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  1. A. R. A. (1962). The Concept of Law. Review of Metaphysics 15 (3):525-525.
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  2. Hidehiko Adachi (2005). Die Radbruchsche Formel: Eine Untersuchung der Rechtsphilosophie Gustav Radbruchs. Baden-Badennomos.
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  3. Jonny Anomaly & Geoffrey Brennan (2014). Social Norms, The Invisible Hand, and the Law. University of Queensland Law Journal 33 (2).
  4. Dennis J. Baker (2008). The Harm Principle Vs. Kantian Criteria for Ensuring Fair, Principled and Just Criminalisation. Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 33 (66):66-99.
    In this paper, I consider Ripstein and Dan-Cohen's critiques of the 'harm principle'. Ripstein and Dan-Cohen have asserted that the harm principle should be jettisoned, because it allegedly fails to provide a rationale for criminalising certain harmless wrongs that ought to be criminalised. They argue that Kant's second formulation of the categorical imperative and his concept of 'external freedom' are better equipped for ensuring that criminalisation decisions meet the requirements of fairness. Per contra, I assert that Kant's deontological theory is (...)
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  5. Lars Bergström (2000). The Concept of Ownership. The Nordic Committee on Bioethics.
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  6. Brian Bix (1993). Law, Language, and Legal Determinacy. Oxford University Press.
    This book discusses one of the central problems in the philosophy of law--the question of legal determinacy. Is the law a seamless web or are there gaps? Bix argues that the major re-thinking of the common and "common sense" views about law that have been proposed by various recent legal theories is unnecessary. He offers a reconsideration of the role of language in the law, and the way ideas about language have been used and misused in recent legal theory. He (...)
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  7. Vihren Bouzov (2016). 20th-Century Bulgarian Philosophy of Law: From Critical Acceptance of Kant’s Ideas to the Logic of Legal Reasoning. In Enrico Pattaro & C. Roversi (eds.), A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence. V.12 (1), Legal Philosophy in the Twentieth Century: The Civil Law World. 681-690.
    My analysis here is an attempt to bring out the main through-line in the development of Bulgarian philosophy of law today. A proper account of Bulgarian philosophy of law in the 20th century requires an attempt to find, on the one hand, a solution to epistemological and methodological problems in law and, on the other, a clear-cut influence of the Kantian critical tradition. Bulgarian philosophy of law follows a complicated path, ranging from acceptance and revision of Kantian philosophy to the (...)
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  8. Thom Brooks (2004). The Right to Trial by Jury. Journal of Applied Philosophy 21 (2):197–212.
    This article offers a justification for the continued use of jury trials. I shall critically examine the ability of juries to render just verdicts, judicial impartiality, and judicial transparency. My contention is that the judicial system that best satisfies these values is most preferable. Of course, these three values are not the only factors relevant for consideration. Empirical evidence demonstrates that juries foster both democratic participation and public legitimation of legal decisions regarding the most serious cases. Nevertheless, juries are costly (...)
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  9. H. G. Callaway (ed.) (2011). Alexander James Dallas: An Exposition of the Causes and Character of the War. An Annotated Edition. Dunedin Academic Press.
    Alexander James Dallas' An Exposition of the Causes and Character of the War was written as part of an effort by the then US government to explain and justify its declaration of war in 1812. However publication coincided with the ratification of the Treaty of Ghent, which ended the War. The Exposition is especially interesting for the insight it provides into the self-constraint of American foreign policy and of the conduct of a war. The focus is on the foreign policy (...)
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  10. Michael Cholbi (2012). Getting to the Rule of Law. [REVIEW] Law and Politics Book Review 22 (1):266-269.
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  11. Simon Deakin, David Gindis, Geoffrey M. Hodgson, Kainan Huang & Katharina Pistor (forthcoming). Legal Institutionalism: Capitalism and the Constitutive Role of Law. Journal of Comparative Economics.
    Social scientists have paid insufficient attention to the role of law in constituting the economic institutions of capitalism. Part of this neglect emanates from inadequate conceptions of the nature of law itself. Spontaneous conceptions of law and property rights that downplay the role of the state are criticized here, because they typically assume relatively small numbers of agents and underplay the complexity and uncertainty in developed capitalist systems. In developed capitalist economies, law is sustained through interaction between private agents, courts (...)
