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  1. A. Abraham, M. Werning, H. Rakoczy, D. Von Cramon & R. Schubotz (2008). Minds, Persons, and Space: An fMRI Investigation Into the Relational Complexity of Higher-Order Intentionality. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (2):438-450.
    Mental state reasoning or theory-of-mind has been the subject of a rich body of imaging research. Although such investigations routinely tap a common set of regions, the precise function of each area remains a contentious matter. With the help of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we sought to determine which areas are involved when processing mental state or intentional metarepresentations by focusing on the relational aspect of such representations. Using non-intentional relational representations such as spatial relations between persons and between (...)
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  2. H. A. Abramson (ed.) (1952). Problems of Consciousness: Transactions of the Third Conference. Josiah Macy Foundation.
  3. Bernard J. Baars (1995). Surprisingly Small Subcortical Structures Are Needed for the State of Waking Consciousness, While Cortical Projection Areas Seem to Provide Perceptual Contents of Consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 4 (2):159-62.
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  4. Sergio Bagnato, Cristina Boccagni, Antonino Sant'Angelo, Alexander A. Fingelkurts, Andrew A. Fingelkurts & Giuseppe Galardi (2013). Emerging From an Unresponsive Wakefulness Syndrome: Brain Plasticity has to Cross a Threshold Level. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 37 (10):2721-2736.
    Unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (UWS, previously known as vegetative state) occurs after patients survive a severe brain injury. Patients suffering from UWS have lost awareness of themselves and of the external environment and do not retain any trace of their subjective experience. Current data demonstrate that neuronal functions subtending consciousness are not completely reset in UWS; however, they are reduced below the threshold required to experience consciousness. The critical factor that determines whether patients will recover consciousness is the distance of their (...)
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  5. Katalin Balog (2007). Comments on Ned Block's Target Article “Consciousness, Accessibility, and the Mesh Between Psychology and Neuroscience”. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (4):499-500.
    Block argues that relevant data in psychology and neuroscience shows that access consciousness is not constitutively necessary for phenomenality. However, a phenomenal state can be access conscious in two radically different ways. Its content can be access conscious, or its phenomenality can be access conscious. I’ll argue that while Block’s thesis is right when it is formulated in terms of the first notion of access consciousness, there is an alternative hypothesis about the relationship between phenomenality and access in terms of (...)
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  6. R. Bauer (2004). In Search of a Neural Signature of Consciousness: Facts, Hypotheses, and Proposals. Synthese 141 (2):233-45.
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  7. Cristina Becchio & Cesare Bertone (2005). Beyond Cartesian Subjectivism: Neural Correlates of Shared Intentionality. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (7):20-30.
    In the present paper we present a short review of some recent neuro- physiological and neuropsychological findings which suggest that self-generated actions and actions of others are mapped on the same neural substratum. Since this substratum is neutral with respect to the agent, correctly attributing an action to its proper author requires the co-activation of areas specific to the self and the other. A conceptual analysis of the empirical data will lead us to conclude that from a neurobiological point of (...)
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  8. Samuel Bellini-Leite & Alfredo Pereira (2013). Is Global Workspace a Cartesian Theater? How the Neuro-Astroglial Interaction Model Solves Conceptual Issues. Journal of Cognitive Science 14 (4):335-360.
    The Global Workspace Theory (GWT) proposed by Bernard Baars (1988) along with Daniel Dennett’s (1991) Multiple Drafts Model (MDM) of consciousness are renowned cognitive theories of consciousness bearing similarities and differences. Although Dennett displays sympathy for GWT, his own MDM does not seem to be fully compatible with it. This work discusses this compatibility, by asking if GWT suffers from Daniel Dennett’s criticism of what he calls a “Cartesian Theater”. We identified in Dennett 10 requirements for avoiding the Cartesian Theater. (...)
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  9. F. Blankenburg, C. C. Ruff, R. Deichmann, G. Rees & J. Driver (2006). The Cutaneous Rabbit Illusion Affects Human Primary Sensory Cortex Somatotopically. PLoS Biology 4 (3):e69.
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  10. Worth Boone (2013). Operationalizing Consciousness: Subjective Report and Task Performance. Philosophy of Science 80 (5):1031-1041.
