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  1. Marshall David Abrams (2002). Probabilistic Foundations of Teleology and Content. Dissertation, The University of Chicago
    Ruth Millikan and others advocate theories which attempt to naturalize wide mental content in terms of functions, where the latter are in turn based in part on facts concerning past natural selection. While I support basing content on functions which are constituted by facts about the past, I argue that it is a mistake to base content on selection. This dissertation works out an alternative concept of function which is a more appropriate basis for a theory of mental content. In (...)
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  2. Mark Alfano (2013). Nietzsche, Naturalism, and the Tenacity of the Intentional. Journal of Nietzsche Studies 44 (3):457-464.
    In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche demands that “psychology shall be<br>recognized again as the queen of the sciences.” While one might cast a dubious glance at the “again,” many of Nietzsche’s insights were indeed psychological, and many of his arguments invoke psychological premises. In Genealogy, he criticizes the “English psychologists” for the “inherent psychological absurdity” of their theory of the origin of good and bad, pointing out the implausibility of the claim that the utility of unegoistic<br>actions would be forgotten. Tabling (...)
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  3. David Leech Anderson (2012). Machine Intentionality, the Moral Status of Machines, and the Composition Problem. In Vincent C. Müller (ed.), Philosophy & Theory of Artificial Intelligence. Springer 312-333.
    According to the most popular theories of intentionality, a family of theories we will refer to as “functional intentionality,” a machine can have genuine intentional states so long as it has functionally characterizable mental states that are causally hooked up to the world in the right way. This paper considers a detailed description of a robot that seems to meet the conditions of functional intentionality, but which falls victim to what I call “the composition problem.” One obvious way to escape (...)
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  4. Daniel Anderson Arnold (2012). Brains, Buddhas, and Believing: The Problem of Intentionality in Classical Buddhist and Cognitive-Scientific Philosophy of Mind. Columbia University Press.
    Aiming to complicate this story, Dan Arnold confronts a significant obstacle to popular attempts at harmonizing classical Buddhist and modern scientific thought: since most Indian Buddhists believe that the mental continuum is uninterrupted ..
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  5. Marc Artiga (2014). Prinz's Naturalistic Theory of Intentional Content. Critica 46 (136):69-86.
    This paper addresses Prinz's naturalistic theory of conceptual content, which he has defended in several works (Prinz, 2000; 2002; 2006). More precisely, I present in detail and critically assess his account of referential content, which he distinguishes from nominal or cognitive content. The paper argues that Prinz's theory faces four important difficulties, which might have significant consequences for his overall empiricist project.
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  6. George Bealer (1996). Materialism and the Logical Structure of Intentionality. In Howard Robinson (ed.), Objections to Physicalism. New York: Clarendon Press
    After a brief history of Brentano's thesis of intentionality, it is argued that intentionality presents a serious problem for materialism. First, it is shown that, if no general materialist analysis (or reduction) of intentionality is possible, then intentional phenomena would have in common at least one nonphysical property, namely, their intentionality. A general analysis of intentionality is then suggested. Finally, it is argued that any satisfactory general analysis of intentionality must share with this analysis a feature which entails the existence (...)
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  7. Ansgar Beckermann (1996). Is There a Problem About Intentionality? Erkenntnis 45 (1):1-24.
    The crucial point of the mind-body-problem appears to be that mental phenome- na (events, properties, states) seem to have features which at first sight make it impossible to integrate these phenomena into a naturalistic world view, i.e. to identify them with, or to reduce them to, physical phenomena.1 In the contemp- orary discussion, there are mainly two critical features which are important in this context. The first of these is the feature of intentional states, e.g. beliefs and desires, to have (...)
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  8. Ansgar Beckermann (1988). Why Tropistic Systems Are Not Genuine Intentional Systems. Erkenntnis 29 (July):125-142.
  9. Thomas W. Bestor (1991). Naturalizing Semantics: New Insights or Old Folly? Inquiry 34 (September):285-310.
    Those who naturalize semantics concentrate on avoiding difficulties in getting the right sort of cause for the biological item which is to possess semantic properties (to be ?true of or to be ?about? some physical item). Using an analogy with sense?data, I argue that the real difficulties will be trying to get any proposed neural representation to be the right sort of effect of natural processes. The idea of a biological item which can be a semantic ?primitive? is as bankrupt (...)
