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  1. Jan Almäng (2006). McDowell's Naturalism. In Björn Haglund & Helge Malmgren (eds.), Kvantifikator för en Dag. Essays Dedicated to Dag Westerståhl on his Sixtieth Birthday. Philosophical Communications
    This is an essay on McDowell’s naturalism. It is, pace some commentators, argued that McDowell’s naturalism does not end up in any strange metaphysical positions in the philosophy of mind, because second nature non-reductively supervenes on first nature and have causal powers. Pace certain other commentators, it is also argued that McDowell can be read as drawing a clear line between ethical platonism, and his own naturalized platonism, but only at the cost of landing in standard naturalism.
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  2. Alejandro Arango (2014). Husserl's Concept of Position-Taking and Second Nature. Phenomenology and Mind 6:168-176.
    I argue that Husserl’s concept of position-taking, Stellungnahme, is adequate to understand the idea of second nature as an issue of philosophical anthropology. I claim that the methodological focus must be the living subject that acts and lives among others, and that the notion of second nature must respond to precisely this fundamental active character of subjectivity. The appropriate concept should satisfy two additional desiderata. First, it should be able to develop alongside the biological, psychological, and social individual development. Second, (...)
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  3. Christoph Asmuth & Patrick Grüneberg (eds.) (2011). Subjekt Und Gehirn, Mensch Und Natur. Königshausen & Neumann.
    Wissenschaft ist Aufklärung. Und sie ist der Wahrheit verpflichtet. Nicht jede Wahrheit ist aber im emphatischen Sinne wahr und genügt dem hehren Anspruch dieses Ehrentitels. Vieles Wahre erscheint uns trivial, manches spannend, einiges auch hochinteressant und von äußerster Wichtigkeit. Als Quell der letzteren Kategorie gelten die modernen exakten Wissenschaften, wie sie sich in den letzten Jahrhunderten in einer immer weiter zusammenwachsenden Welt etabliert haben. Was wirklich, was im empathischen Sinne wahr ist, bestimmen ausgeklügelte Methoden, die unsere Welt messbar und quantifizierbar (...)
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  4. Aaron Barth (2013). Anti- Naturalism: The Role of Non-Empirical Methods in Philosophy. History and Philosophy of Logic 34 (3):196-206.
    Some naturalistic conceptions of philosophical methodologies interpret the doctrine that philosophy is continuous with science to mean that philosophical investigations must implement empirical methods and must not depart from the experimental results that the scientific application of those methods reveal. In this paper, I argue that while our answers to philosophical questions are certainly constrained by empirical considerations, this does not imply that the methods by which these questions are correctly settled are wholly captured by empirical methods. Many historical cases (...)
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  5. Francis J. Beckwith (2015). Or We Can Be Philosophers: A Response to Barbara Forrest. Synthese 192 (S1):1-23.
    This article is a response to Barbara Forrest’ 2011 Synthese article, “On the Non-Epistemology of Intelligent Design.” Forrest offers an account of my philosophical work that consists almost entirely of personal attacks, excursions into my religious pilgrimage, and misunderstandings and misrepresentations of my work as well as of certain philosophical issues. Not surprisingly, the Synthese editors include a disclaimer in the front matter of the special issue in which Forrest’s article was published. In my response, I address three topics: (1) (...)
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  6. Nathan Robert Cockram (2014). Challenging Exclusionary Naturalism. Studia Philosophica Estonica 7 (1):1-37.
    The purpose of this paper is to reconstruct Hilary Kornblith’s (2002) argument for excluding conceptual analysis from epistemological inquiry, and then provide three objections to it. More specifically, Kornblith argues that epistemological properties such as ‘knowledge’ reduce to natural kinds (with a constitutive essence) which can only be discovered and investigated using the a posteriori methods of the natural sciences. Thus, he continues, conceptual analysis can’t properly illuminate the target domain. The three objections to Kornblith’s argument which I present are (...)
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  7. Mario de Caro & David Macarthur (eds.) (2010). Naturalism and Normativity. Columbia University Press.
    Naturalism and Normativity engages with both sides of this debate. Essays explore philosophical options for understanding normativity in the space between scientific naturalism and Platonic supernaturalism.
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  8. E. Engelen (2001). Schwerpunkt: Naturalismus und Naturgeschichte. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 49 (6):857-860.
