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  1. Bernard J. Baars, Why It Must Be Consciousness - for Real!
    1.1 Bilateral damage to the thalamus abolishes waking consciousness. The critical site of this damage is believed to be a relatively small cluster of neurons, about the size of a pencil eraser on either side of the brain's midline, called the Intra-Laminar Nuclei (ILN) because they are located inside the white layers (laminae) that divide the two thalami into their major groupings of nuclei. The fact that bilateral damage to the ILNs abolishes consciousness is very unusual. There is no other (...)
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  2. Bernard J. Baars & J. B. Newman (1994). A Neurobiological Interpretation of the Global Workspace Theory of Consciousness. In Antti Revonsuo & Matti Kamppinen (eds.), Consciousness in Philosophy and Cognitive Neuroscience. Lawrence Erlbaum.
  3. Bernard J. Baars, J. B. Newman & John G. Taylor (1998). Neuronal Mechanisms of Consciousness: A Relational Global Workspace Approach. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A.C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press. 269-278.
    This paper explores a remarkable convergence of ideas and evidence, previously presented in separate places by its authors. That convergence has now become so persuasive that we believe we are working within substantially the same broad framework. Taylor's mathematical papers on neuronal systems involved in consciousness dovetail well with work by Newman and Baars on the thalamocortical system, suggesting a brain mechanism much like the global workspace architecture developed by Baars (see references below). This architecture is relational, in the sense (...)
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  4. C. BeCchio, M. Adenzato & B. Bara (2006). How the Brain Understands Intention: Different Neural Circuits Identify the Componential Features of Motor and Prior Intentions. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (1):64-74.
    In this paper we present theoretical and experimental evidence for a set of mechanisms by which intention is understood. We propose that three basic aspects are involved in the understanding of intention. The first aspect to consider is intention recognition, i.e., the process by which we recognize other people’s intentions, distinguishing among different types. The second aspect concerns the attribution of intention to its author: the existence of shared neural representations provides a parsimonious explanation of how we recognize other people’s (...)
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  5. Samuel Bellini-Leite & Alfredo Pereira (2013). Is Global Workspace a Cartesian Theater? How the Neuro-Astroglial Interaction Model Solves Conceptual Issues. Journal of Cognitive Science 14 (4):335-360.
    The Global Workspace Theory (GWT) proposed by Bernard Baars (1988) along with Daniel Dennett’s (1991) Multiple Drafts Model (MDM) of consciousness are renowned cognitive theories of consciousness bearing similarities and differences. Although Dennett displays sympathy for GWT, his own MDM does not seem to be fully compatible with it. This work discusses this compatibility, by asking if GWT suffers from Daniel Dennett’s criticism of what he calls a “Cartesian Theater”. We identified in Dennett 10 requirements for avoiding the Cartesian Theater. (...)
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  6. Ned Block (2014). Consciousness, Big Science and Conceptual Clarity. In Gary Marcus & Jeremy Freeman (eds.), in The Future of the Brain: Essays by the World’s Leading Neuroscientists. Princeton University Press. 161-176.
  7. Ned Block (2014). Rich Conscious Perception Outside Focal Attention. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 18.
    Can we consciously see more items at once than can be held in visual working memory? This question has elud- ed resolution because the ultimate evidence is subjects’ reports in which phenomenal consciousness is filtered through working memory. However, a new technique makes use of the fact that unattended ‘ensemble prop- erties’ can be detected ‘for free’ without decreasing working memory capacity.
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  8. Ned Block (2011). Perceptual Consciousness Overflows Cognitive Access. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (12):567-575.
    One of the most important issues concerning the foundations ofconscious perception centerson thequestion of whether perceptual consciousness is rich or sparse. The overflow argument uses a form of ‘iconic memory’ toarguethatperceptual consciousnessisricher (i.e.,has a higher capacity) than cognitive access: when observing a complex scene we are conscious of more than we can report or think about. Recently, the overflow argumenthas been challenged both empirically and conceptually. This paper reviews the controversy, arguing that proponents of sparse perception are committed to the (...)
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  9. Joseph E. Bogen (2007). The Thalamic Intralaminar Nuclei and the Property of Consciousness. In Philip David Zelazo, Morris Moscovitch & Evan Thompson (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge.
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  10. Joseph E. Bogen (1998). Locating the Subjectivity Pump: The Thalamic Intralaminar Nuclei. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A.C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press.
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  11. Joseph E. Bogen (1997). Some Neurophysiologic Aspects of Consciousness. Seminars in Neurology 17:95-103.
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  12. Joseph E. Bogen (1995). On the Neurophysiology of Consciousness, Part I: An Overview. Consciousness and Cognition 4:52-62.
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  13. Joseph E. Bogen (1995). On the Neurophysiology of Consciousness, Part II: Constraining the Semantic Problem. Consciousness and Cognition 4 (2):137-58.
