scopes over modalities, and that there is a big difference between the wide scope reading and the narrow scope reading of a modal sentence with a name. Its final conclusions are that all of Kripke's and Soames's arguments are untenable due to some fallacies or mistakes; names are not “rigid designators”; if there were rigid designators, (...)
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  23. Steven E. Boër (1975). Proper Names as Predicates. Philosophical Studies 27 (6):389 - 400.
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  24. David Boersema (2007). Geach on Proper Names. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 6:37-42.
    Recently, several philosophers of language have claimed that, at least in some respects, Peter Geach proposed a view about proper names that anticipated important features of the causal theory (or historical chain theory) that was later set forth by Saul Kripke and others. Quentin Smith, for example, in his essay, "Direct, Rigid Designation and A Posteriori Necessity: A History and Critique," says explicitly that "Geach (1969) ... originated the causal or 'historical chain' theory of names" (1999). In his entry on (...)
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  25. David Boersema (2005). Eco on Names and Reference. Contemporary Pragmatism 2 (1):167-184.
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  26. Cynthia J. Bolton (1996). Proper Names, Taxonomic Names and Necessity. Philosophical Quarterly 46 (183):145-157.
    One reason why we find the causal theory of reference so interesting is because it provides an account of de re necessity. Necessity is not only predicated of statements but also of objects. It is not only discovered by means of linguistic analysis but also by means of empirical investigation. And this means that truths we once described as contingent turn out to be necessary after all. We may think that this account of de re necessity is due to the (...)
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  27. J. Van Brakel (1982). Conventions In Naming. Philosophy Research Archives 8:243-277.
    Conventions in the use of names are discussed, particularly names of linguistic expressions. Also the reference of measure terms like ‘kg’ is discussed, and it is found analogous in important respects to expression names. Some new light is shed on the token-type distinction. Applications to versions of the liar paradox are shown. The use of quotation marks is critically examined.
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  28. David M. Braun (1991). Proper Names, Cognitive Contents, and Beliefs. Philosophical Studies 62 (3):289 - 305.
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  29. Deborah J. Brown (1996). The Puzzle of Names in Ockham's Theory of Mental Language. Review of Metaphysics 50 (1):79 - 99.
    There is a tension within Ockham's theory of mental language between its claim to being a semantics for conventional languages and its claim to being a model of concept acquisition and thought. In particular, the commitment to a redundancy-free mental language which serves to explain important semantic relations such as synonymy and ambiguity conflicts, _prima facie, with the possibility of opaque belief contexts. I argue that it is preferable to treat the theory of mental language as an idealized theory of (...)
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  30. Arthur W. Burks (1951). A Theory of Proper Names. Philosophical Studies 2 (3):36 - 45.
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  31. John V. Canfield (1979). Names and Causes. Philosophical Studies 35 (1):71 - 80.
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  32. Mihnea D. I. Capraru (2016). A Counterexample to Variabilism. Analysis 76 (1):26-29.
    Recent literature contains influential arguments for variabilism, the view that we should understand proper names as analogues not of constants but of variables. In particular, proper names are said to sometimes take semantic values that are not referential but purely general. I present a counter-example to this view.
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  33. Greg Carlson (1998). Names, and What They Are Names Of. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):69-70.
    Terms designating substances and kinds function grammatically much like proper names of individuals. This supports Ruth Millikan's theory, but it also poses the question of how we can understand the reference of kind terms when the ontological status of the kind term is uncertain or disputed.
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  34. James D. Carney (1983). Names and the de Re/de Dicto Distinction. Philosophia 12 (3-4):357-361.
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  35. James D. Carney (1977). Fictional Names. Philosophical Studies 32 (4):383 - 391.
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  36. L. S. Carrier (1971). Meaning and Proper Names. Southern Journal of Philosophy 9 (3):237-245.
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  37. Peter Carruthers (1983). Understanding Names. Philosophical Quarterly 33 (130):19-36.
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  38. Andrew Carstairs-McCarthy (2003). What Proper Names, and Their Absence, Do Not Demonstrate. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (3):288-289.
    Hurford claims that empty variables antedated proper names in linguistic (not merely logical) predicate-argument structure, and this had an effect on visual perception. But his evidence, drawn from proper names and the supposed inability of nonhumans to recognise individual conspecifics, is weak. So visual perception seems less relevant to the evolution of grammar than Hurford thinks.
