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  1. F. M. Akeroyd (1991). A Practical Example of Grue. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42 (4):535-539.
    This article describes a practical example of the predicate grue, examining the economic relationship between the percentage rate of unemployment and the percentage change of money wage rates known as the simple Phillips curve which exhibited regular behaviour before 1969 and erratic behaviour thereafter. It is proposed that such practical examples of grue from the real world be redescribed as regulatic. i.e. regular before time t and erratic thereafter. In the instance of a scientific model or theory being falsified it (...)
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  2. J. E. J. Altham (1968). A Note on Goodman's Paradox. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 19 (3):257.
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  3. S. F. Barker & Peter Achinstein (1960). On the New Riddle of Induction. Philosophical Review 69 (4):511-522.
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  4. Lukas Bielik (2013). Goodman's Riddle (Unsuccessfully?) Resolved: A Respond to R. Maco. Filozofia 68 (4):343-350.
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  5. Lukas Bielik (2013). On the Presentation of the Raven Paradox and the New Riddle of Induction. A Reply to Eugen Zelenak. Organon F 20 (2):251-261.
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  6. Lukas Bielik (2011). " The New Riddle of Induction" and Testing of Qualities. Filozofia 66 (8):746-754.
    The paper deals with the New Riddle of Induction set forth by N. Goodman in his Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. The problem is introduced through the definition of grue-predicate. The relation between the grue-hypothesis and empirical evidence is examined. Goodman’s underlying thesis about the neutrality of empirical evidence is undermined. The intelligibility of the idea that disjunctive properties such as Grue can be observed and seen is questioned. A solution of Goodman’s riddle is outlined by means of the definition of (...)
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  7. Elodie Boublil (2013). 8 Of the Vision and the Riddle. In Christine Daigle & Élodie Boublil (eds.), Nietzsche and Phenomenology: Power, Life, Subjectivity. Indiana University Press. 141.
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  8. F. Thomas Burke (2002). Qualities, Universals, Kinds, and the New Riddle of Induction. In F. Thomas Burke, D. Micah Hester & Robert B. Talisse (eds.), Dewey's Logical Theory: New Studies and Interpretations. Vanderbilt University Press.
    The limited aim here is to explain what John Dewey might say about the formulation of the grue example. Nelson Goodman’s problem of distinguishing good and bad inductive inferences is an important one, but the grue example misconstrues this complex problem for certain technical reasons, due to ambiguities that contemporary logical theory has not yet come to terms with. Goodman’s problem is a problem for the theory of induction and thus for logical theory in general. Behind the whole discussion of (...)
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  9. Tom Burke (2002). And the New Riddle of Induction. In F. Thomas Burke, D. Micah Hester & Robert B. Talisse (eds.), Dewey's Logical Theory: New Studies and Interpretations. Vanderbilt University Press. 225.
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  10. Timothy Chambers (1999). Is Goodman's Solution of Hume's Riddle Too Strong? Dialogos 34 (74):63-70.
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  11. D. Chart (2000). Discussion. Schulte and Goodman's Riddle. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (1):147-149.
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  12. Fabio Ciaramelli (2005). The Riddle of the Pre-Original. In Claire Elise Katz & Lara Trout (eds.), Emmanuel Levinas. Routledge. 1--67.
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  13. F. John Clenndinen (1996). Mired in Grue. Metascience 5 (1):86-94.
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  14. Ramesh M. Dave (1981). Is'akshara'an Unsolved Riddle? In Sahajānanda (ed.), New Dimensions in Vedanta Philosophy. Bochasanwasi Shri Aksharpurushottam Sanstha. 1--132.
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  15. Scott DeVito (1997). A Gruesome Problem for the Curve-Fitting Solution. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (3):391-396.
    This paper is a response to Forster and Sober's [1994] solution to the curve-fitting problem. If their solution is correct, it will provide us with a solution to the New Riddle of Induction as well as provide a basis for choosing realism over conventionalism. Examining this solution is also important as Forster and Sober incorporate it in much of their other philosophical work (see Forster [1995a, b, 1994] and Sober [1996, 1995, 1993]). I argue that Forster and Sober's solution is (...)
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  16. Crawford L. Elder (1990). Goodman's “New Riddle” — a Realist's Reprise. Philosophical Studies 59 (2):115 - 135.
