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  1. Roman Altshuler (2015). Teleology, Narrative, and Death. In John Lippitt & Patrick Stokes (eds.), Narrative, Identity and the Kierkegaardian Self. Edinburgh University Press 29-45.
    Heidegger, like Kierkegaard, has recently been claimed as a narrativist about selves. From this Heideggerian perspective, we can see how narrative expands upon the psychological view, adding a vital teleological dimension to the understanding of selfhood while denying the reductionism implicit in the psychological approach. Yet the narrative approach also inherits the neo-Lockean emphasis on the past as determining identity, whereas the self is fundamentally about the future. Death is crucial on this picture, not as allowing for the possibility of (...)
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  2. José Antúnez-Cid (2014). Nuevas Antropologías: por una antropología de la carne de hondura metafísica. Teología y Catequesis 129:43-80.
    This study divides some of the philosophical anthropologies developed after the Holocaust into three frameworks. To do this the author shows how the present modern crisis is an anthropological one and unites the sum of the different crisis dimensions mankind is currently facing. The article approaches the postmodern journey from its two routes—the relativistic and the metaphysical. The second is presented as “status quo-oriented” or as a form of modernized democracy. Because of its popularity, the neologism “transhumanism” is here examined (...)
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  3. Bruce Aune (1983). The Identity of the Self, by Geoffrey Madel. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 36 (3):724-726.
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  4. Robert H. Ayers (1971). "Survival and Disembodied Existence," by Terence Penelhum. Modern Schoolman 48 (4):395-398.
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  5. Robert H. Ayers (1970). Personal Survival of Death--An Analysis. Modern Schoolman 47 (3):331-339.
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  6. Michael Bourke (2015). Persons, Virtual Persons, and Radical Interpretation. Modern Horizons:1-24.
    A dramatic problem facing the concept of the self is whether there is anything to make sense of. Despite the speculative view that there is an essential role for the perceiver in measurement, a physicalist view of reality currently seems to be ruling out the conditions of subjectivity required to keep the concept of the self. Eliminative materialism states this position explicitly. The doctrine holds that we have no objective grounds for attributing personhood to anyone, and can therefore dispense with (...)
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  7. Edward P. Butler (2015). Transformation and Individuation in Giordano Bruno's Monadology. SOCRATES 3 (2).
    The essay explores the systematic relationship in the work of Giordano Bruno (1548-1600) between his monadology, his metaphysics as presented in works such as De la causa, principio et uno, the mythopoeic cosmology of Lo spaccio de la bestia trionfante, and practical works like De vinculis in genere. Bruno subverts the conceptual regime of the Aristotelian substantial forms and its accompanying cosmology with a metaphysics of individuality that privileges individual unity (singularity) over formal unity and particulars over substantial forms without (...)
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  8. Troy Catterson (2008). Changing the Subject: On the Subject of Subjectivity. Synthese 162 (3):385 - 404.
    In this paper I shall attempt to argue for the simple view of personal identity. I shall first argue that we often do have warrant for our beliefs that we exist as continuing subjects of experience, and that these beliefs are justified independently of any reductionist analysis of what it means to be a person. This has two important implications that are relevant to the ongoing debate concerning the number of persons that are in existence throughout any duration in time: (...)
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  9. Benjamin L. Curtis & Harold W. Noonan (2015). Identity Over Time, Constitution and the Problem of Personal Identity. In Steven Miller (ed.), The Constitution of Phenomenal Consciousness: Toward a science and theory. John Benjamins Publishing Company 348-371.
    What am I? And what is my relationship to the thing I call ‘my body’? Thus each of us can pose for himself the philosophical problems of the nature of the self and the relationship between a person and his body. One answer to the question about the relationship between a person and the thing he calls ‘his body’ is that they are two things composed of the same matter at the same time (like a clay statue and the piece (...)
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  10. Tanya De Villiers (2002). Complexity and the Self. Dissertation, University of Stellenbosch
    In this thesis it is argued that the age-old philosophical "Problem of the Self' can benefit by being approached from the perspective of a relatively recent science, namely that of Complexity Theory. With this in mind the conceptual features of this theory is highlighted and summarised. Furthermore, the argument is made that the predominantly dualistic approach to the self that is characteristic of the Western Philosophical tradition serves to hinder, rather than edify, our understanding of the phenomenon. The benefits posed (...)
