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  1. Frederick R. Adams (1993). Reply to Russow's Fodor, Adams and Causal Properties. Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):63-65.
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  2. Frederick R. Adams, David Drebushenko, Gary Fuller & Robert A. Stecker (1990). Narrow Content: Fodor's Folly. Mind and Language 5 (3):213-29.
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  3. Frederick R. Adams & Gary Fuller (1992). Names, Contents, and Causes. Mind and Language 7 (3):205-21.
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  4. Lilian Alweiss (2009). Between Internalism and Externalism: Husserl's Account of Intentionality. Inquiry 52 (1):53 – 78.
    There is a strong consensus among analytic philosophers that Husserl is an internalist and that his internalism must be understood in conjunction with his methodological solipsism. This paper focuses on Husserl's early work the, Logical Investigations , and explores whether such a reading is justified. It shows that Husserl is not a methodological solipsist: He neither believes that meaning can be reduced to the individual, nor does he assign an explanatory role for meaning to the subject. Explanatory priority is assigned (...)
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  5. Louise M. Antony, What Are You Thinking? Character and Content in the Language of Thought.
  6. Louise M. Antony (1990). Semantic Anorexia: On the Notion of Content in Cognitive Science. In George S. Boolos (ed.), Meaning and Method. Cambridge University Press.
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  7. Dan Arnold (2009). Svasamvitti as Methodological Solipsism: Narrow Content and the Problem of Intentionality in Buddhist Philosophy of Mind. In Mario D'Amato, Jay L. Garfield & Tom J. F. Tillemans (eds.), Pointing at the Moon: Buddhism, Logic, Analytic Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
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  8. Murat Aydede (1997). Has Fodor Really Changed His Mind on Narrow Content? Mind and Language 12 (3-4):422-58.
    In his latest book, The Elm and the Expert (1994), Fodor notoriously rejects the notion of narrow content as superfluous. He envisions a scientific intentional psychology that adverts only to broad content properties in its explanations. I argue that Fodor's change in view is only apparent and that his previous position (1985-1991) is extensionally equivalent to his "new" position (1994). I show that, despite what he says narrow content is for in his (1994), Fodor himself has previously never appealed to (...)
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  9. Kent Bach (1996). Content: Wide Vs. Narrow. In Edward Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge.
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  10. Lynne Rudder Baker (1994). Content and Context. Philosophical Perspectives 8:17-32.
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  11. Lynne Rudder Baker (1987). Content by Courtesy. Journal of Philosophy 84 (April):197-213.
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  12. Lynne Rudder Baker (1987). Saving Belief. Princeton University Press.
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  13. Lynne Rudder Baker (1985). A Farewell to Functionalism. Philosophical Studies 48 (July):1-14.
    dilemma, a dilemma concerning the individuation of psychological states that explain behavior. Beliefs are individuated by most functionahsts in terms of that 'that'-clauses; functional states are individuated 'narrowly' (i.e.
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  14. Lynne Rudder Baker (1985). Just What Do We Have in Mind? Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):25-48.
    Nevertheless, I believe that, as it has been construed recently, the assumption is false. At the very least, it does not deserve the largely unquestioned status it enjoys, as I hope to show by a graduated series of thought experiments. I present the thought experiments as a series to expose a shared inadequacy in a variety of individualistic views, from type-type physicalism to the most sophisticated methodological solipsism; and I present them as graduated to suggest that having accepted the first (...)
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  15. Paul Bernier (1993). Narrow Content, Context of Thought, and Asymmetric Dependence. Mind and Language 8 (3):327-42.
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  16. Akeel Bilgrami (1989). Realism Without Internalism: A Critique of Searle on Intentionality. Journal of Philosophy 86 (February):57-72.
  17. John I. Biro (1992). In Defense of Social Content. Philosophical Studies 67 (3):277-93.
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  18. Ned Block (1995). Ruritania Revisited. Philosophical Issues 6:171-187.
    Perhaps you are wondering what I mean by ‘holism’. After all, everyone seems to use the term in a different sense. Even if we restrict ourselves to holism of meaning and content, we have many different holisms. Some take holism about meaning to be the doctrine that if you’ve got one meaning, you’ve got lots of them.2 On other views, to say meaning is holistic is to say that the meaning of each term depends on the meanings of all or (...)