    There are two distinct but related threads in this article. The first is methodological and is aimed at exploring the relative merits and faults of different operational definitions of consciousness. The second is conceptual and is aimed at understanding the prior commitments regarding the nature of conscious content that motivate these positions. I consider two distinct operationalizations: one defines consciousness in terms of dichotomous subjective reports, the other in terms of graded subjective reports. I ultimately argue that both approaches are (...)
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  11. Richard Brown (2012). Editorial: Standing on the Verge: Lessons and Limits From the Empirical Study of Consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):597-599.
    The papers in this special issue are all descended from papers presented at the second Online Consciousness Conference. I founded the Online Consciousness Conference at Consciousness Online (http://consciousnessonline.wordpress.com) in 2008 mostly because no one else would. Being inspired by the Online Philosophy Conference, I mentioned to several people that it would be great if we had something like that in Consciousness Studies. People I talked to were very enthusiastic but no one seemed like they wanted to initiate the process. I (...)
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  12. Richard Brown (2006). What is a Brain State? Philosophical Psychology 19 (6):729-742.
    Philosophers have been talking about brain states for almost 50 years and as of yet no one has articulated a theoretical account of what one is. In fact this issue has received almost no attention and cognitive scientists still use meaningless phrases like 'C-fiber firing' and 'neuronal activity' when theorizing about the relation of the mind to the brain. To date when theorists do discuss brain states they usually do so in the context of making some other argument with the (...)
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  13. Ann B. Butler, Paul R. Manger, B. I. B. Lindahl & Peter Århem (2005). Evolution of the Neural Basis of Consciousness: A Bird-Mammal Comparison. Bioessays 27 (9):923-936.
    The main objective of this essay is to validate some of the principal, currently competing, mammalian consciousness-brain theories by comparing these theories with data on both cognitive abilities and brain organization in birds. Our argument is that, given that multiple complex cognitive functions are correlated with presumed consciousness in mammals, this correlation holds for birds as well. Thus, the neuroanatomical features of the forebrain common to both birds and mammals may be those that are crucial to the generation of both (...)
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  14. John T. Cacioppo, Penny S. Visser & Cynthia L. Pickett (eds.) (2006). Social Neuroscience: People Thinking About Thinking People. MIT Press.
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  15. A. M. L. Coenen (1998). Neuronal Phenomena Associated with Vigilance and Consciousness: From Cellular Mechanisms to Electroencephalographic Patterns. Consciousness and Cognition 7 (1):42-53.
    The neuroanatomical substrates controlling and regulating sleeping and waking, and thus consciousness, are located in the brain stem. Most crucial for bringing the brain into a state conducive for consciousness and information processing is the mesencephalic part of the brain stem. This part controls the state of waking, which is generally associated with a high degree of consciousness. Wakefulness is accompanied by a low-amplitude, high-frequency electroencephalogram, due to the fact that thalamocortical neurons fire in a state of tonic depolarization. Information (...)
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  16. Daniel Collerton & Elaine Perry (2007). Do Multiple Cortical-Subcortical Interactions Support Different Aspects of Consciousness? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (1):88-89.
    Merker's core idea, that the experience of being conscious reflects the interactions of actions, targets, and motivations in the upper brainstem, with cortex providing the content of the conscious experience, merits serious consideration. However, we have two areas of concern: first, that his definition of consciousness is so broad that it is difficult to find any organisms with a brain that could be non-conscious; second, that the focus on one cortical–subcortical system neglects other systems (e.g., basal forebrain and brainstem cholinergic (...)
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  17. O. D. Creutzfeld & John C. Eccles (eds.) (1988). The Brain and Conscious Experience. Pontifical Academy.
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  18. Sander M. Daselaar, Mathias S. Fleck, Steven E. Prince & Roberto Cabeza (2006). The Medial Temporal Lobe Distinguishes Old From New Independently of Consciousness. Journal of Neuroscience 26 (21):5835-5839.
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  19. Antoine Del Cul, Sylvain Baillet & Stanislas Dehaene (2007). Brain Dynamics Underlying the Nonlinear Threshold for Access to Consciousness. Public Library of Science, Biology 5 (10):e260.
