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  1. F. M. Akeroyd (1991). A Practical Example of Grue. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42 (4):535-539.
    This article describes a practical example of the predicate grue, examining the economic relationship between the percentage rate of unemployment and the percentage change of money wage rates known as the simple Phillips curve which exhibited regular behaviour before 1969 and erratic behaviour thereafter. It is proposed that such practical examples of grue from the real world be redescribed as regulatic. i.e. regular before time t and erratic thereafter. In the instance of a scientific model or theory being falsified it (...)
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  2. S. F. Barker & Peter Achinstein (1960). On the New Riddle of Induction. Philosophical Review 69 (4):511-522.
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  3. F. Thomas Burke (2002). Qualities, Universals, Kinds, and the New Riddle of Induction. In F. Thomas Burke, D. Micah Hester & Robert B. Talisse (eds.), Dewey's Logical Theory: New Studies and Interpretations. Vanderbilt University Press.
    The limited aim here is to explain what John Dewey might say about the formulation of the grue example. Nelson Goodman’s problem of distinguishing good and bad inductive inferences is an important one, but the grue example misconstrues this complex problem for certain technical reasons, due to ambiguities that contemporary logical theory has not yet come to terms with. Goodman’s problem is a problem for the theory of induction and thus for logical theory in general. Behind the whole discussion of (...)
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  4. Scott DeVito (1997). A Gruesome Problem for the Curve-Fitting Solution. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (3):391-396.
    This paper is a response to Forster and Sober's [1994] solution to the curve-fitting problem. If their solution is correct, it will provide us with a solution to the New Riddle of Induction as well as provide a basis for choosing realism over conventionalism. Examining this solution is also important as Forster and Sober incorporate it in much of their other philosophical work (see Forster [1995a, b, 1994] and Sober [1996, 1995, 1993]). I argue that Forster and Sober's solution is (...)
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  5. Catherine Z. Elgin (ed.) (1997). Nelson Goodman's New Riddle of Induction. Garland Pub..
    A challenger of traditions and boundaries A pivotal figure in 20th-century philosophy, Nelson Goodman has made seminal contributions to metaphysics, epistemology, aesthetics, and the philosophy of language, with surprising connections that cut across traditional boundaries. In the early 1950s, Goodman, Quine, and White published a series of papers that threatened to torpedo fundamental assumptions of traditional philosophy. They advocated repudiating analyticity, necessity, and prior assumptions. Some philosophers, realizing the seismic effects repudiation would cause, argued that philosophy should retain the familiar (...)
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  6. Branden Fitelson (2008). Goodman's "New Riddle". Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (6):613 - 643.
    First, a brief historical trace of the developments in confirmation theory leading up to Goodman's infamous "grue" paradox is presented. Then, Goodman's argument is analyzed from both Hempelian and Bayesian perspectives. A guiding analogy is drawn between certain arguments against classical deductive logic, and Goodman's "grue" argument against classical inductive logic. The upshot of this analogy is that the "New Riddle" is not as vexing as many commentators have claimed (especially, from a Bayesian inductive-logical point of view). Specifically, the analogy (...)
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  7. Branden Fitelson (2001). Studies in Bayesian Confirmation Theory. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, Madison
    According to Bayesian confirmation theory, evidence E (incrementally) confirms (or supports) a hypothesis H (roughly) just in case E and H are positively probabilistically correlated (under an appropriate probability function Pr). There are many logically equivalent ways of saying that E and H are correlated under Pr. Surprisingly, this leads to a plethora of non-equivalent quantitative measures of the degree to which E confirms H (under Pr). In fact, many non-equivalent Bayesian measures of the degree to which E confirms (or (...)
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  8. MR Forster (1999). Model Selection in Science: The Problem of Language Variance. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (1):83-102.
    Recent solutions to the curve-fitting problem, described in Forster and Sober ([1995]), trade off the simplicity and fit of hypotheses by defining simplicity as the paucity of adjustable parameters. Scott De Vito ([1997]) charges that these solutions are 'conventional' because he thinks that the number of adjustable parameters may change when the hypotheses are described differently. This he believes is exactly what is illustrated in Goodman's new riddle of induction, otherwise known as the grue problem. However, the 'number of adjustable (...)
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  9. Kevin D. Hoover (1980). Abduction and the New Riddle of Induction. The Monist 63 (3):329-341.
