This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Siblings:History/traditions: Normative Ethics, Misc
378 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Order:
1 — 50 / 378
  1. A. R. A. (1958). New Foundations for Ethical Theory, Part I. Review of Metaphysics 11 (4):693-693.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2. John Anderson (1928). Determinism and Ethics. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 6 (4):241 – 255.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. Vuko Andric & Attila Tanyi (2016). Multidimensional Consequentialism and Risk. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (1):49-57.
    In his new book, The Dimensions of Consequentialism, Martin Peterson proposes a version of multi-dimensional consequentialism according to which risk is one among several dimensions. We argue that Peterson’s treatment of risk is unsatisfactory. More precisely, we want to show that all problems of one-dimensional (objective or subjective) consequentialism are also problems for Peterson’s proposal, although it may fall prey to them less often. In ending our paper, we address the objection that our discussion overlooks the fact that Peterson’s proposal (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4. Caroline T. Arruda (2016). What We Can Intend: Recognition and Collective Intentionality. Southern Journal of Philosophy 54 (1):5-26.
    The concept of recognition has played a role in two debates. In political philosophy, it is part of a communitarian response to liberal theories of distributive justice. It describes what it means to respect others’ right to self-determination. In ethics, Stephen Darwall argues that it comprises our judgment that we owe others moral consideration. I present a competing account of recognition on the grounds that most accounts answer the question of why others deserve recognition without answering the question of what (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5. Marcus Arvan (2014). A Better, Dual Theory of Human Rights. Philosophical Forum 45 (1):17-47.
    Human rights theory and practice have long been stuck in a rut. Although disagreement is the norm in philosophy and social-political practice, the sheer depth and breadth of disagreement about human rights is truly unusual. Human rights theorists and practitioners disagree – wildly in many cases – over just about every issue: what human rights are, what they are for, how many of them there are, how they are justified, what human interests or capacities they are supposed to protect, what (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6. N. Athanassoulis (2005). Jeff McMahan, the Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life, New York, Oxford University Press, 2002, Pp. VII+540. Utilitas 17 (1):117-119.
  7. Emad H. Atiq (2016). How to Be Impartial as a Subjectivist. Philosophical Studies 173 (3):757-779.
    The metaethical subjectivist claims that there is nothing more to a moral disagreement than a conflict in the desires of the parties involved. Recently, David Enoch has argued that metaethical subjectivism has unacceptable ethical implications. If the subjectivist is right about moral disagreement, then it follows, according to Enoch, that we cannot stand our ground in moral disagreements without violating the demands of impartiality. For being impartial, we’re told, involves being willing to compromise in conflicts that are merely due to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8. Philip Atkins & Ian Nance (2015). Defending the Suberogatory. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy:1-7.
    Ethicists generally agree that there are supererogatory acts, which are morally good, but not morally obligatory. It is sometimes claimed that, in addition to supererogatory acts, there are suberogatory acts, which are morally bad, but not morally impermissible. According to Julia Driver (1992), the distinction between impermissible acts and suberogatory acts is legitimate and unjustly neglected by ethicists. She argues that certain cases are best explained in terms of the suberogatory. Hallie Rose Liberto (2012) denies the suberogatory on the grounds (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9. Jovan Babić (2013). Pacifism and Moral Integrity. Philosophia 41 (4):1007-1016.
    The paper has three parts. The first is a discussion of the values as goals and means. This is a known Moorean distinction between intrinsic and instrumental values, with one other Moorean item - the doctrine of value wholes. According to this doctrine the value wholes are not simply a summation of their parts, which implies a possibility that two evils might be better than one (e. g. crime + punishment, two evils, are better than either one of them taken (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. Neera K. Badhwar, Friendship.
    Philosophical interest in friendship has revived after a long eclipse. This is largely due to a renewed interest in ancient moral philosophy, in the role of emotion in morality, and in the ethical dimensions of personal relations in general. Some of the main questions raised by philosophers are the following: Is friendship only an instrumental value, i.e., only a means to other values, or also an intrinsic value - a value in its own right? Is friendship a mark of psychological (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11. Brenda M. Baker (1997). Improving Our Practice of Sentencing. Utilitas 9 (1):99.
    Restorative justice should have greater weight as a criterion in criminal justice sentencing practice. It permits a realistic recognition of the kinds of harm and damage caused by offences, and encourages individualized non-custodial sentencing options as ways of addressing these harms. Non-custodial sentences have proven more effective than incarceration in securing social reconciliation and preventing recidivism, and they avoid the serious social and personal costs of imprisonment. This paper argues in support of restorative justice as a guiding idea in sentencing. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  12. Brenda M. Baker (1995). Jules L. Coleman, Risks and Wrongs, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993, Pp. Xvii + 508. Utilitas 7 (1):167.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13. Brenda M. Baker (1995). Review of Jules Coleman's Risks and Wrongs. [REVIEW] Utilitas 7 (1):167-169.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14. Christian Barry & David Wiens (2014). Benefiting From Wrongdoing and Sustaining Wrongful Harm. Brill.
