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  1. Mafizuddin Ahmed (1989). Bertrand Russell's Neutral Monism. Mittal Publications.
  2. Harald Atmanspacher (2012). Dual-Aspect Monism à la Pauli and Jung. Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (9-10):9-10.
    Dual-aspect monism and neutral monism offer interesting alternatives to mainstream positions concerning the mind-matter problem. Both assume a domain underlying the mind-matter distinction, but they also differ in definitive ways. In the twentieth century, variants of both positions have been advanced by a number of protagonists. One of these variants, the dual-aspect monism due toWolfgang Pauli and Carl Gustav Jung, will be described and commented on in detail. As a unique feature in the Pauli-Jung conception, the duality of mental and (...)
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  3. Erik C. Banks (2014). The Realistic Empiricism of Mach, James, and Russell. Cambridge University Press.
    The book revives the neutral monism of Mach, James, and Russell and applies the updated view to the problem of redefining physicalism, explaining the origins of sensation, and the problem of deriving extended physical objects and systems from an ontology of events.
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  4. Erik C. Banks (2012). Sympathy for the Devil: Reconsidering Ernst Mach's Empiricism. [REVIEW] Metascience 21 (2):321-330.
    A 2012 survey article for Metascience which explains Mach's realistic brand of empiricism, contrasting it with the common phenomenalist reading of Mach by John Blackmore in two recent books.
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  5. Erik C. Banks (2010). Neutral Monism Reconsidered. Philosophical Psychology 23 (2):173-187.
    Neutral monism is a position in metaphysics defended by Mach, James, and Russell in the early twentieth century. It holds that minds and physical objects are essentially two different orderings of the same underlying neutral elements of nature. This paper sets out some of the central concepts, theses and the historical background of ideas that inform this doctrine of elements. The discussion begins with the classic neutral monism of Mach, James, and Russell in the first part of the paper, then (...)
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  6. Erik C. Banks (2003). Ernst Mach's World Elements. Kluwer.
    A consideration of Mach's elements, his philosophy of neutral monism, and philosophy of physics, especially space and time, much of it based on unpublished writings from the Nachlass and other original sources. The historical connection between Mach and logical positivism is shown to be superficial at best, and Mach's elements are shown to be mind independent natural qualities (world-elements) with dynamic force, not limited to human sensations.
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  7. Manjulekha Bhattacharya (1972). Ernst Mach: Neutral Monism. Studi Internazionali Di Filosofia 4:145-182.
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  8. Boyd H. Bode (1905). The Concept of Pure Experience. Philosophical Review 14 (6):684-695.
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  9. Boyd H. Bode (1905). 'Pure Experience' and the External World. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 2 (5):128-133.
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  10. Evander Bradley McGilvary (1911). Experience as Pure and Consciousness as Meaning. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 8 (19):511-525.
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  11. Evander Bradley McGilvary (1907). Pure Experience and Reality: A Reassertion. Philosophical Review 16 (4):422-424.
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  12. Godehard Brüntrup (1998). Is Psycho-Physical Emergentism Committed to Dualism? The Causal Efficacy of Emergent Mental Properties. Erkenntnis 3 (2):133-151.
  13. Sam Coleman (2013). Consciousness and The Prospects of Physicalism. By Derk Pereboom. (New York: Oxford UP, 2011. Pp. 208. Price £40.00 Hb.). [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 63 (253):824-827.
  14. Sam Coleman (2013). The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism, Micro-Subjects, and Emergence. Erkenntnis (1):1-26.
    Taking their motivation from the perceived failure of the reductive physicalist project concerning consciousness, panpsychists ascribe subjectivity to fundamental material entities in order to account for macro-consciousness. But there exists an unresolved tension within the mainstream panpsychist position, the seriousness of which has yet to be appreciated. I capture this tension as a dilemma, and offer advice to panpsychists on how to resolve it. The dilemma is as follows: Panpsychists take the micro-material realm to feature phenomenal properties, plus micro-subjects to (...)
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  15. Sam Coleman (2012). Review of 'The Mental as Fundamental' Ed. Michael Blamauer. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
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  16. W. E. Cooper (1990). William James's Theory of Mind. Journal of the History of Philosophy (October) 571 (October):571-593.
    Neutral monist, panpsychist, naturalist, and phenomenological interpretations of James's theory of mind are canvassed. Culling the true tenets from each, I make a case for a reconciling view on the basis of a distinction between mental and proto-mental properties. The resulting interpretation is compared to two forms of panpsychism identified by T Nagel in his essay of that name.
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  17. John E. Drabinski (1993). Radical Empiricism and Phenomenology: Philosophy and the Pure Stuff of Experience. Journal of Speculative Philosophy 7 (3):226-242.
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  18. Philip Goff (forthcoming). Against Constitutive Russellian Monism. In Yujin Nagasawa (ed.), Consciousness and the Physical World. Oxford University Press.
  19. Philip Goff (forthcoming). The Phenomenal Bonding Solution to the Combination Problem. In L. Jaskolla (ed.), Panpsychism. Oxford University Press.
  20. Andy Hamilton (1990). Ernst Mach and the Elimination of Subjectivity. Ratio 3 (2):117-135.
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  21. Emmett Holman (2008). Panpsychism, Physicalism, Neutral Monism and the Russellian Theory of Mind. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (5):48-67.