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  20. J. F. Delafresnaye (ed.) (1954). Brain Mechanisms and Consciousness. Blackwell.
  21. Eric Dietrich & Valerie Gray Hardcastle (2004). Sisyphus's Boulder: Consciousness and the Limits of the Knowable. John Benjamins.
    In Sisyphus's Boulder, Eric Dietrich and Valerie Hardcastle argue that we will never get such a theory because consciousness has an essential property that...
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  22. S. J. Dimond (1976). Brain Circuits for Consciousness. Brain, Behavior, and Evolution 13:376-95.
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  23. Emrah Duzel, Andrew P. Yonelinas, G. R. Mangun, H. J. Heinze & Endel Tulving (1997). Event-Related Brain Potential Correlates of Two States of Conscious Awareness in Memory. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 94:5973-8.
  24. Andreas Elpidorou (2013). The “New Mind” Revisited, or Minding the Content/Vehicle Distinction: A Response to Manzotti and Pepperell. AI and Society 28 (4):461-466.
    I argue that Manzotti and Pepperell’s presentation of the New Mind not only obfuscates pertinent differences between externalist views of various strengths, but also, and most problematically, conflates a distinction that cannot, without consequences, be conflated. We can talk about the contents of the mind and/or about the vehicles of those contents. But we should not conflate the two. Conflation of contents and vehicles comes with a price. In Manzotti and Pepperell’s case, it undermines claims they make about the implications (...)
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  25. Alexander A. Fingelkurts & Andrew A. Fingelkurts (2009). Is Our Brain Hardwired to Produce God, or is Our Brain Hardwired to Perceive God? A Systematic Review on the Role of the Brain in Mediating Religious Experience. Cognitive Processing 10 (4):293-326.
    To figure out whether the main empirical question “Is our brain hardwired to believe in and produce God, or is our brain hardwired to perceive and experience God?” is answered, this paper presents systematic critical review of the positions, arguments and controversies of each side of the neuroscientific-theological debate and puts forward an integral view where the human is seen as a psycho-somatic entity consisting of the multiple levels and dimensions of human existence (physical, biological, psychological, and spiritual reality), allowing (...)
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  26. Alexander A. Fingelkurts, Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Sergio Bagnato, Cristina Boccagni & Giuseppe Galardi (2013). The Value of Spontaneous EEG Oscillations in Distinguishing Patients in Vegetative and Minimally Conscious States. In Eror Basar & et all (eds.), Application of Brain Oscillations in Neuropsychiatric Diseases. Supplements to Clinical Neurophysiology. Elsevier. 81-99.
    Objective: The value of spontaneous EEG oscillations in distinguishing patients in vegetative and minimally conscious states was studied. Methods: We quantified dynamic repertoire of EEG oscillations in resting condition with closed eyes in patients in vegetative and minimally conscious states (VS and MCS). The exact composition of EEG oscillations was assessed by the probability-classification analysis of short-term EEG spectral patterns. Results: The probability of delta, theta and slow-alpha oscillations occurrence was smaller for patients in MCS than for VS. Additionally, only (...)
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  27. Andrew A. Fingelkurts & Alexander A. Fingelkurts (2013). Dissipative Many-Body Model and a Nested Operational Architectonics of the Brain. Physics of Life Reviews 10:103-105.
    This paper briefly review a current trend in neuroscience aiming to combine neurophysiological and physical concepts in order to understand the emergence of spatio-temporal patterns within brain activity by which brain constructs knowledge from multiple streams of information. The authors further suggest that the meanings, which subjectively are experienced as thoughts or perceptions can best be described objectively as created and carried by large fields of neural activity within the operational architectonics of brain functioning.
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  28. Andrew A. Fingelkurts & Alexander A. Fingelkurts (2012). Mind as a Nested Operational Architectonics of the Brain. Physics of Life Reviews 9 (1):49-50.
    The target paper of Dr. Feinberg is a testimony to an admirable scholarship and deep thoughtfulness. This paper develops a general theoretical framework of nested hierarchy in the brain that allows production of mind with consciousness. The difference between non-nested and nested hierarchies is the following. In a non-nested hierarchy the entities at higher levels of the hierarchy are physically independent from the entities at lower levels and there is strong constraint of higher upon lower levels. In a nested hierarchy, (...)