    _ Source: _Page Count 23 Some moral theorists argue that innocent beneficiaries of wrongdoing may have special remedial duties to address the hardships suffered by the victims of the wrongdoing. These arguments generally aim to simply motivate the idea that being a beneficiary can provide an independent ground for charging agents with remedial duties to the victims of wrongdoing. Consequently, they have neglected contexts in which it is implausible to charge beneficiaries with remedial duties to the victims of wrongdoing, thereby (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  15. Christian Barry & Gerhard Øverland (forthcoming). Individual Responsibility for Carbon Emissions: Is There Anything Wrong with Overdetermining Harm? In Jeremy Moss (ed.), Climate Change and Justice. Cambridge University Press
    Climate change and other harmful large-scale processes challenge our understandings of individual responsibility. People throughout the world suffer harms—severe shortfalls in health, civic status, or standard of living relative to the vital needs of human beings—as a result of physical processes to which many people appear to contribute. Climate change, polluted air and water, and the erosion of grasslands, for example, occur because a great many people emit carbon and pollutants, build excessively, enable their flocks to overgraze, or otherwise stress (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  16. Christian Barry & Gerhard Øverland (2014). The Implications of Failing to Assist. Social Theory and Practice 40 (4):570-590.
    In this essay we argue that an agent’s failure to assist someone in need at one time can change the cost she can be morally required to take on to assist that same person at a later time. In particular, we show that the cost the agent can subsequently be required to take on to help the person in need can increase quite significantly, and can be enforced through the proportionate use of force. We explore the implications of this argument (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17. Fiorella Battaglia, Nikil Mukerji & Julian Nida-Rümelin (eds.) (2014). Rethinking Responsibility in Science and Technology. Pisa University Press.
    The idea of responsibility is deeply embedded into the “lifeworld” of human beings and not subject to change. However, the empirical circumstances in which we act and ascribe responsibility to one another are subject to change. Science and technology play a great part in this transformation process. Therefore, it is important for us to rethink the idea, the role and the normative standards behind responsibility in a world that is constantly being transformed under the influence of scientific and technological progress. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18. Peter Baumann (2007). Persons, Human Beings, and Respect. Polish Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):5-17.
    Human dignity seems very important to us. At the same time, the concept ‘human dignity’ is extrordinarily elusive. A good way to approach the questions “What is it?” and “Why is it important?” is to raise another question first: In virtue of what do human beings have dignity? Speciesism - the idea that human beings have a particular dignity because they are humans - does not seem very convincing. A better answer says that human beings have dignity because and insofar (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19. Christopher Belshaw (2016). Victims. In Michael Cholbi (ed.), Immortality and the Philosophy of Death. Rowman and Littlefield
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20. Gilbert Bennett, Towards Personalism.
    Critique of the concepts of the self in Nietzsche and Foucault, pointing to personhood as a basis for normative moral philosophy. This is a draft. (2009).
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21. Lars Bergström (1968). Utilitarianism and Deontic Logic. Analysis 29 (2):43 - 44.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22. Richard J. Bernstein (2012). The Normative Core of the Public Sphere. Political Theory 40 (6):767 - 778.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23. Christopher J. Berry (1994). David Allan Virtue, Learning and the Scottish Enlightenment: Ideals of Scholarship in Early Modern History, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1993, Pp. Viii + 276. Utilitas 6 (2):332.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24. Christopher J. Berry (1992). Thomas Reid, Practical Ethics: Being Lectures and Papers on Natural Religion, Self-Government, Natural Jurisprudence, and the Law of Nations, Ed. Knud Haakonssen, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1990, Pp. Xiv + 556. [REVIEW] Utilitas 4 (2):331-333.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25. Christopher J. Berry (1992). Thomas Reid on Practical Ethics: Being Lectures and Papers on Natural Religion, Self-Government, Natural Jurisprudence, and the Law of Nations. [REVIEW] Utilitas 4 (2):331-333.
