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  1. Bettina Bergo (2003). Evolution and Force: Anxiety in Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (2):143-168.
  2. Peter Bornedal (2010). The Surface and the Abyss: Nietzsche as Philosopher of Mind and Knowledge. Walter de Gruyter.
    Peter Bornedalprovides an interpretation of Nietzsche's philosophy as a whole in the context of 19th century philosophy of mind and cognition.
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  3. Pietro Gori (2015). Psychology Without a Soul, Philosophy Without an I: Nietzsche and 19th Century Psychophysics. In Bartholomew Ryan, Maria Joao Mayer Branco & João Constancio (eds.), Nietzsche and the Problem of Subjectivity. De Gruyter 166-195.
    Friedrich Nietzsche’s criticism towards the substance-concept „I“ plays an important role in his late thought, and can be properly understood by making reference to the 19th century debate on the scientific psychology. Friedrich Lange and Ernst Mach gave an important contribution to that debate. Both of them developed the ideas of Gustav Fechner, and thought about a „psychology without soul“, i.e. an investigation that gives up with the old metaphysics of substance in dealing with the mind-body problem. In this paper (...)
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  4. Donovan Miyasaki, Nietzsche's Incompatibilism.
  5. Donovan Miyasaki (forthcoming). Feeling, Not Freedom: Nietzsche Against Agency. Journal of Nietzsche Studies 47 (2).
    This paper argues that, although Nietzsche’s rejection of free will leaves no room for a morally substantial, compatibilist conception of freedom of agency, freedom nevertheless plays an important role in his positive moral philosophy, since Nietzsche’s higher human types are characterized by a heightened feeling of freedom—a qualitative affect without deeper substance. Moreover, because the feeling of freedom is increased by resistance, it requires a limitation of practical freedom—a relative constraint of ability, strength, and activity rather than their absolute promotion. (...)
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