This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Siblings:See also:
157 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 157
  1. Joseph Almog (2009). Dualistic Materialism. In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Louise M. Antony (2007). Everybody has Got It: A Defense of Non-Reductive Materialism. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Louise M. Antony (1999). Making Room for the Mental. Philosophical Studies 95 (1-2):37-44.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. D. M. Armstrong (1980). Book Reviews : Persons and Minds: The Prospects of Nonreductive Materialism. By Joseph Margolis. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. Lvii Dordrecht--Holland/Boston--U.S.A.: D. Reidel, 1978. $26.00 (Cloth), $11.95 (Paper). [REVIEW] Philosophy of the Social Sciences 10 (2):227-229.
  5. Lynne Baker (2011). Christian Materialism in a Scientific Age. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 70 (1):47-59.
    Many Christians who argue against Christian materialism direct their arguments against what I call ‘Type-I materialism’, the thesis that I cannot exist without my organic body. I distinguish Type-I materialism from Type-II materialism, which entails only that I cannot exist without some body that supports certain mental functions. I set out a version of Type-II materialism, and argue for its superiority to Type-I materialism in an age of science. Moreover, I show that Type-II materialism can accommodate Christian doctrines like the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Lynne Rudder Baker (2013). Pereboom's Robust Nonreductive Physicalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):736-744.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Lynne Rudder Baker (2009). Nonreductive Materialism I. Introduction. In Brian McLaughlin and Ansgar Beckermann (ed.), Oxford Handbook for the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.
    The expression ‘nonreductive materialism’ refers to a variety of positions whose roots lie in attempts to solve the mind-body problem. Proponents of nonreductive materialism hold that the mental is ontologically part of the material world; yet, mental properties are causally efficacious without being reducible to physical properties.s After setting out a minimal schema for nonreductive materialism (NRM) as an ontological position, I’ll canvass some classical arguments in favor of (NRM).1 Then, I’ll discuss the major challenge facing any construal of (NRM): (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Lynne Rudder Baker (2006). Review of Nancey Murphy, Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (8).
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Joseph A. Baltimore (2010). Defending the Piggyback Principle Against Shapiro and Sober's Empirical Approach. Synthese 175 (2):151-168.
    Jaegwon Kim’s supervenience/exclusion argument attempts to show that non-reductive physicalism is incompatible with mental causation. This influential argument can be seen as relying on the following principle, which I call “the piggyback principle”: If, with respect to an effect, E, an instance of a supervenient property, A, has no causal powers over and above, or in addition to, those had by its supervenience base, B, then the instance of A does not cause E (unless A is identical with B). In (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. J. Barrett (1995). Causal Relevance and Nonreductive Physicalism. Erkenntnis 42 (3):339-62.
    It has been argued that nonreductive physicalism leads to epiphenominalism about mental properties: the view that mental events cannot cause behavioral effects by virtue of their mental properties. Recently, attempts have been made to develop accounts of causal relevance for irreducible properties to show that mental properties need not be epiphenomenal. In this paper, I primarily discuss the account of Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit. I show how it can be developed to meet several obvious objections and to capture our (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Michael Baumgartner (2013). Rendering Interventionism and Non‐Reductive Physicalism Compatible. Dialectica 67 (1):1-27.
    In recent years, the debate on the problem of causal exclusion has seen an ‘interventionist turn’. Numerous non-reductive physicalists (e.g. Shapiro and Sober 2007) have argued that Woodward's (2003) interventionist theory of causation provides a means to empirically establish the existence of non-reducible mental-to-physical causation. By contrast, Baumgartner (2010) has presented an interventionist exclusion argument showing that interventionism is in fact incompatible with non-reductive physicalism. In response, a number of revised versions of interventionism have been suggested that are compatible with (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Ansgar Beckermann, Introduction - Reductive and Nonreductive Physicalism.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Ansgar Beckermann (1992). Reductive and Nonreductive Physicalism. In Ansgar Beckermann, Hans Flohr & Jaegwon Kim (eds.), Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism. De Gruyter.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Ansgar Beckermann, H. Flohr & Jaegwon Kim (eds.) (1992). Emergence or Reduction?: Essays on the Prospects of Nonreductive Physicalism. W. De Gruyter.
    Introduction — Reductive and Nonreductive Physicalism A Short Survey of Six Decades of Philosophical Discussion Including an Attempt to Formulate a Version ...
