Naturalizing Mental Content Edited by Dan Ryder (University of British Columbia)

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Information-Based Accounts of Mental Content
  1. Juan José Acero (1998). Non-Conceptual Content, Subject-Centered Information and the Naturalistic Demand. Philosophical Issues 9:359-367.
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  2. Frederick R. Adams (2003). The Informational Turn in Philosophy. Minds and Machines 13 (4):471-501.
    This paper traces the application of information theory to philosophical problems of mind and meaning from the earliest days of the creation of the mathematical theory of communication. The use of information theory to understand purposive behavior, learning, pattern recognition, and more marked the beginning of the naturalization of mind and meaning. From the inception of information theory, Wiener, Turing, and others began trying to show how to make a mind from informational and computational materials. Over the last 50 years, (...)
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  3. Kathleen Akins (1996). Of Sensory Systems and the "Aboutness" of Mental States. Journal of Philosophy 93 (7):337--372.
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  4. Jon Barwise (1987). Unburdening the Language of Thought. Mind and Language 2 (1):82-96.
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  5. Jon Barwise (1986). Information and Circumstance. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 27 (July):324-338.
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  6. Jon Barwise & John Perry (1983). Situations and Attitudes. Mit Press.
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  7. Radu J. Bogdan (1994). Grounds for Cognition. Erlbaum.
    This is how guidance of behavior to goal grounds and explains cognition and the main forms in which it manages information.
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  8. Radu J. Bogdan (1988). Information and Semantic Cognition: An Ontological Account. Mind and Language 3 (2):81-122.
    Information is the fuel of cognition. At its most basic level, information is a matter of structures interacting under laws. The notion of information thus reflects the (relational) fact that a structure is created by the impact of another structure. The impacted structure is an encoding, in some concrete form, of the interaction with the impacting structure. Information is, essentially, the structural trace in some system of an interaction with another system; it is also, as a consequence, the structural fuel (...)
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  9. Radu J. Bogdan (1987). Mind, Content and Information. Synthese 70 (February):205-227.
    What is it that one thinks or believes when one thinks or believes something? A mental formula? A sentence in some natural language? Its truth conditions? Or perhaps an abstract proposition? The current story of content is fairly ecumenical. It says that a number of aspects, some mental, other semantic, go into our understanding of content. Yet the current story is incomplete. It leaves out a very important aspect of content, one which I call incremental information. It is information in (...)
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  10. Jason Bridges (2006). Does Informational Semantics Commit Euthyphro's Fallacy. Nos 40 (3):522�547.
    In this paper, I argue that informational semantics, the most well-known and worked-out naturalistic account of intentional content, conflicts with a fundamental psychological principle about the conditions of belief-formation. Since this principle is an important premise in the argument for informational semantics, the upshot is that the view is self-contradictory??indeed, it turns out to be guilty of a sophisticated version of the fallacy famously committed by Euthyphro in the eponymous Platonic dialogue. Criticisms of naturalistic accounts of content typically proceed piecemeal (...)
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  11. Anthony Chemero (2003). Information for Perception and Information Processing. Minds and Machines 13 (4):577-588.
    Do psychologists and computer/cognitive scientists mean the same thing by the term `information'? In this essay, I answer this question by comparing information as understood by Gibsonian, ecological psychologists with information as understood in Barwise and Perry's situation semantics. I argue that, with suitable massaging, these views of information can be brought into line. I end by discussing some issues in (the philosophy of) cognitive science and artificial intelligence.
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  12. Andy Clark (1987). Intentionality and Information. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (September):335-341.
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  13. Austen Clark (1993). Mice, Shrews, and Misrepresentation. Journal of Philosophy 60 (6):290-310.
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  14. Jonathan Cohen (2006). An Objective Counterfactual Theory of Information. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (3):333 – 352.
    We offer a novel theory of information that differs from traditional accounts in two respects: (i) it explains information in terms of counterfactuals rather than conditional probabilities, and (ii) it does not make essential reference to doxastic states of subjects, and consequently allows for the sort of objective, reductive explanations of various notions in epistemology and philosophy of mind that many have wanted from an account of information.
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  15. Jonathan Cohen (2002). Information and Content. In Luciano Floridi (ed.), Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Information and Computing. Blackwell.