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  11. S. Clint Dowland (2016). Embodied Mind Sparsism. Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1853-1872.
    If we are physical things with parts, then accounts of what we are and accounts of when composition occurs have important implications for one another. Defenders of restricted composition tend to endorse a sparse ontology in taking an eliminativist stance toward composite objects that are not organisms, while claiming that we are organisms. However, these arguments do not entail that we are organisms, for they rely on the premise that we are organisms. Thus, sparsist reasoning need not be paired with (...)
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  12. James Duerlinger (1993). Reductionist and Nonreductionist Theories of Persons in Indian Buddhist Philosophy. Journal of Indian Philosophy 21 (1):79-101.
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  13. C. Stephen Evans & Brandon L. Rickabaugh (2015). What Does It Mean to Be a Bodily Soul? Philosophia Christi 17 (2):315-330.
    Evangelical scholars have recently offered criticisms of mind-body dualism from the disciplines of theology, philosophy, and neuroscience. We offer several arguments as to why these reasons for abandoning mind-body dualism fail. Additionally, we offer a positive thesis, a dualism that brings together the best aspects of the Cartesian view and the Thomistic view of human persons. The result is a substance dualism that treats the nature of embodiment quite seriously. This view explains why we, as souls, require a resurrected body (...)
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  14. A. R. J. Fisher (2013). Personal Identity: Complex or Simple? Gasser Georg and Stefan Matthias, Eds. Cambridge University Press, 2012. XI + 259 Pp. $95 (Hardback). [REVIEW] Dialogue 52 (4):1-3.
  15. Robert Francescotti (1998). The Nonreductionist's Troubles with Supervenience. Philosophical Studies 89 (1):105-24.
    I argue that there is a tension between three popular views in the philosophy of mind: (1) mental properties are not identical with physical properties (a version of nonreductionism), but (2) mental properties are had solely by virtue of physical properties (physicalism regarding the mind), which requires that (3) mental properties supervene on physical properties. To earn the title "physicalist," one must hold a sufficiently strong version of the supervenience thesis. But this, I argue, will be a version that undermines (...)
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  16. Brian Garrett (2002). Personal Identity and Self-Consciousness. Routledge.
    _Personal Identity and Self-Consciousness_ is about persons and personal identity. What are we? And why does personal identity matter? Brian Garrett, using jargon-free language, addresses questions in the metaphysics of personal identity, questions in value theory, and discusses questions about the first person singular. Brian Garrett makes an important contribution to the philosophy of personal identity and mind, and to epistemology.
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  17. Dirk Hartmann (2011). Personalität, Persönlichkeit und personale Identität: Einführung. In Carl Friedrich Gethmann (ed.), Lebenswelt und Wissenschaft: Deutsches Jahrbuch Philosophie Band 2. Meiner 583 - 584.
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  18. Tabea Hirzel (2015). Principles of Liberty: A Design-Based Research on Liberty as A Priori Constitutive Principle of the Social in the Swiss Nation Story. Dissertation, SCM University, Zug, Switzerland
    One of the still unsolved problems in liberal anarchism is a definition of social constituency in positive terms. Partially, this had been solved by the advancements of liberal discourse ethics. These approaches, built on praxeology as a universal framework for social formation, are detached from the need of any previous or external authority or rule for the discursive partners. However, the relationship between action, personal identity, and liberty within the process of a community becoming solely generated from the praxeological a (...)
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  19. Claus Janew (1998). Die Erschaffung der Realität. Sumari-Verlag.
    The main argument in this book is the undeniable openness of every system to the unknown. And the fundamental question goes: What does this openness produce? We are a part of the infinite universe and an incorporation of its wholeness. Both for us means an individualized reality, through which the universe expresses itself and on the other hand through which it is built up with. It also means our necessity, importance and indestructibility for the sum of its incorporations. Most connections (...)
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  20. Jens Johansson (2007). Non-Reductionism and Special Concern. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (4):641 – 657.
    The so-called 'Extreme Claim' asserts that reductionism about personal identity leaves each of us with no reason to be specially concerned about his or her own future. Both advocates and opponents of the Extreme Claim, whether of a reductionist or non-reductionist stripe, accept that similar problems do not arise for non-reductionism. In this paper I challenge this widely held assumption.