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Ansgar Beckermann, Hans Flohr & Jaegwon Kim (1992). Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism. De Gruyter.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Ansgar Beckermann & Brian P. McLaughlin (eds.) (2007). Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Dennis D. Bielfeldt (1999). Nancey Murphy's Nonreductive Physicalism. Zygon 34 (4):619-628.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Robert C. Bishop (2012). Excluding the Causal Exclusion Argument Against Non-Redirective Physicalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (5-6):57-74.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Thomas Bittner & Barry Smith (2003). Granular Spatio-Temporal Ontologies. AAAI Symposium:12-17.
    We propose an ontological theory that is powerful enough to describe both complex spatio-temporal processes (occurrents) and the enduring entities (continuants) that participate therein. The theory is divided into two major categories of sub-theories: (sub-) theories of type SPAN and (sub-)theories of type SNAP. These theories represent two complementary perspectives on reality and result in distinct though compatible systems of categories. In SNAP we have enduring entities such as substances, qualities, roles, functions; in SPAN we have perduring entities such as (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Ned Block (ed.) (1980). Readings In Philosophy Of Psychology. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
    ... PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOLOGY is the study of conceptual issues in psychology. For the most part, these issues fall equally well in psychology as in ...
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. A. Botterell (2005). A Physicalist Manifesto: Thoroughly Modern Materialism. Philosophical Review 114 (1):125-128.
    A review of Andrew Melnyk's _A Physicalist Manifesto_ (Cambridge: CUP, 2003).
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Richard Boyd (1980). Materialism Without Reductionism: What Physicalism Does Not Entail. In Ned Block (ed.), Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology. , Vol 1. 1--67.
  23. Janez Bregant (2009). Physicalism, or Something Near Enough. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):219-232.
    The article critically examines Jaegwon Kim’s book Physicalism, or Something Near Enough (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005). It recognizes the »near enough type of physicalism« involving functional reduction and covering the relational properties of qualia. Its intrinsic qualites are left out, but since it is qualia’s differences and similarities that matter, i.e. which affect our cognition and behaviour, this is, according to Kim, “no big loss”. While appreciating the book’s effort to offer an intelligible physicalistic theory of the world, the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Ingo Brigandt (2010). Beyond Reduction and Pluralism: Toward an Epistemology of Explanatory Integration in Biology. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 73 (3):295-311.
    The paper works towards an account of explanatory integration in biology, using as a case study explanations of the evolutionary origin of novelties-a problem requiring the integration of several biological fields and approaches. In contrast to the idea that fields studying lower level phenomena are always more fundamental in explanations, I argue that the particular combination of disciplines and theoretical approaches needed to address a complex biological problem and which among them is explanatorily more fundamental varies with the problem pursued. (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Andrei A. Buckareff (2011). Intralevel Mental Causation. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (3):402-425.
    This paper identifies and critiques a theory of mental causation defended by some proponents of nonredutive physicalism that I call “intralevelism.” Intralevelist theories differ in their details. On all versions, the causal outcome of the manifestation of physical properties is physical and the causal outcome of the manifestation of mental properties is mental. Thus, mental causation on this view is intralevel mental to mental causation. This characterization of mental causation as intralevel is taken to insulate nonreductive physicalism from some objections (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Lawrence Cahoone (2008). Reduction, Emergence, and Ordinal Physicalism. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 44 (1):pp. 40-62.
    A metaphysics of the world described by contemporary science faces the problem of the relative ontological status of microphysical constituents (e.g. elementary particles), ultimate mathematical structures (e.g. of the Standard Model and General Relativity), and complex macroscopic systems with their arguably emergent properties. Justus Buchler's ordinal metaphysics, which provides a "view from anywhere" by analyzing whatever is under consideration through its location in an order of relationships, refusing to privilege any type of being, contributes a fresh perspective to this discussion. (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. David Charles & Kathleen Lennon (eds.) (1992). Reduction, Explanation, and Realism. Oxford University Press.
    The contributors to this volume examine the motivations for anti-reductionist views, and assess their coherence and success, in a number of different fields, including moral and mental philosophy, psychology, organic biology, and the social sciences.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. J. Christensen & J. Kallestrup (2012). Counterfactuals and Downward Causation: A Reply to Zhong. Analysis 72 (3):513-517.
