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Summary Many philosophers think that conscious experience is always accompanied by a minimal, nonconceptual, or pre-reflective sense of self and, further, that we have to appeal to such a minimal sense of self in order to account for higher forms of self-consciousness.
Key works Bermudez 1998 makes a case for the necessity to appeal to nonconceptual forms of self-consciousness in order to be able to explain the ability to think conceptual 'I'-thought and discusses various different forms of nonconceptual self-consciousness. Zahavi 2005 discusses pre-reflective self-consciousness from a contemporary phenomenological perspective.
Introductions Gallagher & Zahavi 2008 give an introduction of phenomenological approaches to self-consciousness, with a focus on pre-reflective self-consciousness.
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  1. Adrian Alsmith (2012). What Reason Could There Be to Believe in Pre-Reflective Bodily Self-Consciousness. In Fabio Paglieri (ed.), Consciousness in interaction: The role of the natural and social environment in shaping consciousness. John Benjamins Press.
  2. L. R. Baker (2013). From Consciousness to Self-Consciousness. Grazer Philosophische Studien 84:19--38.
  3. Lynne Rudder Baker (2012). From Consciousness to Self-Consciousness. Grazer Philosophische Studien 84 (1):19-38.
  4. Berm (1998). Ecological Perception and the Notion of a Nonconceptual Point of View. In The Body and the Self. Cambridge: Mit Press.
  5. José Luis Bermúdez (2001). Nonconceptual Self-Consciousness and Cognitive Science. Synthese 129 (1):129 - 149.
    This paper explores some of the areas where neuroscientific and philosophical issues intersect in the study of self-consciousness. Taking as point of departure a paradox (the paradox of self-consciousness) that appears to block philosophical elucidation of self-consciousness, the paper illustrates how the highly conceptual forms of self-consciousness emerge from a rich foundation of nonconceptual forms of self-awareness. Attention is paid in particular to the primitive forms of nonconceptual self-consciousness manifested in visual perception, somatic proprioception, spatial reasoning and interpersonal psychological interactions. (...)
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  6. Jose Luis Bermudez (2000). The Cognitive Neuroscience of Primitive Self-Consciousness. Psycoloquy 11 (35).
    Myin, Erik (2000) Direct Self-Consciousness (2)Bermúdez, José Luis (2000) Concepts and the Priority Principle (10)Bermúdez, José Luis (2000) Circularity, "I"-Thoughts and the Linguistic Requirement for Concept Possession (11)Meeks, Roblin R. (2000) Withholding Immunity: Misidentification, Misrepresentation, and Autonomous Nonconceptual Proprioceptive First-Person Content (12)Newen, Albert (2001) Kinds of Self-Consciousness (13)Bermudez, Jose Luis (2000) Direct Self-Consciousness (4)Bermudez, Jose Luis (2000) Prelinguistic Self-Consciousness (5)Gallese, Vittorio (2000) The Brain and the Self: Reviewing the Neuroscientific Evidence (6)Bermudez, Jose Luis (2000) The Cognitive Neuroscience of Primitive Self-Consciousness (...)
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  7. Jose Luis Bermudez (1998). The Paradox of Self-Consciousness. MIT Press.
  8. Jose Luis Bermudez & Peter Carruthers (1999). Reviews-The Paradox of Self-Consciousness. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (3):483-486.
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  9. José Luis Bermúdez & I. V. Objections (2011). Bodily Awareness and Self-Consciousness. In Shaun Gallagher (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Self. Oxford University Press.
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  10. Michel Bitbol & Claire Petitmengin (2011). On Pure Reflection. Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (2):24-37.
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  11. Johannes Brandl (2013). What is Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness? Brentano's Theory of Inner Consciousness Revisited. In D. Fisette & G. Frechette (eds.), Themes from Brentano. Rodopi. 44--41.
  12. Ingar Brinck (2000). José Luis Bermúdez, the Paradox of Self-Consciousness. Theoria 66 (3):299-306.
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  13. Glenn Carruthers (2011). The Nature of Representation and the Experience of Oneself: A Critical Notice on Gottfried Vosgerau's Mental Representation and Self-Consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 24 (3):411 - 425.
  14. P. Carruthers (2000). Review of The Paradox of Self-Consciousness by José Luis Bermúdez. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (3):483-486.