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  21. Andreas Kemmerling (2015). The Conceptual Inexhaustibility of Personhood. Tsinghua Studies in Western Philosophy 1 (1):368-399.
    Some leading neuro-scientists recently proclaimed an obviously false view that a human person is his/her brain. This falsity arises partly from the conceptual difficulties concerning personhood/a person. By revealing inexhaustible richness of the characteristics of this concept of a person, this essay explains why the concept is so utterly puzzling. The author contrasts Descartes’ concept of a person with Locke’s. For Descartes, the concept has four features: (1) it is the concept of the mind/body-union; (2) it is innate and a (...)
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  22. Tim Klaassen, Why Am I Me and Not Someone Else?
    In this article I discuss the seeming contingency of the fact that one is the specific person that one is. Here, I propose that this contingency is illusory.
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  23. John-Michael Kuczynski (2016). A Theory of Personal Identity. Amazon Digital Services LLC.
    According to David Hume, there is nothing to the mind other than the various fleeting events that it hosts. According to commonsense, this is false. But the commonsense view has never been meaningfully elaborated. This short work states an analysis of personal identity that combines Hume's position with the position, so far as there is one, of commonsense, thereby giving much needed substance to the latter.
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  24. Hugo Luzio (forthcoming). A Continuidade Física Garante a Persistência Pessoal no Tempo. Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia.
    Defendemos que a continuidade física garante a persistência pessoal no tempo. Determinamos, primeiro, os fundamentos teóricos e conceptuais do problema metafísico da identidade pessoal no tempo: apuramos a noção relevante de «identidade pessoal», a questão da persistência temporal simpliciter e aquilo em que consistem critérios identitários e princípios de individuação. Examinamos propriedades lógicas e formais do conceito de identidade: as leis da congruência, o princípio lógico da identidade, a reflexividade, simetria e transitividade, distinguimos as relações de identidade qualitativa e numérica (...)
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  25. Antonio Malo (ed.) (2010). Io E Gli Altri: Dall'identità Alla Relazione. Edusc.
    This essay pretends just to try out the relationship between these realities, seemingly so distant and in reality so close, because - and this is the central thesis - the origin and destiny of human person is in his/her relationship with others. To support this thesis the author uses some data that sciences and humanities offer to anthropological reflection. Psychology, neuroscience and sociology are some of the disciplines from which to take inspiration to deepen this paradoxical relationship present in human (...)
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  26. Trenton Merricks (2001). Objects and Persons. Oxford University Press.
    Objects and Persons presents an original theory about what kinds of things exist. Trenton Merricks argues that there are no non-living inanimate macrophysical objects -- no statues or rocks or chairs or stars -- because they would have no causal role over and above the causal role of their microphysical parts. Humans do exist: we have non-redundant causal powers. Along the way, Merricks has interesting things to say about mental causation, free will, and various philosophical puzzles. Anyone working in metaphysics (...)
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  27. James Moulder (1972). In Defense of Immaterial Persons. Philosophical Papers 1 (May):38-55.
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  28. Ignacio Moya Arriagada (2013). La identidad personal, el dialogo y la extensión: Por qué no existe el yo sin los otros. Intus-Legere Filosofia 7 (1):59-77.
    (ENGLISH) In this paper I propose a concept of the self that allows us to address and solve some of the issues associated with problem of diachronic personal identity. That is, by virtue of what can we consider that I am today the same person I was yesterday? The problem of continuity in time of identity has a long history in analytic philosophy. I argue that the continuity of personal identity over time can be ensured by resorting to the concept (...)
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  29. Ignacio Moya Arriagada (2009). The Primacy of Space in Heidegger and Taylor: Towards a Unified Account of Personal Identity. Appraisal 7 (4):17-24.
    My aim is to explore how the notion of personhood is tied to the notion of space--both physical and moral space. In particular, I argue against the Cartesian view of the disengaged/disembodied self and in favour of Charles Taylor's and Martin Heidegger's view of the engaged and embedded self. I contend that space, as the transcendental condition for the possibility of human agency, is the place where questions of identity are possible and answers, if any, are to be found. Thus, (...)
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  30. Eric T. Olson (forthcoming). In Search of the Simple View. In G. Gasser & M. Stefan (eds.), Personal Identity: Complex or Simple? Cambridge University Press
    Accounts of personal identity over time are supposed to fall into two broad categories: 'complex views' saying that our persistence consists in something else, and 'simple views' saying that it doesn' t. But it is impossible to characterize this distinction in any satisfactory way. The debate has been systematically misdescribed. After arguing for this claim, the paper says something about how the debate might be better characterized.
