@article{Adams2007-ADAROA-2, volume = {2007}, number = {2}, author = {Fred Adams}, title = {Review of Andrew Brook, Kathleen Akins (eds.), \_Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement\_}, journal = {Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews}, year = {2007}, } @article{Andrews2003-ANDNOF, volume = {6}, number = {1}, author = {Kristin Andrews}, title = {Neurophilosophy of free will: From libertarian illusions to a concept of natural autonomy by Henrik Walter}, journal = {Philo}, year = {2003}, pages = {166-175}, } @unpublished{AntoineManuscript-ANTNAI-2, author = {Lutz Antoine and A. Lutz Thompson E. and D. Cosmelli}, title = {Neurophenomenology: An introduction for neurophilosophers in cognition and the brain : The philosophy and neuroscience movement}, } @incollection{Bechtel1999-BECHIT, author = {William P. Bechtel and Robert N. McCauley}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the 21st Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society}, abstract = {Functionalists in philosophy of mind traditionally raise two major arguments against the type identity theory: (1) psychological states are \_multiply realizable\_ so that there are no one-to-one mappings of psychological states onto neural states and (2) the most that evidence could ever establish is the \_correlation\_ of psychological and neural states, not their identity. We defend a variant on the traditional type identity theory which we call \_heuristic identity theory\_ (HIT) against both of these objections. Drawing its inspiration from scientific practice, heuristic identity theory construes identity claims as hypotheses that guide subsequent inquiry, not as conclusions of the research}, title = {Heuristic identity theory (or back to the future): The mind-body problem against the background of research strategies in cognitive neuroscience}, publisher = {Lawrence Erlbaum}, year = {1999}, pages = {67-72}, } @article{Bermudez2000-LUITCN, volume = {11}, number = {35}, author = {Jose Luis Bermudez}, abstract = {Myin, Erik (2000) Direct Self-Consciousness (2)Berm\'u{}dez, Jos\'e Luis (2000) Concepts and the Priority Principle (10)Berm\'u{}dez, Jos\'e Luis (2000) Circularity, "I"-Thoughts and the Linguistic Requirement for Concept Possession (11)Meeks, Roblin R. (2000) Withholding Immunity: Misidentification, Misrepresentation, and Autonomous Nonconceptual Proprioceptive First-Person Content (12)Newen, Albert (2001) Kinds of Self-Consciousness (13)Bermudez, Jose Luis (2000) Direct Self-Consciousness (4)Bermudez, Jose Luis (2000) Prelinguistic Self-Consciousness (5)Gallese, Vittorio (2000) The Brain and the Self: Reviewing the Neuroscientific Evidence (6)Bermudez, Jose Luis (2000) The Cognitive Neuroscience of Primitive Self-Consciousness (7) [Currently Displayed]Robbins, Philip (2000) Paradox Twice Lost (8)Fuller, Gary and Slater, Carol W. (2000) "I"-Thoughts: Criteria, Constitution, and Concept Possession (9)Evans, Cedric Oliver (2000) Prelinguistic Self-Consciousness (3)Bermudez, Jose Luis and Polytechnique, CREA Ecole (1999) The Paradox of Self-Consciousness (representation and Mind) (1)}, title = {The cognitive neuroscience of primitive self-consciousness}, journal = {Psycoloquy}, year = {2000}, } @book{Bickle2009-BICTOH, author = {John Bickle}, title = {The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2009}, } @article{Bickle1997-BICFSN, volume = {10}, number = {4}, author = {John Bickle}, abstract = {Philosophers and psychologists seeking an accessible introduction to current neuroscience will find much value in this volume. Befitting the neuroscientific focus on sensory processes, many essays address explicitly the binding problem. Theoretical and experimental work pertaining to the \textquotedblleft{}temporal synchronicity\textquotedblright solution is prominent. But there are also some surprising implications for current philosophical concerns, such as the intemalism/extemalism debate about representational content, epistemological realism, a \textquotedblleft{}bottom-up\textquotedblright approach to naturalizing intentionality, Humean concerns about the self, and implications from phantom-limb phenomena. Higher-level theorists about the mind ignore results like these from current neuroscience at their own peril, at least from the point of view of discourse worthy of serious attention as the sciences of the mind/brain push forward into the 21st century}, title = {From sensory neuroscience to neurophilosophy: Reflections on llinas and Churchland's mind-brain continuum}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, year = {1997}, pages = {523-530}, } @article{Bortolotti2009-BORNAW, volume = {69}, number = {1}, author = {Lisa Bortolotti}, title = {Neurophilosophy at work \textbullet by Paul Churchland}, journal = {Analysis}, year = {2009}, } @book{Brain1951-BRAMPA-2, author = {Walter R. Brain}, title = {Mind, Perception And Science}, publisher = {Blackwell Scientific}, year = {1951}, } @article{Briscoe2009-BRIESR, volume = {79}, number = {2}, author = {Robert Briscoe}, abstract = {Neuropsychological findings used to motivate the \textquotedblleft{}two visual systems\textquotedblright hypothesis have been taken to endanger a pair of widely accepted claims about spatial representation in visual experience. The first is the claim that visual experience represents 3-D space around the perceiver using an egocentric frame of reference. The second is the claim that there is a constitutive link between the spatial contents of visual experience and the perceiver\textquoteright{}s bodily actions. In this paper, I carefully assess three main sources of evidence for the two visual systems hypothesis and argue that the best interpretation of the evidence is in fact consistent with both claims. I conclude with some brief remarks on the relation between visual consciousness and rational agency.