    Der Begriff ‘Naturalismus’ wird hier im Sinne eines „schwachen“ Naturalismus verwendet werden. Der Terminus ist ein Versuch zu verstehen, was es bedeutet, daß der Mensch und der menschliche Geist Teil der natürlichen Welt sind. Zum besseren Verständnis wird dafür in der Mehrzahl der hier veröffentlichten Arbeiten der Begriff der Naturgeschichte herangezogen, der auf die Entwicklungsgeschichte des Menschen verweist. Die hier abgeruckten Beiträge werden dabei zeigen, inwiefern diese Position eines schwachen Naturalismus in philosophischer Hinsicht interessant ist. Es sollen mit anderen Worten (...)
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  9. Domingos Faria (2015). Será procedente o argumento de Plantinga contra o naturalismo metafísico? Princípios: Revista de Filosofia 22 (39):121-139.
    O naturalismo metafísico é a perspetiva de que não há uma pessoa como Deus, nem algo semelhante a Deus. Alvin Plantinga tem argumentado que esta perspetiva é auto-refutante e, por isso, irracional. Isto porque se o naturalismo metafísico fosse verdadeiro (em conjunção com a teoria da evolução), então teríamos fortes razões para duvidar da fiabilidade das nossas faculdades cognitivas e, por conseguinte, teríamos fortes razões para duvidar da verdade de qualquer das nossas crenças, inclusive do naturalismo metafísico. O meu objetivo (...)
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  10. Gary Hatfield (1994). Psychology as a Natural Science in the Eighteenth Century. Revue de Synthèse 115 (3-4):375-391.
    Psychology considered as a natural science began as Aristotelian "physics" or "natural philosophy" of the soul. C. Wolff placed psychology under metaphysics, coordinate with cosmology. Scottish thinkers placed it within moral philosophy, but distinguished its "physical" laws from properly moral laws (for guiding conduct). Several Germans sought to establish an autonomous empirical psychology as a branch of natural science. British and French visual theorists developed mathematically precise theories of size and distance perception; they created instruments to test these theories and (...)
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  11. Andrew Higgins & Alexis Dyschkant (2014). Interdisciplinary Collaboration in Philosophy. Metaphilosophy 45 (3):372-398.
    Many philosophers would, in theory, agree that the methods and tools of philosophy ought to be supplemented by those of other academic disciplines. In practice, however, the sociological data suggest that most philosophers fail to engage or collaborate with other academics, and this article argues that this is problematic for philosophy as a discipline. In relation to the value of interdisciplinary collaboration, the article highlights how experimental philosophers can benefit the field, but only insofar as they draw from the distinctive (...)
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  12. Frédérique Laurent & François-Igor Pris (2015). Sur les notions d’usage chez Wittgenstein et Heidegger. AL-MUKHATABAT (13):132-146.
    Nous comparons les notions d’usage et de signification chez Ludwig Wittgenstein et Martin Heidegger. Contrairement à Jocelyn Benoist, nous pensons que l’analogie entre Wittgenstein et Heidegger n’est pas superficielle. La métaphysique de Heidegger explicite certaines présuppositions implicites de la seconde philosophie de Wittgenstein. Le pragmatisme naturaliste de Wittgenstein peut être théorisé. Notamment la notion wittgensteinienne d’usage, ou de jeu de langage, peut être comprise comme une pratique à la fois naturelle et normative régie par des règles. -/- Wittgenstein’s notions of (...)
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  13. Hallvard Lillehammer (forthcoming). Smile When You're Winning: How to Become a Cambridge Pragmatist. In Sheryl Misak Huw Price (ed.), Pragmatism in Britain in the Long Twentieth Century: Proccedings of the 2014 Dawes Hicks Symposium. British Academy
    The aim of this paper is to trace the development of a particular current of thought known under the label ‘pragmatism’ in the last part of the Twentieth century and the beginning of the Twenty-first. I address three questions about this current of thought. First, what is its actual historical development? Second, does it constitute a single, coherent, philosophical outlook? Third, in what form, if any, does it constitute an attractive philosophical outlook. In the course of addressing these questions I (...)
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  14. Michael Losonsky (2014). The Preoccupation and Crisis of Analytic Philosophy. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 10 (1):5-20.
    I propose to reconsider Gilbert Ryle’s thesis in 1956 in his introduction to The Revolution of Philosophy that “the story of twentieth-century philosophy is very largely the story of this notion of sense or meaning” and, as he writes elsewhere, the “preoccupation with the theory of meaning is the occupational disease of twentieth-century Anglo-Saxon and Austrian philoso- phy.” Ryle maintains that this preoccupation demar- cates analytic philosophy from its predecessors and that it gave philosophy a set of academic credentials as (...)
