This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Siblings:See also:
102 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 102
  1. Kenneth Aizawa & Frederick R. Adams (2005). Defending Non-Derived Content. Philosophical Psychology 18 (6):661-669.
    In ‘‘The Myth of Original Intentionality,’’ Daniel Dennett appears to want to argue for four claims involving the familiar distinction between original (or underived) and derived intentionality.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Mark Alfano (forthcoming). Nietzsche, Naturalism, and the Tenacity of the Intentional. Journal of Nietzsche Studies.
    In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche demands that “psychology shall be<br>recognized again as the queen of the sciences.” While one might cast a dubious glance at the “again,” many of Nietzsche’s insights were indeed psychological, and many of his arguments invoke psychological premises. In Genealogy, he criticizes the “English psychologists” for the “inherent psychological absurdity” of their theory of the origin of good and bad, pointing out the implausibility of the claim that the utility of unegoistic<br>actions would be forgotten. Tabling (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Mark Alfano (2010). The Tenacity of the Intentional Prior to the Genealogy. Journal of Nietzsche Studies 40:29-46.
    I have argued elsewhere that the psychological aspects of Nietzsche’s later works are best understood from a psychodynamic point of view. Nietzsche holds a view I dubbed the tenacity of the intentional (T): when an intentional state loses its object, a new object replaces the original; the state does not disappear entirely. In this essay I amend and clarify (T) to (T``): When an intentional state with a sub-propositional object loses its object, the affective component of the state persists without (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Peter Alward (2009). The Inessential Quasi-Indexical. Philosophical Studies 145 (2):235 - 255.
    In this paper, I argue, contra Perry, that the existence of locating beliefs does not require the abandonment of the analysis of belief as a relation between subjects and propositions. I argue that what the "problem of the essential indexical" reveals is that a complete explanation of behaviour requires both an explanation of the type of behaviour the agent engaged in and an explanation of why she engaged in it in the circumstances that she did. And I develop an account (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Michael L. Anderson & Gregg H. Rosenberg (2008). Content and Action: The Guidance Theory of Representation. Journal of Mind and Behavior 29 (1-2):55-86.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Michael V. Antony (2006). How to Argue Against (Some) Theories of Content. Iyyun 55 (July):265-286.
    An argument is offered against three naturalistic theories of intentional content: causal-covariation theories, teleological theories, and certain versions of conceptual role semantics. The strategy involves focusing on a normative problem regarding the practice of associating content expressions (e.g., that-clauses) with internal entities (states, symbol structures, etc.). The problem can be expressed thus: Which content expressions are the right ones to associate with internal entities? I argue, first, that an empirical solution to this problem—what I call the Normative Problem—will follow naturally (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. John Barresi (2004). Intentionality, Consciousness and Intentional Relations: From Constitutive Phenomenology to Cognitive Science. In L. Embree (ed.), Gurwitsch's Relevance for Cognitive Science. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 79--93.
    In this chapter I look closely at the intentionality of consciousness from a naturalistic perspective. I begin with a consideration of Gurwitsch's suggestive ideas about the role of acts of consciousness in constituting both the objects and the subjects of consciousness. I turn next to a discussion of how these ideas relate to my own empirical approach to intentional relations seen from a developmental perspective. This is followed by a discussion of some recent ideas in philosophical cognitive science on the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Wolfgang Barz (2008). The Real Trouble with Intentionality. Philosophical Explorations 11 (2):79 – 92.
    I argue that the project of naturalizing intentionality is misconceived. Intentionality should not be considered as a challenge to our naturalistic world-view, but rather as something which gives rise to a logical problem: how to save the principle of indiscernibility of identicals from apparent counterexamples arising from intensional discourse.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Radu J. Bogdan (1993). The Pragmatic Psyche. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (1):157-158.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Paul A. Boghossian (2008). Content and Justification: Philosophical Papers. OUP Oxford.
    Content and Justification presents a series of essays by Paul Boghossian on the theory of content and on its relation to the phenomenon of a priori knowledge. -/- Part one comprises essays on the nature of rule-following and its relation to the problem of mental content; on the intelligibility of eliminativist views of the mental; on the prospects for a naturalistic reduction of mental content; and on the currently influential view that meaning is a normative notion. -/- Part two includes (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Laurence BonJour (1991). Is Thought a Symbolic Process? Synthese 89 (3):331-52.
  12. Myles Brand (ed.) (1986). The Representation Of Knowledge And Belief. Tucson: University Of Arizona Press.
  13. Andrew Brook & Robert J. Stainton (1997). Fodor's New Theory of Content and Computation. Mind and Language 12 (3-4):459-74.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (12 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Todd Buras (2009). An Argument Against Causal Theories of Mental Content. American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (2):117-129.
