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  1. Frederick R. Adams (2002). Mental Representation. In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell
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  2. Kenneth Aizawa & Frederick R. Adams (2005). Defending Non-Derived Content. Philosophical Psychology 18 (6):661-669.
    In ‘‘The Myth of Original Intentionality,’’ Daniel Dennett appears to want to argue for four claims involving the familiar distinction between original (or underived) and derived intentionality.
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  3. Mark Alfano (2013). Nietzsche, Naturalism, and the Tenacity of the Intentional. Journal of Nietzsche Studies 44 (3):457-464.
    In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche demands that “psychology shall be<br>recognized again as the queen of the sciences.” While one might cast a dubious glance at the “again,” many of Nietzsche’s insights were indeed psychological, and many of his arguments invoke psychological premises. In Genealogy, he criticizes the “English psychologists” for the “inherent psychological absurdity” of their theory of the origin of good and bad, pointing out the implausibility of the claim that the utility of unegoistic<br>actions would be forgotten. Tabling (...)
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  4. Mark Alfano (2010). The Tenacity of the Intentional Prior to the Genealogy. Journal of Nietzsche Studies 40:29-46.
    I have argued elsewhere that the psychological aspects of Nietzsche’s later works are best understood from a psychodynamic point of view. Nietzsche holds a view I dubbed the tenacity of the intentional (T): when an intentional state loses its object, a new object replaces the original; the state does not disappear entirely. In this essay I amend and clarify (T) to (T``): When an intentional state with a sub-propositional object loses its object, the affective component of the state persists without (...)
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  5. Peter Alward (2009). The Inessential Quasi-Indexical. Philosophical Studies 145 (2):235 - 255.
    In this paper, I argue, contra Perry, that the existence of locating beliefs does not require the abandonment of the analysis of belief as a relation between subjects and propositions. I argue that what the "problem of the essential indexical" reveals is that a complete explanation of behaviour requires both an explanation of the type of behaviour the agent engaged in and an explanation of why she engaged in it in the circumstances that she did. And I develop an account (...)
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  6. Michael L. Anderson & Gregg H. Rosenberg (2008). Content and Action: The Guidance Theory of Representation. Journal of Mind and Behavior 29 (1-2):55-86.
    The current essay introduces the guidance theory of representation, according to which the content and intentionality of representations can be accounted for in terms of the way they provide guidance for action. The guidance theory offers a way of fixing representational content that gives the causal and evolutionary history of the subject only an indirect role, and an account of representational error, based on failure of action, that does not rely on any such notions as proper functions, ideal conditions, or (...)
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  7. Michael V. Antony (2006). How to Argue Against (Some) Theories of Content. Iyyun 55 (July):265-286.
    An argument is offered against three naturalistic theories of intentional content: causal-covariation theories, teleological theories, and certain versions of conceptual role semantics. The strategy involves focusing on a normative problem regarding the practice of associating content expressions (e.g., that-clauses) with internal entities (states, symbol structures, etc.). The problem can be expressed thus: Which content expressions are the right ones to associate with internal entities? I argue, first, that an empirical solution to this problem—what I call the Normative Problem—will follow naturally (...)
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  8. John Barresi (2004). Intentionality, Consciousness and Intentional Relations: From Constitutive Phenomenology to Cognitive Science. In L. Embree (ed.), Gurwitsch's Relevance for Cognitive Science. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers 79--93.
    In this chapter I look closely at the intentionality of consciousness from a naturalistic perspective. I begin with a consideration of Gurwitsch's suggestive ideas about the role of acts of consciousness in constituting both the objects and the subjects of consciousness. I turn next to a discussion of how these ideas relate to my own empirical approach to intentional relations seen from a developmental perspective. This is followed by a discussion of some recent ideas in philosophical cognitive science on the (...)
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  9. Wolfgang Barz (2008). The Real Trouble with Intentionality. Philosophical Explorations 11 (2):79 – 92.
