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  1. G. Adam, I. Meszaros & E. I. Banyai (eds.) (1981). Advances in Physiological Science.
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  2. William P. Banks & Susan Pockett (2007). Benjamin Libet's Work on the Neuroscience of Free Will. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell 657--670.
  3. T. J. Bittner (1996). Consciousness and the Act of Will. Philosophical Studies 81 (2-3):31-41.
  4. Amanda R. Bolbecker, Zixi Cheng, Gary Felsten, King-Leung Kong, Corrinne C. M. Lim, Sheryl J. Nisly-Nagele, Lolin T. Wang-Bennett & Gerald S. Wasserman (2002). Two Asymmetries Governing Neural and Mental Timing. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):265-272.
    Mental timing studies may be influenced by powerful cognitive illusions that can produce an asymmetry in their rate of progress relative to neuronal timing studies. Both types of timing research are also governed by a temporal asymmetry, expressed by the fact that the direction of causation must follow time's arrow. Here we refresh our earlier suggestion that the temporal asymmetry offers promise as a means of timing mental activities. We update our earlier analysis of Libet's data within this framework. Then (...)
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  5. Bruno G. Breitmeyer (2002). In Support of Pockett's Critique of Libet's Studies of the Time Course of Consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):280-283.
    Susan Pockett presents sound arguments supporting her reinterpretations of data that Libet and co-workers used to support a number of intriguing and influential conclusions regarding the microgenesis and timing of conscious sensory experience and volitionally controlled motor responses. The following analysis, extending and elaborating some of her main arguments, proposes that Libet's experimental methodologies and rationales, and thus also his interpretation of data, are flawed and that neglect or ignorance of methodological and empirical constraints well known to sensory psychologists risks (...)
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  6. Richard Brown (2012). The Brain and its States. In Shimon Edelman, Tomer Fekete & Neta Zach (eds.), Being in Time: Dynamical Models of Phenomenal Experience. John Benjamins 211-238.
    In recent times we have seen an explosion in the amount of attention paid to the conscious brain from scientists and philosophers alike. One message that has emerged loud and clear from scientific work is that the brain is a dynamical system whose operations unfold in time. Any theory of consciousness that is going to be physically realistic must take account of the intrinsic nature of neurons and brain activity. At the same time a long discussion on consciousness among philosophers (...)
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  7. P. A. Buser & A. Rougeul-Buser (1978). Cerebral Correlates of Conscious Experience. Elsevier.
  8. David J. Chalmers, Determining the Moment of Consciousness? Commentary on Valerie Hardcastle.
    It's very interesting to see neurophysiological evidence brought to bear on the puzzling question of conscious experience. Many have observed that information-processing models of cognition seem to leave consciousness untouched; it is natural to hope that turning to neurophysiology might lead us to the Holy Grail. Still, I think there are reasons to be skeptical. There are good reasons to suppose that neurophysiological investigation contributes to cognitive explanation at best in virtue of constraining the information-processing structure of cognition. Of course (...)
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  9. Patricia S. Churchland (1981). Discussion: The Timing of Sensations: Reply to Libet. Philosophy of Science 48 (September):492-497.
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  10. Patricia S. Churchland (1981). On the Alleged Backward Referral of Experience and its Relevance to the Mind-Body Problem. Philosophy of Science 48 (June):165-81.
    A remarkable hypothesis has recently been advanced by Libet and promoted by Eccles which claims that there is standardly a backwards referral of conscious experiences in time, and that this constitutes empirical evidence for the failure of identity of brain states and mental states. Libet's neurophysiological data are critically examined and are found insufficient to support the hypothesis. Additionally, it is argued that even if there is a temporal displacement phenomenon to be explained, a neurophysiological explanation is most likely.
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  11. Patricia S. Churchland (1981). The Timing of Sensations: Reply to Libet. Philosophy of Science 48 (3):492-7.
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  12. Daniel C. Dennett & Marcel Kinsbourne (1992). Time and the Observer: The Where and When of Consciousness in the Brain. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):183-201.
    _Behavioral and Brain Sciences_ , 15, 183-247, 1992. Reprinted in _The Philosopher's Annual_ , Grim, Mar and Williams, eds., vol. XV-1992, 1994, pp. 23-68; Noel Sheehy and Tony Chapman, eds., _Cognitive Science_ , Vol. I, Elgar, 1995, pp.210-274.
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  13. Frank H. Durgin & Saul Sternberg (2002). The Time of Consciousness and Vice Versa. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):284-290.