    The main idea in this series of essays is that subjective awareness depends upon the intralaminar nuclei of each thalmus . This implies that the internal structure and external relations of ILN make subjective awareness possible. An array of material relevant to this proposal was briefly reviewed in Part I . This Part II considers in more detail some semantic aspects and a bit of philosophic background as these pertain to propositions 0, 1, and 2 of Part I. Part II (...)
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  14. J. Boitano (1996). Edelmans's Biological Theory of Consciousness. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness. MIT Press.
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  15. F. Bremer (1966). Neurophysiological Correlates of Mental Unity. In John C. Eccles (ed.), Brain and Conscious Experience. Springer. 283--297.
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  16. Bruce Bridgeman (1998). Cortical Models and the Neurological Gap. Consciousness and Cognition 7 (2):157-158.
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  17. Robert Briscoe & John Schwenkler (2015). Conscious Vision in Action. Cognitive Science 39 (2).
    It is natural to assume that the fine-grained and highly accurate spatial information present in visual experience is often used to guide our bodily actions. Yet this assumption has been challenged by proponents of the Two Visual Systems Hypothesis , according to which visuomotor programming is the responsibility of a “zombie” processing stream whose sources of bottom-up spatial information are entirely non-conscious . In many formulations of TVSH, the role of conscious vision in action is limited to “recognizing objects, selecting (...)
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  18. Richard Brockman (2001). Toward a Neurobiology of the Unconscious. Journal of the American Academy of Psychoanalysis and Dynamic Psychiatry 29 (4):601-615.
  19. Richard Brown (2012). The Brain and its States. In Shimon Edelman, Tomer Fekete & Neta Zach (eds.), Being in Time: Dynamical Models of Phenomenal Experience. John Benjamins. 211-238.
    In recent times we have seen an explosion in the amount of attention paid to the conscious brain from scientists and philosophers alike. One message that has emerged loud and clear from scientific work is that the brain is a dynamical system whose operations unfold in time. Any theory of consciousness that is going to be physically realistic must take account of the intrinsic nature of neurons and brain activity. At the same time a long discussion on consciousness among philosophers (...)
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  20. P. A. Buser & A. Rougeul-Buser (1978). Cerebral Correlates of Conscious Experience. Elsevier.
  21. William Clancey (1993). The Biology of Consciousness: Comparative Review of Rosenfield and Edelman. Artificial Intelligence 60:313-356.
  22. Jonathan D. Cohen & Jonathan W. Schooler (eds.) (1997). Scientific Approaches to Consciousness. Lawrence Erlbaum.
  23. Diego J. Cosmelli, Jean-Philippe Lachaux & Evan Thompson (2007). Neurodynamics of Consciousness. In P.D. Zelazo, Morris Moscovitch & Evan Thompson (eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge. 731--774.
    cal basis of consciousness. We continue by discussing the relation between spatiotem- One of the outstanding problems in the cog- poral patterns of brain activity and con- nitive sciences is to understand how ongo- sciousness, with particular attention to pro- ing conscious experience is related to the cesses in the gamma frequency band. We workings of the brain and nervous system. then adopt a critical perspective and high-.
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  24. Rodney M. J. Cotterill (ed.) (1989). Models of Brain Function. Cambridge University Press.
  25. L. Andrew Coward (2005). A System Architecture Approach to the Brain: From Neurons to Consciousness. Nova Biomedical Books.
    This book is the integrated presentation of a large body of work on understanding the operation of biological brains as systems.
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  26. Francis Crick (1984). Functions of the Thalamic Reticular Complex: The Searchlight Hypothesis. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Usa 81:4586-93.
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  27. Francis Crick & Christof Koch (2007). A Neurobiological Framework for Consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. 567--579.
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  28. Francis Crick & Christof Koch (2003). What Are the Neural Correlates of Consciousness? In L. van Hemmen & Terrence J. Sejnowski (eds.), Problems in Systems Neuroscience. Oxford University Press.
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  29. Francis Crick & Christof Koch (2000). The Unconscious Homunculus. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Neural Correlates of Consciousness. MIT Press. 3-11.
  30. Francis Crick & Christof Koch (1998). Consciousness and Neuroscience. Cerebral Cortex.
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  31. Francis Crick & Christof Koch (1990). Toward a Neurobiological Theory of Consciousness. Seminars in the Neurosciences 2:263-275.
  32. Antonio R. Damasio (2000). A Neurobiology for Consciousness. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Neural Correlates of Consciousness. MIT Press.
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  33. Antonio R. Damasio (1999). The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness. Harcourt Brace and Co.
  34. Balaram Das, A Framework for Conscious Information Processing.
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  35. Stanislas Dehaene & Jean-Pierre Changeux (2004). Neural Mechanisms for Access to Consciousness. In Michael S. Gazzaniga (ed.), The Cognitive Neurosciences. Mit Press. 1145-1157.
