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  1. Barbara Abbott (1999). Water =H 2 O. Mind 108 (429):145--8.
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  2. Barbara Abbott (1997). A Note on the Nature of "Water". Mind 106 (422):311-319.
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  3. Barbara Abbott (1989). Nondescriptionality and Natural Kind Terms. Linguistics and Philosophy 12 (3):269 - 291.
    The phrase "natural kind term" has come into the linguistic and philosophical literature in connection with well-known work of Kripke (1972) and Pulrmm (1970, 1975a). I use that phrase here in the sense it has acquired from those and subseqnent works on related topics. This is not the transparent sense of the phrase. That is, if I am right in what follows there are words for kinds of things existing in nature which are not natural kind terms in the current (...)
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  4. Leandro Assis & Ingo Brigandt (2009). Homology: Homeostatic Property Cluster Kinds in Systematics and Evolution. Evolutionary Biology 36:248-255.
    Taxa and homologues can in our view be construed both as kinds and as individuals. However, the conceptualization of taxa as natural kinds in the sense of homeostatic property cluster kinds has been criticized by some systematists, as it seems that even such kinds cannot evolve due to their being homeostatic. We reply by arguing that the treatment of transformational and taxic homologies, respectively, as dynamic and static aspects of the same homeostatic property cluster kind represents a good perspective for (...)
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  5. Michael R. Ayers (1981). Locke Versus Aristotle on Natural Kinds. Journal of Philosophy 78 (5):247-272.
  6. Jordan Bartol (forthcoming). Biochemical Kinds. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    Chemical kinds (e.g. gold) are generally treated as having timelessly fixed identities. Biological kinds (e.g. goldfinches) are generally treated as evolved and/or evolving entities. So what kind of kind is a biochemical kind? This paper defends the thesis that biochemical molecules are clustered chemical kinds, some of which–namely, evolutionarily conserved units–are also biological kinds.On this thesis, a number of difficulties that have recently occupied philosophers concerned with proteins and kinds are shown to be resolved or dissolved.
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  7. Helen Beebee & Nigel Sabbarton-Leary (eds.) (2010). The Semantics and Metaphysics of Natural Kinds. Routledge.
    Essentialism--roughly, the view that natural kinds have discrete essences, generating truths that are necessary but knowable only a posteriori --is an increasingly popular view in the metaphysics of science. At the same time, philosophers of language have been subjecting Kripke’s views about the existence and scope of the necessary a posteriori to rigorous analysis and criticism. Essentialists typically appeal to Kripkean semantics to motivate their radical extension of the realm of the necessary a posteriori ; but they rarely attempt to (...)
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  8. Helen Beebee & Nigel Sabbarton-Leary (2010). Introduction. In Helen Beebee & Nigel Sabbarton-Leary (eds.), The Semantics and Metaphysics of Natural Kinds. Routledge.
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  9. Helen Beebee & Nigel Sabbarton-Leary (2010). On the Abuse of the Necessary a Posteriori. In Helen Beebee & Nigel Sabbarton-Leary (eds.), The Semantics and Metaphysics of Natural Kinds. Routledge. 159--79.
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  10. Corine Besson (2010). Rigidity, Natural Kind Terms, and Metasemantics. In Helen Beebee & Nigel Sabbarton-Leary (eds.), The Semantics and Metaphysics of Natural Kinds. Routledge. 25--44.
    A paradigmatic case of rigidity for singular terms is that of proper names. And it would seem that a paradigmatic case of rigidity for general terms is that of natural kind terms. However, many philosophers think that rigidity cannot be extended from singular terms to general terms. The reason for this is that rigidity appears to become trivial when such terms are considered: natural kind terms come out as rigid, but so do all other general terms, and in particular all (...)
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  11. John Bigelow, Brian Ellis & Caroline Lierse (1992). The World as One of a Kind: Natural Necessity and Laws of Nature. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 43 (3):371-388.
  12. Alexander Bird, Are Natural Kinds Reducible?
    We talk as if there are natural kinds and in particular we quantify over them. We can count the number of elements discovered by Sir Humphrey Davy, or the number of kinds of particle in the standard model. Consequently, it looks at first sight at least, that natural kinds are entities of a sort. In the light of this we may ask certain questions: is the apparent existence of natural kinds real or an illusion? And if real, what sort of (...)
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  13. Alexander Bird (2010). Discovering the Essences of Natural Kinds. In Helen Beebee & Nigel Sabbarton-Leary (eds.), The Semantics and Metaphysics of Natural Kinds. Routledge.
