I argue that law is not best considered an essentially contested concept. After first explaining the notion of essential contestability and disaggregating the concept of law into several related concepts, I show that the most basic and general concept of law does not fit within the criteria generally offered for essential contestation. I then buttress this claim with the additional explanation that essential contestation is itself a framework for understanding complex concepts and therefore should only be applied when it is (...) useful to gain a greater understanding of uses of the concept to which it is applied (adducing criteria for making such judgments of usefulness). With that in mind, I then show that applying the appellation of essential contestation to the concept of law does not helpfully illuminate the most general concept of law (usually of most interest to legal philosophers) and therefore it should not be used, while allowing that it might be more useful for the related concept of the rule of law. (shrink)

FINAL DRAFT VERSION: We argued that the paradox of the preface suggests a reason why machines cannot, will not, and should not be allowed to judge criminal cases. The argument merely shows that they cannot now and will not soon or easily be so allowed. The author, in fact, now believes that when--and only when--they are ready they actually should be so allowed, in the interests of justice. -/- Both the original argument applied and this detailed reconsideration applies exclusively to (...) trial courts, and both specifically exclude(d) sentencing. -/- The argument highlights some key differences between minds and machines and attempts, also, to explain why automation is of far greater import for the first-level justice system (trial courts) than for higher courts. (shrink)

This article is intended to, in Sections I and II, flesh out and put within a metaphilosophical framework the theoretical argument first made in 2002 in “Do Internet Stings Directed at Pedophiles Capture Offenders or Create Offenders? And Allied Questions” (Sexuality & Culture 6(4): 73–100), with some modifications (See note 14). Where there are differences, I stand by this version as the final version of the argument. Section III addresses three experimental or empirical studies which might be thought to contradict (...) or confirm the data of the 2002 study. Section IV compares what we have done with the one other jurisprudential argument made by Summer 2005. Section V discusses why, despite the evidence and the arguments, these sting operations are popular with prosecutors and the public alike. Section VI comments on why my empirical study dating to 2002 does not appear to have gained wide acceptance, and what, if anything, can be said about this. (shrink)

Joseph Raz's new book, Between Authority and Interpretation, collects his most important papers in the philosophy of law and the theory of practical rationality from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s. In these papers, Raz not only advances earlier theses but also breaks new ground in a number of areas. I focus on three of Raz's topics here: theories of law, separability and necessity, and the normativity of law. While I am generally sympathetic to Raz's thinking on these topics, I raise (...) some room for doubts – especially with regard to his pessimism about finding a uniquely best theory of law and the relationship between law and morality. (shrink)

One of the central normative questions regards a decision between conflicting moral values. A decision of this nature is often required in disciplines such as philosophy, economics and law. According to common terminology, a decision between conflicting values reflects a balance of values, considerations or interests. Several types of questions arise in this context. One category includes substantive questions: which values exist, which considerations should be derived from these values, what is the degree of importance of these considerations, and which (...) principles should be established for deciding between conflicting considerations? Another category includes institutional questions: which individual or body should decide normative questions, and should the normative nature of the decision be manifest or concealed? This paper is an abstract of a book that considers general aspects concerning these questions. (shrink)

In this article, I seek to make sense of the oft-invoked idea of 'public emergency' and of some of its (supposedly) radical moral implications. I challenge controversial claims by Tom Sorell, Michael Walzer, and Giorgio Agamben, and argue for a more discriminating understanding of the category and its moral force.