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  19. Ned Block (1991). What Narrow Content is Not. In Barry M. Loewer & Georges Rey (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Blackwell.
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  20. S. E. Boer (2001). A Slim Book About Narrow Content. Gabriel M. A. Segal. Mind 110 (440):1115-1119.
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  21. Steven E. Boër (2001). A Slim Book About Narrow Content. Gabriel M. A. Segal. Mind 110 (440):1115-1119.
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  22. George S. Boolos (ed.) (1990). Meaning and Method: Essays in Honor of Hilary Putnam. Cambridge University Press.
    This volume is a report on the state of philosophy in a number of significant areas.
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  23. Joao Branquinho (1999). The Problem of Cognitive Dynamics. Grazer Philosophische Studien Grazen 56:2-15.
    This paper is devoted to an examination of some aspects of the central issue of Cognitive Dynamics, the issue about the conditions under which intentional mental states may persist over time. I discuss two main sorts of approach to the topic: the directly referential approach, which I take as best represented in David Kaplan?s views, and the neo-Fregean approach, which I take as best represented in Gareth Evans?s views. The upshot of my discussion is twofold. On the one hand, I (...)
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  24. David M. Braun (2002). Cognitive Significance, Attitude Ascriptions, and Ways of Believing Propositions. Philosophical Studies 108 (1-2):65-81.
    We use names to talk about objects. We use predicates to talk about properties and relations. We use sentences to attribute properties and relations to objects. We say things when we utter sentences, often things we believe.
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  25. Berit Brogaard (2010). Centered Worlds and the Content of Perception: Short Version. In David Sosa (ed.), Philosophical Books (Analytic Philosophy).
    0. Relativistic Content In standard semantics, propositional content, whether it be the content of utterances or mental states, has a truth-value relative only to a possible world. For example, the content of my utterance of ‘Jim is sitting now’ is true just in case Jim is sitting at the time of utterance in the actual world, and the content of my belief that Alice will give a talk tomorrow is true just in case Alice will give a talk on the (...)
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  26. Curtis Brown, Narrow Mental Content. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Narrow mental content is a kind of mental content that does not depend on an individual's environment. Narrow content contrasts with “broad” or “wide” content, which depends on features of the individual's environment as well as on features of the individual. It is controversial whether there is any such thing as narrow content. Assuming that there is, it is also controversial what sort of content it is, what its relation to ordinary or “broad” content is, and how it is determined (...)
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  27. Curtis Brown (1993). Belief States and Narrow Content. Mind and Language 8 (3):343-67.
    The first thesis is that beliefs play a role in explaining behavior. This is reasonably uncontroversial, though it has been controverted. Why did I raise my arm? Because I wanted to emphasize a point, and believed that I could do so by raising my arm. The belief that I could emphasize a point by raising my arm is central to the most natural explanation of my action.
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  28. David J. Chalmers (2003). The Nature of Narrow Content. Philosophical Issues 13 (1):46-66.
    A content of a subject's mental state is narrow when it is determined by the subject's intrinsic properties: that is, when any possible intrinsic duplicate of the subject has a corresponding mental state with the same content. A content of a subject's mental state is..
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  29. David J. Chalmers (2002). The Components of Content. In , Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press.
    [[This paper appears in my anthology _Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings_ (Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 608-633. It is a heavily revised version of a paper first written in 1994 and revised in 1995. Sections 1, 7, 8, and 10 are similar to the old version, but the other sections are quite different. Because the old version has been widely cited, I have made it available (in its 1995 version) at http://consc.net/papers/content95.html.
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  30. David J. Chalmers (2002). The Components of Content (Revised Version). In , Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oup Usa.
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  31. Kam-Yuen Cheng (2002). Narrow Content and Historical Accounts: Can Fodor Live Without Them? Journal of Philosophical Research 27:101-113.
