This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Siblings:
28 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Order:
  1. Roman Altshuler (2015). Teleology, Narrative, and Death. In John Lippitt & Patrick Stokes (eds.), Narrative, Identity and the Kierkegaardian Self. Edinburgh University Press 29-45.
  2. José Antúnez-Cid (2014). Nuevas Antropologías: por una antropología de la carne de hondura metafísica. Teología y Catequesis 129:43-80.
    This study divides some of the philosophical anthropologies developed after the Holocaust into three frameworks. To do this the author shows how the present modern crisis is an anthropological one and unites the sum of the different crisis dimensions mankind is currently facing. The article approaches the postmodern journey from its two routes—the relativistic and the metaphysical. The second is presented as “status quo-oriented” or as a form of modernized democracy. Because of its popularity, the neologism “transhumanism” is here examined (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. Bruce Aune (1983). The Identity of the Self, by Geoffrey Madel. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 36 (3):724-726.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4. Robert H. Ayers (1971). "Survival and Disembodied Existence," by Terence Penelhum. Modern Schoolman 48 (4):395-398.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5. Robert H. Ayers (1970). Personal Survival of Death--An Analysis. Modern Schoolman 47 (3):331-339.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6. Edward P. Butler (2015). Transformation and Individuation in Giordano Bruno's Monadology. SOCRATES 3 (2).
    The essay explores the systematic relationship in the work of Giordano Bruno (1548-1600) between his monadology, his metaphysics as presented in works such as De la causa, principio et uno, the mythopoeic cosmology of Lo spaccio de la bestia trionfante, and practical works like De vinculis in genere. Bruno subverts the conceptual regime of the Aristotelian substantial forms and its accompanying cosmology with a metaphysics of individuality that privileges individual unity (singularity) over formal unity and particulars over substantial forms without (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7. Troy Catterson (2008). Changing the Subject: On the Subject of Subjectivity. Synthese 162 (3):385 - 404.
    In this paper I shall attempt to argue for the simple view of personal identity. I shall first argue that we often do have warrant for our beliefs that we exist as continuing subjects of experience, and that these beliefs are justified independently of any reductionist analysis of what it means to be a person. This has two important implications that are relevant to the ongoing debate concerning the number of persons that are in existence throughout any duration in time: (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8. Benjamin L. Curtis & Harold W. Noonan (2015). Identity Over Time, Constitution and the Problem of Personal Identity. In Steven Miller (ed.), The Constitution of Phenomenal Consciousness: Toward a science and theory. John Benjamins Publishing Company 348-371.
  9. Tanya De Villiers (2002). Complexity and the Self. Dissertation, University of Stellenbosch
    In this thesis it is argued that the age-old philosophical "Problem of the Self' can benefit by being approached from the perspective of a relatively recent science, namely that of Complexity Theory. With this in mind the conceptual features of this theory is highlighted and summarised. Furthermore, the argument is made that the predominantly dualistic approach to the self that is characteristic of the Western Philosophical tradition serves to hinder, rather than edify, our understanding of the phenomenon. The benefits posed (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. S. Clint Dowland (2015). Embodied Mind Sparsism. Philosophical Studies:1-20.
    If we are physical things with parts, then accounts of what we are and accounts of when composition occurs have important implications for one another. Defenders of restricted composition tend to endorse a sparse ontology in taking an eliminativist stance toward composite objects that are not organisms, while claiming that we are organisms. However, these arguments do not entail that we are organisms, for they rely on the premise that we are organisms. Thus, sparsist reasoning need not be paired with (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11. C. Stephen Evans & Brandon L. Rickabaugh (2015). What Does It Mean to Be a Bodily Soul? Philosophia Christi 17 (2):315-330.