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  12. Simon Deakin, David Gindis, Geoffrey M. Hodgson, Kainan Huang & Katharina Pistor (forthcoming). Legal Institutionalism: Capitalism and the Constitutive Role of Law. Journal of Comparative Economics.
    Social scientists have paid insufficient attention to the role of law in constituting the economic institutions of capitalism. Part of this neglect emanates from inadequate conceptions of the nature of law itself. Spontaneous conceptions of law and property rights that downplay the role of the state are criticized here, because they typically assume relatively small numbers of agents and underplay the complexity and uncertainty in developed capitalist systems. In developed capitalist economies, law is sustained through interaction between private agents, courts (...)
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  13. Kenneth M. Ehrenberg (2015). Law’s Artifactual Nature: How Legal Institutions Generate Normativity. In George Pavlakos & Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco (eds.), Reasons and Intentions in Law and Practical Agency. Cambridge University Press 247-266.
    I argue that law is best understood as an institutionalized abstract artifact. Using the ideas of John Searle on institutions and Amie Thomasson on artifacts, I show how the law is capable of generating new reasons for action, arguing against recent work by David Enoch who holds that legal reason-giving is ultimately a form of triggering conditional reasons.
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  14. Kenneth M. Ehrenberg (2013). Pattern Languages & Institutional Facts: Functions & Coherence in Law. In Michał Araszkiewicz & Jaromir Savelka (eds.), Coherence: Insights from Philosophy, Jurisprudence and Artificial Intelligence. Springer 155-166.
    Under John Searle’s theory of institutional facts, the law can be understood both as an institution governed by foundational documents and practices, and as a method for creating new institutions through the codification of the assignment of functions, usually of the form ‘X counts as Y in circumstances C’. The architect Christopher Alexander’s notion of pattern languages, schematic templates for problem-solving widely adopted by computer programmers, can be developed within a legal system as a coherence constraint on the assignment of (...)
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  15. Kenneth M. Ehrenberg (2007). The Ideal and Non-Ideal in Behavior Guidance: Reflections on Law and Buddhism in Conversation with the Dalai Lama. Buffalo Law Review 55:675-679.
    Highlighting the distinct approaches to behavior guidance employed by law and aspirational religious institutions like Buddhism, focusing on the work of Lon Fuller. There is importance to both baseline or duty-centered rules such as found primarily in criminal law and deontic morality, as well as aspirational guidance principles that are found in religious law, virtue ethics, and sometimes seen in civil law. However, the specific assumptions and aims of these two modes of guidance must be harmonized to be effective.
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  16. Pavlos Eleftheriadis (forthcoming). The Law of Laws. Transnational Legal Theory 1 (3).
    How can legal orders coexist? Contemporary lawyers and philosophers frequently accept that a legal system operates under its own terms and is shaped by its own participants. Any problems posed by the plurality of legal orders in the world are to be dealt with by each legal order separately. So persons that are caught in transnational disputes because they are subject to two or more jurisdictions, have recourse to private international law, which is always part of domestic law, i.e. the (...)
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  17. C. Faraco, Tra saggezza e realismo politico: machiavellismi di Suárez. HELIOPOLIS.
  18. C. Faraco (2013). Breve excursus sul concetto di legge in Francisco Suárez. In Colonne Ofitiche. Percorsi di ermeneutica simbolica. 73-84.
    Il breve saggio sul concetto di lex in Suárez evidenzia come la nota definizione di Tommaso d’Aquino, pur rappresentando un punto di riferimento imprescindibile nel dibattito giuridico, morale e teologico, possa esser riscritta. E l’innovazione del gesuita spagnolo si delinea in una definizione di legge, ove i termini intelletto e volontà sono posti in modo differente e il dialogo tra questi concetti generi una costruzione morale, che tenga conto della libertà della volontà dall’intelletto e da un ordo precostituito.
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  19. C. Faraco (ed.) (2013). Obbligo politico e libertà nel pensiero di Francisco Suárez, FrancoAngeli, Milano, 2013. FrancoAngeli.
    Se l’uomo è nato libero e non soggetto ad un suo pari, può obbligare un altro uomo senza cadere nella tirannia? È la domanda a cui Suárez cerca di dare risposta attraverso lo studio della legge, interpretata come una manifestazione dell’intelletto e della volontà, ovvero le due componenti che, in continuo ed armonico dialogo, sono la base di una nuova costruzione morale. Il gesuita riscrive il rapporto tra Creatore e creatura, da un lato, e il rapporto tra obbligo politico e (...)