    Mental states differ from most other entities in the world in having semantic or intentional properties: they have meanings, they are about other things, they have satisfaction- or truth-conditions, they have representational content. Mental states are not the only entities that have intentional properties - so do linguistic expressions, some paintings, and so on; but many follow Grice, 1957 ] in supposing that we could understand the intentional properties of these other entities as derived from the intentional properties of mental (...)
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  16. David J. Cole, Natural Language and Natural Meaning.
    In Book II of the _Essay_, at the beginning of his discussion of language in Chapter II ("Of the Signification of Words"), John Locke writes that we humans have a variety of thoughts which might profit others, but that unfortunately these thoughts lie invisible and hidden from others. And so we use language to communicate these thoughts. As a result, "words, in their primary or immediate signification,stand for nothing but _the ideas in the mind of him that uses them_.
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  17. Jeff Coulter (1995). The Informed Neuron: Issues in the Use of Information Theory in the Behavioral Sciences. Minds and Machines 5 (4):583-96.
  18. Fred Dretske (2000). Perception, Knowledge and Belief: Selected Essays. Cambridge University Press.
    This collection of essays by eminent philosopher Fred Dretske brings together work on the theory of knowledge and philosophy of mind spanning thirty years. The two areas combine to lay the groundwork for a naturalistic philosophy of mind. The fifteen essays focus on perception, knowledge, and consciousness. Together, they show the interconnectedness of Dretske's work in epistemology and his more contemporary ideas on philosophy of mind, shedding light on the links which can be made between the two. The first section (...)
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  19. Fred Dretske (1988). Bogdan on Information: Commentary. Mind and Language 3 (2):141-144.
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  20. Fred Dretske (1981/1999). Knowledge and the Flow of Information. MIT Press.
    This book presents an attempt to develop a theory of knowledge and a philosophy of mind using ideas derived from the mathematical theory of communication developed by Claude Shannon. Information is seen as an objective commodity defined by the dependency relations between distinct events. Knowledge is then analyzed as information caused belief. Perception is the delivery of information in analog form (experience) for conceptual utilization by cognitive mechanisms. The final chapters attempt to develop a theory of meaning (or belief content) (...)
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  21. Kevan Edwards (2010). Concept Referentialism and the Role of Empty Concepts. Mind and Language 25 (1):89-118.
    This paper defends a reference-based approach to concept individuation against the objection that such an approach is unable to make sense of concepts that fail to refer. The main line of thought pursued involves clarifying how the referentialist should construe the relationship between a concept's (referential) content and its role in mental processes. While the central goal of the paper is to defend a view aptly titled Concept Referentialism , broader morals are drawn regarding reference-based approaches in general. The paper (...)
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  22. Gareth Evans (1985). Collected Papers. Oxford University Press.
    This volume collects thirteen papers by one of the leading philosophers of his generation, who died prematurely in 1980.
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  23. Luciano Floridi (2005). Is Semantic Information Meaningful Data? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):351-370.
    There is no consensus yet on the definition of semantic information. This paper contributes to the current debate by criticising and revising the Standard Definition of semantic Information (SDI) as meaningful data, in favour of the Dretske-Grice approach: meaningful and well-formed data constitute semantic information only if they also qualify as contingently truthful. After a brief introduction, SDI is criticised for providing necessary but insufficient conditions for the definition of semantic information. SDI is incorrect because truth-values do not supervene on (...)
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  24. Luciano Floridi (2003). Two Approaches to the Philosophy of Information. Minds and Machines 13 (4):459-469.
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  25. Jerry A. Fodor (1998). Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong. Oxford University Press.
    The renowned philosopher Jerry Fodor, a leading figure in the study of the mind for more than twenty years, presents a strikingly original theory on the basic constituents of thought. He suggests that the heart of cognitive science is its theory of concepts, and that cognitive scientists have gone badly wrong in many areas because their assumptions about concepts have been mistaken. Fodor argues compellingly for an atomistic theory of concepts, deals out witty and pugnacious demolitions of rival theories, and (...)
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  26. Jerry A. Fodor (1990). A Theory of Content and Other Essays. MIT Press.
