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  1. Troy Catterson (2008). Changing the Subject: On the Subject of Subjectivity. Synthese 162 (3):385 - 404.
    In this paper I shall attempt to argue for the simple view of personal identity. I shall first argue that we often do have warrant for our beliefs that we exist as continuing subjects of experience, and that these beliefs are justified independently of any reductionist analysis of what it means to be a person. This has two important implications that are relevant to the ongoing debate concerning the number of persons that are in existence throughout any duration in time: (...)
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  2. Jens Johansson (2007). Non-Reductionism and Special Concern. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (4):641 – 657.
    The so-called 'Extreme Claim' asserts that reductionism about personal identity leaves each of us with no reason to be specially concerned about his or her own future. Both advocates and opponents of the Extreme Claim, whether of a reductionist or non-reductionist stripe, accept that similar problems do not arise for non-reductionism. In this paper I challenge this widely held assumption.
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  3. James Moulder (1972). In Defense of Immaterial Persons. Philosophical Papers 1 (May):38-55.
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  4. Eric T. Olson (forthcoming). In Search of the Simple View. In G. Gasser & M. Stefan (eds.), Personal Identity: Complex or Simple? Cambridge University Press.
    Accounts of personal identity over time are supposed to fall into two broad categories: 'complex views' saying that our persistence consists in something else, and 'simple views' saying that it doesn' t. But it is impossible to characterize this distinction in any satisfactory way. The debate has been systematically misdescribed. After arguing for this claim, the paper says something about how the debate might be better characterized.
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  5. Derek Parfit (2002). Reductionism and Personal Identity. In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Contemporary Readings. OUP. 655-51.
  6. Douglas V. Porpora (2013). How Many Thoughts Are There? Or Why We Likely Have No Tegmark Duplicates $$ 10^{{10^{115} }} $$ M Away. Philosophical Studies 163 (1):133-149.
    Physicist Max Tegmark argues that if there are infinite universes or sub-universes, we will encounter our exact duplicates infinite times, the nearest within $$ 10^{{10^{115} }} $$ m. Tegmark assumes Humean supervenience and a finite number of possible combinations of elementary quantum states. This paper argues on the contrary that Tegmark’s argument fails to hold if possible thoughts, persons, and life histories are all infinite in number. Are there infinite thoughts we could possibly think? This paper will show that there (...)
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  7. Jeanine Weekes Schroer & Robert Schroer (2014). Getting the Story Right: A Reductionist Narrative Account of Personal Identity. Philosophical Studies:1-25.
    A popular “Reductionist” account of personal identity unifies person stages into persons in virtue of their psychological continuity with one another. One objection to psychological continuity accounts is that there is more to our personal identity than just mere psychological continuity: there is also an active process of self-interpretation and self-creation. This criticism can be used to motivate a rival account of personal identity that appeals to the notion of a narrative. To the extent that they comment upon the issue, (...)
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  8. David W. Shoemaker (2002). The Irrelevance/Incoherence of Non-Reductionism About Personal Identity. Philo 5 (2):143-160.
    Before being able to answer key practical questions dependent on a criterion of personal identity (e.g., am I justified in anticipating surviving the death of my body?), we must first determine which general approach to the issue of personal identity is more plausible, reductionism or non-reductionism. While reductionism has become the more dominant approach amongst philosophical theorists over the past thirty years, non-reductionism remains an approach that, for all these theorists have shown, could very well still be true. My aim (...)
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  9. Tuomas E. Tahko (2013). More Kinds of Being: A Further Study of Individuation, Identity, and the Logic of Sortal Terms, by E. J. Lowe. [REVIEW] Mind 122 (485):302-305.
    Book review of 'More Kinds of Being: A Further Study of Individuation, Identity, and the Logic of Sortal Terms' (2009, Wiley-Blackwell). By E. J. LOWE.
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  10. Daniel von Wachter (1999). Ein bemerkenswerter Unterschied zwischen Personen und Schiffen. In E. Runggaldier & W. Löffler (eds.), Vielfalt und Konvergenz der Philosophie. Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky. 243-247, http://epub.ub.uni-muen.
    Argues that persons have determinate conditions of diachronic identity, but not material things do not. That is evidence for the soul.
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