    The temporal granularity of consciousness may be far less fine than the real-time information processing mechanisms that underlie our sensitivity to small temporal differences. It is suggested that conscious time perception, like space perception, is subject to errors that belie a unitary underlying representation. E. R. Clay's concept of the “specious present,” an extended moment represented in consciousness, is suggested as an alternative to the more common notion of instantaneous experience that underlies much reasoning based on the “time of arrival” (...)
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  14. Shimon Edelman, Tomer Fekete & Neta Zach (eds.) (2012). Being in Time: Dynamical Models of Phenomenal Experience. John Benjamins Pub. Co..
    The chapters comprising this book represent a collective attempt on the part of their authors to redress this aberration.
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  15. Ronald N. Ehrman, Charles P. O'Brien & J. W. Ternes (1983). Apes: A Digital-Circuit Simulation Program for Real-Time Control of Behavioral and Physiological Data Collection. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 21 (6):473-475.
  16. Avshalom C. Elitzur (1996). Time and Consciousness: The Uneasy Bearing of Relativity on the Mind-Body Problem. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness. MIT Press
  17. Andrew A. Fingelkurts & Alexander A. Fingelkurts (2015). Attentional State: From Automatic Detection to Willful Focused Concentration. In G. Marchetti, G. Benedetti & A. Alharbi (eds.), Attantion and Meaning. The Attentional Basis of Meaning. Nova Science Publishers, Inc 133-150.
    Despite the fact that attention is a core property of all perceptual and cognitive operations, our understanding of its neurophysiological mechanisms is far from complete. There are many theoretical models that try to fill this gap in knowledge, though practically all of them concentrate only on either involuntary (bottom-up) or voluntarily (top-down) aspect of attention. At the same time, both aspects of attention are rather integrated in the living brain. In this chapter we attempt to conceptualise both aspects of attentional (...)
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  18. Andrew A. Fingelkurts & Alexander A. Fingelkurts (2014). Present Moment, Past, and Future: Mental Kaleidoscope. Frontiers Psychology 5:395.
    It is the every person's daily phenomenal experience that conscious states represent their contents as occurring now. Following Droege (2009) we could state that consciousness has a peculiar affinity for presence. Some researchers even argue that conscious awareness necessarily demands that mental content is somehow held “frozen” within a discrete progressive present moment. Thus, phenomenal content seems to be minimally conscious if it is integrated into a single and coherent model of reality during a “virtual window” of presence.
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  19. Andrew A. Fingelkurts & Alexander A. Fingelkurts (2006). Timing in Cognition and EEG Brain Dynamics: Discreteness Versus Continuity. Cognitive Processing 7 (3):135-162.
    This article provides an overview of recent developments in solving the timing problem (discreteness vs. continuity) in cognitive neuroscience. Both theoretical and empirical studies have been considered, with an emphasis on the framework of Operational Architectonics (OA) of brain functioning (Fingelkurts and Fingelkurts, 2001, 2005). This framework explores the temporal structure of information flow and interarea interactions within the network of functional neuronal populations by examining topographic sharp transition processes in the scalp EEG, on the millisecond scale. We conclude, based (...)
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  20. I. M. Glynn (1990). Consciousness and Time. Nature 348:477-79.
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  21. Gilberto Gomes (2002). On Experimental and Philosophical Investigations of Mental Timing: A Response to Commentary. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):304-307.
    Reinterpretations of Libet's results have received support from most commentaries. Libet's arguments against alternative hypotheses are contested. Latency depends on intensity. Integration of intensity and duration explains the Minimum Train Duration. Analogies of Libet's timing of intentions with control experiments indicate biases of opposite signs, according to intramodal or intermodal results. Rosenthal's view of nonconscious intentions becoming conscious after a delay is favored. Compatibilist free will is discussed.
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  22. Gilberto Gomes (2002). Problems in the Timing of Conscious Experience. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):191-97.
    Libet's arguments in defense of his interpretation of his experimental results are insufficient. The claims of my critical review do not suffer with his new statements.
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  23. Gilberto Gomes (2002). The Interpretation of Libet's Results on the Timing of Conscious Events: A Commentary. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):221-230.
    A commentary on articles by Klein, Pockett, and Trevena and Miller, in this issue, is given. Average shift in the point of subjective equality , calculated by Klein on Libet's data, and corresponding change in mean shift, calculated by Libet et al. , may be “corrected,” taking as a reference point the end of the minimum train duration. Values obtained, if significant, indicate a latency for conscious sensation of the skin stimulus of at least 230 ms. Pockett's main conclusions are (...)