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  39. William Carter (1998). How Not to Preserve Kripke's Fundamental Insight. Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):99-108.
    Kripke´s work on names and identity continues to be subject of intense critical scrutiny. The Kripkean message, briefly statet, is that names are rigid designators and that identy statements formulated in terms of names are, if true, necessarily true. Recently Micheal Jubien developes a revisionist line that denies that names serve a referential role but allows, nonetheless, that Kripke´s fundamental insight can be preserved. In my paper, I critically examine Jubien´s proposal for preserving the Kripkean insight that "deserves to be (...)
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  40. Hector-Neri Castañeda (1985). The Semantics and the Causal Roles of Proper Names. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (1):91-113.
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  41. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1985). The Semantics and the Causal Roles of Proper Names. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (1):91 - 113.
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  42. David Charles (1994). Aristotle on Names and Their Signification. In Stephen Everson (ed.), Language. Cambridge University Press 3--37.
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  43. Demetra Christopoulou, How to Deal with Janus'face of Natural Numbers?
    This paper addresses a dilemma arising from the linguistic behaviour of arithmetical expressions in two basic ways: they occur, either as singular terms in identity statements or as predicates of concepts in adjectival statements. However, those forms of syntactical behaviour give rise to opposite accounts of the ontological status of natural numbers. The substantival use of arithmetical expressions is associated with the interpretation of natural numbers as abstract particulars while the adjectival use of arithmetical expressions ordinarily supports the interpretation of (...)
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  44. Ralph Clark (2011). Perspectival Direct Reference for Proper Names. Philosophia 39 (2):251-265.
    I defend what I believe to be a new variation on Kripkean themes, for the purpose of providing an improved way to understand the referring functions of proper names. I begin by discussing roles played by perceptual perspectives in the use of proper names, and then broaden the discussion to include what I call cognitive perspectives. Although both types of perspectives underwrite the existence of intentional intermediaries between proper names and their referents, the existence of these intentional intermediaries does not (...)
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  45. Richard Coates (2009). A Strictly Millian Approach to the Definition of the Proper Name. Mind and Language 24 (4):433-444.
    A strictly Millian approach to proper names is defended, i.e. one in which expressions when used properly ('onymically') refer directly, i.e. without the semantic intermediaryship of the words that appear to comprise them. The approach may appear self-evident for names which appear to have no component parts (in current English) but less so for others. Two modes of reference are distinguished for potentially ambiguous expressions such as The Long Island . A consequence of this distinction is to allow a speculative (...)
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  46. Nino Cocchiarella (2005). Denoting Concepts, Reference, and the Logic of Names, Classes as Many, Groups, and Plurals. Linguistics and Philosophy 28 (2):135 - 179.
    Bertrand Russell introduced several novel ideas in his 1903 Principles of Mathematics that he later gave up and never went back to in his subsequent work. Two of these are the related notions of denoting concepts and classes as many. In this paper we reconstruct each of these notions in the framework of conceptual realism and connect them through a logic of names that encompasses both proper and common names, and among the latter, complex as well as simple common names. (...)
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  47. John Collins, Names, Descriptions and Quantifiers.
  48. Arthur Bernard Cook (1894). Descriptive Animal Names in Greece. The Classical Review 8 (09):381-385.
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  49. Eros Corazza (2002). Description-Names. Journal of Philosophical Logic 31 (4):313-325.
    It is argued that, contrary to appearances, description-names (e.g.: "The Roman Empire", "The Beatles", "The Holy Virgin",...) do conform to Millianism, i.e. the view that proper names are directly referential expressions, referring regardless of whether the relevant individual satisfies some associated description or not. However, description-names name and describe. Some arguments supporting this peculiarity and a logic to handle description-names are proposed. It will be shown that the best framework with which to accommodate description-names is a multiple-proposition theory, according to (...)
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  50. J. Angelo Corlett (1989). Is Kripke's Puzzle Really a Puzzle? Theoria 55 (2):95-113.
    In his famous essay, "A Puzzle About Belief," Saul Kripke poses a puzzle regarding belief. In this paper I shall first describe Kripke's puzzle. Second, I shall introduce and examine five positions one might take in attempting to solve Kripke's Puzzle. In so doing, I shall show why each of these attempts fails to solve Kripke's Puzzle. The significance of this analysis is that if Kripke's Puzzle remains unresolved, then (as Kripke himself claims) the normal apparatus for belief ascription needs (...)
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