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  10. Jonathan Birch (2014). Propositional Content in Signalling Systems. Philosophical Studies 171 (3):493-512.
    Skyrms, building on the work of Dretske, has recently developed a novel information-theoretic account of propositional content in simple signalling systems. Information-theoretic accounts of content traditionally struggle to accommodate the possibility of misrepresentation, and I show that Skyrms’s account is no exception. I proceed to argue, however, that a modified version of Skyrms’s account can overcome this problem. On my proposed account, the propositional content of a signal is determined not by the information that it actually carries, but by the (...)
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  11. Margaret A. Boden (1970). Intentionality and Physical Systems. Philosophy of Science 32 (June):200-214.
    Intentionality is characteristic of many psychological phenomena. It is commonly held by philosophers that intentionality cannot be ascribed to purely physical systems. This view does not merely deny that psychological language can be reduced to physiological language. It also claims that the appropriateness of some psychological explanation excludes the possibility of any underlying physiological or causal account adequate to explain intentional behavior. This is a thesis which I do not accept. I shall argue that physical systems of a specific sort (...)
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  12. Thomas D. Bontly (2001). Should Intentionality Be Naturalized? In D. Walsh (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press 43-60.
    One goal of recent philosophy of mind has been to ‘naturalize’ intentionality by showing how a purely physical system could have states that represent or are about items in the world. The project is reductionist in spirit, the aim being to explain intentional relations—to say what they really are—and to do so in terms that do not themselves utilize intentional or semantic concepts. In this vein there are attempts to explain intentional relations in terms of causal relations, informational relations, teleological (...)
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  13. Noam Chomsky (1995). Language and Nature. Mind 104 (413):1-61.
  14. Earl Conee (1995). Supervenience and Intentionality. In Elias E. Savellos & Ümit D. Yalçin (eds.), Supervenience: New Essays. Needham Heights: Cambridge
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  15. Earl Conee (1995). Supervenience: New Essays. Needham Heights: Cambridge.
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  16. Christian Coseru (2009). Naturalism and Intentionality: A Buddhist Epistemological Approach. Asian Philosophy 19 (3):239-264.
    In this paper I propose a naturalist account of the Buddhist epistemological discussion of _svasa(m)dotvitti_ ('self-awareness', 'self-cognition') following similar attempts in the domains of phenomenology and analytic epistemology. First, I examine the extent to which work in naturalized epistemology and phenomenology, particularly in the areas of perception and intentionality, could be profitably used in unpacking the implications of the Buddhist epistemological project. Second, I argue against a foundationalist reading of the causal account of perception offered by (...)
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  17. Mario De Caro & David Macarthur (eds.) (2004). Naturalism in Question. Harvard University Press.
    This volume presents a group of leading thinkers who criticize scientific naturalism not in the name of some form of supernaturalism, but in order to defend a ...
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  18. Michael Devitt (1994). The Methodology of Naturalistic Semantics. Journal of Philosophy 91 (10):545-72.
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  19. Janice Dowell, J. L. (2004). From Metaphysical to Substantive Naturalism: A Case Study. Synthese 138 (2):149-173.
    This paper addresses two related questions. First, what is involved in giving a distinctively realist and naturalist construal of an area of discourse, that is, in so much as stating a distinctively realist and naturalist position about, for example, content or value? I defend a condition that guarantees the realism and naturalism of any position satisfying it, at least in the case of positions on content, but perhaps in other cases as well. Second, what sorts of considerations render a distinctively (...)
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  20. Frances Egan (2003). Chomsky and His Critics. Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing.
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  21. Frances Egan (2003). Naturalistic Inquiry: Where Does Mental Representation Fit In? In Louise M. Antony (ed.), Chomsky and His Critics. Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing 89--104.
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  22. Frances Egan (1994). Aworld Withoutmind: Comments on Terence Horgan's “Naturalism and Intentionality”. Philosophical Studies 76 (2-3):327 - 338.