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  10. Rami Israel (2004). Two Interpretations of ‘Grue’– or How to Misunderstand the New Riddle of Induction. Analysis 64 (284):335–339.
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  11. Frank Jackson (1998). Mind, Method, and Conditionals: Selected Essays. Routledge.
    This collection brings together some of Frank Jackson's most influential essays on mind, action, conditionals, method in metaphysics, and ethics. These have each been revised for this edition, and are presented along with his challenge to orthodoxy on the new riddle of induction.
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  12. Frank Jackson (1975). Grue. Journal of Philosophy 72 (5):113-131.
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  13. Frank Jackson & Robert Pargetter (1980). Confirmation and the Nomological. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 10 (3):415 - 428.
    We argue that it is a mistake to approach goodman's new riddle of induction by demarcating projectible from non-Projectible predicates and hypotheses, And put forward an alternative way of looking at the whole question.
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  14. Bredo Johnsen (1979). Russell's New Riddle of Induction. Philosophy 54 (207):87 - 97.
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  15. I. A. Kieseppä (2001). Statistical Model Selection Criteria and the Philosophical Problem of Underdetermination. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (4):761 - 794.
    I discuss the philosophical significance of the statistical model selection criteria, in particular their relevance for philosophical problems of underdetermination. I present an easily comprehensible account of their simplest possible application and contrast it with their application to curve-fitting problems. I embed philosophers' earlier discussion concerning the situations in which the criteria yield implausible results into a more general framework. Among other things, I discuss a difficulty which is related to the so-called subfamily problem, and I show that it has (...)
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  16. Robert Kowalenko (2012). Reply to Israel on the New Riddle of Induction. Philosophia 40 (3):549-552.
    Israel 2004 claims that numerous philosophers have misinterpreted Goodman’s original ‘New Riddle of Induction’, and weakened it in the process, because they do not define ‘grue’ as referring to past observations. Both claims are false: Goodman clearly took the riddle to concern the maximally general problem of “projecting” any type of characteristic from a given realm of objects into another, and since this problem subsumes Israel’s, Goodman formulated a stronger philosophical challenge than the latter surmises.
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  17. Dean Lubin (2012). Goodman's New Riddle of Induction. Open Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):61-63.
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  18. Floyd Merrell (2007). Toward a Concept of Pluralistic, Inter-Relational Semiosis. Sign Systems Studies 35 (1-2):9-68.
    Brief consideration of (1) Peirce’s ‘logic of vagueness’, (2) his categories, and (3) the concepts of overdetermination and underdetermination, vagueness and generality, and inconsistency and incompleteness, along with (4) the abrogation of classical Aristotelian principles of logic, bear out the complexity of all relatively rich sign systems. Given this complexity, there is semiotic indeterminacy, which suggests sign limitations, and at the same time it promises semiotic freedom, giving rise to sign proliferation the yield of which is pluralistic, inter-relational semiosis. This (...)
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  19. John Moreland (1976). On Projecting Grue. Philosophy of Science 43 (3):363-377.
    This paper attempts to place Goodman's "New Riddle of Induction" within the context of a subjectivist understanding of inductive logic. It will be argued that predicates such as 'grue' cannot be denied projectible status in any a priori way, but must be considered in the context of a situation of inductive support. In particular, it will be argued that questions of projectibility are to be understood as a variety of questions about the ways a given sample is random. Various examples (...)
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  20. John D. Norton (2006). How the Formal Equivalence of Grue and Green Defeats What is New in the New Riddle of Induction. Synthese 150 (2):185 - 207.
    That past patterns may continue in many different ways has long been identified as a problem for accounts of induction. The novelty of Goodman’s ”new riddle of induction” lies in a meta-argument that purports to show that no account of induction can discriminate between incompatible continuations. That meta-argument depends on the perfect symmetry of the definitions of grue/bleen and green/blue, so that any evidence that favors the ordinary continuation must equally favor the grue-ified continuation. I argue that this very dependence (...)
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  21. John D. Norton, The Formal Equivalence of Grue and Green and How It Undoes the New Riddle of Induction.
    The hidden strength of Goodman's ingenious "new riddle of induction" lies in the perfect symmetry of grue/bleen and green/blue. The very same sentence forms used to define grue/bleen in terms of green/blue can be used to define green/blue in terms of grue/bleen by permutation of terms. Therein lies its undoing. In the artificially restricted case in which there are no additional facts that can break the symmetry, grue/bleen and green/blue are merely notational variants of the same facts; or, if they (...)