}, title = {Egocentric spatial representation in action and perception}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2009}, pages = {423-460}, } @article{Burton1999-BURANA, volume = {9}, number = {2}, author = {Robert G. Burton}, abstract = {Recent developments in the cognitive sciences and artificial intelligence suggest ways of answering the most serious challenge to Peirce's notion of abduction. Either there is no such logical process as abduction or, if abduction is a form of inference, it is essentially unconscious and therefore beyond rational control so that it lacks any normative significance. Peirce himself anticipates and attempts to answer this challenge. Peirce argues that abduction is both a source of creative insight and a form of logical inference subject to a degree of conscious control. In this paper I shall sketch a developing account of abduction that is suggested by the work of Paul Churchland, Paul Thagard, Chris Eliasmith, William Wimsatt, Owen Flanagan, and others. I shall argue that a credible account of abduction will require that we approach the phenomenon from both higher and lower levels as represented by these approaches.}, title = {A neurocomputational approach to abduction}, journal = {Minds and Machines}, year = {1999}, } @article{Campbell1953-CAMPAB, volume = {3}, number = {January}, author = {Charles A. Campbell}, title = {Philosophy and brain physiology}, journal = {Philosophical Quarterly}, year = {1953}, pages = {51-56}, } @book{Changeux2002-CHAWMU, author = {Jean-Pierre Changeux and Paul Ricoeur}, abstract = {In a remarkable exchange between neuroscientist Jean-Pierre Changeux and philosopher Paul Ricoeur, this book explores the vexed territory between these...}, title = {What Makes Us Think? A Neuroscientist and a Philosopher Argue About Ethics, Human Nature, and the Brain}, publisher = {Princeton}, year = {2002}, } @article{Chemero2007-CHEAWI, volume = {17}, number = {3}, author = {Anthony Chemero}, abstract = {In their historical overview of cognitive science, Bechtel, Abraham- son and Graham (1999) describe the {}eld as expanding in focus be- ginning in the mid-1980s. The {}eld had spent the previous 25 years on internalist, high-level GOFAI (\textquotedblleft{}good old fashioned arti{}cial intelli- gence\textquotedblright [Haugeland 1985]), and was {}nally moving \textquotedblleft{}outwards into the environment and downards into the brain\textquotedblright (Bechtel et al, 1999, p.75). One important force behind the downward movement was Patricia Churchland\textquoteright{}s Neurophilosophy (1986). This book began a movement bearing its name, one that truly came of age in 1999 when Kath- leen Akins won a million-dollar fellowship to begin the McDonnell Project in Philosophy and the Neurosciences. The McDonnell Project put neurophilosophy at the forefront of philosophy of mind and cogni- tive science, yielding proliferating articles, conferences, special journal issues and books. In two major new books, neurophilosophers Patricia Churchland (2002) and John Bickle (2003) clearly feel this newfound prominence: Churchland mocks those who do not apply {}ndings in neuroscience to philosophical problems as \textquotedblleft{}no-brainers\textquotedblright; Bickle mocks anyone with traditional philosophical concerns, including \textquotedblleft{}naturalistic philosophers of mind\textquotedblright and other neurophilosophers}, title = {Asking what's inside the head: Neurophilosophy meets the extended mind}, journal = {Minds and Machines}, year = {2007}, } @article{Chessick1953-CHENSA, volume = {20}, number = {October}, author = {Richard D. Chessick}, title = {Neurological studies and philosophical problems}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {1953}, pages = {300-312}, } @article{Chessick1953-CHETAO, volume = {20}, number = {4}, author = {Richard D. Chessick}, title = {The application of neurological studies in an approach to some philosophical problems}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {1953}, pages = {300-312}, } @book{Churchland2002-CHUBSI, author = {Patricia S. Churchland}, title = {Brain-Wise: Studies in Neurophilosophy}, publisher = {MIT Press}, year = {2002}, } @article{Churchland1990-CHUINR, volume = {323}, author = {Patricia S. Churchland}, title = {Is neuroscience relevant to philosophy?