  27. Jerry A. Fodor (1986). Information and Association. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 27 (July):307-323.
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  28. Richard Foley (1987). Dretske's 'Information-Theoretic' Account of Knowledge. Synthese 70 (February):159-184.
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  29. Gary Gates (1996). The Price of Information. Synthese 107 (3):325-347.
    In this paper I apply an old problem of Quine's (the inscrutability of reference in translation) to a new style of theory about mental content (causal/nomological/informational accounts of meaning) and conclude that no "naturalization" of content of the sort currently popular can solve Quine's "gavagai" enigma. I show how failure to solve the problem leads to absurd conclusions not about one's own mental life, but about the non-mental world. I discuss various ways of attempting to remedy the accounts so as (...)
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  30. Olav Gjelsvik (1991). Dretske on Knowledge and Content. Synthese 86 (March):425-41.
    In this paper I discuss Fred Dretske's account of knowledge critically, and try to bring out how his account of informational content leads to cases of extreme epistemic good luck in his treatment of knowledge. My main interest, however, is to establish that the cases of epistemic luck arise because Dretske's account of knowledge in a fundamental way fails to take into account the role our actual recognitional capacities and powers of discrimination play in perceptually based knowledge. This result is, (...)
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  31. Richard E. Grandy (1987). Information-Based Epistemology, Ecological Epistemology and Epistemology Naturalized. Synthese 70 (February):191-203.
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  32. Patrick Grim, P. St Denis & T. Kokalis (2004). Information and Meaning: Use-Based Models in Arrays of Neural Nets. Minds and Machines 14 (1):43-66.
    The goal of philosophy of information is to understand what information is, how it operates, and how to put it to work. But unlike ‘information’ in the technical sense of information theory, what we are interested in is meaningful information. To understand the nature and dynamics of information in this sense we have to understand meaning. What we offer here are simple computational models that show emergence of meaning and information transfer in randomized arrays of neural nets. These we take (...)
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  33. Valerie Gray Hardcastle (1994). Indicator Semantics and Dretske's Function. Philosophical Psychology 7 (3):367-82.
    In his Explaining Behavior, Fred Dretske uses a reliabilist theory of representation to try to vindicate the use of intentional explanation for behaviour against latter-day elitninativism. Although Dretske's indicator semantics turns on the notion of function, he himself never explicitly defines what function means. Dretske's reticence in discussing function may ultimately be an error, for, as I argue, his implicit understanding of what a function amounts to does not fit with data from op rant conditioning. Still, this need not be (...)
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  34. M. Heller (1991). Indication and What Might Have Been. Analysis 51 (October):187-91.
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  35. David R. Hilbert, Content, Intention, and Explanation.
    Naturalistic theories of content and whether or not reason-giving explanations of human behavior are causal explanations have been central topics in recent philosophy of mind. Fred Dretske, in his book Explaining Behavior, attempts to construct a naturalistic theory of the contents of beliefs and desires that gives these mental states an important role in the causation of behavior. Even if Dretske is granted that the theory adequately accounts for individual behaviors the theory still faces problems in offering an adequate account (...)
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  36. Frank Hofmann (2001). The Reference of de Re Representations. Grazer Philosophische Studien 62 (1):83-101.
    Full understanding ofrepresentation requires both an accountofrepresentational content and of reference. Fred Dretske has proposed a powerful theory of representational content, the teleological theory of indicator functions. And he has indicated that he thinks an informational account of reference is basically correct. According to this account, reference is determined by a certain informational relation, the relation of carrying primary information about an object. However, a closer examination will show that the informational account cannot adequately deal with our intuitions about certain (...)
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  37. Amir Horowitz (1990). Dretske on Perception. Ratio 3 (2):136-141.
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  38. David J. Israel (1988). Bogdan on Information: Commentary. Mind and Language 3 (2):123-140.
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  39. David J. Israel & John Perry (1990). What is Information? In Philip P. Hanson (ed.), Information, Language and Cognition. University of British Columbia Press.
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  40. Ray S. Jackendoff (1985). Information is in the Mind of the Beholder. Linguistics and Philosophy 8 (February):23-33.
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  41. Matti Kamppinen (1988). Intentionality and Information From an Ontological Point of View. Philosophia 18 (April):107-118.