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  36. Stanislas Dehaene, Michel Kerszberg & Jean-Pierre Changeux (2001). A Neuronal Model of a Global Workspace in Effortful Cognitive Tasks. Pnas 95 (24):14529-14534.
  37. Stanislas Dehaene & Lionel Naccache (2001). Towards a Cognitive Neuroscience of Consciousness: Basic Evidence and a Workspace Framework. Cognition 79 (1):1-37.
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  38. J. F. Delafresnaye (ed.) (1954). Brain Mechanisms and Consciousness. Blackwell.
  39. Daniel C. Dennett, Review of Damasio, Descartes' Error. [REVIEW]
    The legacy of René Descartes' notorious dualism of mind and body extends far beyond academia into everyday thinking: "These athletes are prepared both mentally and physically," and "There's nothing wrong with your body--it's all in your mind." Even among those of us who have battled Descartes' vision, there has been a powerful tendency to treat the mind (that is to say, the brain) as the body's boss, the pilot of the ship. Falling in with this standard way of thinking, we (...)
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  40. John C. Eccles (ed.) (1966). Brain and Conscious Experience. Springer.
  41. Gerald M. Edelman (2001). Consciousness: The Remembered Present. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 929:111-122.
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  42. Gerald M. Edelman (1992). Bright Air, Brilliant Fire: On the Matter of the Mind. Penguin.
  43. Gerald M. Edelman (1989). The Remembered Present: A Biological Theory of Consciousness. Basic Books.
    Having laid the groundwork in his critically acclaimed books Neural Darwinism (Basic Books, 1987) and Topobiology (Basic Books, 1988), Nobel laureate Gerald M. Edelman now proposes a comprehensive theory of consciousness in The Remembered ...
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  44. Gerald M. Edelman & Giulio Srinivasan Tononi (2000). Reentry and the Dynamic Core: Neural Correlates of Conscious Experience. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Neural Correlates of Consciousness. MIT Press.
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  45. Shimon Edelman, Tomer Fekete & Neta Zach (eds.) (2012). Being in Time: Dynamical Models of Phenomenal Experience. John Benjamins Pub. Co..
    The chapters comprising this book represent a collective attempt on the part of their authors to redress this aberration.
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  46. Ralph D. Ellis (2001). A Theoretical Model of the Role of the Cerebellum in Cognition, Attention and Consciousness. Consciousness and Emotion 2 (2):300-309.
  47. Ralph D. Ellis (2000). Efferent Brain Processes and the Enactive Approach to Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (4):40-50.
    [opening paragraph]: Nicholas Humphrey argues persuasively that consciousness results from active and efferent rather than passive and afferent functions. These arguments contribute to the mounting recent evidence that consciousness is inseparable from the motivated action planning of creatures that in some sense are organismic and agent-like rather than passively mechanical and reactive in the way that digital computers are. Newton calls this new approach the ‘action theory of understanding'; Varela et al. dubbed it the ‘enactive’ view of consciousness. It was (...)
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  48. Bill Faw (2003). Pre-Frontal Executive Committee for Perception, Working Memory, Attention, Long-Term Memory, Motor Control, and Thinking: A Tutorial Review. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (1):83-139.
    As an explicit organizing metaphor, memory aid, and conceptual framework, the prefrontal cortex may be viewed as a five-member ‘Executive Committee,’ as the prefrontal-control extensions of five sub-and-posterior-cortical systems: the ‘Perceiver’ is the frontal extension of the ventral perceptual stream which represents the world and self in object coordinates; the ‘Verbalizer’ is the frontal extension of the language stream which represents the world and self in language coordinates; the ‘Motivator’ is the frontal cortical extension of a subcortical extended-amygdala stream which (...)
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  49. Tomer Fekete (2010). Representational Systems. Minds and Machines 20 (1):69-101.
    The concept of representation has been a key element in the scientific study of mental processes, ever since such studies commenced. However, usage of the term has been all but too liberal—if one were to adhere to common use it remains unclear if there are examples of physical systems which cannot be construed in terms of representation. The problem is considered afresh, taking as the starting point the notion of activity spaces—spaces of spatiotemporal events produced by dynamical systems. It is (...)
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  50. Tomer Fekete & Shimon Edelman (2012). The (Lack of) Mental Life of Some Machines. In Shimon Edelman, Tomer Fekete & Neta Zach (eds.), Being in Time: Dynamical Models of Phenomenal Experience. John Benjamins.. 88--95.
    The proponents of machine consciousness predicate the mental life of a machine, if any, exclusively on its formal, organizational structure, rather than on its physical composition. Given that matter is organized on a range of levels in time and space, this generic stance must be further constrained by a principled choice of levels on which the posited structure is supposed to reside. Indeed, not only must the formal structure fit well the physical system that realizes it, but it must do (...)
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