}, journal = {Canadian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {1990}, pages = {323-341}, } @article{Churchland1988-CHURTR, volume = {3}, number = {July}, author = {Patricia S. Churchland}, title = {Replies to reviews of \_Psychology's Place in the Science of the Mind/Brain\_}, journal = {Biology and Philosophy}, year = {1988}, pages = {393-402}, } @article{Churchland1988-CHUR, volume = {3}, number = {3}, author = {Patricia S. Churchland}, title = {Replies}, journal = {Biology and Philosophy}, year = {1988}, } @article{Churchland1987-CHUEIT, volume = {84}, number = {October}, author = {Patricia S. Churchland}, title = {Epistemology in the age of neuroscience}, journal = {Journal of Philosophy}, year = {1987}, pages = {546-53}, } @book{Churchland1986-CHUNTA, author = {Patricia S. Churchland}, title = {Neurophilosophy: Toward A Unified Science of the Mind-Brain}, publisher = {MIT Press}, year = {1986}, } @article{Churchland1986-CHURTC, volume = {29}, number = {June}, author = {Patricia S. Churchland}, title = {Replies to comments to symposium on Patricia Smith Churchland's neurophilosophy}, journal = {Inquiry}, year = {1986}, pages = {241-272}, } @article{Churchland1980-CHUAPO, volume = {77}, number = {April}, author = {Patricia S. Churchland}, title = {A perspective on mind-brain research}, journal = {Journal of Philosophy}, year = {1980}, pages = {185-207}, } @unpublished{ChurchlandManuscript-CHUTIO, author = {Patricia Smith Churchland}, abstract = {Philosophy, in its traditional guise, addresses questions where experimental science has not yet nailed down plausible explanatory theories. Thus, the ancient Greeks pondered the nature of life, the sun, and tides, but also how we learn and make decisions. The history of science can be seen as a gradual process whereby speculative philosophy cedes intellectual space to increasingly wellgrounded experimental disciplines---{}first astronomy, but followed by physics, chemistry, geology, biology, archaeology, and more recently, ethology, psychology, and neuroscience. Science now encompasses plausible theories in many domains, including large-scale theories about the cosmos, life, matter, and energy. The mind\textquoteright{}s turn has now come. The classical \textquoteleft\textquoteleft{}mind\textquoteright\textquoteright questions center on free will, the self, consciousness, how thoughts can have meaning and \textquoteleft\textquoteleft{}aboutness,\textquoteright\textquoteright and how we learn and use knowledge. All these matters interlace with questions about morality: where values come from, the roles of reason and emotion in choice, and the wherefore of responsibility and punishment. The vintage mind/body problem is a legacy of Descartes: if the mind is a completely nonphysical substance, as he thought, how can it interact causally with the physical brain? Since the weight of evidence indicates that mental processes actually are processes of the brain, Descartes\textquoteright problem has disappeared. The classical mind/ body problem has been replaced with a range of questions: what brain mechanisms explain learning, decision making, self-deception, and so on. The replacement for \textquoteleft\textquoteleft{}the mind-body problem\textquoteright\textquoteright is not a single problem; it is the vast research program of cognitive neuroscience. The dominant methodology of philosophy of mind and morals in the twentieth..}, title = {The impact of neuroscience on philosophy}, } @book{Churchland2007-CHUNAW, author = {Paul M. Churchland}, abstract = {In this collection of essays, Paul Churchland explores the unfolding impact of the several empirical sciences of the mind, especially cognitive neurobiology and computational neuroscience on a variety of traditional issues central to the discipline of philosophy. Representing Churchland's most recent research, they continue his research program, launched over thirty years ago, and which has evolved into the field of neurophilosophy}, title = {Neurophilosophy at Work}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {2007}, } @article{Churchland2006-CHUITB, volume = {25}, number = {1-2}, author = {Paul M. Churchland}, abstract = {The maturation of the cognitive neurosciences will throw light on many central philosophical issues. Among them: semantic theory, perception, learning, social and moral knowledge, and practical reasoning and decision making. As contemporary medicine cannot do without the achievements of modern biology, philosophy would be pitiful if it disregarded the achievements of brain research}, title = {Into the brain: Where philosophy should go from here}, journal = {Topoi}, year = {2006}, pages = {29-32}, } @article{Churchland2005-CHUCCS, volume = {18}, number = {5}, author = {Paul M. Churchland}, abstract = {The Hurvich-Jameson (H-J) opponent-process network offers a familiar account of the empirical structure of the phenomenological color space for humans, an account with a number of predictive and explanatory virtues. Its successes form the bulk of the existing reasons for suggesting a strict identity between our various color sensations on the one hand, and our various coding vectors across the color-opponent neurons in our primary visual pathways on the other. But anti-reductionists standardly complain that the systematic parallels discovered by the H-J network are just empirical correspondences, constructed