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  1. Majid Amini (2011). Fodor's Argument for Linguistic Nativism. In Michael Bruce & Steven Barbone (eds.), Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell
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  2. Zoltan Jakab (2013). How to Improve on Quinian Bootstrapping – a Response to Nativist Objections. Proceedings of the 35th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society.
    Quinian bootstrapping is Susan Carey's solution to Fodor’s paradox of concept learning. Carey claims that contrary to Fodor’s view, not all learning amounts to hypothesis testing, and that there are ways in which even primitive concepts can be learned. Recently Georges Rey has argued that Carey’s attempt to refute radical concept nativism is unsuccessful. First it cannot explain how the expressive power of mental representational systems could increase due to learning. Second, both Fodorian circularity charges and Goodmanian problems of indeterminacy (...)
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  3. David Martel Johnson & Christina E. Erneling (eds.) (1997). The Future of the Cognitive Revolution, Chapter 11. Oxford University Press.
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  4. Kent Johnson (2004). Gold's Theorem and Cognitive Science. Philosophy of Science 70 (4):571-592.
    A variety of inaccurate claims about Gold's Theorem have appeared in the cognitive science literature. I begin by characterizing the logic of this theorem and its proof. I then examine several claims about Gold's Theorem, and I show why they are false. Finally, I assess the significance of Gold's Theorem for cognitive science.
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  5. Henry Rosemont Jr (1978). Gathering Evidence for Linguistic Innateness. Synthese 38 (1):127 - 148.
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  6. Annette Karmiloff-Smith, Kim Plunkett & Mark H. Johnson (1998). What Does It Mean to Claim That Something Is 'Innate'? Response to Clark, Harris, Lightfoot and Samuels. Mind and Language 13 (4):588-597.
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  7. J. M. Katz (2000). Realistic Rationalism. MIT Press.
    Jerrold Katz develops a new philosophical position integrating realism and rationalism.
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  8. J. M. Katz (1966). Innate Ideas. In The Philosophy of Language. Harper & Row
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  9. Jerrold J. Katz (1966). The Philosophy of Language. New York, Harper & Row.
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  10. Lawrence J. Kaye (1993). Are Most of Our Concepts Innate? Synthese 2 (2):187-217.
    Fodor has argued that, because concept acquisition relies on the use of concepts already possessed by the learner, all concepts that cannot be definitionally reduced are innate. Since very few reductive definitions are available, it appears that most concepts are innate. After noting the reasons why we find such radical concept nativism implausible, I explicate Fodor's argument, showing that anyone who is committed to mentalistic explanation should take it seriously. Three attempts at avoiding the conclusion are examined and found to (...)
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  11. Frank Keil, Nurturing Nativism.
    empiricist approaches to knowledge acquisition. I say " appears" because so often the debaters seem to be talking past each other, arguing about different things or misunderstanding each other in such basic ways that the debates can seem to an observer as incoherent. For these reasons there has been a powerful need for a systematic treatment of the different senses of nativism and empiricism that considers both their historical contexts and their current manifestations. Cowie's book offers such a treatment, one (...)
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  12. Muhammad Ali Khalidi (2001). Innateness and Domain-Specificity. Philosophical Studies 105 (2):191-210.
    There is a widespread assumption in cognitive science that there is anintrinsic link between the phenomena of innateness and domainspecificity. Many authors seem to hold that given the properties ofthese two phenomena, it follows that innate mental states aredomain-specific, or that domain-specific states are innate. My aim inthis paper is to argue that there are no convincing grounds forasserting either claim. After introducing the notions of innateness anddomain specificity, I consider some possible arguments for theconclusion that innate cognitive states are (...)
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  13. Simon Kirby (1999). Function, Selection, and Innateness the Emergence of Language Universals. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
    This book explores issues at the core of modern linguistics and cognitive science. Why are all languages similar in some ways and in others utterly different? Why do languages change and change variably? How did the human capacity for language evolve, and how far did it do so as an innate ability? Simon Kirby looks at these questions from a broad perspective, arguing that they can be studied together. The author begins by examining how far the universal properties of language (...)
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  14. Philip S. Kitcher (1978). The Nativist's Dilemma. Philosophical Quarterly 28 (January):1-16.
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  15. Joshua Knobe & Richard Samuels (2013). Thinking Like a Scientist: Innateness as a Case Study. Cognition 126 (1):72-86.