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  15. David Macarthur (2015). Liberal Naturalism and Second-Personal Space: A Neo-Pragmatist Response to “The Natural Origins of Content”. Philosophia 43 (3):565-578.
    Reviewing the state of play in the attempt to naturalise content a quarter of a century after John Haugeland’s survey paper “The Intentionality All-Stars”, Dan Hutto and Glenda Satne propose a new naturalistic account of content that supposedly synthesizes what is best in the three failed programs of neo-Cartesianism, neo-Behaviourism and neo-Pragmatism. They propose to appeal to a Relaxed Naturalism, a non-reductive genealogical form of explanation and a primitive notion of contentless ur-intentionality. In this paper I argue that the authors’ (...)
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  16. David Macarthur (2009). Review of Jack Ritchie, Understanding Naturalism. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (11).
  17. Andrew Melnyk (2013). Can Metaphysics Be Naturalized? And If So, How? In Don Ross, James Ladyman & Harold Kincaid (eds.), Scientific Metaphysics. Oxford University Press 79-95.
    This is a critical, but sympathetic, examination of the manifesto for naturalized metaphysics that forms the first chapter of James Ladyman and Don Ross's 2006 book, Every Thing Must Go, but it has wider implications than this description suggests.
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  18. Andrew Melnyk (2009). Naturalism as a Philosophical Paradigm. Philo 12 (2):188-199.
    I develop the conjecture that “naturalism” in philosophy names not a thesis but a paradigm in something like Thomas Kuhn’s sense, i.e., a set of commitments, shared by a group of investigators, whose acceptance by the members of the group powerfully influences their day-to-day investigative practice. I take a stab at spelling out the shared commitments that make up naturalism, and the logical and evidential relations among them.
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  19. Matteo Morganti (2015). Science-Based Metaphysics: On Some Recent Anti-Metaphysical Claims. Philosophia Scientae 19:57-70.
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  20. Sean Morris (2015). Quine, Russell, and Naturalism. Journal of the History of Philosophy 53 (1):133-155.
    Most commentators have overlooked the impact of Russell on Quine, focusing instead on the influence of Carnap. In what follows, I will argue that the early Quine’s engagement with Russell’s logicism was a crucial stage in the development of his philosophy. More specifically, we can see Quine’s naturalism as developing out of a certain strand of Russell’s thought concerning scientific philosophy. In addition to giving us a better sense of the origins of Quine’s philosophy, this reading also shows how his (...)
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  21. Eric S. Nelson (2013). Between Nature and Spirit: Naturalism and Anti-Naturalism in Dilthey. In Anthropologie und Geschichte. Studien zu Wilhelm Dilthey aus Anlass seines 100. Todestages.
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  22. G. Oppy (2001). Naturalism: A Critical Analysis. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (4):576 – 577.
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  23. James Pearson (2011). Distinguishing W.V. Quine and Donald Davidson. Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 1 (1):1-22.
    Given W.V. Quine’s and Donald Davidson’s extensive agreement about much of the philosophy of language and mind, and the obvious methodological parallels between Quine’s radical translation and Davidson’s radical interpretation, many—including Quine and Davidson—are puzzled by their occasional disagreements. I argue for the importance of attending to these disagreements, not just because doing so deepens our understanding of these influential thinkers, but because they are in fact the shadows thrown from two distinct conceptions of philosophical inquiry: Quine’s “naturalism” and what (...)
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  24. Charles H. Pence, Hope Hollocher, Ryan Nichols, Grant Ramsey, Edwin Siu & Daniel John Sportiello (2011). Elliott Sober: Did Darwin Write the Origin Backwards? Philosophical Essays on Darwin's Theory. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 78 (4):705-709.
  25. Tuomas K. Pernu (2008). Philosophy and the Front Line of Science. The Quarterly Review of Biology 83 (1):29-36.
    According to one traditional view, empirical science is necessarily preceded by philosophical analysis. Yet the relevance of philosophy is often doubted by those engaged in empirical sciences. I argue that these doubts can be substantiated by two theoretical problems that the traditional conception of philosophy is bound to face. First, there is a strong normative etiology to philosophical problems, theories, and notions that is difficult to reconcile with descriptive empirical study. Second, conceptual analysis (a role that is typically assigned to (...)
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  26. Francois-Igor Pris (2015). Quelques applications de la seconde philosophie de Wittgenstein (ISBN 978-3-639-48126-6). Editions Universitaires Europeennes.