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  20. C. Faraco (2011). Suárez Francisco, Trattato delle leggi e di Dio legislatore. Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia Del Diritto 88 (1):137.
  21. Colin Farrelly & Lawrence B. Solum (2007). An Introduction to Aretaic Theories of Law. In Colin Patrick Farrelly & Lawrence Solum (eds.), Virtue Jurisprudence. Palgrave Macmillan
  22. Joseph S. Fulda (1999). Can One Really Reason About Laws? Acm Sigcas Computers and Society 29 (2):31.
    This is a review article of Tokuyasu Kakuta, Makoto Haraguchi, and Yoshiaki Okubo, "A Goal-Dependent Abstraction for Legal Reasoning by Analogy," /Artificial Intelligence and Law/ 5(March 1997): 97-118.
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  23. Triantafyllos Gkouvas, Constitutivism and the Normativity of Social Practices: The Case of Law.
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  24. Michael Steven Green (2008). Kelsen, Quietism, and the Rule of Recognition. In Matthew D. Adler & Kenneth E. Himma (eds.), THE RULE OF RECOGNITION AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. Oxford University Press
    Sometimes the fact that something is the law can be justified by the law. For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is the law because it was enacted by Congress pursuant to the Commerce Clause. But eventually legal justification of law ends. The ultimate criteria of validity in a legal system cannot themselves be justified by law. According to H.L.A. Hart, justification of these ultimate criteria is still available, by reference to social facts concerning official acceptance - facts about what Hart calls (...)
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  25. Jaap C. Hage, Ronald Leenes & Arno R. Lodder (1993). Hard Cases: A Procedural Approach. [REVIEW] Artificial Intelligence and Law 2 (2):113-167.
    Much work on legal knowledge systems treats legal reasoning as arguments that lead from a description of the law and the facts of a case, to the legal conclusion for the case. The reasoning steps of the inference engine parallel the logical steps by means of which the legal conclusion is derived from the factual and legal premises. In short, the relation between the input and the output of a legal inference engine is a logical one. The truth of the (...)
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  26. Jaap Hage & Aleksander Peczenik (2000). Law, Morals and Defeasibility. Ratio Juris 13 (3):305-325.
  27. Andrew Ingram (2014). Breaking Laws to Fix Broken Windows: A Revisionist Take on Order Maintenance Policing. Berkeley Journal of Criminal Law 19 (2):112-152.
    Today, there is a family of celebrated police strategies that teach the importance of cracking down on petty crime and urban nuisance as the key to effective crime control. Under the “broken windows” appellation, this strategy is linked in the public mind with New York City and the alleged successes of its police department in reducing the rate of crime over the past two decades. This paper is critical of such order maintenance approaches to policing: I argue that infringements of (...)
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  28. Catherine Kemp (2002). "Law's Intertia: Custom in Logic And Experience". In Austin Sarat Patricia Ewick (ed.), Studies in Law, Politics, and Society, vol. 25. 135-149.
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  29. Catherine Kemp (1999). Habermas Among The Americans: Some Reflections On The Common Law. Denver University Law Review 76 (4):1999.
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  30. Matthew H. Kramer (2013). In Defense of Hart. In Wil Waluchow & Stefan Sciaraffa (eds.), Philosophical Foundations of the Nature of Law. OUP Oxford 22.
    In Legality Scott Shapiro seeks to provide the motivation for the development of his own elaborate account of law by undertaking a critique of H.L.A. Hart's jurisprudential theory. Hart maintained that every legal system is underlain by a rule of recognition through which officials of the system identify the norms that belong to the system as laws. Shapiro argues that Hart's remarks on the rule of recognition are confused and that his model of lawis consequently untenable. Shapiro contends that a (...)
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  31. Matthew Lister (2014). Review of Defeasibility in Philosophy: Knowledge, Agency, Responsibility, and the Law; Claudia Blöser, Mikael Janvid, Hannes Ole Matthiessen, and Marcus Willaschek (Eds.). [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2014.
    This volume is based on papers presented at a conference on defeasibility in ethics, epistemology, law, and logic that took place at the Goethe University in Frankfurt in 2010. The subtitle (“Knowledge, Agency, Responsibility, and the Law”) better reflects the content than does the title of the original conference. None of the papers focuses directly or primarily on defeasible reasoning in logic, though a few touch on this indirectly. Nor are the papers evenly split among the topics. Six are primarily (...)