    I argue that the project of naturalizing intentionality is misconceived. Intentionality should not be considered as a challenge to our naturalistic world-view, but rather as something which gives rise to a logical problem: how to save the principle of indiscernibility of identicals from apparent counterexamples arising from intensional discourse.
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  10. Wolfgang Barz (2006). Naturalisierung der Intentionalität. Ein philosophischer Holzweg. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 54 (2/2006):189-200.
    Der Beitrag versucht zu zeigen, dass Intentionalität nicht deshalb problematisch ist, weil sie unser naturalistisches Weltbild herausfordert, sondern deshalb, weil sie gegen gewisse logische Intuitionen zu verstoßen scheint, und dass die angemessene Reaktion auf dieses Problem nicht darin besteht, über die physikalische Realisierung intentionaler mentaler Zustände, sondern über die logische Form intensionaler Sätze nachzudenken. Als Zeuge führt der Autor Fred Dretske an, dessen Analyse der Intentionalität sich bei näherem Hinsehen als naturalistisch verbrämte Theorie der logischen Form intensionaler Sätze herausstellt.
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  11. Radu J. Bogdan (1993). The Pragmatic Psyche. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (1):157-158.
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  12. Paul A. Boghossian (2008). Content and Justification: Philosophical Papers. OUP Oxford.
    This volume presents a series of influential essays by Paul Boghossian on the theory of content and on its relation to the phenomenon of a priori knowledge. The essays are organized under four headings: the nature of content; content and self-knowledge; knowledge, content, and the a priori; and colour concepts.
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  13. Laurence BonJour (1991). Is Thought a Symbolic Process? Synthese 89 (3):331-52.
  14. Myles Brand (ed.) (1986). The Representation Of Knowledge And Belief. Tucson: University Of Arizona Press.
  15. Maria Brincker (2014). Navigating Beyond “Here & Now” Affordances—on Sensorimotor Maturation and “False Belief” Performance. Frontiers in Psychology 5.
    How and when do we learn to understand other people’s perspectives and possibly divergent beliefs? This question has elicited much theoretical and empirical research. A puzzling finding has been that toddlers perform well on so-called implicit false belief (FB) tasks but do not show such capacities on traditional explicit FB tasks. I propose a navigational approach, which offers a hitherto ignored way of making sense of the seemingly contradictory results. The proposal involves a distinction between how we navigate FBs as (...)
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  16. Andrew Brook & Robert J. Stainton (1997). Fodor's New Theory of Content and Computation. Mind and Language 12 (3-4):459-74.
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  17. Todd Buras (2009). An Argument Against Causal Theories of Mental Content. American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (2):117-129.
    Some mental states are about themselves. Nothing is a cause of itself. So some mental states are not about their causes; they are about things distinct from their causes. If this argument is sound, it spells trouble for causal theories of mental content—the precise sort of trouble depending on the precise sort of causal theory. This paper shows that the argument is sound (§§1-3), and then spells out the trouble (§4).
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  18. Paul M. Churchland & Patricia S. Churchland (1983). Stalking the Wild Epistemic Engine. Noûs 17 (March):5-18.
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  19. Hugh Clapin (ed.) (2002). Philosophy of Mental Representation. Oxford University Press.
    In Philosophy of Mental Representation five of the most original and important thinkers in philosophy of mind engage in an overlapping dialogue about mental representation. In new papers, contributors Andy Clark, Robert Cummins, Daniel Dennett, John Haugeland, and Brian Cantwell Smith each investigate the views and claims of one of the other contributors regarding mental representation. The subject then offers a reply. An exciting feature of this collection is the dynamic discussion among all contributors following each exchange. This collection offers (...)
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  20. Dimitri Coelho Mollo (2015). Being Clear on Content - Commentary on Hutto and Satne. Philosophia 43 (3):687-699.
    In the target article Hutto and Satne propose a new approach to studying mental content. Although I believe there is much to commend in their proposal, I argue that it makes no space for a kind of content that is of central importance to cognitive science, and which need not be involved in beliefs and desires: I will use the expression ‘representational content’ to refer to it. Neglecting representational content leads to an undue limitation of the contribution that the neo-Cartesian (...)