    Fodor’s Informational Semantics states that the content of a representation depends on the counterfactual relation between the representation and the represented. However, his theory suffers from the psychological explanation problem and the indeterminacy problem raised by twin cases. In response to these problems, Fodor has introduced narrow content and a mixed theory of content that combines a historical account with the counterfactual account. In The Elm and the Expert, he drops both of them for the reason that twin cases are (...)
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  32. Noam Chomsky (1995). Language and Nature. Mind 104 (413):1-61.
  33. Sean Crawford (2003). Relational Properties, Causal Powers and Psychological Laws. Acta Analytica 18 (30-31):193-216.
    This paper argues that Twin Earth twins belong to the same psychological natural kind, but that the reason for this is not that the causal powers of mental states supervene on local neural structure. Fodor’s argument for this latter thesis is criticized and found to rest on a confusion between it and the claim that Putnamian and Burgean type relational psychological properties do not affect the causal powers of the mental states that have them. While it is true that Putnamian (...)
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  34. Sean Crawford (1998). In Defence of Object-Dependent Thoughts. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (2):201-210.
    The existence of object-dependent thoughts has been doubted on the grounds that reference to such thoughts is unnecessary or 'redundant' in the psychological explanation of intentional action. This paper argues to the contrary that reference to object-dependent thoughts is necessary to the proper psychological explanation of intentional action upon objects. Section I sets out the argument for the alleged explanatory redundancy of object-dependent thoughts; an argument which turns on the coherence of an alternative 'dual-component' model of explanation. Section II rebuts (...)
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  35. Martin Davies (1986). Externality, Psychological Explanation, and Narrow Content. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 60:263-83.
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  36. Martin Davies (1986). Individualism and Supervenience: Externality, Psychological Explanation, and Narrow Content. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 263:263-283.
  37. Daniel C. Dennett (1983). Beyond Belief. In Andrew Woodfield (ed.), Thought and Object. Oxford University Press.
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  38. Michael Devitt (1990). The Narrow Representational Theory of Mind. In William G. Lycan (ed.), Mind and Cognition. Blackwell.
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  39. Hartry Field (1990). "Narrow" Aspects of Intentionality and the Information-Theoretic Approach to Content. In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Information, Semantics, and Epistemology. Blackwell. 102--116.
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  40. Jerry A. Fodor (1991). A Modal Argument for Narrow Content. Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):5-26.
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  41. Jerry A. Fodor (1986). Individualism and Supervenience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 60:235-262.
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  42. Bryan Frances, A Philosophically Inexpensive Introduction to Twin-Earth.
    I say that it’s philosophically inexpensive because I think it is more convincing than any other Twin-Earth thought experiment in that it sidesteps many of the standard objections to the usual thought experiments. I also briefly discuss narrow contents and give an analysis of Putnam’s original argument.
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  43. Bryan Frances (1999). On the Explanatory Deficiencies of Linguistic Content. Philosophical Studies 93 (1):45-75.
    The Burge-Putnam thought experiments have generated the thesis that beliefs are not fixed by the constitution of the body. However, many philosophers have thought that if this is true then there must be another content-like property. Even if the contents of our attitudes such as the one in ‘believes that aluminum is a light metal’, do not supervene on our physical makeups, nevertheless people who are physical duplicates must be the same when it comes to evaluating their rationality and explaining (...)
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  44. N. Georgalis (1996). Awareness, Understanding, and Functionalism. Erkenntnis 44 (2):225-56.
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  45. Nicholas Georgalis (2006). The Primacy of the Subjective: Foundations for a Unified Theory of Mind and Language. Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.
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  46. Nick Georgalis (2006). First-Person Intentionality. In The Primacy of the Subjective. Mit Press.
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  47. Robert H. Grimm & D. D. Merrill (eds.) (1988). Contents of Thought. University of Arizona Press.
  48. Ulrike Haas-Spohn (1999). Anti-Individualism and Cognitive Semantics. DFG-Forschergruppe Logik in Der Philosophie 15.
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  49. Ulrike Haas-Spohn (1994). Hidden Indexicality and Subjective Meaning. Dissertation, Universitaet Tuebingen
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  50. Valerie Gray Hardcastle (1997). Discussion: [Explanation] is Explanation Better. Philosophy of Science 64 (1):154-160.
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