    Some mental states are about themselves. Nothing is a cause of itself. So some mental states are not about their causes; they are about things distinct from their causes. If this argument is sound, it spells trouble for causal theories of mental content—the precise sort of trouble depending on the precise sort of causal theory. This paper shows that the argument is sound (§§1-3), and then spells out the trouble (§4).
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Paul M. Churchland & Patricia S. Churchland (1983). Stalking the Wild Epistemic Engine. Noûs 17 (March):5-18.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Hugh Clapin (ed.) (2002). Philosophy of Mental Representation. Oxford University Press.
    In Philosophy of Mental Representation five of the most original and important thinkers in philosophy of mind engage in an overlapping dialogue about mental representation. In new papers, contributors Andy Clark, Robert Cummins, Daniel Dennett, John Haugeland, and Brian Cantwell Smith each investigate the views and claims of one of the other contributors regarding mental representation. The subject then offers a reply. An exciting feature of this collection is the dynamic discussion among all contributors following each exchange. This collection offers (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Mike Collins (2009). The Nature and Implementation of Representation in Biological Systems. Dissertation, City University of New York
    I defend a theory of mental representation that satisfies naturalistic constraints. Briefly, we begin by distinguishing (i) what makes something a representation from (ii) given that a thing is a representation, what determines what it represents. Representations are states of biological organisms, so we should expect a unified theoretical framework for explaining both what it is to be a representation as well as what it is to be a heart or a kidney. I follow Millikan in explaining (i) in terms (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. T. Crane (forthcoming). Intentionality. .
  19. Robert Cummins (1994). Interpretational Semantics. In Steven P. Stitch & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), mental representation: a reader. Blackwell.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Robert C. Cummins (2002). Haugeland on Representation and Intentionality. In Hugh Clapin (ed.), Philosophy of Mental Representation. Oxford University Press.
    Haugeland doesn’t have what I would call a theory of mental representation. Indeed, it isn’t clear that he believes there is such a thing. But he does have a theory of intentionality and a correlative theory of objectivity, and it is this material that I will be discussing in what follows. It will facilitate the discussion that follows to have at hand some distinctions and accompanying terminology I introduced in Representations, Targets and Attitudes (Cummins, 1996; RTA hereafter). Couching the discussion (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Robert C. Cummins (2000). Reply to Millikan. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):113-127.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Robert C. Cummins (1996). Representations, Targets, and Attitudes. MIT Press.
    "This is an important new Cummins work.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Robert C. Cummins (1989). Meaning and Mental Representation. MIT Press.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Robert C. Cummins & Pierre Poirier (2004). Representation and Indication. In Hugh Clapin (ed.), Representation in Mind. Elsevier. 21--40.
    This paper is about two kinds of mental content and how they are related. We are going to call them representation and indication. We will begin with a rough characterization of each. The differences, and why they matter, will, hopefully, become clearer as the paper proceeds.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Daniel C. Dennett (2001). Intentionality. In Richard L. Gregory (ed.), Oxford Companion to the Mind. Oxford University Press. 139-143.
    Intentionality is _aboutness_. Some things are about other things: a belief can be about icebergs, but an iceberg is not about anything; an idea can be about the number 7, but the number 7 is not about anything; a book or a film can be about Paris, but Paris is not about anything. Philosophers have long been concerned with the analysis of the phenomenon of intentionality, which has seemed to many to be a fundamental feature of mental states and events.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Daniel C. Dennett (1991). Ways of Establishing Harmony. In Brian P. McLaughlin (ed.), Dretske and His Critics. Blackwell.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Daniel C. Dennett (1990). Granny's Campaign for Safe Science. In Barry M. Loewer & Georges Rey (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Blackwell.
    What do these various heresies have in common? From Fodor's point of view, two things, obviously: (1) they are all wrong, wrong, wrong! and (2) they are endorsed by people who are otherwise quite decent company. That would be thread enough to tie Fodor's targets together if he were right, but as one who finds more than a morsel of truth in each of the derided doctrines, I must seek elsewhere for a uniting principle, and I think I have found (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Michael Devitt (1991). Naturalistic Representation. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42 (3):425-443.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. John Dilworth (2010). Realistic Virtual Reality and Perception. Philosophical Psychology 23 (1):23-42.