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  17. Catherine Z. Elgin (ed.) (1997). Nelson Goodman's New Riddle of Induction. Garland Pub..
    A challenger of traditions and boundaries A pivotal figure in 20th-century philosophy, Nelson Goodman has made seminal contributions to metaphysics, epistemology, aesthetics, and the philosophy of language, with surprising connections that cut across traditional boundaries. In the early 1950s, Goodman, Quine, and White published a series of papers that threatened to torpedo fundamental assumptions of traditional philosophy. They advocated repudiating analyticity, necessity, and prior assumptions. Some philosophers, realizing the seismic effects repudiation would cause, argued that philosophy should retain the familiar (...)
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  18. L. S. F. (1958). The Riddle of Life. Review of Metaphysics 12 (2):321-321.
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  19. Haskell Fain (1967). The Very Thought of Grue. Philosophical Review 76 (1):61-73.
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  20. Branden Fitelson (2008). Goodman's "New Riddle". Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (6):613 - 643.
    First, a brief historical trace of the developments in confirmation theory leading up to Goodman's infamous "grue" paradox is presented. Then, Goodman's argument is analyzed from both Hempelian and Bayesian perspectives. A guiding analogy is drawn between certain arguments against classical deductive logic, and Goodman's "grue" argument against classical inductive logic. The upshot of this analogy is that the "New Riddle" is not as vexing as many commentators have claimed (especially, from a Bayesian inductive-logical point of view). Specifically, the analogy (...)
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  21. Branden Fitelson (2001). Studies in Bayesian Confirmation Theory. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, Madison
    According to Bayesian confirmation theory, evidence E (incrementally) confirms (or supports) a hypothesis H (roughly) just in case E and H are positively probabilistically correlated (under an appropriate probability function Pr). There are many logically equivalent ways of saying that E and H are correlated under Pr. Surprisingly, this leads to a plethora of non-equivalent quantitative measures of the degree to which E confirms H (under Pr). In fact, many non-equivalent Bayesian measures of the degree to which E confirms (or (...)
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  22. MR Forster (1999). Model Selection in Science: The Problem of Language Variance. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (1):83-102.
    Recent solutions to the curve-fitting problem, described in Forster and Sober ([1995]), trade off the simplicity and fit of hypotheses by defining simplicity as the paucity of adjustable parameters. Scott De Vito ([1997]) charges that these solutions are 'conventional' because he thinks that the number of adjustable parameters may change when the hypotheses are described differently. This he believes is exactly what is illustrated in Goodman's new riddle of induction, otherwise known as the grue problem. However, the 'number of adjustable (...)
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  23. Roger L. Geiger (2008). The Riddle of the Valley. Minerva 46 (1):127-132.
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  24. Nelson Goodman (2000). The New Riddle of Induction. In Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.), Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology. Oup Oxford.
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  25. I. Hacking (1993). Goodman New Riddle is Pre-Humian+ New-Riddle-of-Induction. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 47 (185):229-243.
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  26. Kevin D. Hoover (1980). Abduction and the New Riddle of Induction. The Monist 63 (3):329-341.
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  27. Rami Israel (2004). Two Interpretations of ‘Grue’– or How to Misunderstand the New Riddle of Induction. Analysis 64 (284):335–339.
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  28. Frank Jackson (1998). Mind, Method, and Conditionals: Selected Essays. Routledge.
    This collection brings together some of Frank Jackson's most influential essays on mind, action, conditionals, method in metaphysics, and ethics. These have each been revised for this edition, and are presented along with his challenge to orthodoxy on the new riddle of induction.
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  29. Frank Jackson (1975). Grue. Journal of Philosophy 72 (5):113-131.
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  30. Frank Jackson & Robert Pargetter (1980). Confirmation and the Nomological. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 10 (3):415 - 428.
    We argue that it is a mistake to approach goodman's new riddle of induction by demarcating projectible from non-Projectible predicates and hypotheses, And put forward an alternative way of looking at the whole question.
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  31. Bredo Johnsen (1979). Russell's New Riddle of Induction. Philosophy 54 (207):87 - 97.