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  14. Alexander Bird (2009). Essences and Natural Kinds. In Robin Le Poidevin (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics. Routledge. 497--506.
    Essentialism as applied to individuals is the claim that for at least some individuals there are properties that those individuals possess essentially. What it is to possess a property essentially is a matter of debate. To possess a property essentially is often taken to be akin to possessing a property necessarily, but stronger, although this is not a feature of Aristotle’s essentialism, according to which essential properties are those thing could not lose without ceasing to exist. Kit Fine (1994) takes (...)
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  15. Alexander Bird (2008). Remarks on Our Knowledge of Modal Facts. Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 43:54--60.
    Can we have a posteriori knowledge of modal facts? And if so, is that knowledge fundamentally a posteriori, or does a priori intuition provide the modal component of what is known? Though the latter view seems more straightforward, there are also reasons for taking the first option seriously.
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  16. Alexander Bird (2008). Lowe on a Posteriori Essentialism. Analysis 68 (4):336 - 344.
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  17. Alexander Bird (2007). A Posteriori Knowledge of Natural Kind Essences. Philosophical Topics 35 (1-2):293-312.
    I defend this claim that some natural essences can be known (only) a pos- teriori against two philosophers who accept essentialism but who hold that essences are known a priori: Joseph LaPorte, who argues from the use of kind terms in science, and E. J. Lowe, who argues from general metaphysical and epistemological principles.
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  18. Alexander Bird & Emma Tobin (2008). Natural Kinds. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  19. Steven Boër (1985). Substance and Kind: Reflections on New Theory of Reference. In B. K. Matilal & J. L. Shaw (eds.), Analytical Philosophy in Comparative Perspective. D. Reidel. 103-50.
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  20. Richard Boyd (2010). Realism, Natural Kinds, and Philosophical Methods. In Helen Beebee & Nigel Sabbarton-Leary (eds.), The Semantics and Metaphysics of Natural Kinds. Routledge. 212--234.
  21. Richard Boyd (1999). Homeostasis, Species, and Higher Taxa. In R. A. Wilson (ed.), Species: New Interdisciplinary Essays. Mit Press. 141-85.
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  22. Richard Boyd (1991). Realism, Anti-Foundationalism and the Enthusiasm for Natural Kinds. Philosophical Studies 61 (1-2):127-48.
  23. David Braddon-Mitchell (2005). Conceptual Stability and the Meaning of Natural Kind Terms. Biology and Philosophy 20 (4):859-868.
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  24. J. Brakel (1990). Units of Measurement and Natural Kinds: Some Kripkean Considerations. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 33 (3):297 - 317.
    Kripke has argued that definitions of units of measurements provide examples of statements that are both contingent and a priori. In this paper I argue that definitions of units of measurement are intended to be stipulations of what Kripke calls theoretical identities: a stipulation that two terms will have the same rigid designation. Hence such a definition is both a priori and necessary. The necessity arises because such definitions appeal to natural kind properties only, which on Kripke's account are necessary.
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  25. David Braun (2006). Names and Natural Kind Terms. In Ernest Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press. 490--515.
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  26. Ingo Brigandt (2011). Natural Kinds and Concepts: A Pragmatist and Methodologically Naturalistic Account. In Jonathan Knowles & Henrik Rydenfelt (eds.), Pragmatism, Science and Naturalism. Peter Lang Publishing.
    The central aim of this essay is to put forward a notion of naturalism that broadly aligns with pragmatism. I do so by outlining my views on natural kinds and my account of concepts, which I have defended in recent publications (Brigandt 2009, in press-b). Philosophical accounts of both natural kinds and concepts are usually taken to be metaphysical endeavours, which attempt to develop a theory of the nature of natural kinds (as objectively existing entities of the world) or of (...)
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  27. Ingo Brigandt (2009). Natural Kinds in Evolution and Systematics: Metaphysical and Epistemological Considerations. Acta Biotheoretica 57:77-97.
    Despite the traditional focus on metaphysical issues in discussions of natural kinds in biology, epistemological considerations are at least as important. By revisiting the debate as to whether taxa are kinds or individuals, I argue that both accounts are metaphysically compatible, but that one or the other approach can be pragmatically preferable depending on the epistemic context. Recent objections against construing species as homeostatic property cluster kinds are also addressed. The second part of the paper broadens the perspective by considering (...)
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  28. Ingo Brigandt (2007). When Traditional Essentialism Fails. Philosophical Topics 35 (1/2):189-215.