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  21. Mike Collins (2009). The Nature and Implementation of Representation in Biological Systems. Dissertation, City University of New York
    I defend a theory of mental representation that satisfies naturalistic constraints. Briefly, we begin by distinguishing (i) what makes something a representation from (ii) given that a thing is a representation, what determines what it represents. Representations are states of biological organisms, so we should expect a unified theoretical framework for explaining both what it is to be a representation as well as what it is to be a heart or a kidney. I follow Millikan in explaining (i) in terms (...)
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  22. Robert Cummins (1994). Interpretational Semantics. In Steven P. Stitch & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), mental representation: a reader. Blackwell
    This is a condensed version of the material in chapters 8-10 in Meaning and Mental Representation (MIT, 1989). It is an explanation and defence of a theory of content for the mind considered as a symbolic computational process. It is a view i abandoned shortly thereafter when I abandoned symbolic computatioalism as a viable theory of cognition.
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  23. Robert C. Cummins (2002). Haugeland on Representation and Intentionality. In Hugh Clapin (ed.), Philosophy of Mental Representation. Oxford University Press
    Haugeland doesn’t have what I would call a theory of mental representation. Indeed, it isn’t clear that he believes there is such a thing. But he does have a theory of intentionality and a correlative theory of objectivity, and it is this material that I will be discussing in what follows. It will facilitate the discussion that follows to have at hand some distinctions and accompanying terminology I introduced in Representations, Targets and Attitudes (Cummins, 1996; RTA hereafter). Couching the discussion (...)
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  24. Robert C. Cummins (2000). Reply to Millikan. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):113-127.
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  25. Robert C. Cummins (1996). Representations, Targets, and Attitudes. MIT Press.
    "This is an important new Cummins work.
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  26. Robert C. Cummins (1989). Meaning and Mental Representation. MIT Press.
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  27. Robert C. Cummins & Pierre Poirier (2004). Representation and Indication. In Hugh Clapin (ed.), Representation in Mind. Elsevier 21--40.
    This paper is about two kinds of mental content and how they are related. We are going to call them representation and indication. We will begin with a rough characterization of each. The differences, and why they matter, will, hopefully, become clearer as the paper proceeds.
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  28. Daniel C. Dennett (2001). Intentionality. In Richard L. Gregory (ed.), Southwestern Journal of Philosophy. Oxford University Press 139-143.
    Intentionality is _aboutness_. Some things are about other things: a belief can be about icebergs, but an iceberg is not about anything; an idea can be about the number 7, but the number 7 is not about anything; a book or a film can be about Paris, but Paris is not about anything. Philosophers have long been concerned with the analysis of the phenomenon of intentionality, which has seemed to many to be a fundamental feature of mental states and events.
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  29. Daniel C. Dennett (1991). Ways of Establishing Harmony. In Brian P. McLaughlin (ed.), Dretske and His Critics. Blackwell
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  30. Daniel C. Dennett (1990). Granny's Campaign for Safe Science. In Barry M. Loewer & Georges Rey (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Blackwell
    What do these various heresies have in common? From Fodor's point of view, two things, obviously: (1) they are all wrong, wrong, wrong! and (2) they are endorsed by people who are otherwise quite decent company. That would be thread enough to tie Fodor's targets together if he were right, but as one who finds more than a morsel of truth in each of the derided doctrines, I must seek elsewhere for a uniting principle, and I think I have found (...)
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  31. Michael Devitt (1991). Naturalistic Representation. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42 (3):425-443.
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  32. John Dilworth (2010). More on the Interactive Indexing Semantic Theory. Minds and Machines 20 (3):455-474.
    This article further explains and develops a recent, comprehensive semantic naturalization theory, namely the interactive indexing (II) theory as described in my 2008 Minds and Machines article Semantic Naturalization via Interactive Perceptual Causality (Vol. 18, pp. 527–546). Folk views postulate a concrete intentional relation between cognitive states and the worldly states they are about. The II theory eliminates any such concrete intentionality, replacing it with purely causal relations based on the interactive theory of perception. But intentionality is preserved via purely (...)