  23. Andreas Elpidorou (2012). Where is My Mind? Mark Rowlands on the Vehicles of Cognition. Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 3 (1):145-160.
    Do our minds extend beyond our brains? In a series of publications, Mark Rowlands has argued that the correct answer to this question is an affirmative one. According to Rowlands, certain types of operations on bodily and worldly structures should be considered to be proper and literal parts of our cognitive and mental processes. In this article, I present and critically evaluate Rowlands' position.
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  24. Berent Enc (1982). Intentional States of Mechanical Devices. Mind 91 (April):161-182.
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  25. Robin Faichney (2013). Mind, Matter, Meaning and Information. TripleC - Cognition, Communication, Co-Operation 11 (1):36-45.
  26. Philippe Gagnon (2011). L’irréductibilité de la connaissance et l’intentionnalité en contexte de découverte abductive. Laval Théologique et Philosophique 67 (2):227-258.
    Knowledge is still an enigma, with its ability to inductively bring out a pattern without restricting itself to an empirical count of situations experienced. Instead of seeing the concept as a weakened object representing an external reality, it is suggested to view knowledge as the bridging of a distance with an ability for the knower to stay connected with outward reality. Attempts at defining an external and quantitative criterion of truth are questioned, as many human performances are not likely to (...)
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  27. Mattia Gallotti (2012). A Naturalistic Argument for the Irreducibility of Collective Intentionality. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 42 (1):3-30.
    According to many philosophers and scientists, human sociality is explained by our unique capacity to “share” attitudes with others. The conditions under which mental states are shared have been widely debated in the past two decades, focusing especially on the issue of their reducibility to individual intentionality and the place of collective intentions in the natural realm. It is not clear, however, to what extent these two issues are related and what methodologies of investigation are appropriate in each case. In (...)
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  28. Steven F. Geisz (2009). Turning Representation Inside Out: An Adverbial Approach to the Metaphysics of Language and Mind. Philosophical Forum 40 (4):437-471.
    In order to resolve problems about the normative aspects of representation without having to (1) provide a naturalized theory of intentional/semantic properties, (2) accept non-natural intentional/semantic properties into our worldview, or (3) eliminate intentionality, this article questions a basic assumption about the metaphysics of representation: that representation involves representation-objects. An alternative, nonreifying approach to the metaphysics of representation is introduced and developed in detail. The argumentative strategy is as follows. First, an adverbial view of linguistic representation is introduced. Two potential (...)
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  29. Grant Gillett (1997). Husserl, Wittgenstein and the Snark: Intentionality and Social Naturalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (2):331-349.
    The Snark is an intentional object. I examine the general philosophical characteristics of thoughts of objects from the perspective of Husserl's, hyle, noesis, and noema and show how this meets constraints of opacity, normativity, and possible existence as generated by a sensitive theory of intentionality. Husserl introduces terms which indicate the normative features of intentional content and attempts to forge a direct relationship between the norms he generates and the actual world object which a thought intends. I then attempt to (...)
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  30. Mark Greenberg (2005). A New Map of Theories of Mental Content: Constitutive Accounts and Normative Theories. Philosophical Issues 15 (1):299-320.
    In this paper, I propose a new way of understanding the space of possibilities in the field of mental content. The resulting map assigns separate locations to theories of content that have generally been lumped together on the more traditional map. Conversely, it clusters together some theories of content that have typically been regarded as occupying opposite poles. I make my points concrete by developing a taxonomy of theories of mental content, but the main points of the paper concern not (...)
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  31. John J. Haldane (1989). Naturalism and the Problem of Intentionality. Inquiry 32 (September):305-22.
    To the memory of Ian McFetridge 1948?1988 The general concern of the essay is with the question of whether cognitive states can be accounted for in naturalistic (i.e. physicalist) terms. An argument is presented to the effect that they cannot. This turns on the idea that cognitive states involve modes of presentation the identity and individuation conditions of which are ineliminably both intentional and intensional and consequently they cannot be accounted for in terms of physico?causal powers. In connection with this (...)
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  32. John Heil (2004). Natural Intentionality. In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter
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  33. William Hirstein (2001). On Searle. Wadsworth.