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  29. Ingo Brigandt (2004). Biological Kinds and the Causal Theory of Reference. In J. C. Marek & M. E. Reicher (eds.), Experience and Analysis: Papers of the 27th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
    This paper uses an example from biology, the homology concept, to argue that current versions of the causal theory of reference give an incomplete account of reference determination. It is suggested that in addition to samples and stereotypical properties, the scientific use of concepts and the epistemic interests pursued with concepts are important factors in determining the reference of natural kind terms.
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  30. B. A. Brody (1967). Natural Kinds and Real Essences. Journal of Philosophy 64 (14):431-446.
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  31. Berit Brogaard (2004). Species as Individuals. Biology and Philosophy 19 (2):223-242.
    There is no question that the constituents of cells and organisms are joined together by the part-whole relation. Genes are part of cells, and cells are part of organisms. Species taxa, however, have traditionally been conceived of, not as wholes with parts, but as classes with members. But why does the relation change abruptly from part-whole to class-membership above the level of organisms? Ghiselin, Hull and others have argued that it doesn't. Cells and organisms are cohesive mereological sums, and since (...)
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  32. J. Brown (1998). Natural Kind Terms and Recognitional Capacities. Mind 107 (426):275-303.
    The main contribution of this paper is a new account of how a community may introduce a term for a natural kind in advance of knowing the correct scientific account of that kind. The account is motivated by the inadequacy of the currently dominant accounts of how a community may do this, namely those proposed by Kripke and by Putman. Their accounts fail to deal satisfactorily with the facts that (1) typically, an item that instantiates one natural kind instantiates several (...)
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  33. Barbara Brüning (2001). Natürliche Unarten. Erkenntnis 54 (1):17-29.
    Today it is widely accepted among philosophers ofanalytical inclination that there are two theoriesabout what endows words with their extensions: thetheory of natural kinds and the so-called Californiansemantics. It is widely agreed that the first issuperior to the second because it can not only explainthe indexicality of the extension of natural kindterms as well as their social character but also avoidGoodman''s paradox of projectibility. Natural kindterms can not be corrupted concepts since theirmembers are grouped by objective similarity.It will be shown (...)
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  34. Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & Matthew H. Slater (eds.) (2011). Carving Nature at its Joints: Natural Kinds in Metaphysics and Science. Mit Press.
    Are there natural kinds of things around which our theories cut? The essays in this volume offer reflections by a distinguished group of philosophers on a series of intertwined issues in the metaphysics and epistemology of classification.
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  35. Joseph Keim Campbell, Matthew H. Slater & Michael O'Rourke (eds.) (forthcoming). Carving Nature at its Joints. Topics in Contemporary Philosophy, Vol. 8. MIT Press.
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  36. Arthur C. Caplan (1980). Have Species Become Declasse? Psa 1980:71-82.
    Traditionally, species have been treated as classes or kinds in philosophical discussions of systematics and evolutionary biology. Recently a number of biologists and philosophers have proposed a drastic revision of this traditional ontological categorization. They have argued that species ought be viewed as individuals rather than as classes or natural kinds. In this paper an attempt is made to show that (a) the reasons advanced in support of this new view of species are not persuasive, (b) a reasonable explication can (...)
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  37. Carleton B. Christensen (2001). Escape From Twin Earth: Putnam's 'Logic' of Natural Kind Terms. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 9 (2):123-150.
    Many still seem confident that the kind of semantic theory Putnam once proposed for natural kind terms is right. This paper seeks to show that this confidence is misplaced because the general idea underlying the theory is incoherent. Consequently, the theory must be rejected prior to any consideration of its epistemological, ontological or metaphysical acceptability. Part I sets the stage by showing that falsehoods, indeed absurdities, follow from the theory when one deliberately suspends certain devices Putnam built into it , (...)
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  38. Peter Clark & Bob Hale (eds.) (1994). Reading Putnam. Blackwell.
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  39. F. John Clendinnen (2010). Note on Howard Sankey's "Induction and Natural Kinds". Principia 2 (1):125-134.
    Note on Howard Sankey's "Induction and Natural Kinds".
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  40. Nino Cocchiarella (1976). On the Logic of Natural Kinds. Philosophy of Science 43 (2):202-222.
    A minimal second order modal logic of natural kinds is formulated. Concepts are distinguished from properties and relations in the conceptual-logistic background of the logic through a distinction between free and bound predicate variables. Not all concepts (as indicated by free predicate variables) need have a property or relation corresponding to them (as values of bound predicate variables). Issues pertaining to identity and existence as impredicative concepts are examined and an analysis of mass terms as nominalized predicates for kinds of (...)