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  22. Rosemarie Rheinwald (1993). An Epistemic Solution to Goodman's New Riddle of Induction. Synthese 95 (1):55 - 76.
    Goodman'snew riddle of induction can be characterized by the following questions: What is the difference between grue and green?; Why is the hypothesis that all emeralds are grue not lawlike?; Why is this hypothesis not confirmed by its positive instances?; and, Why is the predicate grue not projectible? I argue in favor of epistemological answers to Goodman's questions. The notions of lawlikeness, confirmation, and projectibility have to be relativized to (actual and counterfactual) epistemic situations that are determined by the available (...)
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  23. Adina L. Roskies (2008). Robustness and the New Riddle Revived. Ratio 21 (2):218–230.
    The problem of induction is perennially important in epistemology and the philosophy of science. In response to Goodman's 'New Riddle of Induction', Frank Jackson made a compelling case for there being no new riddle, by arguing that there are no nonprojectible properties. Although Jackson's denial of nonprojectible properties is correct, I argue here that he is mistaken in thinking that he thereby shows that there is no new riddle of induction, and demonstrate that his solution to the grue paradox fails (...)
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  24. David H. Sanford (1993). Disjunctive Predicates. American Philosophical Quarterly 30 (2):167-1722.
    Philosophers have had difficulty in explaining the difference between disjunctive and non-disjunctive predicates. Purely syntactical criteria are ineffective, and mention of resemblance begs the question. I draw the distinction by reference to relations between borderline cases. The crucial point about the disjoint predicate 'red or green', for example, is that no borderline case of 'red' is a borderline case of 'green'. Other varieties of disjunctive predicates are: inclusively disjunctive (such as 'red or hard'), disconnected (such as 'grue' on the usual (...)
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  25. Alfred Schramm (2014). Evidence, Hypothesis, and Grue. Erkenntnis 79 (3):571-591.
    Extant literature on Goodman’s ‘New Riddle of Induction’ deals mainly with two versions. I consider both of them, starting from the (‘epistemic’) version of Goodman’s classic of 1954. It turns out that it belongs to the realm of applications of inductive logic, and that it can be resolved by admitting only significant evidence (as I call it) for confirmations of hypotheses. Sect. 1 prepares some ground for the argument. As much of it depends on the notion of evidential significance, this (...)
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  26. Edward S. Shirley (1981). An Unnoticed Flaw in Barker and Achinstein's Solution to Goodman's New Riddle of Induction. Philosophy of Science 48 (4):611-617.
    Barker and Achinstein misread Goodman's definitions of 'grue' and 'bleen'. If we stick to Goodman's definition of 'grue' as applying "to all things examined before t just in case they are green but to other things just in case they are blue" (my italics), and his parallel definition of 'bleen', then Barker and Achinstein's arguments are seen to be irrelevant. The result is to by-pass the question whether Mr. Grue sees things as grue rather than as green while showing that (...)
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  27. Brian Skyrms (1966). Choice and Chance. Belmont, Calif.,Dickenson Pub. Co..
  28. Daniel Steel, Mind Changes and Testability: How Formal and Statistical Learning Theory Converge in the New Riddle of Induction.
    This essay demonstrates a previously unnoticed connection between formal and statistical learning theory with regard to Nelson Goodman’s new riddle of induction. Discussions of Goodman’s riddle in formal learning theory explain how conjecturing “all green” before “all grue” can enhance efficient convergence to the truth, where efficiency is understood in terms of minimizing the maximum number of retractions or “mind changes.” Vapnik-Chervonenkis (VC) dimension is a central concept in statistical learning theory and is similar to Popper’s notion of degrees of (...)
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  29. Daniel Steel (2009). Testability and Ockham's Razor: How Formal and Statistical Learning Theory Converge in the New Riddle of Induction. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (5):471 - 489.
    Nelson Goodman’s new riddle of induction forcefully illustrates a challenge that must be confronted by any adequate theory of inductive inference: provide some basis for choosing among alternative hypotheses that fit past data but make divergent predictions. One response to this challenge is to distinguish among alternatives by means of some epistemically significant characteristic beyond fit with the data. Statistical learning theory takes this approach by showing how a concept similar to Popper’s notion of degrees of testability is linked to (...)
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  30. R. G. Swinburne (1969). Primary and Secondary Tests. Analysis 29 (6):203 - 205.