  27. Michael C. Rea (2004). Replies to Critics. Philo 7 (2):163-175.
    In World Without Design: The Ontological Consequences of Naturalism, I argued that there is an important sense in which philosophilosophical naturalism’s current status as methodological orthodoxy is without rational foundation, and I argued that naturalists must give up two views that many of them are inclined to hold dear-realism about material objects and materialism. In the present article, I respond to objections raised by W. R. Carter, Austin Dacey, Paul Draper, and Andrew Melnyk in a symposium on World Without Design (...)
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  28. Jack Reynolds (forthcoming). Merleau-Ponty's Gordian Knot: Transcendental Phenomenology, Empirical Science, and Naturalism. Continental Philosophy Review.
    In this paper, I want to explore a series of fertile ambiguities that Maurice Merleau-Ponty's work is premised upon and which are of major interest to contemporary philosophy today. These ambiguities concern some of the central methodological commitments of Merleau-Ponty's work, in particular: 1. his commitment (or otherwise) to transcendental phenomenology and his renovation of that tradition; and 2. his sustained engagement with empirical sciences (on an apparently level playing-field) that seems to deny the methodological autonomy of either philosophy or (...)
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  29. Jack Reynolds (2017). Phenomenology, Naturalism and Empirical Science: A Hybrid and Heretical Proposal. Routledge.
    In _Phenomenology, Naturalism and Empirical Science_, Jack Reynolds takes the controversial position that phenomenology and naturalism are compatible, and develops a hybrid account of phenomenology and empirical science. Though phenomenology and naturalism are typically understood as philosophically opposed to one another, Reynolds argues that this resistance is based on an understanding of transcendental phenomenology that is ultimately untenable and in need of updating. Phenomenology, as Reynolds reorients it, is compatible with liberal naturalism, as well as with weak forms of methodological (...)
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  30. Jack Ritchie (2010). Naturalized Metaphysics. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18 (5):673-685.
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  31. Jack Ritchie (2008). Understanding Naturalism. Acumen Pub..
    Many contemporary Anglo-American philosophers describe themselves as naturalists. But what do they mean by that term? Popular naturalist slogans like, "there is no first philosophy" or "philosophy is continuous with the natural sciences" are far from illuminating. "Understanding Naturalism" provides a clear and readable survey of the main strands in recent naturalist thought. The origin and development of naturalist ideas in epistemology, metaphysics and semantics is explained through the works of Quine, Goldman, Kuhn, Chalmers, Papineau, Millikan and others. The most (...)
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  32. Jeffrey W. Roland (2013). On Naturalism in the Quinean Tradition. In Matthew C. Haug (ed.), Philosophical Methodology: The Armchair or the Laboratory. Routledge
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  33. Richard Marc Rubin (2000). Metaphysics as Morals: The Controversy Between John Dewey and George Santayana. Dissertation, Washington University
    John Dewey and George Santayana engaged in a philosophic controversy that lasted more than forty years, beginning with Dewey's two reviews of The Life of Reason and concluding with a posthumously published essay by Santayana . The most well-known part of this controversy began with Santayana's review of Experience and Nature in which he said that Dewey's naturalism is "half-hearted and short-winded." To this Dewey replied that if his naturalism is half-hearted, then Santayana's is "broken-backed." In Metaphysics as Morals I (...)
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  34. Hannes Rusch (2014). Naturalistische Zumutungen. Aufklärung Und Kritik 2014 (1):103-122.
    Diese Arbeit untersucht die Frage, welche möglichen Auslöser für emotional bedingte Voreingenommenheit es auf Seiten der Kritiker des heutigen philosophischen Naturalismus gibt. Sie findet diese zum einen in bestimmten Ergebnissen einzelner wissenschaftlicher Disziplinen, den sogenannten ›Kränkungen‹, die fälschlicherweise dem philosophischen Naturalismus angelastet werden, und zum anderen in den programmatischen Voraussetzungen des philosophischen Naturalismus, den ›naturalistischen Zumutungen‹. Nach einer kurzen Darstellung des naturalistischen Programms werden diese beiden Gruppen exemplifiziert, voneinander abgegrenzt und zwei Ansätze zur Klärung von Missverständnissen der naturalistischen Position vorgeschlagen.