    Evangelical scholars have recently offered criticisms of mind-body dualism from the disciplines of theology, philosophy, and neuroscience. We offer several arguments as to why these reasons for abandoning mind-body dualism fail. Additionally, we offer a positive thesis, a dualism that brings together the best aspects of the Cartesian view and the Thomistic view of human persons. The result is a substance dualism that treats the nature of embodiment quite seriously. This view explains why we, as (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12. Claus Janew (1998). Die Erschaffung der Realität. Sumari-Verlag.
    Das Hauptargument dieses Buches ist die unleugbare Offenheit jedes Systems zum Unbekannten hin. Und die Grundfrage lautet: Was ergibt sich aus dieser Offenheit? Wir sind ein Teil des unendlichen Universums und eine Verkörperung seiner Ganzheit. Beides bedeutet für uns eine individualisierte Wirklichkeit, durch die sich das Universum ausdrückt und durch die es andererseits mit gebildet wird. Es bedeutet ebenfalls unsere Notwendigkeit, Wichtigkeit und Unzerstörbarkeit für die Gesamtheit seiner Verkörperungen. Die meisten Verbindungen untereinander sind uns kaum bewusst. Indessen gewährleistet die Infinitesimalstruktur (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13. Jens Johansson (2007). Non-Reductionism and Special Concern. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (4):641 – 657.
    The so-called 'Extreme Claim' asserts that reductionism about personal identity leaves each of us with no reason to be specially concerned about his or her own future. Both advocates and opponents of the Extreme Claim, whether of a reductionist or non-reductionist stripe, accept that similar problems do not arise for non-reductionism. In this paper I challenge this widely held assumption.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  14. Tim Klaassen, Why Am I Me and Not Someone Else?
    In this article I discuss the seeming contingency of the fact that one is the specific person that one is. Here, I propose that this contingency is illusory.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15. Trenton Merricks (2001). Objects and Persons. Oxford University Press.
    Objects and Persons presents an original theory about what kinds of things exist. Trenton Merricks argues that there are no non-living inanimate macrophysical objects -- no statues or rocks or chairs or stars -- because they would have no causal role over and above the causal role of their microphysical parts. Humans do exist: we have non-redundant causal powers. Along the way, Merricks has interesting things to say about mental causation, free will, and various philosophical puzzles. Anyone working in metaphysics (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   88 citations  
  16. James Moulder (1972). In Defense of Immaterial Persons. Philosophical Papers 1 (May):38-55.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17. Ignacio Moya Arriagada (2013). La identidad personal, el dialogo y la extensión: Por qué no existe el yo sin los otros. Intus-Legere Filosofia 7 (1):59-77.
    (ENGLISH) In this paper I propose a concept of the self that allows us to address and solve some of the issues associated with problem of diachronic personal identity. That is, by virtue of what can we consider that I am today the same person I was yesterday? The problem of continuity in time of identity has a long history in analytic philosophy. I argue that the continuity of personal identity over time can be ensured by resorting to the concept (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18. Ignacio Moya Arriagada (2009). The Primacy of Space in Heidegger and Taylor: Towards a Unified Account of Personal Identity. Appraisal 7 (4):17-24.
    My aim is to explore how the notion of personhood is tied to the notion of space--both physical and moral space. In particular, I argue against the Cartesian view of the disengaged/disembodied self and in favour of Charles Taylor's and Martin Heidegger's view of the engaged and embedded self. I contend that space, as the transcendental condition for the possibility of human agency, is the place where questions of identity are possible and answers, if any, are to be found. Thus, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19. Eric T. Olson (forthcoming). In Search of the Simple View. In G. Gasser & M. Stefan (eds.), Personal Identity: Complex or Simple? Cambridge University Press
    Accounts of personal identity over time are supposed to fall into two broad categories: 'complex views' saying that our persistence consists in something else, and 'simple views' saying that it doesn' t. But it is impossible to characterize this distinction in any satisfactory way. The debate has been systematically misdescribed. After arguing for this claim, the paper says something about how the debate might be better characterized.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20. Abraham J. Palakudy (ed.) (2015). Many Doors of New Knowledge That Mankind yet to Knock-At. Amazon.Com.
    see at link: http://www.amazon.com/Many-doors-knowledge-mankind-knock-at/dp/1514354772/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=143 5236004&sr=8-1&keywords=book%2C+many+doors+of+new+knowledge .