    Lei Zhong (2012. Counterfactuals, regularity and the autonomy approach. Analysis 72: 75–85) argues that non-reductive physicalists cannot establish the autonomy of mental causation by adopting a counterfactual theory of causation since such a theory supports a so-called downward causation argument which rules out mental-to-mental causation. We respond that non-reductive physicalists can consistently resist Zhong's downward causation argument as it equivocates between two familiar notions of a physical realizer.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (12 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. John Ross Churchill (2010). Nonreductive Physicalism or Emergent Dualism : The Argument From Mental Causation. In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism. Oxford University Press.
    Throughout the 1990s, Jaegwon Kim developed a line of argument that what purport to be nonreductive forms of physicalism are ultimately untenable, since they cannot accommodate the causal efficacy of mental states. His argument has received a great deal of discussion, much of it critical. We believe that, while the argument needs some tweaking, its basic thrust is sound. In what follows, we will lay out our preferred version of the argument and highlight its essential dependence on a causal-powers metaphysic, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Paul M. Churchland (1980). Joseph Margolis: Persons and Minds: The Prospects of Nonreductive Materialism. Dialogue 19 (03):461-469.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Randolph Clarke (1999). Nonreductive Physicalism and the Causal Powers of the Mental. Erkenntnis 51 (2-3):295-322.
    Nonreductive physicalism is currently one of the most widely held views about the world in general and about the status of the mental in particular. However, the view has recently faced a series of powerful criticisms from, among others, Jaegwon Kim. In several papers, Kim has argued that the nonreductivist's view of the mental is an unstable position, one harboring contradictions that push it either to reductivism or to eliminativism. The problems arise, Kim maintains, when we consider the causal powers (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Antonella Corradini & Timothy O'Connor (eds.) (2010). Emergence in Science and Philosophy. Routledge.
    The concept of emergence has seen a significant resurgence in philosophy and the sciences, yet debates regarding emergentist and reductionist visions of the natural world continue to be hampered by imprecision or ambiguity. Emergent phenomena are said to arise out of and be sustained by more basic phenomena, while at the same time exerting a "top-down" control upon those very sustaining processes. To some critics, this has the air of magic, as it seems to suggest a kind of circular causality. (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Richard Corry (2013). Emerging From the Causal Drain. Philosophical Studies 165 (1):29-47.
    For over 20 years, Jaegwon Kim’s Causal Exclusion Argument has stood as the major hurdle for non-reductive physicalism. If successful, Kim’s argument would show that the high-level properties posited by non-reductive physicalists must either be identical with lower-level physical properties, or else must be causally inert. The most prominent objection to the Causal Exclusion Argument—the so-called Overdetermination Objection—points out that there are some notions of causation that are left untouched by the argument. If causation is simply counterfactual dependence, for example, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. John Dupre (1988). Materialism, Physicalism, and Scientism. Philosophical Topics 16 (1):31-56.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Joseph Earley (2008). How Philosophy of Mind Needs Philosophy of Chemistry. Hyle 14 (1):1 - 26.
    By the 1960s many, perhaps most, philosophers had adopted 'physicalism' – the view that physical causes fully account for mental activities. However, controversy persists about what counts as 'physical causes'. 'Reductive' physicalists recognize only microphysical (elementary-particle-level) causality. Many, perhaps most, physicalists are 'non-reductive' – they hold that entities considered by other 'special' sciences have causal powers. Philosophy of chemistry can help resolve main issues in philosophy of mind in three ways: developing an extended mereology applicable to chemical combination; testing whether (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. BarbaraVon Eckardt (1981). Review Article. Margolis on Persons and Nonreductive Materialism. Metaphilosophy 12 (2):169–180.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Ralph D. Ellis (2000). Consciousness, Self-Organization, and the Process-Substratum Relation: Rethinking Nonreductive Physicalism. Philosophical Psychology 13 (2):173-190.
    Knowing only what is empirically knowable can't by itself entail knowledge of what consciousness "is like." But if dualism is to be avoided, the question arises: how can a process be completely empirically unobservable when all of its components are completely observable? The recently emerging theory of self-organization offers resources with which to resolve this problem: Consciousness can be an empirically unobservable process because the emotions motivating attention are experienced only from the perspective of the one whose phenomenal states are (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Ralph D. Ellis (1999). Why Isn't Consciousness Empirically Observable? Emotion, Self-Organization, and Nonreductive Physicalism. Journal of Mind and Behavior 20 (4):391-402.
  39. Ten G. Elshof (1997). Supervenient Difficulties with Nonreductive Physicalism: A Critical Analysis of Supervenience Physicalism. Kinesis 24 (1):3-22.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Markus Eronen (2012). Pluralistic Physicalism and the Causal Exclusion Argument. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (2):219-232.
    There is a growing consensus among philosophers of science that scientific endeavors of understanding the human mind or the brain exhibit explanatory pluralism. Relatedly, several philosophers have in recent years defended an interventionist approach to causation that leads to a kind of causal pluralism. In this paper, I explore the consequences of these recent developments in philosophy of science for some of the central debates in philosophy of mind. First, I argue that if we adopt explanatory pluralism and the interventionist (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Jerry A. Fodor (1974). Special Sciences. Synthese 28 (2):97-115.
  42. Robert Francescotti (1998). The Nonreductionist's Troubles with Supervenience. Philosophical Studies 89 (1):105-24.
    I argue that there is a tension between three popular views in the philosophy of mind: (1) mental properties are not identical with physical properties (a version of nonreductionism), but (2) mental properties are had solely by virtue of physical properties (physicalism regarding the mind), which requires that (3) mental properties supervene on physical properties. To earn the title "physicalist," one must hold a sufficiently strong version of the supervenience thesis. But this, I argue, will be a version that undermines (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Brian Jonathan Garrett (2013). Constitution, Over Determination and Causal Power. Ratio 26 (2):162-178.
    Kim's exclusion argument threatens to show that irreducible constituted objects are epiphenomenal. Kim's arguments are examined and found to be unconvincing; that a constituted cause requires its constituent to be a cause is not an adequate reason to reject the causation of the constituted object (event or property-instance). However, I introduce and argue for, the Causal Power Uniqueness Condition (CPUC). I argue that CPUC and the causal closure of the physical, implies that constituted objects or property-instances are not novel causal (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Paul Giladi (2014). Liberal Naturalism: The Curious Case of Hegel. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 22 (2):248-270.
  45. Carl Gillett (2010). Strong Emergence as a Defese of Non-Reductive Physicalism. Principia 6 (1):89-120.
    Jaegwon Kim, and others, have recently posed a powerful challenge to both emergentism and non-reductive physicalism by providing arguments that these positons are committed to an untenabie combination of both 'upward' and 'dounward' determination. In section 1, I illuminate how the nature of the realization relation underlies such skeptical arguments However, in section 2, I suggest that such conclusions involve a confusion between the implications of physicalism and those of a related thesis in 'Completeness of Physics' (CoP). I show tht (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Carl Gillett (2009). On the Implications of Scientific Composition and Completeness: Or, the Troubles, and Troubles, of Non-Reductive Physicalism. In T. O'connor & A. Corradini (eds.), Emergence in Science and Philosophy. Routledge.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Carl Gillett (2003). Nonreductive Realization and Nonreductive Identity: What Physicalism Does Not Entail. In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic. 31.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Carl Gillett & Aizawa Kenneth (2009). Levels, Individual Variation and Massive Multiple Realization in Neurobiology. In John Bickle (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience. oxford university press.
  49. Carl Gillett & Bradley Rives (2001). Does the Argument From Realization Generalize? Responses to Kim. Southern Journal of Philosophy 39 (1):79-98.
    By quantifying over properties we cannot create new properties any more than by quantifying over individuals we can create new individuals. Someone murdered Jones, and the murderer is either Smith or Jones or Wang. That “someone”, who murdered Jones, is not a person in addition to Smith, Jones, and Wang, and it would be absurd to posit a disjunctive person, Smith-or-Jones-or-Wang, with whom to identify the murderer. The same goes for second-order properties and their realizers. (Kim (1997a), p.201).
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Marion Godman (forthcoming). The Special Science Dilemma and How Culture Solves It. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-18.
    I argue that there is a tension between the claim that at least some kinds in the special sciences are multiply realized and the claim that the reason kinds are prized by science is that they enter into a variety of different empirical generalizations. Nevertheless, I show that this tension ceases in the case of ‘cultural homologues’–such as specific ideologies, religions, and folk wisdom. I argue that the instances of such special science kinds do have several projectable properties in common (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 157