  34. Terence E. Horgan (1994). Naturalism and Intentionality. Philosophical Studies 76 (2-3):301-26.
    I argue for three principle claims. First, philosophers who seek to integrate the semantic and the intentional into a naturalistic metaphysical worldview need to address a task that they have thus far largely failed even to notice: explaining into- level connections between the physical and the intentional in a naturalistically acceptable way. Second, there are serious reasons to think that this task cannot be carried out in a way that would vindicate realism about intentionality. Third, there is much to be (...)
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  35. Amir Horowitz (1990). Intentional and Physical Relations. Manuscrito 13 (1):55-67.
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  36. Geert Keil (2008). Naturalism. In Dermot Moran (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Twentieth-Century Philosophy. Routledge 254-307.
    1. Introduction 2. Naturalism in the First Half of the Century 3. Three Eminent Figures 3.1 Husserl 3.2 Wittgenstein 3.3 Quine 4. The Nature of Naturalism 5. A Classification of Naturalisms 5.1 Metaphysical Naturalism 5.2 Methodological, or Scientific, Naturalism 5.2.1 Naturalism with a Leading Science: Physicalism and Biologism 5.2.2 Naturalism without a Leading Science 5.3. Analytic, or Semantic, Naturalism 6. Three Fields of Naturalisation 6.1 Naturalising Epistemology 6.2 Naturalising Intentionality 6.3 Naturalising Normativity 7. Naturalism and Human Nature 8. Scientific naturalism (...)
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  37. Geert Keil (2007). Biologische Funktionen und das Teleologieproblem. In Ludger Honnefelder & Matthias C. Schmidt (eds.), Naturalismus als Paradigma. Berlin University Press 76-85.
    Die Frage, ob die organische Natur des Menschen sowie seine Gesundheits- und Krankheitszustände sich naturalistisch auffassen lassen, erscheint zunächst irritierend. Ist nicht der Mensch als Säugetier ein natürliches Phänomen par excellence? Wie alle anderen Tiere kann der Mensch gesund oder krank sein, weil er einen Körper hat, dessen vielfältige biologische Funktionen störungsanfällig sind. Was sollte es hier noch zu naturalisieren geben? Integrieren sich Organismus, Gesundheit und Krankheit nicht gleichsam von selbst in ein naturwissenschaftliches Weltbild? Die zu klärende Frage lautet, welche (...)
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  38. Geert Keil (2000). Naturalismus und Intentionalität. In Geert Keil & Herbert Schnädelbach (eds.), Naturalismus. Suhrkamp 187-204.
    Naturalism in theoretical philosophy comes in three kinds: metaphysical, scientific and semantical. Metaphysical naturalism holds that only natural things exist, scientific (or methodological) naturalism holds that the methods of natural science provide the only avenue to truth, semantic (or analytic) naturalism tries to provide sufficient nonintentional conditions for intentional phenomena. The paper argues that analytic naturalism does not render metaphysical or scientific naturalism obsolete, but can be understood as a further step in elaborating upon these programmes. The intentional idiom of (...)
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  39. Geert Keil & Herbert Schnädelbach (eds.) (2000). Naturalismus. Suhrkamp.
    Mit Beiträgen von Gerhard Vollmer, Dirk Koppelberg, Stephen Stich, W. v. O. Quine, Ansgar Beckermann, Dirk Hartmann und Rainer Lange, Mircea Flonta, Geert Keil, Peter Simons, Andreas Kemmerling, Lynne R. Baker, Holm Tetens und Peter Janich.
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  40. Geert Keil & Herbert Schnädelbach (2000). Naturalismus. In Geert Keil & Herbert Schnädelbach (eds.), Naturalismus. Suhrkamp 7-45.
    Survey article which introduces a collection of essays on philosophical naturalism, mainly dealing with the question what “naturalism” means in contemporary philosophy. Structure of the article: 1. History of Ideas/History of the Problems, 2. Man as a Part of Nature, 3. The Explanatory Primacy of the Natural Sciences, 4. Naturalism and Unity of Science, 5. The Consideration of Empirical Knowledge, 6. Naturalism, Science and Common Sense.