    THIS ARTICLE CLARIFIES A DISTINCTION MADE BY ME ELSEWHERE BETWEEN PRIMARY AND SECONDARY TESTS FOR THE APPLICATION OF A CONCEPT. IF THE PRIMARY TESTS ARE SATISFIED, THEN OF LOGICAL NECESSITY THE CONCEPT APPLIES, BUT SATISFACTION OF THE SECONDARY TESTS IS ONLY GOOD EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FOR THE APPLICABILITY OF THE CONCEPT. THIS ARTICLE IS A REPLY TO ONE BY SLOTE (’A GENERAL SOLUTION TO GOODMAN’S RIDDLE?’ ANALYSIS, DECEMBER 1968) CHALLENGING MY EARLIER USE OF THIS DISTINCTION (’GRUE’ ANALYSIS, MARCH 1968) TO PROVIDE (...)
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  31. R. G. Swinburne (1969). Projectible predicates. Analysis 30 (1):1 - 11.
    IF "ALL A’S ARE B" AND "ALL A’S ARE C" ARE BOTH EQUALLY WELL SUPPORTED BY OBSERVATIONS SO FAR, YET YIELD CONFLICTING PREDICTIONS, WHICH OUGHT WE TO ADOPT? GOODMAN’S CONFLICT BETWEEN "ALL EMERALDS ARE GREEN" AND "ALL EMERALDS ARE GRUE" IS A SPECIAL CASE OF SUCH CONFLICT, WHICH MAY BE DEALT WITH BY A RULE STATING THAT WE OUGHT NOT TO PROJECT POSITIONAL IN PREFERENCE TO QUALITATIVE PREDICATES. THIS PAPER ATTEMPTS TO ELUCIDATE THE RULES GOVERNING A LARGER CLASS OF SUCH (...)
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  32. R. G. Swinburne (1968). Grue. Analysis 28 (4):123 - 128.
    CONTRARY TO GOODMAN’S VIEW, A CLEAR DISTINCTION CAN BE MADE BETWEEN QUALITATIVE AND POSITIONAL PREDICATES. HENCE WE CAN EXPLAIN THAT WE OUGHT TO PROJECT ’GREEN’ RATHER THAN ’GRUE’ BECAUSE THE LATTER IS A POSITIONAL PREDICATE, RATHER THAN BECAUSE THE LATTER IS LESS WELL ENTRENCHED. A PREDICATE IS POSITIONAL IF, TO FIND OUT AS CERTAINLY AS WE CAN WHETHER IT APPLIES TO AN OBJECT, WE HAVE TO FIND OUT THE LATTER’S SPATIO-TEMPORAL LOCATION.
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  33. Barry Ward (2012). Explanation and the New Riddle of Induction. Philosophical Quarterly 62 (247):365-385.
    I propose a novel solution to Goodman's new riddle of induction, one on which aspects of scientific methodology preclude significant confirmation of the Grue Hypothesis. The solution appeals to intuitive constraints on the confirmation of explanatory hypotheses, and can be construed as a fragment of a theory of Inference to the Best Explanation. I give it an objective Bayesian formalisation, and contrast it with Goodman's and Sober's solutions, which make appeal to both methodological and non-methodological considerations, and those of Jackson, (...)
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  34. John R. Welch (2005). Gruesome Predicates. In Roberto Festa, Atocha Aliseda & Jeanne Peijnenburg (eds.), Confirmation, Empirical Progress and Truth Approximation: Essays in Debate with Theo Kuipers. Rodopi. 129-137.
    This chapter examines gruesome predicates, the most notorious of which is 'grue'. It proceeds by extending the analysis of Theo A. F. Kuipers' From Instrumentalism to Constructive Realism in three directions. It proposes an amplified typology of grue problems, first of all, and argues that one such problem is the root of the rest. Second, it suggests a solution to this root problem influenced by Kuipers' Bayesian solution to a related problem. Finally, it expands the class of gruesome predicates by (...)
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  35. Roger White (2005). Explanation as a Guide to Induction. Philosophers' Imprint 5 (2):1-29.
    It is notoriously difficult to spell out the norms of inductive reasoning in a neat set of rules. I explore the idea that explanatory considerations are the key to sorting out the good inductive inferences from the bad. After defending the crucial explanatory virtue of stability, I apply this approach to a range of inductive inferences, puzzles, and principles such as the Raven and Grue problems, and the significance of varied data and random sampling.
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