    The concept of innateness appears in systematic research within cognitive science, but it also appears in less systematic modes of thought that long predate the scientific study of the mind. The present studies therefore explore the relationship between the properly scientific uses of this concept and its role in ordinary folk understanding. Studies 1-4 examined the judgments of people with no specific training in cognitive science. Results showed (a) that judgments about whether a trait was innate were not affected by (...)
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  16. Stephen Laurence & Eric Margolis (2003). Radical Concept Nativism. Cognition 86 (1):25-55.
    Radical concept nativism is the thesis that virtually all lexical concepts are innate. Notoriously endorsed by Jerry Fodor (1975, 1981), radical concept nativism has had few supporters. However, it has proven difficult to say exactly what’s wrong with Fodor’s argument. We show that previous responses are inadequate on a number of grounds. Chief among these is that they typically do not achieve sufficient distance from Fodor’s dialectic, and, as a result, they do not illuminate the central question of how new (...)
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  17. Wendy Lee-Lampshire (1998). The Foundation Walls That Are Carried by the House: A Critique of the Poverty of Stimulus Thesis and a Wittgensteinian-Dennettian Alternative. Journal of Mind and Behavior 19 (2):177-193.
  18. Andreas C. Lehmann (1998). Historical Increases in Expert Performance Suggest Large Possibilities for Improvement of Performance Without Implicating Innate Capacities. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (3):419-420.
    Innate talents supposedly limit an individual's highest attainable level of performance and the rate of skill acquisition. However, Howe et al. have not reviewed evidence that the level of expert performance has increased dramatically over the last few centuries. Those increases demonstrate that the highest levels of performance may be less constrained by innate capacities than is commonly believed.
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  19. David G. Lockwood (2003). “Parallel Architecture” as a Variety of Stratificationalism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (6):686-687.
    The model of parallel architecture for language presented by Jackendoff is a kind of stratificational model in the spirit of Sydney Lamb. It differs from the more usual stratificationalism most importantly in its clear commitment to nativism, though the variety of nativism is greatly modified from what is more usual among Chomskyans. The revised model presents a potential for fruitful discussion with proponents of stratificationalism, and the potential for enrichment via a relational implementation.
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  20. Cynthia Macdonald (1990). What is Empiricism?--, Nativism, Naturalism, and Evolutionary Theory. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 81:81-92.
  21. Eduoard Machery & P. E. Griffiths, Innateness, Canalization, and 'Biologicising the Mind'.
    This paper examines and rejects the claim that ‘innateness is canalization’. Waddington’s concept of canalization is distinguished from the narrower concept of environmental canalization with which it is often confused. Evidence is presented that the concept of environmental canalization is not an accurate analysis of the existing concept of innateness. The strategy of ‘biologicizing the mind’ by treating psychological or behavioral traits as if they were environmentally canalized physiological traits is criticized using data from developmental psychobiology. It is concluded that (...)
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  22. Ron Mallon & Jonathan M. Weinberg (2006). Innateness as Closed Process Invariance. Philosophy of Science 73 (3):323-344.
    Controversies over the innateness of cognitive processes, mechanisms, and structures play a persistent role in driving research in philosophy as well as the cognitive sciences, but the appropriate way to understand the category of the innate remains subject to dispute. One venerable approach in philosophy and cognitive science merely contrasts innate features with those that are learned. In fact, Jerry Fodor has recently suggested that this remains our best handle on innateness.
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  23. Matteo Mameli & Patrick Bateson (2006). Innateness and the Sciences. Biology and Philosophy 21 (2):155-188.
    The concept of innateness is a part of folk wisdom but is also used by biologists and cognitive scientists. This concept has a legitimate role to play in science only if the colloquial usage relates to a coherent body of evidence. We examine many different candidates for the post of scientific successor of the folk concept of innateness. We argue that none of these candidates is entirely satisfactory. Some of the candidates are more interesting and useful than others, but the (...)
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  24. Matteo Mameli & David Papineau (2006). The New Nativism: A Commentary on Gary Marcus's The Birth of the Mind. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 21 (4):559-573.
    Gary Marcus has written a very interesting book about mental development from a nativist perspective. For the general readership at which the book is largely aimed, it will be interesting because of its many informative examples of the development of cognitive structures and because of its illuminating explanations of ways in which genes can contribute to these developmental processes. However, the book is also interesting from a theoretical point of view. Marcus tries to make nativism compatible with the central arguments (...)