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  32. Massimo Mancini (2000). Democrazia, ordinamento e costituzione da J.-J. Rousseau a FPG Guizot. Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia Del Diritto 77 (2):161-191.
    Il concetto di democrazia ed i progetti di costituzione elaborati da Rousseau vengono posti a confronto con la teoria del governo rappresentativo di Guizot: in particolare vengono esaminate le prospettive olistiche e individualistiche nel processo di individuazione della volontà generale attraverso il suffragio. Il ruolo della volontà prevale nella teoria rappresentativa di Rosseau, mentre per Guizot la ragione deve essere predominante sulla volontà. La libertà viene considerata irrinunciabile da Rousseau, che però non accetta una libertà di fede, preferendo l'istituzione di (...)
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  33. Maurizio Manzin (1994). Il Petrarchismo Giuridico: Filosofia E Logica Del Diritto Agli Inizi Dell'umanesimo. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
  34. Maurizio Manzin (1990). L'autorità della ragione e le ragioni dell'autorità. Il De utilitate credendi di S. Agostino. Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia Del Diritto 67 (3):412-431.
    An analysis on St. Augustine's dialogue on the usefulness of faith (De utilitate credendi), where the distinction between authority and faith is critically discussed.
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  35. Azevedo Marco Antonio (2013). Commands and Claims. In Bartosz Wojciechowski, Karolina M. Cern & Piotr W. Juchacz (eds.), DIA-LOGOS, VOL 15: Legal Rules, Moral Norms and Democratic Principles. Peter Lang
    Notwithstanding the widely accepted view that rights establish normative constraints on authority’s powers, command is still a core notion in modern philosophical jurisprudence. Nevertheless, if Herbert Hart is correct in his analysis on the deficiencies of the traditional command theories, a command is binding only if there is a right of being obeyed implying authority. My main objective in this paper is to make explicit the semantical and normative relations between rights and commands. In the first part, after some remarks (...)
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  36. George Pavlakos (2009). Practice, Reasons, and the Agent's Point of View. Ratio Juris 22 (1):74-94.
    Positivism, in its standard outlook, is normative contextualism: If legal reasons are content-independent, then their content may vary with the context or point of view. Despite several advantages vis-à-vis strong metaphysical conceptions of reasons, contextualism implies relativism, which may lead further to the fragmentation of the point of view of agency. In his Oxford Hart Lecture, Coleman put forward a fresh account of the moral semantics of legal content, one that lays claim to preserving the unity of agency while retaining (...)
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  37. David Plunkett (2013). Legal Positivism and the Moral Aim Thesis. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 33 (3):563-605.
    According to Scott Shapiro’s Moral Aim Thesis, it is an essential feature of the law that it has a moral aim. In short, for Shapiro, this means that the law has the constitutive aim of providing morally good solutions to morally significant social problems in cases where other, less formal ways of guiding the activity of agents won’t work. In this article, I argue that legal positivists should reject the Moral Aim Thesis. In short, I argue that although there are (...)
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  38. David Plunkett (2013). The Planning Theory of Law I: The Nature of Legal Institutions. Philosophy Compass 8 (2):149-158.
    This paper and its companion (‘‘The Planning Theory of Law II: The Nature of Legal Norms’’) provide a general introduction to Scott Shapiro’s Planning Theory of Law as developed in his recent book Legality. The Planning Theory encompasses both an account of the nature of legal institutions and an account of the nature of legal norms. This first paper concerns the account of legal institutions. The second concerns the account of legal norms.
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  39. David Plunkett (2012). A Positivist Route for Explaining How Facts Make Law. Legal Theory 18 (2):139-207.
    In “How Facts Make Law” and other recent work, Mark Greenberg argues that legal positivists cannot develop a viable constitutive account of law that meets what he calls the “the rational-relation requirement.” He argues that this gives us reason to reject positivism in favor of antipositivism. In this paper, I argue that Greenberg is wrong: positivists can in fact develop a viable constitutive account of law that meets the rational-relation requirement. I make this argument in two stages. First, I offer (...)
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  40. Jennifer W. Primmer (2014). Beyond the Law-State: The Adequacy of Raz’s Account of Legal Systems in Explaining Intra-State and Supra-State Legality. Ratio Juris 28 (1):149-158.