    The most innovative and important parts of Bertrand Russell's Human Knowledge were the result of his first attempt in three decades to come to grips with the problem of induction, or, more generally, ‘non-demonstrative inference’. My purpose here is to argue that that work constituted giant progress on the problem; if I succeed, something will have been done to restore this work to its proper place in the history of philosophy and, correlatively, to rearrange that history.
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  32. I. A. Kieseppä (2001). Statistical Model Selection Criteria and the Philosophical Problem of Underdetermination. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (4):761 - 794.
    I discuss the philosophical significance of the statistical model selection criteria, in particular their relevance for philosophical problems of underdetermination. I present an easily comprehensible account of their simplest possible application and contrast it with their application to curve-fitting problems. I embed philosophers' earlier discussion concerning the situations in which the criteria yield implausible results into a more general framework. Among other things, I discuss a difficulty which is related to the so-called subfamily problem, and I show that it has (...)
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  33. Robert Kowalenko (2012). Reply to Israel on the New Riddle of Induction. Philosophia 40 (3):549-552.
    Israel 2004 claims that numerous philosophers have misinterpreted Goodman’s original ‘New Riddle of Induction’, and weakened it in the process, because they do not define ‘grue’ as referring to past observations. Both claims are false: Goodman clearly took the riddle to concern the maximally general problem of “projecting” any type of characteristic from a given realm of objects into another, and since this problem subsumes Israel’s, Goodman formulated a stronger philosophical challenge than the latter surmises.
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  34. Ak L. (1983). On Grue and Bleen. Bulletin of the Santayana Society 1 (1):12-16.
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  35. Dean Lubin (2012). Goodman's New Riddle of Induction. Open Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):61-63.
    In this paper, I consider Goodman’s new riddle of induction and how we should best respond to it. Noticing that all the emeralds so far observed are green, we infer that all emeralds are green. However, all emeralds so far observed are also grue, so we could also infer that they are grue. Only one of these inductive inferences or projections could, however, be valid. For the hypothesis that all emeralds are green predicts that the next observed emerald will be (...)
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  36. Edward H. Madden (1958). The Riddle of Induction. Journal of Philosophy 55 (17):705-718.
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  37. Floyd Merrell (2007). Toward a Concept of Pluralistic, Inter-Relational Semiosis. Sign Systems Studies 35 (1-2):9-68.
    Brief consideration of (1) Peirce’s ‘logic of vagueness’, (2) his categories, and (3) the concepts of overdetermination and underdetermination, vagueness and generality, and inconsistency and incompleteness, along with (4) the abrogation of classical Aristotelian principles of logic, bear out the complexity of all relatively rich sign systems. Given this complexity, there is semiotic indeterminacy, which suggests sign limitations, and at the same time it promises semiotic freedom, giving rise to sign proliferation the yield of which is pluralistic, inter-relational semiosis. This (...)
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  38. John Moreland (1976). On Projecting Grue. Philosophy of Science 43 (3):363-377.
    This paper attempts to place Goodman's "New Riddle of Induction" within the context of a subjectivist understanding of inductive logic. It will be argued that predicates such as 'grue' cannot be denied projectible status in any a priori way, but must be considered in the context of a situation of inductive support. In particular, it will be argued that questions of projectibility are to be understood as a variety of questions about the ways a given sample is random. Various examples (...)
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  39. Rita Nolan, The Unnaturalness of Grue'.
    A category of non-standard predicates was introduced by Goodman (1954) while attempting to recast the old riddle of induction in terms amenable to solution within confirmation theory. The New Riddle proved as intractable as the old one but the category of predicates, "mutant" ones, may assist us in understanding cognitive development from neonate vacuity to linguisticallyinformed rational inquiry. This paper proposes a naturalistic explanation of why we tend to reject grue-type predicates as proper bases for induction. Its conclusion is that (...)
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  40. John D. Norton (2006). How the Formal Equivalence of Grue and Green Defeats What is New in the New Riddle of Induction. Synthese 150 (2):185 - 207.
    That past patterns may continue in many different ways has long been identified as a problem for accounts of induction. The novelty of Goodman’s ”new riddle of induction” lies in a meta-argument that purports to show that no account of induction can discriminate between incompatible continuations. That meta-argument depends on the perfect symmetry of the definitions of grue/bleen and green/blue, so that any evidence that favors the ordinary continuation must equally favor the grue-ified continuation. I argue that this very dependence (...)