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  25. Gary F. Marcus (2005). What Developmental Biology Can Tell Us About Innateness. In Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind: Structure and Contents. New York: Oxford University Press New York 23.
    This chapter examines an apparent tension created by recent research on neurological development and genetics on the one hand and cognitive development on the other. It considers what it might mean for intrinsic signals to guide the initial establishment of functional architecture. It argues that an understanding of the mechanisms by which the body develops can inform our understanding of the mechanisms by which the brain develops. It cites the view of developmental neurobiologists Fukuchi-Shimogori and Grove, that the patterning of (...)
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  26. Gary F. Marcus (2004). Birth of the Mind: How a Tiny Number of Genes Creates the Complexity of Human Thought. Basic Books.
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  27. Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence (2013). In Defense of Nativism. Philosophical Studies 165 (2):693-718.
    This paper takes a fresh look at the nativism–empiricism debate, presenting and defending a nativist perspective on the mind. Empiricism is often taken to be the default view both in philosophy and in cognitive science. This paper argues, on the contrary, that there should be no presumption in favor of empiricism (or nativism), but that the existing evidence suggests that nativism is the most promising framework for the scientific study of the mind. Our case on behalf of nativism has four (...)
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  28. Robert J. Matthews (2001). Cowie's Anti-Nativism. Mind and Language 16 (2):215-230.
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  29. James A. McGilvray (2006). On the Innateness of Language. In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science. Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing 97--112.
  30. James A. McGilvray (ed.) (2005). The Cambridge Companion to Chomsky. Cambridge University Press.
    A comprehensive and accessible companion to the various aspects of Noam Chomsky's work.
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  31. Jacques Mehler & R. Fox (eds.) (1985). Neonate Cognition: Beyond the Blooming Buzzing Confusion. Lawrence Erlbaum.
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  32. Celia L. Moore (2003). Evolution, Development, and the Individual Acquisition of Traits: What We've Learned Since Baldwin. In Bruce H. Weber & David J. Depew (eds.), Evolution and Learning: The Baldwin Effect Reconsidered. MIT Press 115--139.
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  33. K. Moutoussis, Alexander Maier, Semir Zeki & Nikos K. Logothetis (2005). Seeing Invisible Motion: Responses of Area V5 Neurons in the Awake-Behaving Macaque. Soc. For Neurosci. Abstr 390 (11).
    Moutoussis, K., A. Maier, S. Zeki and N. K. Logothetis: Seeing invisible motion: responses of area V5 neurons in the awake-behaving macaque. Soc. for Neurosci. Abstr. 390.11, 1.
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  34. Nicholas Nicastro (2004). Who is Mind Blind? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (6):745-746.
    The authors attempt to explain the ubiquity and persistence of human religion by invoking innate, domain-specific cognitive furniture, while dismissing the potential of other approaches, such as memetics, to produce “mindful” understandings of religion. This commentary challenges the explanatory adequacy of cognitive nativism, suggesting that memetics has as much claim to utility and “mindfulness” as innate mental modules do. And why beholdest thou the mote that is in thy brother's eye, but considerest not the beam that is in thine own (...)
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  35. Shaun Nichols (2005). Innateness and Moral Psychology. In Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind: Structure and Contents. New York: Oxford University Press New York 353--369.
    Although linguistic nativism has received the bulk of attention in contemporary innateness debates, moral nativism has perhaps an even deeper ancestry. If linguistic nativism is Cartesian, moral nativism is Platonic. Moral nativism has taken a backseat to linguistic nativism in contemporary discussions largely because Chomsky made a case for linguistic nativism characterized by unprecedented rigor. Hence it is not surprising that recent attempts to revive the thesis that we have innate moral knowledge have drawn on Chomsky’s framework. I’ll argue, however, (...)
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  36. Elizabeth O’Neill (2015). Relativizing Innateness: Innateness as the Insensitivity of the Appearance of a Trait with Respect to Specified Environmental Variation. Biology and Philosophy 30 (2):211-225.
    I object to eliminativism about innateness and André Ariew’s identification of innateness with canalization, and I propose a new treatment of innateness. I first argue that the concept of innateness is serving a valuable function in a diverse set of research contexts, and in these contexts, claims about innateness are best understood as claims about the insensitivity of the appearance of a trait to certain variations in the environment. I then argue that innateness claims, like claims about canalization, should be (...)
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  37. Jean Piaget (1980). About the Fixed Nucleus and its Innateness. In Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini (ed.), Language and Learning: The Debate Between Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky. Harvard University Press 57--61.