post facto, with no predictive or explanatory purchase on the intrinsic characters of qualia proper. The present paper disputes that complaint, by illustrating that the H-J model yields some novel and unappreciated predictions, and some novel and unappreciated explanations, concerning the qualitative characters of a considerable variety of color sensations possible for human experience, color sensations that normal people have almost certainly never had before, color sensations whose accurate descriptions in ordinary language appear semantically ill-formed or even self-contradictory. Specifically, these "impossible" color sensations are activation-vectors (across our opponent-process neurons) that lie inside the space of neuronally possible activation-vectors, but outside the central 'color spindle' that confines the familiar range of sensations for possible objective colors. These extra-spindle chimerical-color sensations correspond to no reflective color that you will ever see objectively displayed on a physical object. But the H-J model both predicts their existence and explains their highly anomalous qualitative characters in some detail. It also suggests how to produce these rogue sensations by a simple procedure made available in the latter half of this paper. The relevant color plates will allow you to savor these sensations for yourself}, title = {Chimerical colors: Some phenomenological predictions from cognitive neuroscience}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, year = {2005}, pages = {527-560}, } @book{Churchland1998-CHUTDP, author = {Paul M. Churchland}, title = {The Digital Phoenix}, publisher = {Cambridge: Blackwell}, year = {1998}, } @incollection{Churchland1998-CHUTNR, author = {Paul M. Churchland}, booktitle = {The Digital Phoenix}, title = {The neural representation of the social world}, publisher = {Cambridge: Blackwell}, year = {1998}, } @book{Churchland1989-CHUANP, author = {Paul M. Churchland}, abstract = {A Neurocomputationial Perspective illustrates the fertility of the concepts and data drawn from the study of the brain and of artificial networks that model the...}, title = {A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science}, publisher = {MIT Press}, year = {1989}, } phdthesis{Collins2009-COLTNA, author = {Mike Collins}, abstract = {I defend a theory of mental representation that satisfies naturalistic constraints. Briefly, we begin by distinguishing (i) what makes something a representation from (ii) given that a thing is a representation, what determines what it represents. Representations are states of biological organisms, so we should expect a unified theoretical framework for explaining both what it is to be a representation as well as what it is to be a heart or a kidney. I follow Millikan in explaining (i) in terms of teleofunction, explicated in terms of natural selection. To explain (ii), we begin by recognizing that representational states do not have content, that is, they are neither true nor false except insofar as they both \textquotedblleft{}point to\textquotedblright or \textquotedblleft{}refer\textquotedblright to something, as well as \textquotedblleft{}say\textquotedblright something regarding whatever it is they are about. To distinguish veridical from false representations, there must be a way for these separate aspects to come apart; hence, we explain (ii) by providing independent theories of what I call f-reference and f-predication (the \textquoteleft{}f\textquoteright simply connotes \textquoteleft{}fundamental\textquoteright, to distinguish these things from their natural language counterparts). Causal theories of representation typically founder on error, or on what Fodor has called the disjunction problem. Resemblance or isomorphism theories typically founder on what I\textquoteright{}ve called the non-uniqueness problem, which is that isomorphisms and resemblance are practically unconstrained and so representational content cannot be uniquely determined. These traditional problems provide the motivation for my theory, the structural preservation theory, as follows. F-reference, like reference, is a specific, asymmetric relation, as is causation. F-predication, like predication, is a non-specific relation, as predicates typically apply to many things, just as many relational systems can be isomorphic to any given relational system. Putting these observations together, a promising strategy is to explain f-reference via causal history and f-predication via something like isomorphism between relational systems. This dissertation should be conceptualized as having three parts. After motivating and characterizing the problem in chapter 1, the first part is the negative project, where I review and critique Dretske\textquoteright{}s, Fodor\textquoteright{}s, and Millikan\textquoteright{}s theories in chapters 2-4. Second, I construct my theory about the nature of representation in chapter 5 and defend it from objections in chapter 6. In chapters 7-8, which constitute the third and final part, I address the question of how representation is implemented in biological systems. In chapter 7 I argue that single-cell intracortical recordings taken from awake Macaque monkeys performing a cognitive task provide empirical evidence for structural preservation theory, and in chapter 8 I use the empirical results to illustrate, clarify, and refine the theory.