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  15. Kalina Christoff, Diego Cosmelli, Dorothée Legrand & Evan Thompson (2011). Specifying the Self for Cognitive Neuroscience. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (3):104-112.
  16. Giovanna Colombetti (2011). Varieties of Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness: Foreground and Background Bodily Feelings in Emotion Experience. Inquiry 54 (3):293 - 313.
    How do we feel our body in emotion experience? In this paper I initially distinguish between foreground and background bodily feelings, and characterize them in some detail. Then I compare this distinction with the one between reflective and pre-reflective bodily self-awareness one finds in some recent philosophical phenomenological works, and conclude that both foreground and background bodily feelings can be understood as pre-reflective modes of bodily self-awareness that nevertheless differ in degree of self-presentation or self-intimation. Finally, I use the distinction (...)
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  17. Katja Crone, Kristina Musholt & Anna Strasser (2012). Towards an Integrated Theory of Self-Consciousness. Grazer Philosophische Studien 84.
  18. Eva-Maria Engelen (2014). Vom Leben Zur Bedeutung: Philosophische Studien zum Verhältnis von Gefühl, Bewusstsein und Sprache. De Gruyter.
    Wie entwickelt sich ein ich-loses Selbstgefühl? Wie vollzieht sich der Schritt zum Selbstbewusstsein? Und wie wird aus einer emotionalen Reaktion ein Werturteil? „Vom Leben zur Bedeutung“ beschreibt die Übergänge zwischen verschiedenen Erscheinungsformen des Geistigen. Die Rolle der Sprache wird dabei ebenso reflektiert wie das Konzept des Intentionalen als Element der Theorie der Emotionen, der Theorie sprachlicher Bedeutung und der Philosophie des Geistes. -/- 1. Die wichtigsten aktuellen Debatten in Kognitions- und Kulturwissenschaften werden aufgegriffen: Einbezug der Tiere, Emotionsforschung, Leiblichkeit. 2. Bislang (...)
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  19. E. Fivaz-Depeursinge, N. Favez & F. Frascarolo (2004). Threesome Intersubjectivity in Infancy: A Contribution to the Development of Self-Awareness. In Dan Zahavi, T. Grunbaum & Josef Parnas (eds.), The Structure and Development of Self-Consciousness: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. John Benjamins.
  20. M. Frank (1995). Mental Familiarity and Epistemic Self-Ascription. Common Knowledge 4:30--50.
  21. M. Frank (1993). Selbstbewusstseinstheorien von Fichte Bis Sartre. Suhrkamp.
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  22. M. Frank (1991). Selbstbewusstsein Und Selbsterkenntnis: Essays Zur Analytischen Philosophie der Subjektivitã¤T. P. Reclam Jun..
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  23. Manfred Frank (2012). Ansichten der Subjektivität. Suhrkamp.
    Als »Subjektphilosophie« hat man das neuzeitliche Denken insgesamt charakterisiert. Diese Auszeichnung verdankt das Subjekt der verwegenen Hoffnung, es eigne sich zum ultimativen Prinzip der Wissensbegründung. Das Interesse an einer Aufklärung seiner Struktur wurde dadurch jedoch in den Hintergrund gedrängt. Diese Struktur steht im Zentrum von Manfred Franks jüngstem Buch, das einen Blick auf die moderne Geschichte der Subjekttheorien mit Analysen der inneren Beschaffenheit und der Zeitlichkeit des Subjekts sowie seines Verhältnisses zur Intersubjektivität und einer Auseinandersetzung mit klassischen und neuesten analytischen (...)
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  24. Manfred Frank (2007). Non-Objectal Subjectivity. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (s 5-6):152-173.
    The immediate successors of Kant in classical German philosophy considered a subjectivity irreducible to objecthood as the core of personhood. The thesis of an irreducible subjectivity has, after the German idealists, been advocated by the phenomenological movement, as well as by analytical philosophers of self-consciousness such as Hector-Neri Castaneda and Sydney Shoemaker. Their arguments together show that self-consciousness cannot be reduced to a relation whereby a subject grasps itself as an object, but that there must be a core of subjectivity (...)
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  25. Manfred Frank (1992). Is Self-Consciousness a Case of Presence à Soi? Towards a Meta-Critique of the Recent French Critique of Metaphysics. In David Wood (ed.), Derrida: A Critical Reader. Blackwell. 218--34.