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  29. Andrew A. Fingelkurts & Alexander A. Fingelkurts (2001). Operational Architectonics of the Human Brain Biopotential Field: Toward Solving the Mind-Brain Problem. [REVIEW] Brain and Mind 2 (3):261-296.
    The understanding of the interrelationship between brain and mind remains far from clear. It is well established that the brain's capacity to integrate information from numerous sources forms the basis for cognitive abilities. However, the core unresolved question is how information about the "objective" physical entities of the external world can be integrated, and how unifiedand coherent mental states (or Gestalts) can be established in the internal entities of distributed neuronal systems. The present paper offers a unified methodological and conceptual (...)
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  30. Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Alexander A. Fingelkurts, Sergio Bagnato, Cristina Boccagni & Giuseppe Galardi (2013). Prognostic Value of Resting-State EEG Structure in Disentangling Vegetative and Minimally Conscious States: A Preliminary Study. Neurorehabilitation and Neural Repair 27 (4):345-354.
    Background: Patients in a vegetative state pose problems in diagnosis, prognosis and treatment. Currently, no prognostic markers predict the chance of recovery, which has serious consequences, especially in end-of-life decision-making. -/- Objective: We aimed to assess an objective measurement of prognosis using advanced electroencephalography (EEG). -/- Methods: EEG data (19 channels) were collected in 14 patients who were diagnosed to be persistently vegetative based on repeated clinical evaluations at 3 months following brain damage. EEG structure parameters (amplitude, duration and variability (...)
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  31. Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Alexander A. Fingelkurts, Sergio Bagnato, Cristina Boccagni & Giuseppe Galardi (2012). Toward Operational Architectonics of Consciousness: Basic Evidence From Patients with Severe Cerebral Injuries. Cognitive Processing 13 (2):111-131.
    Although several studies propose that the integrity of neuronal assemblies may underlie a phenomenon referred to as awareness, none of the known studies have explicitly investigated dynamics and functional interactions among neuronal assemblies as a function of consciousness expression. In order to address this question EEG operational architectonics analysis (Fingelkurts and Fingelkurts, 2001, 2008) was conducted in patients in minimally conscious (MCS) and vegetative states (VS) to study the dynamics of neuronal assemblies and operational synchrony among them as a function (...)
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  32. Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Alexander A. Fingelkurts, Sergio Bagnato, Cristina Boccagni & Giuseppe Galardi (2012). DMN Operational Synchrony Relates to Self-Consciousness: Evidence From Patients in Vegetative and Minimally Conscious States. Open Neuroimaging Journal 6:55-68.
    The default mode network (DMN) has been consistently activated across a wide variety of self-related tasks, leading to a proposal of the DMN’s role in self-related processing. Indeed, there is limited fMRI evidence that the functional connectivity within the DMN may underlie a phenomenon referred to as self-awareness. At the same time, none of the known studies have explicitly investigated neuronal functional interactions among brain areas that comprise the DMN as a function of self-consciousness loss. To fill this gap, EEG (...)
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  33. Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Alexander A. Fingelkurts & Carlos F. H. Neves (2009). Phenomenological Architecture of a Mind and Operational Architectonics of the Brain: The Unified Metastable Continuum. In Robert Kozma & John Caulfield (eds.), Journal of New Mathematics and Natural Computing. Special Issue on Neurodynamic Correlates of Higher Cognition and Consciousness: Theoretical and Experimental Approaches - in Honor of Walter J Freeman's 80th Birthday. World Scientific. 221-244.
    In our contribution we will observe phenomenal architecture of a mind and operational architectonics of the brain and will show their intimate connectedness within a single integrated metastable continuum. The notion of operation of different complexity is the fundamental and central one in bridging the gap between brain and mind: it is precisely by means of this notion that it is possible to identify what at the same time belongs to the phenomenal conscious level and to the neurophysiological level of (...)
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  34. Walter J. Freeman (2007). Roles of Allocortex and Centrencephalon in Intentionality and Consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (1):92-93.
