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  1. Paul Abela (1996). Is Less Always More? An Argument Against the Natural Ontological Attitude. Philosophical Quarterly 46 (182):72-76.
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  2. Marc Alspector-Kelly (2003). The NOAer's Dilemma: Constructive Empiricism and the Natural Ontological Attitude. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (3):307 - 322.
  3. Jamin Asay (2013). Three Paradigms of Scientific Realism: A Truthmaking Account. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 27 (1):1-21.
    This paper investigates the nature of scientific realism. I begin by considering the anomalous fact that Bas van Fraassen’s account of scientific realism is strikingly similar to Arthur Fine’s account of scientific non-realism. To resolve this puzzle, I demonstrate how the two theorists understand the nature of truth and its connection to ontology, and how that informs their conception of the realism debate. I then argue that the debate is much better captured by the theory of truthmaking, and not by (...)
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  4. Alexandra Bradner, On the Very Idea of a Style of Reasoning.
    Although Ian Hacking’s meta-concept is frequently applied to historical cases, few theorists have questioned the very idea of a style of reasoning. Hacking himself considers Donald Davidson’s conceptual scheme argument to be the most formidable challenge to the style idea, but Hacking has set up a straw man in Davidson. Beyond Hacking’s own conclusion, that Davidson's narrow concern with meaning incommensurability does not apply to styles, which are not incommensurable in that way, there is the more obvious point that styles, (...)
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  5. E. P. Brandon (1997). California Unnatural: On Fine's Natural Ontological Attitude. Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):232-235.
    Abela accepts Fine’s account of realism and instrumentalism, but thinks that we can reject the Natural Ontological Attitude by distinguishing the theoretical attempt to make sense of scientific practice from choosing the attitude we bring to the debate, or to science itself. But Abela’s attitudes are vulnerable to Fine’s criticisms of the philosophical positions. However, if we take attitude as contrastive and as full‐blooded enough to lead to different behaviour we can see a gap in Fine’s position. He cannot tell (...)
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  6. Sharon L. Crasnow (2000). How Natural Can Ontology Be? Philosophy of Science 67 (1):114-132.
    Arthur Fine's Natural Ontological Attitude (NOA) is intended to provide an alternative to both realism and antirealism. I argue that the most plausible meaning of "natural" in NOA is "nonphilosophical," but that Fine comes to NOA through a particular conception of philosophy. I suggest that instead of a natural attitude we should adopt a philosophical attitude. This is one that is self-conscious, pragmatic, pluralistic, and sensitive to context. I conclude that when scientific realism and antirealism are viewed with a philosophical (...)
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  7. Arthur I. Fine (1984). The Natural Ontological Attitude. In J. Leplin (ed.), Scientific Realism. University of California Press. 261--77.
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  8. Amit Hagar, Chronicle of a Death Foretold.
    Scientific realism is dead, or so many philosophers believe. Its death was announced when philosophers became convinced that one can accept all scientific results without committing oneself to metaphysical existence claims about theoretical entities (Fine 1986, 112). In addition, the inability of self–proclaimed scientific realists, despite recurrent demands, to distinguish themselves from their rival anti–realists (Stein 1989) didn’t exactly help their cause. If realists cannot identify the key feature or features that set them apart from their opponents, then there is (...)
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  9. André Kukla (1994). Scientific Realism, Scientific Practice, and the Natural Ontological Attitude. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (4):955-975.
    Both sides in the debate about scientific realism have argued that their view provides a better account of actual scientific practice. For example, it has been claimed that the practice of theory conjunction presupposes realism, and that scientists' use of multiple and incompatible models presupposes some form of instrumentalism. Assuming that the practices of science are rational, these conclusions cannot both be right. I argue that neither of them is right, and that, in fact, all scientific practices are compatible with (...)
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  10. Alan Musgrave (1989). Noa's Ark--Fine for Realism. Philosophical Quarterly 39 (157):383-398.
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  11. Richard H. Schlagel (1991). Fine's "Shaky Game" (And Why NOA Is No Ark for Science):The Shaky Game Arthur Fine. Philosophy of Science 58 (2):307-.
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