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  31. Abraham J. Palakudy (ed.) (2015). Many Doors of New Knowledge That Mankind yet to Knock-At. Amazon.Com.
    see at link: http://www.amazon.com/Many-doors-knowledge-mankind-knock-at/dp/1514354772/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=143 5236004&sr=8-1&keywords=book%2C+many+doors+of+new+knowledge .
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  32. Derek Parfit (2002). Reductionism and Personal Identity. In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Contemporary Readings. OUP 655-51.
  33. Ray Scott Percival (2004). Persons and Popper's World 3: Do Humans Dream of Electric Sheep? In Jeffrey A. Schaler (ed.), Szasz Under Fire: The Psychiatric Abolitionist Faces His Critics. Open Court Publishing Company 119-130.
    In the film classic Blade Runner, the story explores the notion of personal identity through that of carefully crafted androids. Can an android have a personality; can androids be persons? The title of the original story by Philip K. Dick is Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? The story suggests that our sense of being a person depends on our having memories that connect us with our childhood. In the movie, the androids are only a couple of years old, but (...)
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  34. Douglas V. Porpora (2013). How Many Thoughts Are There? Or Why We Likely Have No Tegmark Duplicates $$ 10^{{10^{115} }} $$ M Away. Philosophical Studies 163 (1):133-149.
    Physicist Max Tegmark argues that if there are infinite universes or sub-universes, we will encounter our exact duplicates infinite times, the nearest within $$ 10^{{10^{115} }} $$ m. Tegmark assumes Humean supervenience and a finite number of possible combinations of elementary quantum states. This paper argues on the contrary that Tegmark’s argument fails to hold if possible thoughts, persons, and life histories are all infinite in number. Are there infinite thoughts we could possibly think? This paper will show that there (...)
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  35. Jeanine Weekes Schroer & Robert Schroer (2014). Getting the Story Right: A Reductionist Narrative Account of Personal Identity. Philosophical Studies (3):1-25.
    A popular “Reductionist” account of personal identity unifies person stages into persons in virtue of their psychological continuity with one another. One objection to psychological continuity accounts is that there is more to our personal identity than just mere psychological continuity: there is also an active process of self-interpretation and self-creation. This criticism can be used to motivate a rival account of personal identity that appeals to the notion of a narrative. To the extent that they comment upon the issue, (...)
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  36. David W. Shoemaker (2002). The Irrelevance/Incoherence of Non-Reductionism About Personal Identity. Philo 5 (2):143-160.
    Before being able to answer key practical questions dependent on a criterion of personal identity (e.g., am I justified in anticipating surviving the death of my body?), we must first determine which general approach to the issue of personal identity is more plausible, reductionism or non-reductionism. While reductionism has become the more dominant approach amongst philosophical theorists over the past thirty years, non-reductionism remains an approach that, for all these theorists have shown, could very well still be true. My aim (...)
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  37. Tuomas E. Tahko (2013). More Kinds of Being: A Further Study of Individuation, Identity, and the Logic of Sortal Terms. By E. J. Lowe. [REVIEW] Mind 122 (485):302-305.
    Book review of 'More Kinds of Being: A Further Study of Individuation, Identity, and the Logic of Sortal Terms'. By E. J. LOWE.
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  38. Agustin Vicente & Adrian Sampedro Leon (2014). Personas en el mundo: la perspectiva de la primera persona y el naturalismo. Análisis: Revista de Investigación Filosófica 1:161-180.
    In this paper we examine different answers to the question of what we are, focusing in particular on eliminative and reductivist proposals about persons or selves. We conclude that, as of today, dualism seems more reasonable than naturalism, if by naturalism we understand the thesis that psychological entities can be reduced or eliminated.
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  39. Daniel von Wachter (1999). Ein bemerkenswerter Unterschied zwischen Personen und Schiffen. In E. Runggaldier & W. Löffler (eds.), Vielfalt und Konvergenz der Philosophie. Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky 243-247, http://epub.ub.uni-muen.
    Argues that persons have determinate conditions of diachronic identity, but not material things do not. That is evidence for the soul.
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