  26. Luca Bertolino (2014). Mi impegno? Ci impegniamo! L'anelito del soggetto e il coro dei soggetti erranti. In Anna Marina Mariani (ed.), Impegnarsi. Adulti e giovani: nessuno escluso. Edizioni Junior 35-42.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27. Luca Bertolino (2014). "Mi impegno". Note sull'"anelito" del soggetto. Nuova Secondaria 31 (10):46-50.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28. Luca Bertolino (2014). Человек — «гражданин двух миров»: развитие Розенцвейгом кантовских тем. Кантовский Сборник. Научный Журнал (4 (50)):82-97.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29. Luca Bertolino (2008). L'uomo «cittadino di due mondi». Sviluppi in Rosenzweig di temi kantiani. In Mario Signore & Giovanni Scarafile (eds.), La natura umana tra determinismo e libertà. Edizioni Messaggero 151-184.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30. Telma Souza Birchadel (2002). La vrai morale se moque de la morale: questões éticas em Pascal. Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 43 (106):60-76.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31. Telma de Souza Birchal (2002). La vrai morale se moque de la morale: questões éticas em Pascal. Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 43 (106):60-76.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32. Noell Birondo (2014). Review of Mark Timmons (Ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Volume 1. [REVIEW] Journal of Moral Philosophy 11 (5):669-672.
    This volume initiates a welcome new Oxford Studies series based on the annual meeting of the Arizona Workshop in Normative Ethics, organized by Mark Timmons. The back matter indicates that the series is a place where "Leading philosophers present original contributions to our understanding of a wide range of moral issues and positions." But Timmons himself says more accurately, it seems, that the series aims to provide "some of the best contemporary work in the field of contemporary ethical theory" (p. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33. Mavis Biss (2014). On W. P. Ker’s “Imagination and Judgment”. Ethics 125 (1):232-234,.
    In “Imagination and Judgment” W.P. Ker argues, contrary to the “ordinary teaching” of the moralists of his day, that we have good reason to consider imagination as “the highest form of practical wisdom or prudence” (475). Modes of imaginative thought that direct human passion towards morally valuable ends are best understood as a form of reason or an intellectual virtue, as opposed to a dangerous distraction from reality and threat to good judgment. Ker’s piece remains of interest partly because it (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34. Mavis Biss (2011). Aristotle on Friendship and Self-Knowledge: The Friend Beyond the Mirror. History of Philosophy Quarterly 28 (2):125.
    Aristotle's emphasis on sameness of character in his description of the virtuous friend as "another self" figures centrally in all his arguments for the necessity of friendship to self-knowledge. Although the attribution of the Magna Moralia to Aristotle is disputed, the comparison of the friend to a mirror in this work has encouraged many commentators to view the friend as a mirror that provides the clearest and most immediate image of one's own virtue. I will offer my own reading of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35. J. S. Blumenthal-Barby (2014). A Framework for Assessing the Moral Status of Manipulation,. In Christian Coons Michael Weber (ed.), Manipulation. Oxford University Press 121-134.
    This paper deals with the ethics of using knowledge about a person’s particular psychological make-up, or about the psychology of judgment and decision-making in general, to shape that person’s decisions and behaviors. Various moral concerns emerge about this practice, but one of the more elusive and underdeveloped concerns is the charge of manipulation. It is this concern that is the focus of this paper. I argue that it is not the case that any of the practices traditionally labeled as “manipulation” (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  36. J. S. Blumenthal-Barby (2012). Between Reason and Coercion: Ethically Permissible Influence in Health Care and Health Policy Contexts. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 22 (4):345-366.
    In bioethics, the predominant categorization of various types of influence has been a tripartite classification of rational persuasion (meaning influence by reason and argument), coercion (meaning influence by irresistible threats—or on a few accounts, offers), and manipulation (meaning everything in between). The standard ethical analysis in bioethics has been that rational persuasion is always permissible, and coercion is almost always impermissible save a few cases such as imminent threat to self or others. However, many forms of influence fall into the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  37. J. S. Blumenthal-Barby (2012). Seeking Better Health Care Outcomes: The Ethics of Using the “Nudge”. American Journal of Bioethics 12 (2):1-10.
    Policymakers, employers, insurance companies, researchers, and health care providers have developed an increasing interest in using principles from behavioral economics and psychology to persuade people to change their health-related behaviors, lifestyles, and habits. In this article, we examine how principles from behavioral economics and psychology are being used to nudge people (the public, patients, or health care providers) toward particular decisions or behaviors related to health or health care, and we identify the ethically relevant dimensions that should be considered for (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   20 citations  
  38. Greg Bognar (2012). Empirical and Armchair Ethics. Utilitas 24 (04):467-482.
    In a recent paper, Michael Otsuka and Alex Voorhoeve present a novel argument against prioritarianism. The argument takes its starting point from empirical surveys on people's preferences in health care resource allocation problems. In this article, I first question whether the empirical findings support their argument, and then I make some general points about the use of ‘empirical ethics’ in ethical theory.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  39. Matthew Braddock (2013). Defusing the Demandingness Objection: Unreliable Intuitions. Journal of Social Philosophy 44 (2):169-191.