    I argue that there are two conceptions of ‘comprehensiveness’: 1) Raz’s strong conception whereby comprehensiveness entails supremacy, and 2) a weak conception whereby comprehensiveness does not entail supremacy. The latter is sufficient to distinguish legal and non-legal authorities, and unlike Raz’s notion of comprehensiveness, allows one to account for both intra-state forms of legality (e.g., the federal-provincial relation in Canada) and supra-state forms of legality (e.g., the European Union). Moreover, although it is ideal for legal systems to claim supremacy, it (...)
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  41. Pedro Proscurcin Junior (2014). O Direito como uma prática artística, literária e conversacional. Redescrições 5 (3):07-48.
    The article investigates the use of the term “Law” in Richard Rorty and suggests an alternative use of the word. Although Rorty’s anti-foundationalism and antirepresentationalism are well known specially in relation to the metaphysical grounds of the human sciences, I argue that he would employ the term “law” in important rhetorical contexts. The text proposes to identify some aspects of the Rortyan Approach to “law” and, at the same time, focuses on the environment and the professional activity of the jurists (...)
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  42. Joseph Raz, Why the State.
    A broadly sketched exploration of the theory of state-law and of the ways developments in international law are transforming states.
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  43. Joseph Raz (2005). Can There Be a Theory of Law? In Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory. Blackwell Pub.
    The paper deals with the possibility of a theory of the nature of law as such, a theory which will be necessarily true of all law. It explores the relations between explanations of concepts and of the things they are concepts of, the possibility that the law has essential properties, and the possibility that the law changes its nature over time, and that what is law at a given place and time depends on the culture and concepts of that place (...)
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  44. Mark R. Reiff (2005). Punishment, Compensation, and Law: A Theory of Enforceability. Cambridge University Press.
    This book is the first comprehensive study of the meaning and measure of enforceability. While we have long debated what restraints should govern the conduct of our social life, we have paid relatively little attention to the question of what it means to make a restraint enforceable. Focusing on the enforceability of legal rights but also addressing the enforceability of moral rights and social conventions, Mark Reiff explains how we use punishment and compensation to make restraints operative in the world. (...)
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  45. Corrado Roversi, Five Kinds of Perspectives on Legal Institutions.
    There is at least one immediate sense in which legal discourse is perspectival: it qualifies acts and facts in the world on the basis of rules. Legal concepts are for the most part constituted by rules, both in the sense that rules define these concepts’ semantic content and that, in order to engage with legal practice, we must act according to those rules, not necessarily complying with them but at least having them in mind. This is the distinctive perspective of (...)
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  46. Corrado Roversi, Legal Metaphoric Artifacts.
    In this paper I take it for granted that legal institutions are artifacts. In general, this can very well be considered a trivial thesis in legal philosophy. As trivial as this thesis may be, however, to my knowledge no legal philosopher has attempted an analysis of the peculiar reality of legal phenomena in terms of the reality of artifacts, and this is particularly striking because there has been much discussion about artifacts in general philosophy (specifically analytic metaphysics) over the last (...)
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  47. David-Hillel Ruben (1972). Positive and Natural Law Revisited. Modern Schoolman 49 (4):295-317.
    The article argues that the famous debate on natural and positive law between Lon Fuller and HLA Hart rests on a dispute about whether or not that something is a law provides on its own a prima facie reason for doing something.
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  48. David-Hillel Ruben (1972). Positive and Natural Law Revisited. Modern Schoolman 49 (May):295-317.
    The debate between Lon Fuller and HLA Hart on the nature of law rests on two views on the connection between law and having a reason for action. Fuller's assumes that to say that something is a law is by itself reason-providing; Hart's view must deny this. If we can identify whether something is a law purely by descriptive criteria, then for something to be a law should not by itself provide an agent with any reason for action, however weak.
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  49. Stefan Sciaraffa (1999). Critical Legal Studies: A Marxist Rejoinder. Legal Theory 5 (2):201-19.
  50. Jan-R. Sieckmann (2003). Why Non-Monotonic Logic is Inadequate to Represent Balancing Arguments. Artificial Intelligence and Law 11 (2-3):211-219.
    This paper analyses the logical structure of the balancing of conflicting normative arguments, and asks whether non-monotonic logic is adequate to represent this type of legal or practical reasoning. Norm conflicts are often regarded as a field of application for non-monotonic logics. This paper argues, however, that the balancing of normative arguments consists of an act of judgement, not a logical inference, and that models of deductive as well as of defeasible reasoning do not give an adequate account of its (...)
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