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  26. Guillaume Frechette (2013). Searching for the Self: Early Phenomenological Accounts of Self-Consciousness From Lotze to Scheler. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (5):1-26.
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  27. S. Gallagher (2000). Review of Jose Luis Bermudez's' The Paradox of Self-Consciousness'. [REVIEW] Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (7):45-50.
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  28. Shaun Gallagher (2012). The Body in Social Context: Some Qualifications on the'Warmth and Intimacy'of Bodily Self-Consciousness. Grazer Philosophische Studien 84 (1):91-121.
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  29. Shaun Gallagher (2007). Phenomenological Approaches to Consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. 686--696.
    On the phenomenological view, a minimal form of self-consciousness is a constant structural feature of conscious experience. Experience happens for the experiencing subject in an immediate way and as part of this immediacy, it is implicitly marked as my experience. For the phenomenologists, this immediate and first-personal givenness of experiential phenomena must be accounted for in terms of a pre-reflective self-consciousness. In the most basic sense of the term, selfconsciousness is not something that comes about the moment one attentively inspects (...)
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  30. Shaun Gallagher & Dan Zahavi, Phenomenological Approaches to Self-Consciousness. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    On the phenomenological view, a minimal form of self-consciousness is a constant structural feature of conscious experience. Experience happens for the experiencing subject in an immediate way and as part of this immediacy, it is implicitly marked as my experience. For the phenomenologists, this immediate and first-personal givenness of experiential phenomena must be accounted for in terms of a pre-reflective self-consciousness. In the most basic sense of the term, selfconsciousness is not something that comes about the moment one attentively inspects (...)
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  31. Shaun Gallagher & Dan Zahavi (2007). The Phenomenological Mind: An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science. Routledge.
    The Phenomenological Mind is the first book to properly introduce fundamental questions about the mind from the perspective of phenomenology. Key questions and topics covered include: What is phenomenology? naturalizing phenomenology and the empirical cognitive sciences phenomenology and consciousness consciousness and self-consciousness, including perception and action time and consciousness, including William James intentionality the embodied mind action knowledge of other minds situated and extended minds phenomenology and personal identity Interesting and important examples are used throughout, including phantom limb syndrome, blindsight (...)
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  32. Thor Grünbaum (2012). First Person and Minimal Self-Consciousness. In Miguens & Preyer (eds.), Consciousness and Subjectivity. Ontos Verlag. 47--273.
  33. D. Henrich (1967). Fichtes Urspr K Slashã¼Ngliche Einsicht. Klostermann, Frankfurt Am Main.
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  34. Dieter Henrich (1979). Zwei Theorien zur Verteidigung von Selbstbewußtsein. Grazer Philosophische Studien 7:77-99.
    Chisholm's two theories of self-consciousness (before and after 1976) are interpreted and evaluated as well motivated, powerful and instructive attempts to avoid circularities while preserving the phenomenon. They are criticised because of correlative shortcomings: The essentialistic theory allows only the formulation and the ascription of self-consciousness in the first person perspective; the second (epistemic) theory is restricted to the ascription of self-consciousness to others. The first theory suffers furthermore from a hidden circularity whereas the second needs an extension that leads (...)
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  35. Chien-Hsing Ho (2007). Consciousness and Self-Awareness. Asian Philosophy 17 (3):213 – 230.
    In this paper I propose to inquire into the theory of self-awareness propounded by the two Buddhist epistemologists, Dignaga and Dharmakirti. I first give an outline of the Buddhist notion of consciousness, then deal with the notion of objectual appearance, and finally dwell on the theory itself together with certain arguments in its favor. It is shown that the Buddhists subscribed themselves to the following self-awareness thesis: that our waking consciousness is always pre-reflectively and nonconceptually aware of itself. Adopting an (...)
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  36. Greg Janzen (2005). Self-Consciousness and Phenomenal Character. Dialogue 44 44 (04):707-733.
    ABSTRACT: This article defends two theses: that a mental state is conscious if and only if it has phenomenal character, i.e., if and only if there is something it is like for the subject to be in that state, and that all state consciousness involves selfconsciousness, in the sense that a mental state is conscious if and only if its possessor is, in some suitable way, conscious of being in it. Though neither of these theses is novel, there is a (...)