    Dogged resistance to demanding moral views frequently takes the form of The Demandingness Objection. Premise (1): Moral view V demands too much of us. Premise (2): If a moral view demands too much of us, then it is mistaken. Conclusion: Therefore, moral view V is mistaken. Objections of this form harass major theories in normative ethics as well as prominent moral views in applied ethics and political philosophy. The present paper does the following: (i) it clarifies and distinguishes between various (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  40. Ben Bramble (2015). Consequentialism About Meaning in Life. Utilitas 27 (4):445-459.
    What is it for a life to be meaningful? In this article, I defend what I call Consequentialism about Meaning in Life, the view that one's life is meaningful at time t just in case one's surviving at t would be good in some way, and one's life was meaningful considered as a whole just in case the world was made better in some way for one's having existed.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41. J. H. Burns (1989). James Mill's Political Thought. Robert A. Fenn, New York and London, Garland Publishing, Inc. 1987, Pp. Viii +192. Utilitas 1 (1):156.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42. Peter J. Cain (2011). Bentham and the Development of the British Critique of Colonialism. Utilitas 23 (1):1-24.
    This article examines Bentham's contribution to anti-colonial thought in the context of the development of the British radical movement that attacked colonialism on the grounds that it advantaged what Bentham called the at the expense of the . It shows that Bentham was influenced as much by Josiah Tucker and James Anderson as by Adam Smith. Bentham's early economic critique is examined, and the sharp changes in his arguments after 1800 assessed, in the context of the American and French Revolutions (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43. J. Baird Callicott (1994). Moral Monism in Environmental Ethics Defended. Journal of Philosophical Research 19:51-60.
    In dealing with concern for fellow human beings, sentient animals, and the enviroment, Christopher D. Stone suggests that a single agent adopt a different ethical theory---e.g., Kant’s, Bentham’s, Leopold’s---for each domain. Ethical theories, however, and their attendant rules and principles are embedded in moral philosophies. Employing Kant’s categorical imperative in this case, Bentham’s hedonic caIculus in that, and Leopold’s land ethic in another, a single agent would therefore have either simultaneously or cyclically to endorse contradictory moral philosophies. Instead, I suggest (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  44. Chris Calvert-Minor (2008). Rational Agreement and the Validity of Moral Norms. Southwest Philosophy Review 24 (1):101-108.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45. Simon Caney (1995). Eric Rakowski, Equal Justice, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1993, Pp. Xii + 385. Utilitas 7 (1):169.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46. Margaret Canovan (1991). Robert Hole, Pulpits, Politics and Public Order in England 1760–1832, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989, Pp. Xiv + 326. [REVIEW] Utilitas 3 (1):148.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47. Emanuela Ceva (2016). Interactive Justice. A Proceduralist Approach to Value Conflict in Politics. Routledge.
    Contemporary societies are riddled with disputes caused by conflicts between the holders of value claims competing for the regulation of matters of public concern. Disputes regarding whether to permit euthanasia or the presence of religious symbols in public places illustrate this well. This familiar state of affairs is relevant for one of the most important debates within liberal political thought: should institutions seek to realize justice or peace? This book contributes to this debate by moving beyond the apparent dichotomy between (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48. Ruth Chang (2013). Commitment, Reasons, and the Will. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 8. Oxford University Press 74-113.
    This paper argues that there is a particular kind of ‘internal’ commitment typically made in the context of romantic love relationships that has striking meta-normative implications for how we understand the role of the will in practical normativity. Internal commitments cannot plausibly explain the reasons we have in committed relationships on the usual model – as triggering reasons that are already there, in the way that making a promise triggers a reason via a pre-existing norm of the form ‘If you (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  49. Ruth Chang (2012). Are Hard Choices Cases of Incomparability? Philosophical Issues 22 (1):106-126.
    This paper presents an argument against the widespread view that ‘hard choices’ are hard because of the incomparability of the alternatives. The argument has two parts. First, I argue that any plausible theory of practical reason must be ‘comparativist’ in form, that is, it must hold that a comparative relation between the alternatives with respect to what matters in the choice determines a justified choice in that situation. If comparativist views of practical reason are correct, however, the incomparabilist view of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  50. Ruth Chang (2004). All Things Considered. Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):1–22.
    One of the most common judgments of normative life takes the following form: With respect to some things that matter, one item is better than the other, with respect to other things that matter, the other item is better, but all things considered – that is, taking into account all the things that matter – the one item is better than the other. In this paper, I explore how all-things-considered judgments are possible, assuming that they are. In particular, I examine (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   14 citations  
1 — 50 / 378