}, title = {The Nature and Implementation of Representation in Biological Systems}, school = {City University of New York}, year = {2009}, } @incollection{Fingelkurts2009-FINPAO, volume = {5}, number = {1}, author = {Andrew A. Fingelkurts and Alexander A. Fingelkurts and Carlos F. H. Neves}, booktitle = {Journal of New Mathematics and Natural Computing. Special Issue on Neurodynamic Correlates of Higher Cognition and Consciousness: Theoretical and Experimental Approaches - in Honor of Walter J Freeman's 80th Birthday}, abstract = {In our contribution we will observe phenomenal architecture of a mind and operational architectonics of the brain and will show their intimate connectedness within a single integrated metastable continuum. The notion of operation of different complexity is the fundamental and central one in bridging the gap between brain and mind: it is precisely by means of this notion that it is possible to identify what at the same time belongs to the phenomenal conscious level and to the neurophysiological level of brain activity organization, and what mediates between them. Implications for linguistic semantics, self-organized distributed computing algorithms, artificial machine consciousness, and diagnosis of dynamic brain diseases will be discussed briefly.}, title = {Phenomenological architecture of a mind and Operational Architectonics of the brain: the unified metastable continuum}, publisher = {World Scientific}, year = {2009}, pages = {221-244}, } @article{Gillett1991-GILTNO, volume = {66}, number = {April}, author = {Grant R. Gillett}, title = {The neurophilosophy of pain}, journal = {Philosophy}, year = {1991}, pages = {191-206}, } @incollection{Giordano2010-GIOFAN, author = {J. J. Giordano}, booktitle = {Scientific and Philosophical Perspectives in Neuroethics}, title = {From a neurophilosophy of pain to a neuroethics of pain care}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {2010}, } @book{Hahn1999-HAHPOT, author = {Martin Hahn and S.C. Stoness}, title = {Proceedings of the 21st Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society}, publisher = {Lawrence Erlbaum}, year = {1999}, } @article{Hatfield1988-HATNMP, volume = {5}, author = {Gary Hatfield}, title = {Neurophilosophy meets psychology: Reduction, autonomy, and empirical constraints}, journal = {Cognitive Neuropsychology}, year = {1988}, pages = {723-46}, } @book{Kane2002-KANTOH, author = {Robert H. Kane}, abstract = {This comprehensive reference provides an exhaustive guide to current scholarship on the perennial problem of Free Will--perhaps the most hotly and voluminously debated of all philosophical problems. While reference is made throughout to the contributions of major thinkers of the past, the emphasis is on recent research. The essays, most of which are previously unpublished, combine the work of established scholars with younger thinkers who are beginning to make significant contributions. Taken as a whole, the Handbook provides an engaging and accessible roadmap to the state of the art thinking on this enduring topic}, title = {The Oxford Handbook of Free Will}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2002}, } @book{Keeley2005-KEEPC-2, author = {Brian L. Keeley}, abstract = {This collection offers an introduction to Churchland's work, as well as a critique of some of his most famous philosophical positions.}, title = {Paul Churchland}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {2005}, } @article{Klagge1989-KLAWAN, volume = {78}, number = {March}, author = {James C. Klagge}, title = {Wittgenstein and neuroscience}, journal = {Synthese}, year = {1989}, pages = {319-43}, } @book{Kozma2009-KOZJON, author = {Robert Kozma and John Caulfield}, title = {Journal of New Mathematics and Natural Computing. Special Issue on Neurodynamic Correlates of Higher Cognition and Consciousness: Theoretical and Experimental Approaches - in Honor of Walter J Freeman's 80th Birthday}, publisher = {World Scientific}, year = {2009}, } @article{Levy2006-LEVCSC, volume = {19}, number = {5}, author = {Neil Levy}, abstract = {Recent findings in neuroscience, evolutionary biology and psychology seem to threaten the existence or the objectivity of morality. Moral theory and practice is founded, ultimately, upon moral intuition, but these empirical findings seem to show that our intuitions are responses to nonmoral features of the world, not to moral properties. They therefore might be taken to show that our moral intuitions are systematically unreliable. I examine three cognitive scientific challenges to morality, and suggest possible lines of reply to them. I divide these replies into two groups: we might confront the threat, showing that it does not have the claimed implications for morality; or we might bite the bullet, accepting that the claims have moral implications, but incorporating these claims into morality. I suggest that unless we are able to bite the bullet, when confronted by cognitive scientific challenges, there is a real possibility that morality will be threatened. This fact gives us a weighty reason to adopt a metaethics that makes it relatively easy to bite cognitive scientific bullets. Moral constructivism, in one of its many forms, makes these bullets more palatable; therefore, the cognitive scientific challenges provide us with an additional reason to adopt a constructivist metaethics.