    As some see it, an impasse has been reached on the mind- body problem between mainstream physicalism and mainstream dualism. So lately another view has been gaining popularity, a view that might be called the 'Russellian theory of mind' (RTM) since it is inspired by some ideas once put forth by Bertrand Russell. Most versions of RTM are panpsychist, but there is at least one version that rejects panpsychism and styles itself as physicalism, and neutral monism is also a possibility. (...)
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  22. William James (1905). How Two Minds Can Know One Thing. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 2 (7):176-181.
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  23. William James (1904). A World of Pure Experience. Journal of Philosophy Psychology and Scientific Methods 1 (21):533-543.
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  24. William James (1904). A World of Pure Experience. II. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 1 (21):561-570.
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  25. William James & Ralph Barton Perry (eds.) (1996). Essays in Radical Empiricism. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
    William James believed that events could not be catalogued simply as a series of facts, but had to be considered through the lens of experience.
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  26. Amy Kind (forthcoming). Pessimism About Russellian Monism. In Torin Alter & Yujin Nagasawa (eds.), Consciousness in the Physical World: Essays on Russellian Monism.
    From the perspective of many philosophers of mind in these early years of the 21st Century, the debate between dualism and physicalism has seemed to have stalled, if not to have come to a complete standstill. There seems to be no way to settle the basic clash of intuitions that underlies it. Recently however, a growing number of proponents of Russellian monism have suggested that their view promises to show us a new way forward. Insofar as Russellian monism might allow (...)
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  27. Michael Lockwood (1981). What Was Russell's Neutral Monism? Midwest Studes in Philosophy 6 (1):143-58.
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  28. Victor Lowe (ed.) (1942). In Commemoration Of William James: 1842-1942. Columbia University Press.
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  29. Victor Lowe (1942). William James' Pluralistic Metaphysics of Experience. In , In Commemoration Of William James: 1842-1942. Columbia University Press.
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  30. Mark S. Moller (2001). James, Perception and the Miller-Bode Objections. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 37 (4):609-626.
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  31. Gregory Nixon (2009). Skrbina's *Mind That Abides: Panpsychism in the New Millennium*. [REVIEW] Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (9):116-121.
    Is the great god Pan reborn? For a while there, it seemed every intellectual movement began with the prefix ‘post’, implying non-totality, but now there are indications that ‘pan’ (all) is returning to provide another answer to one of the most basic of ontological questions: What is the relationship of mind to matter? In this important book with 17 different authors, panpsychism is given its due.
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  32. Ingmar Persson (2006). Consciousness as Existence as a Form of Neutral Monism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (s 7-8):128-146.
    I shall here raise and attempt to answer -- given the constraints of space, rather dogmatically -- some fundamental questions as regards the fertile and far-reaching doctrine Ted Honderich has in the past called Consciousness as Existence.
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  33. Ingmar Persson (1985). The Primacy of Perception: Towards a Neutral Monism. C.W.K. Gleerup.
  34. Charlene H. Seigfried (1992). William James's Concrete Analysis of Experience. The Monist 75 (4):538-550.
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  35. Roy Wood Sellars (1907). The Nature of Experience. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 4 (1):14-18.
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  36. Leopold Stubenberg, Neutral Monism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  37. Eugene Taylor & Robert H. Wozniak (1996). Pure Experience: The Response to William James. In E. I. Taylor & R. H. Wozniak (eds.), Pure Experience: The Response to William James. Bristol: Thoemmes Press.
    The radical empiricism of William James was first formally presented in his seminal papers of 1904, 'Does Consciousness Exist?' and 'A World of Pure Experience'. In James's view, pure experience was to serve as the source for psychology's primary data and radical empiricism was to launch an effective critique of experimentalism in psychology, a critique from which the problem of experimentalism within science could be addressed more broadly. This collection of papers presents James's formal statements on radical empiricism and a (...)
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  38. R. E. Tully (1993). Three Studies of Russell's Neutral Monism. Russell 13 (1):5-35.
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  39. Robert Tully (1988). Russell's Neutral Monism. Russell 8:209-224.
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  40. Peter Unger (1999). The Mystery of the Physical and the Matter of Qualities: A Paper for Professor Shaffer. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23 (1):75-99.
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  41. Peter K. Unger (1998). The Mystery of the Physical and the Matter of Qualities. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 22 (1):75–99.
    For some fifty years now, nearly all work in mainstream analytic philosophy has made no serious attempt to understand the _nature of_ _physical reality,_ even though most analytic philosophers take this to be all of reality, or nearly all. While we've worried much about the nature of our own experiences and thoughts and languages, we've worried little about the nature of the vast physical world that, as we ourselves believe, has them all as only a small part.
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  42. Max Velmans (2007). Reflexive Monism. [Journal (Paginated)] (in Press) 15 (2):5-50.
    Reflexive monism is, in essence, an ancient view of how consciousness relates to the material world that has, in recent decades, been resurrected in modern form. In this paper I discuss how some of its basic features differ from both dualism and variants of physicalist and functionalist reductionism, focusing on those aspects of the theory that challenge deeply rooted presuppositions in current Western thought. I pay particular attention to the ontological status and seeming “out-thereness” of the phenomenal world and to (...)
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  43. Joanne A. Wood (1994). Lighthouse Bodies: The Neutral Monism of Virginia Woolf and Bertrand Russell. Journal of the History of Ideas 55 (3):483-502.
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