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  41. John D. Norton, The Formal Equivalence of Grue and Green and How It Undoes the New Riddle of Induction.
    The hidden strength of Goodman's ingenious "new riddle of induction" lies in the perfect symmetry of grue/bleen and green/blue. The very same sentence forms used to define grue/bleen in terms of green/blue can be used to define green/blue in terms of grue/bleen by permutation of terms. Therein lies its undoing. In the artificially restricted case in which there are no additional facts that can break the symmetry, grue/bleen and green/blue are merely notational variants of the same facts; or, if they (...)
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  42. Scot Peterson (1995). Douglas Stalker, Ed., Grue! The New Riddle of Induction Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 15 (3):211-213.
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  43. R. Read (1998). " The Riddle of the New Riddle": Or, Goodmanic Method Applied to Goodman. Journal of Thought 33:49-74.
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  44. Rosemarie Rheinwald (1993). An Epistemic Solution to Goodman's New Riddle of Induction. Synthese 95 (1):55 - 76.
    Goodman'snew riddle of induction can be characterized by the following questions: What is the difference between grue and green?; Why is the hypothesis that all emeralds are grue not lawlike?; Why is this hypothesis not confirmed by its positive instances?; and, Why is the predicate grue not projectible? I argue in favor of epistemological answers to Goodman's questions. The notions of lawlikeness, confirmation, and projectibility have to be relativized to (actual and counterfactual) epistemic situations that are determined by the available (...)
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  45. Adina L. Roskies (2008). Robustness and the New Riddle Revived. Ratio 21 (2):218–230.
    The problem of induction is perennially important in epistemology and the philosophy of science. In response to Goodman's 'New Riddle of Induction', Frank Jackson made a compelling case for there being no new riddle, by arguing that there are no nonprojectible properties. Although Jackson's denial of nonprojectible properties is correct, I argue here that he is mistaken in thinking that he thereby shows that there is no new riddle of induction, and demonstrate that his solution to the grue paradox fails (...)
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  46. Eli Rozik (2009). The Riddle of Nonverbal Thought. The European Legacy 14 (6):727-730.
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  47. David H. Sanford (1993). Disjunctive Predicates. American Philosophical Quarterly 30 (2):167-1722.
    Philosophers have had difficulty in explaining the difference between disjunctive and non-disjunctive predicates. Purely syntactical criteria are ineffective, and mention of resemblance begs the question. I draw the distinction by reference to relations between borderline cases. The crucial point about the disjoint predicate 'red or green', for example, is that no borderline case of 'red' is a borderline case of 'green'. Other varieties of disjunctive predicates are: inclusively disjunctive (such as 'red or hard'), disconnected (such as 'grue' on the usual (...)
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  48. Alfred Schramm (2014). Evidence, Hypothesis, and Grue. Erkenntnis 79 (3):571-591.
    Extant literature on Goodman’s ‘New Riddle of Induction’ deals mainly with two versions. I consider both of them, starting from the (‘epistemic’) version of Goodman’s classic of 1954. It turns out that it belongs to the realm of applications of inductive logic, and that it can be resolved by admitting only significant evidence (as I call it) for confirmations of hypotheses. Sect. 1 prepares some ground for the argument. As much of it depends on the notion of evidential significance, this (...)
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  49. Ansgar Seide (2009). Contextualist References in Nelson Goodman's Solution to the “New Riddle of Induction”. In G. Ernst, J. Steinbrenner & O. Scholz (eds.), From Logic to Art: Themes From Nelson Goodman. Ontos. 7--121.
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  50. Edward S. Shirley (1981). An Unnoticed Flaw in Barker and Achinstein's Solution to Goodman's New Riddle of Induction. Philosophy of Science 48 (4):611-617.
    Barker and Achinstein misread Goodman's definitions of 'grue' and 'bleen'. If we stick to Goodman's definition of 'grue' as applying "to all things examined before t just in case they are green but to other things just in case they are blue" (my italics), and his parallel definition of 'bleen', then Barker and Achinstein's arguments are seen to be irrelevant. The result is to by-pass the question whether Mr. Grue sees things as grue rather than as green while showing that (...)
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