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  42. Max Kistler (2000). Source and Channel in the Informational Theory of Mental Content. Facta Philosophica 2:213-36.
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  43. Uriah Kriegel (forthcoming). Two Notions of Mental Representation. In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind. Routledge.
    The main thesis of this paper is twofold. In the first half of the paper, (§§1-2), I argue that there are two notions of mental representation, which I call objective and subjective. In the second part (§§3-7), I argue that this casts familiar tracking theories of mental representation as incomplete: while it is clear how they might account for objective representation, they at least require supplementation to account for subjective representation.
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  44. John Kulvicki (2004). Isomorphism in Information-Carrying Systems. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (4):380-395.
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  45. Barry M. Loewer (1987). From Information to Intentionality. Synthese 70 (February):287-317.
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  46. Olimpia I. Lombardi (2005). Dretske, Shannon's Theory, and the Interpretation of Information. Synthese 144 (1):23-39.
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  47. Olimpia I. Lombardi (2004). What is Information? Foundations of Science 9 (2):105-134.
    The main aim of this work is to contribute tothe elucidation of the concept of informationby comparing three different views about thismatter: the view of Fred Dretske's semantictheory of information, the perspective adoptedby Peter Kosso in his interaction-informationaccount of scientific observation, and thesyntactic approach of Thomas Cover and JoyThomas. We will see that these views involvevery different concepts of information, eachone useful in its own field of application. This comparison will allow us to argue in favorof a terminological `cleansing': it (...)
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  48. J. Christopher Maloney (1983). Dretske on Knowledge and Information. Analysis 43 (January):25-28.
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  49. Ruth G. Millikan (2001). What has Natural Information to Do with Intentional Representation? In D. Walsh (ed.), Evolution, Naturalism and Mind. Cambridge University Press.
    "According to informational semantics, if it's necessary that a creature can't distinguish Xs from Ys, it follows that the creature can't have a concept that applies to Xs but not Ys." (Jerry Fodor, The Elm and the Expert, p.32).
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  50. William E. Morris (1990). Knowledge and the Regularity Theory of Information. Synthese 82 (3):375-398.
    Fred Dretske's "Knowledge and the Flow of Information" is an extended attempt to develop a philosophically useful theory of information. Dretske adapts central ideas from Shannon and Weaver's mathematical theory of communication, and applies them to some traditional problems in epistemology. In doing so, he succeeds in building for philosophers a much-needed bridge to important work in cognitive science. The pay-off for epistemologists is that Dretske promises a way out of a long-standing impasse -- the Gettier problem. He offers an (...)
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  51. S. G. O'Hair (1969). A Definition of Informational Content. Journal of Philosophy 66 (March):132-133.
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  52. David Pineda (1998). Information and Content. Philosophical Issues 9:381-387.
    In this paper I discuss critically Stalnaker's views on content.
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  53. Dan Ryder, Problems of Representation II: Naturalizing Content.
    Introduction The project John is currently thinking that the sun is bright. Consider his occurrent belief or judgement that the sun is bright. Its content is that the sun is bright. This is a truth- evaluable content (which shall be our main concern) because it is capable of being true or false.1 In virtue of what natural, scientifically accessible facts does John’s judgement have this content? To give the correct answer to that question, and to explain why John’s judgement and (...)
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  54. Steven F. Savitt (1987). Absolute Informational Content. Synthese 70 (February):185-90.
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  55. Kenneth M. Sayre (1987). Cognitive Science and the Problem of Semantic Content. Synthese 70 (February):247-69.
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  56. Paul G. Skokowski (1999). Information, Belief, and Causal Role. In L.S. Moss, J Ginzburg & M. de Rijke (eds.), Logic, Language, and Computation Vol 2. CSLI Press.
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  57. Stephen P. Stich (1990). Building Belief: Some Queries About Representation, Indication, and Function. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (4):801-806.
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  58. D. Sturdee (1997). The Semantic Shuffle: Shifting Emphasis in Dretske's Account of Representational Content. Erkenntnis 47 (1):89-104.