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  37. Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth W. Williford (eds.) (2006). Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press.
    Leading theorists examine the self-representational theory of consciousness as an alternative to the two dominant reductive theories of consciousness, the ...
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  38. Joel Krueger (2006). Concrete Consciousness: A Sartrean Critique of Functionalist Accounts of Mind. Sartre Studies International 12 (2):44-60.
    Sartre's notion of pre-reflective consciousness can be summoned to offer a general challenge to contemporary functionalist accounts of mind, broadly construed. In virtue of the challenge Sartre offers these contemporary functionalist accounts and the richness of his phenomenological analysis, I conclude that his voice needs to be included in ongoing debates over the nature of consciousness. First, I look at some of the basic claims motivating functionalist accounts of mind. Next, I look at Sartre's notion of pre-reflective consciousness and discuss (...)
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  39. Dorothée Legrand (2009). Two Senses for 'Givenness of Consciousness'. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (1):89-94.
    The notion of ‘givenness of consciousness’ needs further elucidation. On the one hand, I agree with Lyyra (this volume) that one sense for ‘givenness of consciousness’ is not enough to account for consciousness and self-consciousness. On the other hand, I will argue that Lyyra’s paper is problematic precisely because he fails to consider one basic sense for ‘givenness of consciousness’. Lyyra and I thus agree that there must be (at least) two senses for ‘givenness of consciousness’; we disagree, however about (...)
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  40. Dorothée Legrand (2007). Pre-Reflective Self-as-Subject From Experiential and Empirical Perspectives. Consciousness and Cognition 16 (3):583-599.
  41. Dorothée Legrand (2006). The Bodily Self: The Sensori-Motor Roots of Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (1):89-118.
    A bodily self is characterized by pre-reflective bodily self-consciousness that is.
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  42. Dorothee Peggy Martine Legrand (2007). Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness: On Being Bodily in the World. Janus Head 9 (2):493-519.
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  43. José Luis Bermúdez (2001). Nonconceptual Self-Consciousness and Cognitive Science. Synthese 129 (1):129-149.
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  44. Olivier Massin (2010). L'objectivité du toucher [The Objectivity of the Sense of Touch]. Dissertation, Aix-Marseille
    This thesis vindicates the common-sense intuition that touch is more objective than the other senses. The reason why it is so, it is argued, is that touch is the only sense essential of the experience of physical effort, and that this experience constitutes our only acquaintance with the mind-independence of the physical world. The thesis is divided in tree parts. Part I argues that sensory modalities are individuated by they proper objects, realistically construed. Part II argues that the proper objects (...)
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  45. William Leon McBride (ed.) (1997). Existentialist Ontology and Human Consciousness. Garland Pub..
    Existentialist Ontology and Human Consciousness The majority of the distinguished scholarly articles in this volume focus on Sartre's early philosophical work, which dealt first with imagination and the emotions, then with the critique of Husserl's notion of a transcendental ego, and finally with systematic ontology presented in his best-known book, Being and Nothingness. In addition, since his preoccupation with ontological questions and especially with the meanings of ego, self, and consciousness endured throughout his career, other essays discuss these themes in (...)
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  46. R. Meeks (2006). Why Nonconceptual Content Cannot Be Immune to Error Through Misidentification. European Review of Philosophy 6:81-100.
  47. Thomas K. Metzinger (2013). Why Are Dreams Interesting for Philosophers? The Example of Minimal Phenomenal Selfhood, Plus an Agenda for Future Research1. Frontiers in Psychology 4.
    This metatheoretical paper develops a list of new research targets by exploring particularly promising interdisciplinary contact points between empirical dream research and philosophy of mind. The central example is the MPS-problem. It is constituted by the epistemic goal of conceptually isolating and empirically grounding the phenomenal property of “minimal phenomenal selfhood”, which refers to the simplest form of self-consciousness. In order to precisely describe MPS, one must focus on those conditions that are not only causally enabling, but strictly necessary to (...)
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  48. D. Meyer-Dinkgrafe (2001). The Paradox of Self-Consciousness. By Jose Luis Bermudez. The European Legacy 6 (3):411-411.
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  49. Adam Morton (2001). The Paradox of Self-Consciousness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (3):727-730.
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  50. Kristina Musholt (forthcoming). Thinking About Oneself. MIT Press.
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