    “Decortication” does not distinguish between removing all cerebral cortex, including three-layered allocortex or just six-layered neocortex. Functional decortication, by spreading depression, reversibly suppresses only neocortex, leaving minimal intentionality. Removal of all forebrain structures except a hypothalamic “island” blocks all intentional behaviors, leaving only tropisms. To what extent do Merker's examples retain allocortex, and how might such residues affect his interpretations? (Published Online May 1 2007).
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  35. Vittorio Gallese (2000). The Acting Subject: Toward the Neural Basis of Social Cognition. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Neural Correlates of Consciousness. MIT Press. 325--333.
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  36. Michael S. Gazzaniga (ed.) (2000). The New Cognitive Neurosciences: 2nd Edition. MIT Press.
    The majority of the chapters in this edition of The Cognitive Neurosciences are new, and those from the first edition have been completely rewritten and updated ...
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  37. Michael S. Gazzaniga (1998). Brain and Conscious Experience. In H. Jasper, L. Descarries, V. Castellucci & S. Rossignol (eds.), Consciousness: At the Frontiers of Neuroscience. Lippincott-Raven.
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  38. Michael S. Gazzaniga (1993). Brain Mechanisms and Conscious Experience. In G. R. Bock & James L. Marsh (eds.), Experimental and Theoretical Studies of Consciousness. (Ciba Foundation Symposium 174). 247--62.
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  39. Michael S. Gazzaniga (1993). Experimental and Theoretical Studies of Consciousness. (Ciba Foundation Symposium 174).
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  40. P. S. Goldman-Rakic (1988). The Prefrontal Contribution to Working Memory and Conscious Experience. In O. D. Creutzfeld & John C. Eccles (eds.), The Brain and Conscious Experience. Pontifical Academy.
  41. Peter G. Grossenbacher (ed.) (1997). Finding Consciousness in the Brain: A Neurocognitive Approach. John Benjamins.
    CHAPTER A Phenomenological Introduction to the Cognitive Neuroscience of Consciousness Peter G. Grossenbacher National Institute of Mental Health What is ...
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  42. Debra A. Gusnard (2006). Neural Substrates of Self-Awareness. In John T. Cacioppo, Penny S. Visser & Cynthia L. Pickett (eds.), Social Neuroscience: People Thinking About Thinking People. MIT Press. 41-62.
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  43. Yasuki Hashimoto & Kuniyoshi L. Sakai (2003). Brain Activations During Conscious Self-Monitoring of Speech Production with Delayed Auditory Feedback: An fMRI Study. Human Brain Mapping 20 (1):22-28.
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  44. H. Jasper (1998). Sensory Information and Conscious Experience. In H. Jasper, L. Descarries, V. Castellucci & S. Rossignol (eds.), Consciousness: At the Frontiers of Neuroscience. Lippincott-Raven.
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  45. E. Roy John, P. Easton & R. Isenhart (1997). Consciousness and Cognition May Be Mediated by Multiple Independent Coherent Ensembles. Consciousness and Cognition 6 (1):3-39.
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  46. B. E. Jones (1998). The Neural Basis of Consciousness Across the Sleep-Waking Cycle. In H. Jasper, L. Descarries, V. Castellucci & S. Rossignol (eds.), Consciousness: At the Frontiers of Neuroscience. Lippincott-Raven.
  47. R. Jung (1954). Correlation of Bioelectrical and Autonomic Phenomena with Alterations of Consciousness and Arousal in Man. In J. F. Delafresnaye (ed.), Brain Mechanisms and Consciousness. Blackwell.
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  48. David Kahn, Edward F. Pace-Schott & J. Allan Hobson (1997). Consciousness in Waking and Dreaming: The Roles of Neuronal Oscillation and Neuromodulation in Determining Similarities and Differences. Neuroscience 78:13-38.
  49. Nancy Kanwisher (2001). Neural Events and Perceptual Awareness. Cognition 79 (1):89-113.
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  50. N. Kleitman (1955). The Role of the Cerebral Cortex in the Development and Maintenance of Consciousness. In H. A. Abramson (ed.), Problems of Consciousness: Transactions of the Third Conference. Josiah Macy Foundation.
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