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  33. John Dilworth (2010). Realistic Virtual Reality and Perception. Philosophical Psychology 23 (1):23-42.
    Realistic uses of Virtual Reality technology closely integrate user training on virtual objects with VR-assisted user interactions with real objects. This paper shows how the Interactive Theory of Perception may be extended to cover such cases. Virtual objects are explained as concrete models that have an inner generation mechanism, and the ITP is used to explain how VR users can both perceive such local CMs, and perceptually represent remote real objects. Also, concepts of modeling and representation are distinguished. The paper (...)
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  34. John Dilworth (2009). Semantics Naturalized: Propositional Indexing Plus Interactive Perception. Language and Communication 29 (1):1-25.
    A concrete proposal is presented as to how semantics should be naturalized. Rather than attempting to naturalize propositions, they are treated as abstract entities that index concrete cognitive states. In turn the relevant concrete cognitive states are identified via perceptual classifications of worldly states, with the aid of an interactive theory of perception. The approach enables a broadly realist theory of propositions, truth and cognitive states to be preserved, with propositions functioning much as abstract mathematical constructs do in the nonsemantic (...)
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  35. John Dilworth (2008). Semantic Naturalization Via Interactive Perceptual Causality. Minds and Machines 18 (4):527-546.
    A novel semantic naturalization program is proposed. Its three main differences from informational semantics approaches are as follows. First, it makes use of a perceptually based, four-factor interactive causal relation in place of a simple nomic covariance relation. Second, it does not attempt to globally naturalize all semantic concepts, but instead it appeals to a broadly realist interpretation of natural science, in which the concept of propositional truth is off-limits to naturalization attempts. And third, it treats all semantic concepts as (...)
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  36. John Dilworth (2005). Perceptual Causality Problems Reflexively Resolved. Acta Analytica 20 (3):11-31.
    Causal theories of perception typically have problems in explaining deviant causal chains. They also have difficulty with other unusual putative cases of perception involving prosthetic aids, defective perception, scientifically extended cases of perception, and so on. But I show how a more adequate reflexive causal theory, in which objects or properties X cause a perceiver to acquire X-related dispositions toward that very same item X, can provide a plausible and principled perceptual explanation of all of these kinds of cases. A (...)
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  37. John Dilworth (2005). The Reflexive Theory of Perception. Behavior and Philosophy 33 (1):17-40.
    ABSTRACT: The Reflexive Theory of Perception (RTP) claims that perception of an object or property X by an organism Z consists in Z being caused by X to acquire some disposition D toward X itself. This broadly behavioral perceptual theory explains perceptual intentionality and correct versus incorrect, plus successful versus unsuccessful, perception in a plausible evolutionary framework. The theory also undermines cognitive and perceptual modularity assumptions, including informational or purely epistemic views of perception in that, according to the RTP, any (...)
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  38. John Dilworth (2005). A Naturalistic, Reflexive Dispositional Approach to Perception. Southern Journal of Philosophy 43 (4):583-601.
    This paper will investigate the basic question of the nature of perception, as theoretically approached from a purely naturalistic standpoint. An adequate theory must not only have clear application to a world full of pre-existing biological examples of perception of all kinds, from unicellular perception to conscious human perception, but it must also satisfy a series of theoretical or philosophical constraints, as enumerated and discussed in Section 1 below. A perceptual theory invoking _reflexive dispositions_--that is, dispositions directed toward the very (...)
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  39. John Dilworth (2004). Naturalized Perception Without Information. Journal of Mind and Behavior 25 (4):349-368.
    The outlines of a novel, fully naturalistic theory of perception are provided, that can explain perception of an object X by organism Z in terms of reflexive causality. On the reflexive view proposed, organism Z perceives object or property X just in case X causes Z to acquire causal dispositions reflexively directed back upon X itself. This broadly functionalist theory is potentially capable of explaining both perceptual representation and perceptual content in purely causal terms, making no use of informational concepts. (...)