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21. Derek Parfit (2002). Reductionism and Personal Identity. In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Contemporary Readings. OUP 655-51.
  22. Ray Scott Percival (2004). Persons and Popper's World 3: Do Humans Dream of Electric Sheep? In Jeffrey A. Schaler (ed.), Szasz Under Fire: The Psychiatric Abolitionist Faces His Critics. Open Court Publishers 119-130.
    In the film classic Blade Runner, the story explores the notion of personal identity through that of carefully crafted androids. Can an android have a personality; can androids be persons? The title of the original story by Philip K. Dick is Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? The story suggests that our sense of being a person depends on our having memories that connect us with our childhood. In the movie, the androids are only a couple of years old, but (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23. Douglas V. Porpora (2013). How Many Thoughts Are There? Or Why We Likely Have No Tegmark Duplicates $$ 10^{{10^{115} }} $$ M Away. Philosophical Studies 163 (1):133-149.
    Physicist Max Tegmark argues that if there are infinite universes or sub-universes, we will encounter our exact duplicates infinite times, the nearest within $$ 10^{{10^{115} }} $$ m. Tegmark assumes Humean supervenience and a finite number of possible combinations of elementary quantum states. This paper argues on the contrary that Tegmark’s argument fails to hold if possible thoughts, persons, and life histories are all infinite in number. Are there infinite thoughts we could possibly think? This paper will show that there (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  24. Jeanine Weekes Schroer & Robert Schroer (2014). Getting the Story Right: A Reductionist Narrative Account of Personal Identity. Philosophical Studies (3):1-25.
    A popular “Reductionist” account of personal identity unifies person stages into persons in virtue of their psychological continuity with one another. One objection to psychological continuity accounts is that there is more to our personal identity than just mere psychological continuity: there is also an active process of self-interpretation and self-creation. This criticism can be used to motivate a rival account of personal identity that appeals to the notion of a narrative. To the extent that they comment upon the issue, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25. David W. Shoemaker (2002). The Irrelevance/Incoherence of Non-Reductionism About Personal Identity. Philo 5 (2):143-160.
    Before being able to answer key practical questions dependent on a criterion of personal identity (e.g., am I justified in anticipating surviving the death of my body?), we must first determine which general approach to the issue of personal identity is more plausible, reductionism or non-reductionism. While reductionism has become the more dominant approach amongst philosophical theorists over the past thirty years, non-reductionism remains an approach that, for all these theorists have shown, could very well still be true. My aim (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  26. Tuomas E. Tahko (2013). More Kinds of Being: A Further Study of Individuation, Identity, and the Logic of Sortal Terms, by E. J. Lowe. [REVIEW] Mind 122 (485):302-305.
    Book review of 'More Kinds of Being: A Further Study of Individuation, Identity, and the Logic of Sortal Terms'. By E. J. LOWE.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27. Agustin Vicente & Adrian Sampedro Leon (2014). Personas en el mundo: la perspectiva de la primera persona y el naturalismo. Análisis: Revista de Investigación Filosófica 1:161-180.
    In this paper we examine different answers to the question of what we are, focusing in particular on eliminative and reductivist proposals about persons or selves. We conclude that, as of today, dualism seems more reasonable than naturalism, if by naturalism we understand the thesis that psychological entities can be reduced or eliminated.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28. Daniel von Wachter (1999). Ein bemerkenswerter Unterschied zwischen Personen und Schiffen. In E. Runggaldier & W. Löffler (eds.), Vielfalt und Konvergenz der Philosophie. Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky 243-247, http://epub.ub.uni-muen.
    Argues that persons have determinate conditions of diachronic identity, but not material things do not. That is evidence for the soul.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography