About this topic
Summary Please see category Agent-relative Value.
Key works Please see category Agent-relative Value.
Introductions Please see category Agent-relative Value.
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  1. John Broome (1995). Skorupski on Agent-Neutrality. Utilitas 7 (2):315.
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  2. Nicolas Delon (2014). Moral Status, Final Value, and Extrinsic Properties. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (3pt3):371-379.
    Starting from a distinction between intrinsic and final value, I explore the implications of the supervenience of final value on extrinsic properties regarding moral status. I make a case for ‘extrinsic moral status’ based on ‘extrinsic final value’. I show that the assumption of ‘moral individualism’, that moral status supervenes merely on intrinsic properties, is misguided, and results from a conflation of intrinsic with final value. I argue that at least one extrinsic property, namely vulnerability, can be the basis of (...)
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  3. Guy Fletcher (2012). The Locative Analysis of Good For Formulated and Defended. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (JESP) 6 (1).
    THE STRUCTURE OF THIS PAPER IS AS FOLLOWS. I begin §1 by dealing with preliminary issues such as the different relations expressed by the “good for” locution. I then (§2) outline the Locative Analysis of good for and explain its main elements before moving on to (§3) outlining and discussing the positive features of the view. In the subsequent sections I show how the Locative Analysis can respond to objections from, or inspired by, Sumner (§4-5), Regan (§6), and Schroeder and (...)
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  4. Johan E. Gustafsson (2015). Still Not ‘Good’ in Terms of ‘Better’. Noûs 50 (2).
    Erik Carlson puts forward a new way of defining monadic value predicates, such as ‘good’, in terms of dyadic value relations, such as ‘better’. Earlier definitions of this kind have the unwanted feature that they rule out some reasonable axiologies by conceptual fiat. Carlson claims that his definitions do not have this drawback. In this paper, I argue that they do.
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  5. Johan E. Gustafsson (2013). Neither 'Good' in Terms of 'Better' nor 'Better' in Terms of 'Good'. Noûs 48 (1):466–473.
    In this paper, I argue against defining either of ‘good’ and ‘better’ in terms of the other. According to definitions of ‘good’ in terms of ‘better’, something is good if and only if it is better than some indifference point. Against this approach, I argue that the indifference point cannot be defined in terms of ‘better’ without ruling out some reasonable axiologies. Against defining ‘better’ in terms of ‘good’, I argue that this approach either cannot allow for the incorruptibility of (...)
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  6. Hugh LaFollette (ed.) (2013). The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell.
    Unmatched in scholarship and scope, _The International Encyclopedia of Ethics_ is the definitive single-source reference work on Ethics, available both in print and online. Comprises over 700 entries, ranging from 1000 to 10,000 words in length, written by an international cast of subject experts Is arranged across 9 fully cross-referenced volumes including a comprehensive index Provides clear definitions and explanations of all areas of ethics including the topics, movements, arguments, and key figures in Normative Ethics, Metaethics, and Practical Ethics Covers (...)
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  7. Erich Hatala Matthes (2015). Impersonal Value, Universal Value, and the Scope of Cultural Heritage. Ethics 125 (4):999-1027.
    Philosophers have used the terms 'impersonal' and 'personal value' to refer to, among others things, whether something's value is universal or particular to an individual. In this paper, I propose an account of impersonal value that, I argue, better captures the intuitive distinction than potential alternatives, while providing conceptual resources for moving beyond the traditional stark dichotomy. I illustrate the practical importance of my theoretical account with reference to debate over the evaluative scope of cultural heritage.
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  8. Francesco Orsi (2013). How to Be a Friend of Absolute Goodness. Philosophia 41 (4):1237-1251.
    This paper critically examines Richard Kraut’s attack on the notion of absolute value, and lays out some of the conceptual work required to defend such a notion. The view under attack claims that absolute goodness is a property that provides a reason to value what has it. Kraut’s overall challenge is that absolute goodness cannot play this role. Kraut’s own view is that goodness-for, instead, plays the reason-providing role. My targets are Kraut’s double-counting objection, and his ethical objection against absolute (...)
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  9. Douglas W. Portmore (forthcoming). Agent-Relative Vs. Agent-Neutral. In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley Blackwell
    This is a general introduction to the agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction.
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