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  1. Arif Ahmed (forthcoming). Infallibility in the Newcomb Problem. Erkenntnis:1-13.
    It is intuitively attractive to think that it makes a difference in Newcomb’s problem whether or not the predictor is infallible, in the sense of being certainly actually correct. This paper argues that that view (A) is irrational and (B) manifests a well-documented cognitive illusion.
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  2. Chrisoula Andreou (2008). The Newxin Puzzle. Philosophical Studies 139 (3):415 - 422.
    A variety of thought experiments suggest that, if the standard picture of practical rationality is correct, then practical rationality is sometimes an obstacle to practical success. For some, this in turn suggests that there is something wrong with the standard picture. In particular, it has been argued that we should revise the standard picture so that practical rationality and practical success emerge as more closely connected than the current picture allows. In this paper, I construct a choice situation—which I refer (...)
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  3. Kent Bach (1987). Newcomb's Problem: The $1,000,000 Solution. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (2):409 - 425.
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  4. Maya Bar-Hillel & Avishai Margalit (1972). Newcomb's Paradox Revisited. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 23 (4):295-304.
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  5. R. Eric Barnes (1997). Rationality, Dispositions, and the Newcomb Paradox. Philosophical Studies 88 (1):1-28.
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  6. T. M. Benditt & David J. Ross (1976). Newcomb's 'Paradox'. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 27 (2):161-164.
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  7. Rachael Briggs (2010). Decision-Theoretic Paradoxes as Voting Paradoxes. Philosophical Review 119 (1):1-30.
    It is a platitude among decision theorists that agents should choose their actions so as to maximize expected value. But exactly how to define expected value is contentious. Evidential decision theory (henceforth EDT), causal decision theory (henceforth CDT), and a theory proposed by Ralph Wedgwood that this essay will call benchmark theory (BT) all advise agents to maximize different types of expected value. Consequently, their verdicts sometimes conflict. In certain famous cases of conflict—medical Newcomb problems—CDT and BT seem to get (...)
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  8. John Broome (1989). An Economic Newcomb Problem. Analysis 49 (4):220 - 222.
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  9. Simon Burgess (2012). Newcomb's Problem and its Conditional Evidence: A Common Cause of Confusion. Synthese 184 (3):319-339.
    This paper aims to make three contributions to decision theory. First there is the hope that it will help to re-establish the legitimacy of the problem, pace various recent analyses provided by Maitzen and Wilson, Slezak and Priest. Second, after pointing out that analyses of the problem have generally relied upon evidence that is conditional on the taking of one particular option, this paper argues that certain assumptions implicit in those analyses are subtly flawed. As a third contribution, the piece (...)
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  10. Simon Burgess (2004). The Newcomb Problem: An Unqualified Resolution. Synthese 138 (2):261 - 287.
    The Newcomb problem is analysed here as a type of common cause problem. In relation to such problems, if you take the dominated option your expected outcome will be good and if you take the dominant option your expected outcome will be not so good. As is explained, however, these arenot conventional conditional expected outcomes but `conditional evidence expected outcomes' and while in the deliberation process, the evidence on which they are based is only hypothetical evidence.Conventional conditional expected outcomes are (...)
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  11. Richmond Campbell & Lanning Snowden (eds.) (1985). Paradoxes of Rationality and Cooperation: Prisoner's Dilemma and Newcomb's Problem. University of British Columbia Press.
    1 Background for the Uninitiated RICHMOND CAMPBELL Paradoxes are intrinsically fascinating. They are also distinctively ...
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  12. James Cargile (1975). Newcomb's Paradox. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 26 (3):234-239.
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  13. Erik Carlson (1998). Fischer on Backtracking and Newcomb's Problem. Analysis 58 (3):229–231.
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  14. Eric G. Cavalcanti (2010). Causation, Decision Theory, and Bell's Theorem: A Quantum Analogue of the Newcomb Problem. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (3):569-597.
    I apply some of the lessons from quantum theory, in particular from Bell’s theorem, to a debate on the foundations of decision theory and causation. By tracing a formal analogy between the basic assumptions of causal decision theory (CDT)—which was developed partly in response to Newcomb’s problem— and those of a local hidden variable theory in the context of quantum mechanics, I show that an agent who acts according to CDT and gives any nonzero credence to some possible causal interpretations (...)
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  15. Peter Cave (2004). Reeling and a-Reasoning: Surprise Examinations and Newcomb's Tale. Philosophy 79 (4):609-616.
    Certain paradoxes set us reeling endlessly. In surprise examination paradoxes, pupils' reasonings lead them to reel between expecting an examination and expecting none. With Newcomb's puzzle, choosers reel between reasoning in favour of choosing just one box and choosing two. The paradoxes demand an answer to what it is rational to believe or do. Highlighting other reelings and puzzles, this paper shows that the paradoxes should come as no surprise. The paradoxes demand an end to our reasoning when the conditions (...)