}, title = {Cognitive scientific challenges to morality}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, year = {2006}, pages = {567 -- 587}, } @unpublished{LloydManuscript-LLOANJ, author = {Dan Lloyd}, abstract = {It wasn't that hard to be a polymath in ancient Greece. All it meant, when you come down to it, was that you could write a poem, speak classical Greek (not very difficult in the circumstances) and understand the mechanics of the Archimedes' screw. Today it's not so easy. Arts and sciences have, for the most part, diverged to an alarming extent, with those on the arts side likely to be as hard-pressed to explain the technologies that increasingly govern our world as a member of a "lost" tribe in the Brazilian rainforest.}, title = {A neuro-noir journey to the centre of the mind}, } @incollection{Lowenhard1989-LOWTMP, author = {Percy Lowenhard}, booktitle = {The Life Sciences: Some Problems and Perspectives}, title = {The mind-body problem: Some neurobiological reflections in reductionism and systems theory}, publisher = {Norwell: Kluwer}, year = {1989}, } @book{Lowenhard1989-LOWTLS, author = {Percy Lowenhard}, title = {The Life Sciences: Some Problems and Perspectives}, publisher = {Norwell: Kluwer}, year = {1989}, } @article{Lutz2002-LUTTAN, volume = {1}, number = {2}, author = {Antoine Lutz}, abstract = {This paper analyzes an explicit instantiation of the program of neurophenomenology in a neuroscientific protocol. Neurophenomenology takes seriously the importance of linking the scientific study of consciousness to the careful examination of experience with a specific first-person methodology. My first claim is that such strategy is a fruitful heuristic because it produces new data and illuminates their relation to subjective experience. My second claim is that the approach could open the door to a natural account of the structure of human experience as it is mobilized in itself in such methodology. In this view, generative passages define the type of circulation which explicitly roots the active and disciplined insight the subject has about his/her experience in a biological emergent process.}, title = {Toward a neurophenomenology as an account of generative passages: A first empirical case study}, journal = {Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences}, year = {2002}, pages = {133-67}, } @article{Lutz2003-LUTN, volume = {10}, number = {9-10}, author = {Antoine Lutz and Evan Thompson}, abstract = {\_sciousness called \textquoteleft{}neurophenomenology\textquoteright (Varela 1996) and illustrates it with a\_ \_recent pilot study (Lutz et al., 2002). At a theoretical level, neurophenomenology\_ \_pursues an embodied and large-scale dynamical approach to the\_ \_neurophysiology of consciousness (Varela 1995; Thompson and Varela 2001;\_ \_Varela and Thompson 2003). At a methodological level, the neurophenomeno-\_ \_logical strategy is to make rigorous and extensive use of first-person data about\_ \_subjective experience as a heuristic to describe and quantify the large-scale\_ \_neurodynamics of consciousness (Lutz 2002). The paper foocuses on\_ \_neurophenomenology in relation to three challenging methodological issues\_ \_about incorporating first-person data into cognitive neuroscience: (i) first-person\_ \_reports can be biased or inaccurate; (ii) the process of generating first-person\_ \_reports about an experience can modify that experience; and (iii) there is an \textquoteleft{}ex-\_ \_planatory gap\textquoteright in our understanding of how to relate first-person, phenomeno-\_ \_logical data to third-person, biobehavioural data.\_.}, title = {Neurophenomenology}, journal = {Journal of Consciousness Studies}, year = {2003}, pages = {31-52}, } @article{Madell1986-MADNAP, volume = {29}, number = {June}, author = {Geoffrey C. Madell}, title = {Neurophilosophy: A principled skeptic's response}, journal = {Inquiry}, year = {1986}, pages = {153-168}, } @unpublished{MandikManuscript-MANFSC-2, author = {Pete Mandik}, title = {Fine-grained supervenience, cognitive neuroscience, and the future of functionalism}, } @incollection{Mandik2009-MANTNO-2, author = {Pete Mandik}, booktitle = {Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience}, abstract = {The so-called subjectivity of conscious experience is central to much recent work in the philosophy of mind. Subjectivity is the alleged property of consciousness whereby one can know what it is like to have certain conscious states only if one has undergone such states oneself. I review neurophilosophical work on consciousness and concepts pertinent to this claim and argue that subjectivity eliminativism is at least as well supported, if not more supported, than subjectivity reductionism.