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  40. Fred Dretske (1986). Aspects of Cognitive Representation. In Myles Brand & Robert M. Harnish (eds.), The Representation of Knowledge and Belief. University of Arizona Press
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  41. Frances Egan (1994). Aworld Withoutmind: Comments on Terence Horgan's “Naturalism and Intentionality”. Philosophical Studies 76 (2-3):327 - 338.
  42. Chris Eliasmith (2000). How Neurons Mean: A Neurocomputational Theory of Representational Content. Dissertation, Washington University in St. Louis
    Questions concerning the nature of representation and what representations are about have been a staple of Western philosophy since Aristotle. Recently, these same questions have begun to concern neuroscientists, who have developed new techniques and theories for understanding how the locus of neurobiological representation, the brain, operates. My dissertation draws on philosophy and neuroscience to develop a novel theory of representational content.
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  43. Sergio Farias de SouzaFilho (2014). The Open-Endedness Objection Against Sophisticated Dispositionalism. Perspectiva Filosófica 41 (1):49-56.
    Sophisticated dispositionalism proposes a naturalist reduction of mental content by claiming that the semantic content of a mental symbol is determined by the causes of the occurrence of this symbol under ideal conditions, i.e., conditions under which only the referent of a symbol can cause its tokening. However, Paul Boghossian developed the open-endedness objection in order to show that it is not possible to specify these ideal conditions in non-semantic terms, entailing that the naturalist reduction of mental content proposed by (...)
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  44. Hartry Field (1994). Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content. Mind 103 (411):249-285.
  45. Hartry Field (1978). Mental Representation. Erkenntnis 13 (July):9-61.
  46. Carrie Figdor (2014). Verbs and Minds. In Mark Sprevak Jesper Kallestrup (ed.), New Waves in Philosophy of Mind.
    I introduce and defend verbialism, a metaphysical framework appropriate for accommodating the mind within the natural sciences and the mechanistic model of explanation that ties the natural sciences together. Verbialism is the view that mental phenomena belong in the basic ontological category of activities. If mind is what brain does, then explaining the mind is explaining how it occurs, and the ontology of mind is verbialist -- at least, it ought to be. I motivate verbialism by revealing a kind of (...)
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  47. Justin Fisher, Representational Content and the Keys to Success.
    I consider the question of whether success-linked theories of content – theories like those of Ramsey (1927), Millikan (1984) and Blackburn (2005) which take there to be a definitional link between representational content and behavioral success – are consistent with the plausible claim that we can use content-attributions to explain behavioral success. Peter Godfrey-Smith (1996) argues that success-linked theories of content are too closely linked to success to be able to explain it. Against this, I present a plausible account of (...)
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  48. Gabor Forrai (ed.) (2005). Intentionality: Past and Future (Value Inquiry Book Series, Volume 173). New York: Rodopi NY.
    The present volume has grown out of a conference organized jointly by the History of Philosophy Department of the University of Miskolc and the History and Philosophy of Science Department of Eötvös Loránd University (Budapest), which took place in June 2002. The aim of the conference was to explore the various angles from which intentionality can be studied, how it is related to other philosophical issues, and how it figures in the works of major philosophers in the past. It also (...)
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  49. Steven F. Geisz (2009). Turning Representation Inside Out: An Adverbial Approach to the Metaphysics of Language and Mind. Philosophical Forum 40 (4):437-471.
    In order to resolve problems about the normative aspects of representation without having to (1) provide a naturalized theory of intentional/semantic properties, (2) accept non-natural intentional/semantic properties into our worldview, or (3) eliminate intentionality, this article questions a basic assumption about the metaphysics of representation: that representation involves representation-objects. An alternative, nonreifying approach to the metaphysics of representation is introduced and developed in detail. The argumentative strategy is as follows. First, an adverbial view of linguistic representation is introduced. Two potential (...)
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  50. Gabor Forrai George Kampis (ed.) (2005). Intentionality: Past and Future. Rodopi NY.
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