    Realistic uses of Virtual Reality (VR) technology closely integrate user training on virtual objects with VR-assisted user interactions with real objects. This paper shows how the Interactive Theory of Perception (ITP) may be extended to cover such cases. Virtual objects are explained as concrete models (CMs) that have an inner generation mechanism, and the ITP is used to explain how VR users can both perceive such local CMs, and perceptually represent remote real objects. Also, concepts of modeling and representation are (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. John Dilworth (2010). More on the Interactive Indexing Semantic Theory. Minds and Machines 20 (3):455-474.
    This article further explains and develops a recent, comprehensive semantic naturalization theory, namely the interactive indexing (II) theory as described in my 2008 Minds and Machines article Semantic Naturalization via Interactive Perceptual Causality (Vol. 18, pp. 527–546). Folk views postulate a concrete intentional relation between cognitive states and the worldly states they are about. The II theory eliminates any such concrete intentionality, replacing it with purely causal relations based on the interactive theory of perception. But intentionality is preserved via purely (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. John Dilworth (2009). Semantics Naturalized: Propositional Indexing Plus Interactive Perception. Language and Communication 29 (1):1-25.
    A concrete proposal is presented as to how semantics should be naturalized. Rather than attempting to naturalize propositions, they are treated as abstract entities that index concrete cognitive states. In turn the relevant concrete cognitive states are identified via perceptual classifications of worldly states, with the aid of an interactive theory of perception. The approach enables a broadly realist theory of propositions, truth and cognitive states to be preserved, with propositions functioning much as abstract mathematical constructs do in the nonsemantic (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. John Dilworth (2008). Semantic Naturalization Via Interactive Perceptual Causality. Minds and Machines 18 (4):527-546.
    A novel semantic naturalization program is proposed. Its three main differences from informational semantics approaches are as follows. First, it makes use of a perceptually based, four-factor interactive causal relation in place of a simple nomic covariance relation. Second, it does not attempt to globally naturalize all semantic concepts, but instead it appeals to a broadly realist interpretation of natural science, in which the concept of propositional truth is off-limits to naturalization attempts. And third, it treats all semantic concepts as (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. John Dilworth (2005). Perceptual Causality Problems Reflexively Resolved. Acta Analytica 20 (3):11-31.
    Causal theories of perception typically have problems in explaining deviant causal chains. They also have difficulty with other unusual putative cases of perception involving prosthetic aids, defective perception, scientifically extended cases of perception, and so on. But I show how a more adequate reflexive causal theory, in which objects or properties X cause a perceiver to acquire X-related dispositions toward that very same item X, can provide a plausible and principled perceptual explanation of all of these kinds of cases. A (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. John Dilworth (2005). The Reflexive Theory of Perception. Behavior and Philosophy 33 (1):17-40.
    ABSTRACT: The Reflexive Theory of Perception (RTP) claims that perception of an object or property X by an organism Z consists in Z being caused by X to acquire some disposition D toward X itself. This broadly behavioral perceptual theory explains perceptual intentionality and correct versus incorrect, plus successful versus unsuccessful, perception in a plausible evolutionary framework. The theory also undermines cognitive and perceptual modularity assumptions, including informational or purely epistemic views of perception in that, according to the RTP, any (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. John Dilworth (2005). A Naturalistic, Reflexive Dispositional Approach to Perception. Southern Journal of Philosophy 43 (4):583-601.
    This paper will investigate the basic question of the nature of perception, as theoretically approached from a purely naturalistic standpoint. An adequate theory must not only have clear application to a world full of pre-existing biological examples of perception of all kinds, from unicellular perception to conscious human perception, but it must also satisfy a series of theoretical or philosophical constraints, as enumerated and discussed in Section 1 below. A perceptual theory invoking _reflexive dispositions_--that is, dispositions directed toward the very (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. John Dilworth (2004). Naturalized Perception Without Information. Journal Of Mind And Behavior 25 (4):349-368.
    The outlines of a novel, fully naturalistic theory of perception are provided, that can explain perception of an object X by organism Z in terms of reflexive causality. On the reflexive view proposed, organism Z perceives object or property X just in case X causes Z to acquire causal dispositions reflexively directed back upon X itself. This broadly functionalist theory is potentially capable of explaining both perceptual representation and perceptual content in purely causal terms, making no use of informational concepts. (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Fred Dretske (1986). Aspects of Cognitive Representation. In Myles Brand & Robert M. Harnish (eds.), The Representation of Knowledge and Belief. University of Arizona Press.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Frances Egan (1994). Aworld Withoutmind: Comments on Terence Horgan's “Naturalism and Intentionality”. Philosophical Studies 76 (2-3):327 - 338.