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  41. John Collier (1996). On the Necessity of Natural Kinds. In P. Riggs (ed.), Natural Kinds, Laws of Nature and Scientific Methodology. Kluwer Academic Publishers. 1-10.
    Natural kinds are central to most might decide to restrict systematisation just to scientific reasoning about the world. For that..
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  42. John M. Collins (2006). Temporal Externalism, Natural Kind Terms, and Scientifically Ignorant Communities. Philosophical Papers 35 (1):55-68.
    Temporal externalism (TE) is the thesis (defended by Jackman (1999)) that the contents of some of an individual’s thoughts and utterances at time t may be determined by linguistic developments subsequent to t. TE has received little discussion so far, Brown 2000 and Stoneham 2002 being exceptions. I defend TE by arguing that it solves several related problems concerning the extension of natural kind terms in scientifically ignorant communities. Gary Ebbs (2000) argues that no theory can reconcile our ordinary, practical (...)
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  43. Gabriele Contessa (2007). There Are Kinds and Kinds of Kinds: Ben-Yami on the Semantics of Kind Terms. Philosophical Studies 136 (2):217-248.
    Hanoch Ben-Yami has argued that the theory of the semantics of natural kind terms proposed by Kripke and Putnam is false and has proposed an allegedly novel account of the semantics of kind terms. In this article, I critically examine Ben-Yami’s arguments. I will argue that Ben-Yami’s objections do not show that Kripke and Putnam’s theory is false, but at most that the specific versions of it held by Kripke and Putnam have some weaknesses. Moreover, I will argue that Ben-Yami’s (...)
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  44. Rachel Cooper (2004). Why Hacking is Wrong About Human Kinds. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (1):73-85.
    is a term introduced by Ian Hacking to refer to the kinds of people—child abusers, pregnant teenagers, the unemployed—studied by the human sciences. Hacking argues that classifying and describing human kinds results in feedback, which alters the very kinds under study. This feedback results in human kinds having histories totally unlike those of natural kinds (such as gold, electrons and tigers), leading Hacking to conclude that human kinds are radically unlike natural kinds. Here I argue that Hacking's argument fails and (...)
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  45. Rachel Cooper (2004). What is Wrong with the DSM? History of Psychiatry 15 (1):5-25.
    The DSM is the main classification of mental disorders used by psychiatrists in the United States and, increasingly, around the world. Although widely used, the DSM has come in for fierce criticism, with many commentators believing it to be conceptually flawed in a variety of ways. This paper assesses some of these philosophical worries. The first half of the paper asks whether the project of constructing a classification of mental disorders that ‘cuts nature at the joints’ makes sense. What is (...)
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  46. Ben S. Cordry (2004). Necessity and Rigidly Designating Kind Terms. Philosophical Studies 119 (3):243-264.
    Kripke claims that certainkind terms, particularly natural kind terms,are, like names, rigid designators. However,kind terms are more complicated than names aseach is connected both to a principle ofinclusion and an extension. So, there is aquestion regarding what it is that rigidlydesignating kind terms rigidly designate. Inthis paper, I assume that there are rigidlydesignating kind terms and attempt to answerthe question as to what it is that they rigidlydesignate. I then use this analysis of rigidlydesignating kind terms to show how Kripke''sreasoning (...)
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  47. Mark Couch (2009). Functional Explanation in Context. Philosophy of Science 76 (2):253-269.
    The claim that a functional kind is multiply realized is typically motivated by appeal to intuitive examples. We are seldom told explicitly what the relevant structures are, and people have often preferred to rely on general intuitions in these cases. This article deals with the problem by explaining how to understand the proper relation between structural kinds and the functions they realize. I will suggest that the structural kinds that realize a function can be properly identified by attending to the (...)
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  48. Judith Crane (2003). Locke's Theory of Classification. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 11 (2):249 – 259.
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  49. Judith K. Crane (2004). On the Metaphysics of Species. Philosophy of Science 71 (2):156-173.
    This paper explains the metaphysical implications of the view that species are individuals (SAI). I first clarify SAI in light of the separate distinctions between individuals and classes, particulars and universals, and abstract and concrete things. I then show why the standard arguments given in defense of SAI are not compelling. Nonetheless, the ontological status of species is linked to the traditional "species problem," in that certain species concepts do entail that species are individuals. I develop the idea that species (...)
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  50. Chris Daly (1998). Natural Kinds. In Edward Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge. 682-5.
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