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  24. Gilberto Gomes (1999). Volition and the Readiness Potential. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (8-9):59-76.
    1. Introduction The readiness potential was found to precede voluntary acts by about half a second or more (Kornhuber & Deecke, 1965). Kornhuber (1984) discussed the readiness potential in terms of volition, arguing that it is not the manifestation of an attentional processes. Libet discussed it in relation to consciousness and to free will (Libet et al. 1983a; 1983b; Libet, 1985, 1992, 1993). Libet asked the following questions. Are voluntary acts initiated by a conscious decision to act? Are the physiological (...)
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  25. Gilberto Gomes (1998). The Timing of Conscious Experience: A Critical Review and Reinterpretation of Libet's Research. Consciousness and Cognition 7 (4):559-595.
    An extended examination of Libet's works led to a comprehensive reinterpretation of his results. According to this reinterpretation, the Minimum Train Duration of electrical brain stimulation should be considered as the time needed to create a brain stimulus efficient for producing conscious sensation and not as a basis for inferring the latency for conscious sensation of peripheral origin. Latency for conscious sensation with brain stimulation may occurafterthe Minimum Train Duration. Backward masking with cortical stimuli suggests a 125-300 ms minimum value (...)
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  26. C. C. Gould (ed.) (1994). Artifacts, Representations, and Social Practice. Kluwer.
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  27. Christopher D. Green & Grant R. Gillett (1995). Are Mental Events Preceded by Their Physical Causes? Philosophical Psychology 8 (4):333-340.
    Libet's experiments, supported by a strict one-to-one identity thesis between brain events and mental events, have prompted the conclusion that physical events precede the mental events to which they correspond. We examine this claim and conclude that it is suspect for several reasons. First, there is a dual assumption that an intention is the kind of thing that causes an action and that can be accurately introspected. Second, there is a real problem with the method of timing the mental events (...)
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  28. Marc Grosjean, David A. Rosenbaum & Catherine Elsinger (2001). Timing and Reaction Time. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 130 (2):256.
  29. Patrick Haggard & Benjamin W. Libet (2001). Conscious Intention and Brain Activity. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (11):47-63.
    The problem of free will lies at the heart of modern scientific studies of consciousness. An influential series of experiments by Libet has suggested that conscious intentions arise as a result of brain activity. This contrasts with traditional concepts of free will, in which the mind controls the body. A more recent study by Haggard and Eimer has further examined the relation between intention and brain processes, concluding that conscious awareness of intention is linked to the choice or selection of (...)
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  30. Efi Hatzimanolis (1993). 8 Timing Differences And. In Sneja Marina Gunew & Anna Yeatman (eds.), Feminism and the Politics of Difference. Allen & Unwin 128.
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  31. Ted Honderich, Is the Mind Ahead of the Brain? Rejoinder to Benjamin Libet.
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  32. Ted Honderich (2005). On Benjamin Libet: Is the Mind Ahead of the Brain? Behind It? In On Determinism and Freedom. Edinburgh University Press
    Benjamin Libet and also Libet and collaborators claim to advance a single hypothesis, with important consequences, about the time of a conscious experience in relation to the time when there occurs a certain physical condition in the brain. This condition is spoken of as " _neural_ " _adequacy_ for the experience, or, as we can as well say, _neural adequacy_. 5 This finding has been taken to throw doubt on theories that take neural and mental events to be in necessary (...)
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  33. Ted Honderich (2005). On Determinism and Freedom. Edinburgh Up.
    This is a draft of a paper for a book Philosophy of Action: 5 Questions edited by Jesus Aguilar and Andrei Buckareff and to be published by Automatic Press / VIP. The book contains accounts by various philosophers, including leading theorists, of their engagement with problems of action and agency, and in particular determinism and freedom. The contributors also offer thoughts as to what attracted them to the subject, what their conclusions have been, what the benefit of the subject can (...)
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  34. Ted Honderich (1984). The Time of a Conscious Sensory Experience and Mind-Brain Theories. Journal of Theoretical Biology 110 (1):115-129.
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  35. Terry Horgan (2010). The Phenomenology of Agency and the Libet Results. In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Lynn Nadel (eds.), Conscious Will and Responsibility: A Tribute to Benjamin Libet. OUP Usa 159.
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  36. Ronald C. Hoy (1982). Ambiguities in the Subjective Timing of Experiences Debate. Philosophy of Science 49 (June):254-262.