    In Knowledge and the Flow of Information, Fred Dretske explains representational content by appealing to natural indication: a mental representation has its content in virtue of being a reliable natural indicator of a particular type of state of the world. His account fails for several reasons, not the least of which is that it cannot account for misrepresentation. Recognizing this, Dretske adds a twist in his more recent work on representational content (sketched in 'Misrepresentation' and elaborated in Explaining Behavior): a (...)
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  59. Donna M. Summerfield & Pat A. Manfredi (1998). Indeterminacy in Recent Theories of Content. Minds and Machines 8 (2):181-202.
    Jerry Fodor has charged that Fred Dretske's account of content suffers from indeterminacy to the extent that we should reject it in favor of Fodor‘s own account. In this paper, we ask what the problem of indeterminacy really is; we distinguish a relatively minor problem we call ‘looseness of fit’ from a major problem of failing to show how to point to what is not there. We sketch Dretske's account of content and how it is supposed to solve the major (...)
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  60. Kenneth A. Taylor (1987). Belief, Information and Semantic Content: A Naturalist's Lament. Synthese 71 (April):97-124.
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  61. Marius Usher (2001). A Statistical Referential Theory of Content: Using Information Theory to Account for Misrepresentation. Mind and Language 16 (3):331-334.
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  62. Corey G. Washington (2002). A Conflict Between Language and Atomistic Information. Minds and Machines 12 (3):397-421.
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  63. Michael Welbourne (1983). A Cognitive Thoroughfare. Mind 92 (July):410-413.
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  64. Terry Winograd (1987). Cognition, Attunement and Modularity. Mind and Language 2 (1):97-103.
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  65. Palle Yourgrau (1987). Information Retrieval and Cognitive Accessibility. Synthese 70 (February):229-246.
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  66. Jos Zalabardo (1995). A Problem for Information-Theoretic Semantics. Synthese 105 (1):1-29.
    Information theoretic semantics proposes to construe predicate reference in terms of nomological relations between distal properties and properties of representational mental events. Research on the model has largely concentrated on the problem of choosing the nomological relation in terms of which distal properties are to be singled out. I argue that, in addition to this, an information theoretic account has to provide a specification of which properties of representational mental events will play a role in determining reference, qua bearers of (...)
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Asymmetric-Dependence Accounts of Mental Content
  1. Frederick R. Adams, Fodor's Asymmetrical Causal Dependency Theory of Meaning.
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  2. Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (1997). Fodor's Asymmetric Causal Dependency Theory and Proximal Projections. Southern Journal of Philosophy 35 (4):433-437.
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  3. Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (1994). 'X' Means X: Fodor/Warfield Semantics. Minds and Machines 4 (2):215-31.
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  4. Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (1993). Fodorian Semantics, Pathologies, and "Block's Problem". Minds and Machines 3 (1):97-104.
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  5. Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (1992). 'X' Means X: Semantics Fodor-Style. Minds and Machines 2 (2):175-83.
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  6. Lynne Rudder Baker (1991). Has Content Been Naturalized? In Barry M. Loewer & Georges Rey (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Blackwell.
    The Representational Theory of the Mind (RTM) has been forcefully and subtly developed by Jerry A. Fodor. According to the RTM, psychological states that explain behavior involve tokenings of mental representations. Since the RTM is distinguished from other approaches by its appeal to the meaning or "content" of mental representations, a question immediately arises: by virtue of what does a mental representation express or represent an environmental property like coto or shoe? This question asks for a general account of the (...)
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  7. Lynne Rudder Baker (1989). On a Causal Theory of Content. Philosophical Perspectives 3:165-186.
    The project of explaining intentional phenomena in terms of nonintentional phenomena has become a central task in the philosophy of mind.' Since intentional phenomena like believing, desiring, intending have content essentially, the project is one of showing how semantic properties like content can be reconciled with nonsemantic properties like cause. As Jerry A. Fodor put it, The worry about representation is above all that the semantic (and/or the intentional) will prove permanently recalcitrant to integration in the natural order; for example (...)
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  8. Paul Bernier (1993). Narrow Content, Context of Thought, and Asymmetric Dependence. Mind and Language 8 (3):327-42.