}, title = {The neurophilosophy of subjectivity}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2009}, } @incollection{Mandik2007-MANTNO, author = {Pete Mandik}, booktitle = {The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness}, abstract = {The neurophilosophy of consciousness brings neuroscience to bear on philosophical issues concerning phenomenal consciousness, especially issues concerning what makes mental states conscious, what it is that we are conscious of, and the nature of the phenomenal character of conscious states. Here attention is given largely to phenomenal consciousness as it arises in vision. The relevant neuroscience concerns not only neurophysiological and neuroanatomical data, but also computational models of neural networks. The neurophilosophical theories that bring such data to bear on the core philosophical issues of phenomenal conscious construe consciousness largely in terms of representations in neural networks associated with certain processes of attention and memory.}, title = {The neurophilosophy of consciousness}, publisher = {Blackwell}, year = {2007}, } @incollection{Mandik2006-MANTIO, author = {Pete Mandik}, booktitle = {Paul Churchland}, abstract = {Is the Introspection Thesis true? It certainly isn\textquoteright{}t obvious. Introspection is the faculty by which each of us has access to his or her own mental states. Even if we were to suppose that mental states are identical to brain states, it doesn\textquoteright{}t follow immediately from this supposition that we can introspect our mental states as brain states. This point is analogous to the following. It doesn\textquoteright{}t follow immediately from the mere fact that some distant object is identical to a horse that we can perceive it as a horse. Further, it isn\textquoteright{}t obvious that any amount of education would suffice to make some distant speck on the horizon seem like a horse. It may very well be the case that no matter how well we know that some distant speck is a horse; as long as we are sufficiently distant from it we will only be able to see it as a speck. Analogously then, it may very well be the case that no matter how well we know that our mental states are brain states, we will only be able to introspect them as irreducibly mental}, title = {The introspectibility of brain states as such}, publisher = {Cambridge: Cambridge University Press}, year = {2006}, } @incollection{Mandik2002-MANSN, author = {Pete Mandik}, booktitle = {Cyberphilosophy: The Intersection of Philosophy and Computing}, abstract = {Computation and philosophy intersect three times in this essay. Computation is considered as an object, as a method, and as a model used in a certain line of philosophical inquiry concerning the relation of mind to matter. As object, the question considered is whether computation and related notions of mental representation constitute the best ways to conceive of how physical systems give rise to mental properties. As method and model, the computational techniques of artificial life and embodied evolutionary connectionism are used to conduct prosthetically enhanced thought experiments concerning the evolvability of mental representations. Central to this essay is a discussion of the computer simulation and evolution of three-dimensional synthetic animals with neural network controllers. The minimally cognitive behavior of finding food by exhibit- ing positive chemotaxis is simulated with swimming and walking creatures. These simulations form the basis of a discussion of the evolutionary and neurocomputa- tional bases of the incremental emergence of more complex forms of cognition. Other related work has been used to attack computational and representational theories of cognition. In contrast, I argue that the proper understanding of the evolutionary emergence of minimally cognitive behaviors is computational and representational through and through.}, title = {Synthetic neuroethology}, publisher = {Blackwell Pub.}, year = {2002}, } @unpublished{Minsky2005-MINIGR, author = {Marvin L. Minsky}, abstract = {Some computer programs are expert at some games. Other programs can recognize some words. Yet other programs are highly competent at solving certain technical problems. However, each of those programs is specialized, and no existing program today shows the common sense or resourcefulness of a typical two-year-old child---{}and certainly, no program can yet understand a typical sentence from a child\textquoteright{}s first-grade storybook. Nor can any program today can look around a room and then identify the things that meet its eyes}, title = {Interior grounding, reflection, and self-consciousness}, year = {2005}, } @article{Morin2003-MORTSA, volume = {1}, author = {Alain Morin}, abstract = {Where is the self located in the brain? This is a question that has intrigued philosophers and scientists for quite some time. Four centuries ago, the French philosopher Ren\'e Descartes thought that the self resided in the pineal gland, a small structure centrally positioned in the lower brain}, title = {The self and its brain: A critical examination of \_The Face in the Mirror\_}, journal = {Science and Consciousness Review}, year = {2003}, } @article{Myin2000-MYIDS, author = {Erik Myin}, abstract = {One can