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  16. Michael Clark & Nicholas Shackel (2006). The Dr. Psycho Paradox and Newcomb's Problem. Erkenntnis 64 (1):85 - 100.
    Nicholas Rescher claims that rational decision theory “may leave us in the lurch”, because there are two apparently acceptable ways of applying “the standard machinery of expected-value analysis” to his Dr. Psycho paradox which recommend contradictory actions. He detects a similar contradiction in Newcomb’s problem. We consider his claims from the point of view of both Bayesian decision theory and causal decision theory. In Dr. Psycho and in Newcomb’s Problem, Rescher has used premisses about probabilities which he assumes to be (...)
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  17. John Collins, Newcomb's Problem.
    Newcomb’s problem is a decision puzzle whose difficulty and interest stem from the fact that the possible outcomes are probabilistically dependent on, yet causally independent of, the agent’s options. The problem is named for its inventor, the physicist William Newcomb, but first appeared in print in a 1969 paper by Robert Nozick [12]. Closely related to, though less well-known than, the Prisoners’ Dilemma, it has been the subject of intense debate in the philosophical literature. After three decades, the issues remain (...)
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  18. John R. Cook (2005). Review of Doris Olin's Paradox. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review (6):422-424.
    Doris Olin's Paradox is a very helpful book for those who want to be introduced to the philosophical treatment of paradoxes, or for those who already have knowledge of the general area and would like to have a helpful resource book.
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  19. William Lane Craig (1987). Divine Foreknowledge and Newcomb's Paradox. Philosophia 17 (3):331-350.
    Newcomb's Paradox thus serves as an illustrative vindication of the compatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom. A proper understanding of the counterfactual conditionals involved enables us to see that the pastness of God's knowledge serves neither to make God's beliefs counterfactually closed nor to rob us of genuine freedom. It is evident that our decisions determine God's past beliefs about those decisions and do so without invoking an objectionable backward causation. It is also clear that in the context of (...)
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  20. Raymond Dacey, Richard E. Simmons, David J. Curry & John W. Kennelly (1977). A Cognitivist Solution to Newcomb's Problem. American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (1):79 - 84.
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  21. R. Lance Factor (1978). Newcomb's Paradox and Omniscience. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9 (1):30 - 40.
  22. Arthur E. Falk (1985). Ifs and Newcombs. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 15 (3):449 - 481.
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  23. Branden Fitelson, Comments on Presting's “Computability and Newcomb's Problem”.
    • What’s essential to Newcomb’s problem? 1. You must choose between two particular acts: A1 = you take just the opaque box; A2 = you take both boxes, where the two states of nature are: S 1 = there’s $1M in the opaque box, S2 = there’s $0 in the opaque box.
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  24. André Gallois (1981). Locke on Causation, Compatibilism and Newcomb's Problem. Analysis 41 (1):42 - 46.
  25. André Gallois (1979). How Not to Make a Newcomb Choice. Analysis 39 (1):49 - 53.
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  26. David Gauthier (1988). In the Neighbourhood of the Newcomb-Predictor (Reflections on Rationality). Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 89:179 - 194.
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  27. Terence Horgan (1981). Counterfactuals and Newcomb's Problem. Journal of Philosophy 78 (6):331-356.
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  28. James R. Horne (1983). Newcomb's Problem as a Theistic Problem. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 14 (4):217 - 223.
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  29. Paul Horwich (1985). Decision Theory in Light of Newcomb's Problem. Philosophy of Science 52 (3):431-450.
    Should we act only for the sake of what we might bring about (causal decision theory); or is it enough for a decent motive that our action is highly correlated with something desirable (evidential decision theory)? The conflict between these points of view is embodied in Newcomb's problem. It is argued here that intuitive evidence from familiar decision contexts does not enable us to settle the issue, since the two theories dictate the same results in normal circumstances. Nevertheless, there are (...)
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  30. Don Hubin & Glenn Ross (1985). Newcomb's Perfect Predictor. Noûs 19 (3):439-446.
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  31. James L. Hudson (1979). Schlesinger on the Newcomb Problem. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 57 (2):145 – 156.
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  32. Daniel Hunter & Reed Richter (1978). Counterfactuals and Newcomb's Paradox. Synthese 39 (2):249 - 261.
    In their development of causal decision theory, Allan Gibbard and William Harper advocate a particular method for calculating the expected utility of an action, a method based upon the probabilities of certain counterfactuals. Gibbard and Harper then employ their method to support a two-box solution to Newcomb’s paradox. This paper argues against some of Gibbard and Harper’s key claims concerning the truth-values and probabilities of counterfactuals involved in expected utility calculations, thereby disputing their analysis of Newcomb’s Paradox. If we are (...)
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  33. S. L. Hurley (1994). A New Take From Nozick on Newcomb's Problem and Prisoners' Dilemma. Analysis 54 (2):65 - 72.
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  34. S. L. Hurley (1991). Newcomb's Problem, Prisoners' Dilemma, and Collective Action. Synthese 86 (2):173 - 196.