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  9. Mark H. Bickhard (1998). A Process Model of the Emergence of Representation. In G. L. Farre & T. Oksala (eds.), Emergence, Complexity, Hierarchy, Organization, Selected and Edited Papers From the Echo Iii Conference. Acta Polytechnica Scandinavica.
    Two challenges to the very possibility of emergence are addressed, one metaphysical and one logical. The resolution of the metaphysical challenge requires a shift to a process metaphysics, while the logical challenge highlights normative emergence, and requires a shift to more powerful logical tools -- in particular, that of implicit definition. Within the framework of a process metaphysics, two levels of normative emergence are outlined: that of function and that of representation.
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  10. M. J. Cain (1999). Fodor's Attempt to Naturalize Mental Content. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (197):520-26.
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  11. H.-R. Cram (1992). Fodor's Causal Theory of Representation. Philosophical Quarterly 42 (166):56-70.
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  12. Charles E. M. Dunlop (2004). Mentalese Semantics and the Naturalized Mind. Philosophical Psychology 17 (1):77-94.
    In a number of important works, Jerry Fodor has wrestled with the problem of how mental representation can be accounted for within a physicalist framework. His favored response has attempted to identify nonintentional conditions for intentionality, relying on a nexus of casual relations between symbols and what they represent. I examine Fodor's theory and argue that it fails to meet its own conditions for adequacy insofar as it presupposes the very phenomenon that it purports to account for. I conclude, however, (...)
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  13. William C. Fish (2000). Asymmetry in Action. Ratio 13 (2):138-145.
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  14. Jerry A. Fodor (1998). Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong. Oxford University Press.
    The renowned philosopher Jerry Fodor, a leading figure in the study of the mind for more than twenty years, presents a strikingly original theory on the basic constituents of thought. He suggests that the heart of cognitive science is its theory of concepts, and that cognitive scientists have gone badly wrong in many areas because their assumptions about concepts have been mistaken. Fodor argues compellingly for an atomistic theory of concepts, deals out witty and pugnacious demolitions of rival theories, and (...)
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  15. Jerry A. Fodor (1990). A Theory of Content and Other Essays. MIT Press.
  16. Martha I. Gibson (1996). Asymmetric Dependencies, Ideal Conditions, and Meaning. Philosophical Psychology 9 (2):235-59.
    Jerry Fodor has proposed a causal theory of meaning based on the notion of a certain asymmetric dependency between the causes of a symbol's tokens. This theory is held to be an improvement on Dennis Stampe's causal theory of meaning and Fred Dretske's information theoretic account, because it allegedly solves what Fodor calls the “disjunction problem”, and does so without recourse to the kind of optimal (ideal) conditions to which Stampe and Dretske appeal. A series of counterexamples is proposed to (...)
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  17. Todd Jones (1991). Staving Off Catastrophe: A Critical Notice of Jerry Fodor's Psychosemantics. Mind and Language 6 (1):58-82.
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  18. Jussi Jylkkä (2009). Why Fodor's Theory of Concepts Fails. Minds and Machines 19 (1):25-46.
    Fodor’s theory of concepts holds that the psychological capacities, beliefs or intentions which determine how we use concepts do not determine reference. Instead, causal relations of a specific kind between properties and our dispositions to token a concept are claimed to do so. Fodor does admit that there needs to be some psychological mechanisms mediating the property–concept tokening relations, but argues that they are purely accidental for reference. In contrast, I argue that the actual mechanisms that sustain the reference determining (...)
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  19. Uriah Kriegel (forthcoming). Two Notions of Mental Representation. In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind. Routledge.
    The main thesis of this paper is twofold. In the first half of the paper, (§§1-2), I argue that there are two notions of mental representation, which I call objective and subjective. In the second part (§§3-7), I argue that this casts familiar tracking theories of mental representation as incomplete: while it is clear how they might account for objective representation, they at least require supplementation to account for subjective representation.
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  20. Kenneth R. Livingston (1993). What Fodor Means: Some Thoughts on Reading Jerry Fodor's A Theory of Content and Other Essays. Philosophical Psychology 6 (3):289-301.
    Jerry Fodor's Asymmetric Dependency Theory (ADT) of meaning is discussed in the context of his attempt to avoid holism and the relativism it entails. Questions are raised about the implications of the theory for psychological theories of meaning, and brief suggestions are offered for how to more closely link a theory of meaning to a theory of perception.