distinguish the descriptive view of self-consciousness from the philosophical framework of the theory of nonconceptual content. Propositional attitudes can be ascribed without commitment to the existence of internal states that bear different species of content. The descriptive view can be coupled to this alternative view}, title = {Direct self-consciousness}, journal = {Psycoloquy}, year = {2000}, } @article{Northoff2004-NORWIN, volume = {35}, number = {1}, author = {Georg Northoff}, abstract = {The term ``neurophilosophy'' is often used either implicitly or explicitly for characterizing the investigation of philosophical theories in relation to neuroscientific hypotheses. The exact methodological principles and systematic rules for a linkage between philosophical theories and neuroscientific hypothesis, however, remain to be clarified. The present contribution focuses on these principles, as well as on the relation between ontology and epistemology and the characterization of hypothesis in neurophilosophy. Principles of transdisciplinary methodology include the `principle of asymmetry', the `principle of bi-directionality' and the `principle of transdisciplinary circularity'. The `principle of asymmetry' points to an asymmetric relationship between logical and natural conditions. The `principle of bi-directionality' claims for the necessity of bi-directional linkage between natural and logical conditions. The `principle of transdisciplinary circularity' describes systematic rules for mutual comparison and cross-conditional exchange between philosophical theory and neuroscientific hypotheses. The relation between ontology and epistemology no longer is determined by ontological presuppositions i.e. ``ontological primacy''. Instead, there is correspondence between different `epistemological capacities' and different kinds of ontology which consecutively results in ``epistemic primacy'' and ``ontological pluralism''. The present contribution concludes by rejecting some so-called `standard-arguments' including the `argument of circularity', the `argument of categorical fallacy', the `argument of validity' and the `argument of necessity'.}, title = {What is neurophilosophy? A methodological account}, journal = {Journal for General Philosophy of Science}, year = {2004}, } @article{Northoff2002-NORNNA, volume = {25}, number = {5}, author = {Georg Northoff}, abstract = {The excellent and highly interesting commentaries address the following concerns: (1) neuroanatomy and neurophysiology of catatonia; (2) cognitive-motor deficits in catatonia; (3) conceptual issues; (4) general methodology in neuropsychiatric research; and (5) neurophilosophical implications. The specific problems, issues, and aspects raised by the different commentators are grouped under these categories in Table R1 presented below. These five areas of concern are then discussed in the order listed in the five sections of the Response.}, title = {Neurophysiology, neuropsychiatry and neurophilosophy of catatonia}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2002}, pages = {592-599}, } @incollection{OKeefe1993-OKEKAT, author = {John O'Keefe}, booktitle = {Spatial Representation}, title = {Kant and the sea-horse: An essay in the neurophilosophy of space}, publisher = {Cambridge: Blackwell}, year = {1993}, } @article{Roskies2002-ROSNFT, volume = {35}, number = {1}, author = {Adina L. Roskies}, abstract = {ics. Each of these can be pursued independently to a large extent, but perhaps most intriguing is to contem- plate how progress in each will affect the other. The past several months have seen heightened interest $<$blockquote$>$ \_$<$b$>$The Ethics of Neuroscience$<$/b$>$\_ $<$/blockquote$>$ in the intersection of ethics and neuroscience. In the The ethics of neuroscience can be roughly subdivided popular press, the topic grabbed headlines in a May}, title = {Neuroethics for the new millennium}, journal = {Neuron}, year = {2002}, pages = {21-23}, } @article{Saidel1992-SAIWPN, volume = {1}, author = {Eric Saidel}, title = {What price neurophilosophy?}, journal = {Philosophy of Science Association}, year = {1992}, pages = {461-68}, } @article{Sereno1986-SERAPF, volume = {29}, number = {June}, author = {Martin Sereno}, title = {A program for the neurobiology of mind}, journal = {Inquiry}, year = {1986}, pages = {217-240}, } @article{Smith1986-SMIBP, volume = {29}, number = {June}, author = {A. Smith}, title = {Brain-mind philosophy}, journal = {Inquiry}, year = {1986}, pages = {203-15}, } @incollection{Walter2002-WALNOF-2, author = {Henrik Walter}, booktitle = {The Oxford Handbook on Free Will}, title = {Neurophilosophy of free will}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2002}, } @book{Walter2001-WALNOF, author = {Henrik Walter}, title = {Neurophilosophy of Free Will}, publisher = {MIT Press}, year = {2001}, } @article{Wilkes1986-WILNPN, volume = {29}, number = {June}, author = {Kathleen V. Wilkes}, title = {Nemo psychologus nisi physiologus}, journal = {Inquiry}, year = {1986}, pages = {168-185}, } @book{Young1951-YOUDAC, author = {J. Z. Young}, title = {Doubt And Certainty In Science}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, year = {1951}, }