  39. Chris Eliasmith (2000). How Neurons Mean: A Neurocomputational Theory of Representational Content. Dissertation, Washington University in St. Louis
    Questions concerning the nature of representation and what representations are about have been a staple of Western philosophy since Aristotle. Recently, these same questions have begun to concern neuroscientists, who have developed new techniques and theories for understanding how the locus of neurobiological representation, the brain, operates. My dissertation draws on philosophy and neuroscience to develop a novel theory of representational content.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Hartry Field (1994). Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content. Mind 103 (411):249-285.
  41. Hartry Field (1978). Mental Representation. Erkenntnis 13 (July):9-61.
  42. Carrie Figdor (forthcoming). Verbs and Minds. In Mark Sprevak Jesper Kallestrup (ed.), New Waves in Philosophy of Mind.
    I introduce and defend verbialism, a metaphysical framework appropriate for accommodating the mind within the natural sciences and the mechanistic model of explanation that ties the natural sciences together. Verbialism is the view that mental phenomena belong in the basic ontological category of activities. If mind is what brain does, then explaining the mind is explaining how it occurs, and the ontology of mind is verbialist -- at least, it ought to be. I motivate verbialism by revealing a kind of (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Justin Fisher, Representational Content and the Keys to Success.
    I consider the question of whether success-linked theories of content – theories like those of Ramsey (1927), Millikan (1984) and Blackburn (2005) which take there to be a definitional link between representational content and behavioral success – are consistent with the plausible claim that we can use content-attributions to explain behavioral success. Peter Godfrey-Smith (1996) argues that success-linked theories of content are too closely linked to success to be able to explain it. Against this, I present a plausible account of (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Gabor Forrai (ed.) (2005). Intentionality: Past and Future (Value Inquiry Book Series, Volume 173). New York: Rodopi NY.
    The present volume has grown out of a conference organized jointly by the History of Philosophy Department of the University of Miskolc and the History and Philosophy of Science Department of Eötvös Loránd University (Budapest), which took place in June 2002. The aim of the conference was to explore the various angles from which intentionality can be studied, how it is related to other philosophical issues, and how it figures in the works of major philosophers in the past. It also (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Steven F. Geisz (2009). Turning Representation Inside Out: An Adverbial Approach to the Metaphysics of Language and Mind. Philosophical Forum 40 (4):437-471.
    In order to resolve problems about the normative aspects of representation without having to (1) provide a naturalized theory of intentional/semantic properties, (2) accept non-natural intentional/semantic properties into our worldview, or (3) eliminate intentionality, this article questions a basic assumption about the metaphysics of representation: that representation involves representation-objects. An alternative, nonreifying approach to the metaphysics of representation is introduced and developed in detail. The argumentative strategy is as follows. First, an adverbial view of linguistic representation is introduced. Two potential (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Mikkel Gerken (2013). A Puzzle About Mental Self-Representation and Causation. Philosophical Psychology:1-17.
    A puzzle about mental self-representation and causation. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2013.775642.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Paul Giladi (2014). Liberal Naturalism: The Curious Case of Hegel. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 22 (2):248-270.
  48. Philip A. Glotzbach (1983). Referential Inscrutablility, Perception, and the Empirical Foundation of Meaning. Philosophy Research Archives 9:535-569.
    W.V.O.Quine’s doctrine of referential inscrutability (RI) is the thesis that, first, linguistic reference must always be determined relative to an interpretation of the discourse and, second, that the empirical evidence always underdetermines our choice of interpretation--at least in principle. Although this thesis is a central result of Quine’s theory of language, it was long unclear just how much force RI actually carried. At best, Quine’s discussions provided localized examples of RI (e.g., ‘gavagai’), supplemented merely by arguments for the (in principle) (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Mark Greenberg (2005). A New Map of Theories of Mental Content: Constitutive Accounts and Normative Theories. Philosophical Issues 15 (1):299-320.
    In this paper, I propose a new way of understanding the space of possibilities in the field of mental content. The resulting map assigns separate locations to theories of content that have generally been lumped together on the more traditional map. Conversely, it clusters together some theories of content that have typically been regarded as occupying opposite poles. I make my points concrete by developing a taxonomy of theories of mental content, but the main points of the paper concern not (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (15 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Steven Gross, The Nature of Semantics: On Jackendoff's Arguments.
    Jackendoff defends a mentalist approach to semantics that investigates con- ceptual structures in the mind/brain and their interfaces with other structures, including specifically linguistic structures responsible for syntactic and phono- logical competence. He contrasts this approach with one that seeks to charac- terize the intentional relations between expressions and objects in the world. The latter, he argues, cannot be reconciled with mentalism. He objects in par- ticular that intentionality cannot be naturalized and that the relevant notion of object is suspect. (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 102