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  35. Gregor Schiemann (1996). Die Bedrohung des Geistes. Zu Ernst Troeltschs Kritik des Naturalismus. In G. Raulet (ed.), Die Historismusdebatte in der Weimarer Republik. Peter Lang
    Troeltschs Auseinandersetzung mit naturwissenschaftlichen Weltbildern in "Der Historismus und seine Probleme" bietet grundlegende, noch heute aktuelle Einsichten in die Erkenntnisbedingungen der Naturwissenschaften. Der Begriff des Naturalismus erhält in diesem Zusammenhang eine ähnliche Mehrdeutigkeit wie der Begriff des Historismus (1). Troeltschs Position zu naturwissenschaftlichen Erkenntnissen und ihren Verallgemeinerungen zu Weltbildern findet einen öffentlichen Ausdruck in seiner ambivalenten Haltung gegenüber der nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg aufkommenden Naturwissenschaftskritik. Man kann vermuten, daß diese lebensphilosophisch ausgerichtete Nachkriegsströmung auf die Herausbildung des heutigen Begriffs von Naturwissenschaft (...)
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  36. Fabio Sterpetti (2015). Are Evolutionary Debunking Arguments Really Self-Defeating? Philosophia 43 (3):877-889.
    Evolutionary Debunking Arguments are defined as arguments that appeal to the evolutionary genealogy of our beliefs to undermine their justification. Recently, Helen De Cruz and her co-authors supported the view that EDAs are self-defeating: if EDAs claim that human arguments are not justified, because the evolutionary origin of the beliefs which figure in such arguments undermines those beliefs, and EDAs themselves are human arguments, then EDAs are not justified, and we should not accept their conclusions about the fact that human (...)
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  37. Italo Testa (2012). How Does Recognition Emerge From Nature? The Genesis of Consciousness in Hegel’s Jena Writings. Critical Horizons 13 (2):176-196.
    The paper proposes a reconstruction of some fragments of Hegel’s Jena manuscripts concerning the natural genesis of recognitive spiritual consciousness. On this basis it will be argued that recognition has a foothold in nature. As a consequence, recognition should not be understood as a bootstrapping process, that is, as a self-positing and self-justifying normative social phenomenon, intelligible within itself and independently of anything external to it.
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  38. Brooke Alan Trisel (2016). Human Extinction, Narrative Ending, and Meaning of Life. Journal of Philosophy of Life 6 (1):1-22.
    Some people think that the inevitability of human extinction renders life meaningless. Joshua Seachris has argued that naturalism can be conceptualized as a meta-narrative and that it narrates across important questions of human life, including what is the meaning of life and how life will end. How a narrative ends is important, Seachris argues. In the absence of God, and with knowledge that human extinction is a certainty, is there any way that humanity could be meaningful and have a good (...)
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  39. Ericka Tucker (2013). Spinoza’s Hobbesian Naturalism and Its Promise for a Feminist Theory of Power. Revista Conatus - Filosofia de Spinoza 7 (13):11-23.
    This paper examines recent feminist work on Spinoza and identifies the elements of Spinoza’s philosophy that have been seen as promising for feminist naturalism. I argue that the elements of Spinoza’s work that feminist theorists have found so promising are precisely those concepts he derives from Hobbes. I argue that the misunderstanding of Hobbes as architect of the egoist model of human nature has effaced his contribution to Spinoza’s more praised conception of the human individual. Despite misconceptions, I argue that (...)
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  40. Jörg Volbers (2015). Freiheit als Praxisform. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 63 (6).
    Dewey’s pragmatism and John McDowell’s philosophy of language share central concerns. They defend a naturalistic vision of the mind (“second nature”) and rely on the concept of experience in order to articulate the contact between mind and world. They differ, though, in their understanding of how the human mind can relate spontaneously to itself and to the world. McDowell links this freedom exclusively to language with the consequence of detaching it from any reflexive determination, turning it into an abstract given. (...)
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  41. Jörg Volbers (2012). McDowell und das Problem des verkörperten Subjekts. Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie 37 (3):333-347.
    In identifying rationality as belonging to our 'second nature', McDowell’s specific form of naturalism aims at reconciling the reflecting subject with the world. The detailed exposition of this idea in 'Mind and World', however, operates with two conflicting claims. While arguing for the bodily nature of subjectivity and thus disagreeing fundamentally with Kant’s transcendental conception of reason, McDowell still retains the central Kantian claim that thinking is an autonomous and self-standing capacity. The article argues that the bodily nature of subjectivity (...)
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  42. D. Gene Witmer (2003). Review Of: Michael Rea, World Without Design: The Ontological Consequences of Naturalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):603.