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  1. Robert Barnard (1997). Russell on Vagueness. Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly 95 (1):8--11.
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  2. David Enoch (2007). Epistemicism and Nihilism About Vagueness: What's the Difference? Philosophical Studies 133 (2):285 - 311.
    In this paper I argue, first, that the only difference between Epistemicism and Nihilism about vagueness is semantic rather than ontological, and second, that once it is clear what the difference between these views is, Nihilism is a much more plausible view of vagueness than Epistemicism. Given the current popularity of certain epistemicist views (most notably, Williamson’s), this result is, I think, of interest.
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  3. Bryan Frances, The Inevitability of Sharp Cutoffs.
    According to the view I christen sharpism, when Joe says to his daughter in a perfectly ordinary context ‘The Earth is super-duper old’, his claim has an incredibly discriminating truth condition: although it’s true if the Earth is over 347,342,343 years, 2 days, and 17 nanoseconds old, if the Earth is even a nanosecond younger then his claim has some status other than “just plain true”—but we leave open what that new status might be: false, indeterminate, indeterminately indeterminate, meaningless, just (...)
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  4. Mario Gomez-Torrente (2010). The Sorites, Linguistic Preconceptions, and the Dual Picture of Vagueness. In Richard Dietz & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Cuts and Clouds. Vagueness, its Nature and its Logic. Oxford University Press. 228-253.
    I postulate that the extension of a degree adjective is fixed by implicitly accepted non-analytic reference-fixing principles (“preconceptions”) that combine appeals to paradigmatic cases with generic principles designed to expand the extension of the adjective beyond the paradigmatic range. In regular occasions of use, the paradigm and generic preconceptions are jointly satisfied and determine the existence of an extension/anti-extension pair dividing the adjective’s comparison class into two mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive subclasses. Sorites paradoxical occasions of use are irregular occasions (...)
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  5. Andrea Iacona (2010). Saying More (or Less) Than One Thing. In Richard Dietz & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Cuts and Clouds. Oxford University Press.
    In a paper called 'Definiteness and Knowability', Tim Williamson addresses the question whether one must accept that vagueness is an epistemic phenomenon if one adopts classical logic and a disquotational principle for truth. Some have suggested that one must not, hence that classical logic and the disquotational principle may be preserved without endorsing epistemicism. Williamson’s paper, however, finds ‘no plausible way of substantiating that possibility’. Its moral is that ‘either classical logic fails, or the disquotational principle does, or vagueness is (...)
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  6. R. C. Koons (1994). A New Solution to the Sorites Problem. Mind 103 (412):439-450.
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  7. Stephen Puryear (2013). Frege on Vagueness and Ordinary Language. Philosophical Quarterly 63 (250):120-140.
    Frege supposedly believes that vague predicates have no referent or Bedeutung. But given other things he evidently believes, such a position would seem to commit him to a suspect nihilism according to which assertoric sentences containing vague predicates are neither true nor false. I argue that we have good reason to resist ascribing to Frege the view that vague predicates have no Bedeutung and thus good reason to resist seeing him as committed to the suspect nihilism.
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  8. Bertil Rolf (1980). A Theory of Vagueness. Journal of Philosophical Logic 9 (3):315 - 325.
  9. Bertrand Russell (1923). Vagueness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):84 – 92.
  10. David H. Sanford (1979). Nostalgia for the Ordinary: Comments on Papers by Unger and Wheeler. Synthese 41 (2):175 - 184.
    Unger claims that we can block sorites arguments for the conclusion that there are no ordinary things only by invoking some kind of miracle, but no such miracle is needed if we reject the principle that every statement has a truth value. Wheeler's argument for the nonexistence of ordinary things depends on the assumptions that if ordinary things exist, they comprise real kinds, and that if ordinary predicates really apply to things, the predicates refer to real properties. If we accept (...)
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  11. Samuel C. Wheeler (1979). On That Which is Not. Synthese 41 (2):155 - 173.