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  38. Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini (1986). The Rise of Selective Theories: A Case Study and Some Lessons From Immunology. In William Demopoulos (ed.), Language Learning and Concept Acquisition. Ablex
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  39. Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini (ed.) (1980). Language and Learning: The Debate Between Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky. Harvard University Press.
  40. Paul M. Pietroski & Stephen Crain (2005). Innate Ideas. In James A. McGilvray (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Chomsky. Cambridge 164--181.
    Here's one way this chapter could go. After defining the terms 'innate' and 'idea', we say whether Chomsky thinks any ideas are innate -- and if so, which ones. Unfortunately, we don't have any theoretically interesting definitions to offer; and, so far as we know, Chomsky has never said that any ideas are innate. Since saying that would make for a very short chapter, we propose to do something else. Our aim is to locate Chomsky, as he locates himself, in (...)
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  41. David Pitt (2000). Nativism and the Theory of Content. Protosociology 14:222-239.
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  42. Jesse J. Prinz (2009). Against Moral Nativism. In Dominic Murphy & Michael A. Bishop (eds.), Stich and His Critics. Wiley-Blackwell 167--189.
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  43. Geoffrey K. Pullum (2002). Empirical Assessment of Stimulus Poverty Arguments. Linguistic Review.
  44. Hilary Putnam (1980). Comments on Chomsky's and Fodor's Replies. In Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini (ed.), Language and Learning: The Debate Between Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky. Harvard University Press
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  45. Hilary Putnam (1980). What is Innate and Why. In Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini (ed.), Language and Learning: The Debate Between Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky. Harvard University Press
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  46. S. Quartz (2003). Innateness and the Brain. Biology and Philosophy 18 (1):13-40.
    The philosophical innateness debate has long relied onpsychological evidence. For a century, however, a parallel debate hastaken place within neuroscience. In this paper, I consider theimplications of this neuroscience debate for the philosophicalinnateness debate. By combining the tools of theoretical neurobiologyand learning theory, I introduce the ``problem of development'' that alladaptive systems must solve, and suggest how responses to this problemcan demarcate a number of innateness proposals. From this perspective, Isuggest that the majority of natural systems are in fact innate. (...)
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  47. Athanassios Raftopoulos & Vincent C. Müller (2002). Deictic Codes, Demonstratives, and Reference: A Step Toward Solving the Grounding Problem. In Wayne D. Gray & Christian D. Schunn (eds.), Cogsci 2002, 24th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society. Lawrence Erlbaum 762-767.
    In this paper we address the issue of grounding for experiential concepts. Given that perceptual demonstratives are a basic form of such concepts, we examine ways of fixing the referents of such demonstratives. To avoid ‘encodingism’, that is, relating representations to representations, we postulate that the process of reference fixing must be bottom-up and nonconceptual, so that it can break the circle of conceptual content and touch the world. For that purpose, an appropriate causal relation between representations and the world (...)
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  48. William Ramsey & Stephen P. Stich (1990). Connectionism and Three Levels of Nativism. Synthese 82 (2):177-205.
    Along with the increasing popularity of connectionist language models has come a number of provocative suggestions about the challenge these models present to Chomsky's arguments for nativism. The aim of this paper is to assess these claims. We begin by reconstructing Chomsky's argument from the poverty of the stimulus and arguing that it is best understood as three related arguments, with increasingly strong conclusions. Next, we provide a brief introduction to connectionism and give a quick survey of recent efforts to (...)
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  49. Valentine Reynaud (2014). Can Innateness Ascriptions Avoid Tautology? Philosophia Scientiæ 18:177-190.
    Les hypothèses sur l’innéité d’un trait formulées par les sciences cognitives – l’hypothèse d’une faculté innée de langage, par exemple – peuvent-elles échapper à la tautologie? Aucune définition générale de l’innéité ne semble pleinement satisfaisante. En tant que notion dispositionnelle, l’innéité rencontre le « problème de la tautologie » mis en évidence par Locke. Les jugements en matière d’innéité, qu’ils relèvent d’une théorie innéiste ou d’une théorie empiriste , dépendent toujours d’une vision particulière du développement cognitif. Ce fait ne condamne (...)
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  50. Paul Rozin (2006). About 17 Potential Principles About Links Between the Innate Mind and Culture: Preadaptation, Predispositions, Preferences, Pathways, and Domains. In Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen P. Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind: Culture and Cognition.
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