    Among various cases that equally admit of evidentialist reasoning, the supposedly evidentialist solution has varying degrees of intuitive attractiveness. I suggest that cooperative reasoning may account for the appeal of apparently evidentialist behavior in the cases in which it is intuitively attractive, while the inapplicability of cooperative reasoning may account for the unattractiveness of evidentialist behaviour in other cases. A collective causal power with respect to agreed outcomes, not evidentialist reasoning, makes cooperation attractive in the Prisoners' Dilemma. And a natural (...)
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  35. A. D. Irvine (1993). How Braess' Paradox Solves Newcomb's Problem. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7 (2):141 – 160.
    Abstract Newcomb's problem is regularly described as a problem arising from equally defensible yet contradictory models of rationality. Braess? paradox is regularly described as nothing more than the existence of non?intuitive (but ultimately non?contradictory) equilibrium points within physical networks of various kinds. Yet it can be shown that Newcomb's problem is structurally identical to Braess? paradox. Both are instances of a well?known result in game theory, namely that equilibria of non?cooperative games are generally Pareto?inefficient. Newcomb's problem is simply a limiting (...)
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  36. James M. Joyce (2007). Are Newcomb Problems Really Decisions? Synthese 156 (3):537 - 562.
    Richard Jeffrey long held that decision theory should be formulated without recourse to explicitly causal notions. Newcomb problems stand out as putative counterexamples to this ‘evidential’ decision theory. Jeffrey initially sought to defuse Newcomb problems via recourse to the doctrine of ratificationism, but later came to see this as problematic. We will see that Jeffrey’s worries about ratificationism were not compelling, but that valid ratificationist arguments implicitly presuppose causal decision theory. In later work, Jeffrey argued that Newcomb problems are not (...)
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  37. Gregory S. Kavka (1980). What Is Newcomb's Problem About? American Philosophical Quarterly 17 (4):271 - 280.
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  38. Stephen Leeds (1984). Eells and Jeffrey on Newcomb's Problem. Philosophical Studies 46 (1):97 - 107.
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  39. John Leslie (1991). Ensuring Two Bird Deaths with One Throw. Mind 100 (1):73-86.
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  40. David Lewis (1981). `Why Ain'cha Rich?'. Noûs 15 (3):377-380.
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  41. David Lewis (1979). Prisoners' Dilemma is a Newcomb Problem. Philosophy and Public Affairs 8 (3):235-240.
  42. Don Locke (1979). Causation, Compatibilism and Newcomb's Problem. Analysis 39 (4):210 - 211.
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  43. Don Locke (1978). How to Make a Newcomb Choice. Analysis 38 (1):17 - 23.
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  44. J. L. Mackie (1977). Newcomb's Paradox and the Direction of Causation. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7 (2):213 - 225.
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  45. Stephen Maitzen & Garnett Wilson (2003). Newcomb's Hidden Regress. Theory and Decision 54 (2):151-162.
    Newcomb's problem supposedly involves your choosing one or else two boxes in circumstances in which a predictor has made a prediction of how many boxes you will choose. We argue that the circumstances which allegedly define Newcomb's problem generate a previously unnoticed regress which shows that Newcomb's problem is insoluble because it is ill-formed. Those who favor, as we do, a ``no-box'' reply to Newcomb's problem typically claim either that the problem's solution is underdetermined or else that it is overdetermined. (...)
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  46. Louis Marinoff (1996). How Braess' Paradox Solves Newcomb's Problem: Not! International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 10 (3):217 – 237.
    Abstract In an engaging and ingenious paper, Irvine (1993) purports to show how the resolution of Braess? paradox can be applied to Newcomb's problem. To accomplish this end, Irvine forges three links. First, he couples Braess? paradox to the Cohen?Kelly queuing paradox. Second, he couples the Cohen?Kelly queuing paradox to the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD). Third, in accord with received literature, he couples the PD to Newcomb's problem itself. Claiming that the linked models are ?structurally identical?, he argues that Braess solves (...)
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  47. Phyllis McKay (2004). Newcomb's Problem: The Causalists Get Rich. Analysis 64 (2):187–189.
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  48. Christopher J. G. Meacham (2010). Binding and its Consequences. Philosophical Studies 149 (1):49-71.
    In “Bayesianism, Infinite Decisions, and Binding”, Arntzenius et al. (Mind 113:251–283, 2004 ) present cases in which agents who cannot bind themselves are driven by standard decision theory to choose sequences of actions with disastrous consequences. They defend standard decision theory by arguing that if a decision rule leads agents to disaster only when they cannot bind themselves, this should not be taken to be a mark against the decision rule. I show that this claim has surprising implications for a (...)
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  49. Doris Olin (1976). Newcomb's Problem: Further Investigations. American Philosophical Quarterly 13 (2):129 - 133.
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  50. Philip Pettit (1988). The Prisoner's Dilemma is an Unexploitable Newcomb Problem. Synthese 76 (1):123 - 134.
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