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  37. Iens Iohansson (2013). The Timing Problem. In Fred Feldman Ben Bradley (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Death. 255.
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  38. S. Joordens, Marc van Duijn & T. M. Spalek (2002). When Timing the Mind Should Also Mind the Timing: Biases in the Measurement of Voluntary Actions. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):231-40.
    Trevena and Miller provide further evidence that readiness potentials occur in the brain prior to the time that participants claim to have initiated a voluntary movement, a contention originally forwarded by Libet, Gleason, Wright, and Pearl . In their examination of this issue, though, aspects of their data lead them to question whether their measurement of the initiation of a voluntary movement was accurate. The current article addresses this concern by providing a direct analysis of biases in this task. This (...)
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  39. S. Kitazawa (2002). Where Conscious Sensation Takes Place. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (3):475-477.
    Pockett has drawn an alternative conclusion from the data of Libet, Alberts, Wright, and Feinstein , and suggested that it takes 80 ms, rather than 500 ms, for the sensation evoked by a stimulus to enter awareness. Here, I suggest that our conscious sensation evolves over time, during the period from 80 to 500 ms after a stimulus, until the sensation is stably localized in space.
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  40. S. A. Klein (2002). Libet's Temporal Anomalies: A Reassessment of the Data. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):198-214.
    Benjamin Libet compared the perceived time of direct brain stimulation to the perceived time of skin stimulation. His results are among the most controversial experiments at the interface between psychology and philosophy. The new element that I bring to this discussion is a reanalysis of Libet's raw data. Libet's original data were difficult to interpret because of the manner in which they were presented in tables. Plotting the data as psychometric functions shows that the observers have great uncertainty about the (...)
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  41. Stanley Klein (2002). Libet's Timing of Mental Events: Commentary on the Commentaries. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):326-333.
    This issue of Consciousness and Cognition presents four target articles and eight commentaries on the target articles. The present article presents comments on those commentaries, grouped into backward referral and volition categories. Regarding backward referral: I disagree with my fellow commentators and take the unpopular position of defending Libet's notion of backward referral. I join my fellow commentators in critiquing Libet's notion of a 500-ms delay. I examine several of the hypotheses suggested by other commentators for why cortical and lateral (...)
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  42. Stanley Klein (2002). Libet's Research on the Timing of Conscious Intention to Act: A Commentary. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):273-279.
    S. Pockett and G. Gomes discuss a possible bias in the method by which Libet's subjects estimated the time at which they became aware of their intent to move their hands. The bias, caused by sensory delay processing the clock information, would be sufficient to alter Trevena and Miller's conclusions regarding the timing of the lateralized readiness potential. I show that the flash-lag effect would compensate for that bias. In the last part of my commentary I note that the other (...)
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  43. Neil Levy (2005). Libet's Impossible Demand. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (12):67-76.
    Abstract : Libet’s famous experiments, showing that apparently we become aware of our intention to act only after we have unconsciously formed it, have widely been taken to show that there is no such thing as free will. If we are not conscious of the formation of our intentions, many people think, we do not exercise the right kind of control over them. I argue that the claim this view presupposes, that only consciously initiated actions could be free, places a (...)
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  44. Benjamin Libet (2006). Commentary: The Timing of Brain Events. Consciusness and Cognition 15:540--547.
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  45. Benjamin W. Libet (2004). Mind Time: The Temporal Factor in Consciousness. MIT Press.
    Over a long career, Libet has conducted experiments that have shown, in clear and concrete ways, how the brain produces conscious awareness.
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  46. Benjamin W. Libet (2003). Timing of Conscious Experience: Reply to the 2002 Commentaries on Libet's Findings. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (3):321-331.
  47. Benjamin W. Libet (2002). The Timing of Mental Events: Libet's Experimental Findings and Their Implications. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):291-99.
    The major findings by Libet et al. are briefly summarized. The criticisms and alternative proposals by Trevena and Miller, Pockett, and Gomes are analyzed and found to be largely unwarranted.
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  48. Benjamin W. Libet (2000). Time Factors in Conscious Processes: Reply to Gilberto Gomes. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (1):1-12.
    The critical reinterpretations of Libet's research by G. Gomes make speculative, unwarranted, and untested assumptions. These assumptions and arguments are analyzed and their status relative to Libet's findings is criticized.
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  49. Benjamin W. Libet (1996). Commentary on Free Will in the Light of Neuropsychiatry. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (2):95-96.
  50. Benjamin W. Libet (1993). Experimental and Theoretical Studies of Consciousness. (Ciba Foundation Symposium 174).
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