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  21. Barry M. Loewer (1991). Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.
  22. J. Christopher Maloney (1990). Mental Misrepresentation. Philosophy of Science 57 (September):445-58.
    An account of the contents of the propositional attitudes is fundamental to the success of the cognitive sciences if, as seems correct, the cognitive sciences do presuppose propositional attitudes. Fodor has recently pointed the way towards a naturalistic explication of mental content in his Psychosemantics (1987). Fodor's theory is a version of the causal theory of meaning and thus inherits many of its virtues, including its intrinsic plausibility. Nevertheless, the proposal may suffer from two deficiencies: (1) It seems not to (...)
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  23. Pat A. Manfredi & Donna M. Summerfield (1992). Robustness Without Asymmetry: A Flaw in Fodor's Theory of Content. Philosophical Studies 66 (3):261-83.
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  24. Luciano B. Mariano (1999). Content Naturalized. Philosophical Studies 96 (2):205-38.
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  25. Joseph Mendola (2003). A Dilemma for Asymmetric Dependence. Noûs 37 (2):232-257.
    Accounts of mental content rooted in asymmetric dependence hold, crudely speaking, that the content of a mental representation is the cause of that representation on which all its other causes depend.1 To speak somewhat less crudely, such accounts, hereafter.
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  26. Theo C. Meyering (1997). Fodor's Information Semantics Between Naturalism and Mentalism. Inquiry 40 (2):187-207.
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  27. Steve Palmquist (1992). Unknown. Indian Philosophical Quarterly 19.
    At what stage in its development does a foetus become a living human being? When is it proper to refer to a network of pulsating neurons as a.
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  28. Robert D. Rupert (2000). Dispositions Indisposed: Semantic Atomism and Fodor's Theory of Content. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (3):325-349.
    According to Jerry Fodor’s atomistic theory of content, subjects’ dispositions to token mentalese terms in counterfactual circumstances fix the contents of those terms. I argue that the pattern of counterfactual tokenings alone does not satisfactorily fix content; if Fodor’s appeal to patterns of counterfactual tokenings has any chance of assigning correct extensions, Fodor must take into account the contents of subjects’ various mental states at the times of those tokenings. However, to do so, Fodor must abandon his semantic atomism. And (...)
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  29. Dan Ryder, Problems of Representation II: Naturalizing Content.
    Introduction The project John is currently thinking that the sun is bright. Consider his occurrent belief or judgement that the sun is bright. Its content is that the sun is bright. This is a truth- evaluable content (which shall be our main concern) because it is capable of being true or false.1 In virtue of what natural, scientifically accessible facts does John’s judgement have this content? To give the correct answer to that question, and to explain why John’s judgement and (...)
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  30. William E. Seager (1993). Fodor's Theory of Content: Problems and Objections. Phiosophy of Science 60 (2):262-77.
    Jerry Fodor has recently proposed a new entry into the list of information based approaches to semantic content aimed at explicating the general notion of representation for both mental states and linguistic tokens. The basic idea is that a token means what causes its production. The burden of the theory is to select the proper cause from the sea of causal influences which aid in generating any token while at the same time avoiding the absurdity of everything's being literally meaningful (...)
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  31. Joseph T. Tolliver (1988). Disjunctivitis. Mind and Language 3 (1):64-70.
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  32. Christopher D. Viger (2001). Locking on to the Language of Thought. Philosophical Psychology 14 (2):203-215.
    I demonstrate that locking on, a key notion in Jerry Fodor's most recent theory of content, supplemented informational atomism (SIA), is cashed out in terms of asymmetric dependence, the central notion in his earlier theory of content. I use this result to argue that SIA is incompatible with the language of thought hypothesis because the constraints on the causal relations into which symbols can enter imposed by the theory of content preclude the causal relations needed between symbols for them to (...)
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  33. Charles Wallis (1995). Asymmetric Dependence, Representation, and Cognitive Science. Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (3):373-401.
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  34. Ted A. Warfield (1994). Fodorian Semantics: A Reply to Adams and Aizawa. Minds and Machines 4 (2):205-14.
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