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  41. Jaegwon Kim (2003). Chisholm's Legacy on Intentionality. Metaphilosophy 34 (5):649-662.
  42. Gyula Klima (2013). Three Myths of Intentionality Versus Some Medieval Philosophers. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (3):359-376.
    This paper argues that three characteristic modern positions concerning intentionality – namely, (1) that intentionality is ‘the mark of the mental’; (2) that intentionality concerns a specific type of objects having intentional inexistence; and (3) that intentionality somehow defies logic – are just three ‘modern myths’ that medieval philosophers, from whom the modern notion supposedly originated, would definitely reject.
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  43. K. Talmont-Kaminski M. Milkowski (ed.) (2013). Regarding the Mind, Naturally: Naturalist Approaches to the Sciences of the Mental. Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
    Naturalism is currently the most vibrantly developing approach to philosophy, with naturalised methodologies being applied across all the philosophical disciplines. One of the areas naturalism has been focussing upon is the mind, traditionally viewed as a topic hard to reconcile with the naturalistic worldview. A number of questions have been pursued in this context. What is the place of the mind in the world? How should we study the mind as a natural phenomenon? What is the significance of cognitive science (...)
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  44. David Macarthur (2009). Review of Jack Ritchie, Understanding Naturalism. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (11).
  45. Geoffrey C. Madell (1989). Physicalism and the Content of Thought. Inquiry 32 (1):107-21.
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  46. Arthur B. Markman & Eric Dietrich (2000). In Defense of Representation. Cognitive Psychology 40 (2):138--171.
    The computational paradigm, which has dominated psychology and artificial intelligence since the cognitive revolution, has been a source of intense debate. Recently, several cognitive scientists have argued against this paradigm, not by objecting to computation, but rather by objecting to the notion of representation. Our analysis of these objections reveals that it is not the notion of representation per se that is causing the problem, but rather specific properties of representations as they are used in various psychological theories. Our analysis (...)
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  47. C. B. Martin & Karl Pfeifer (1986). Intentionality and the Non-Psychological. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (June):531-54.
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  48. Mohan Matthen (2014). Debunking Enactivism: A Critical Notice of Hutto and Myin's Radicalizing Enactivism. [REVIEW] Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (1):118-128.
    In this review of Hutto and Myin's Radicalizing Enactivism, I question the adequacy of a non-representational theory of mind. I argue first that such a theory cannot differentiate cognition from other bodily engagements such as wrestling with an opponent. Second, I question whether the simple robots constructed by Rodney Brooks are adequate as models of multimodal organisms. Last, I argue that Hutto and Myin pay very little attention to how semantically interacting representations are needed to give an account of choice (...)
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  49. Christophe Menant (2016). Meaning Generation for Constraint Satisfaction. An Evolutionary Thread for Biosemiotics. Dissertation, Prague Charles University. Gatherings in Biosemiotics 2016
    One of the mains challenges of biosemiotics is ‘to attempt to naturalize biological meaning’ [Sharov & all 2015]. That challenge brings to look at a possible evolutionary thread for biosemiotics based on meaning generation for internal constraint satisfaction, starting with a pre-biotic entity emerging from a material universe. Such perspective complements and extends previous works that used a model of meaning generation for internal constraint satisfaction (the Meaning Generator System) [Menant 2003a, b; 2011]. We propose to look at such an (...)
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  50. Christophe Menant (2015). Biosemiotics, Aboutness, Meaning and Bio-Intentionality. Proposal for an Evolutionary Approach (2015). Dissertation, Biosemiotics Gatherings 2015. Aalborg University Copenhagen
    The management of meaningful information by biological entities is at the core of biosemiotics [Hoffmeyer 2010]. Intentionality, the ‘aboutness’ of mental states, is a key driver in philosophy of mind. Philosophers have been reluctant to use intentionality for non human animals. Some biologists have been in favor of it. J. Hoffmeyer has been using evolutionary intentionality and Peircean semiotics to discuss a biosemiotic approach to the problem of intentionality [Hoffmeyer 1996, 2012]. Also, recent philosophical studies are bringing new openings on (...)
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