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  1. Aude Bandini (2011). Meaning and the Emergence of Normativity. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18 (3):415-431.
    Linguistic meaning has an essential normative dimension that prima facie cannot be reduced to descriptive, non-normative, terms. Taking this point for granted, this paper however aims at proposing a naturalist view of semantics - inspired by Wilfrid Sellars' original works - focused on the way the constitutive normative aspects of meaning might be properly explained and accounted for, rather than eliminated.
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  2. David Beisecker (1999). The Importance of Being Erroneous: Prospects for Animal Intentionality. Philosophical Topics 27 (1):281-308.
    The question of animal belief (or animal intentionality) often degenerates into a frustrating and unproductive exchange. Foes of animal intentionality point out that non-linguistic animals couldn’t possibly possess the kinds of mental states we linguistic beings enjoy. They claim that linguistic ability enables us to become sensitive to intensional contexts or to the states of mind of others in a way that is unavailable to the non-linguistic, and that would be necessary for proper attributions of intentionality. To attribute mental states (...)
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  3. Yitzhak Benbaji & Menachem Fisch (2005). Factuality Without Realism: Normativity and the Davidsonian Approach to Meaning. Southern Journal of Philosophy 43 (4):505-530.
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  4. Akeel Bilgrami (1993). Norms and Meaning. In Ralf Stoecker (ed.), Reflecting Davidson. De Gruyter.
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  5. Paul Boghossian, Is Meaning Normative?
    in Christian Nimtz and Ansgar Beckermann (eds.): Philosophy - Science - Scientific Philosophy. Main Lectures and Colloquia of GAP.5, Fifth International Congress of the Society for Analytical Philosophy, Bielefeld, 2003, Mentis, 2005.
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  6. Paul A. Boghossian (2003). The Normativity of Content. Philosophical Issues 13 (1):31-45.
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  7. Robert Brandom (2000). Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism. Harvard University Press.
    This new work provides an approachable introduction to the complex system that Making It Explicit mapped out.
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  8. Robert B. Brandom (2001). Modality, Normativity, and Intentionality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (3):611-23.
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  9. Robert B. Brandom (1994). Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment. Harvard University Press.
    What would something unlike us--a chimpanzee, say, or a computer--have to be able to do to qualify as a possible knower, like us? To answer this question at the very heart of our sense of ourselves, philosophers have long focused on intentionality and have looked to language as a key to this condition. Making It Explicit is an investigation into the nature of language--the social practices that distinguish us as rational, logical creatures--that revises the very terms of this inquiry. Where (...)
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  10. Robert Briscoe (2006). Individualism, Externalism and Idiolectical Meaning. Synthese 152 (1):95-128.
    Semantic externalism in contemporary philosophy of language typically – and often tacitly – combines two supervenience claims about idiolectical meaning (i.e., meaning in the language system of an individual speaker). The first claim is that the meaning of a word in a speaker’s idiolect may vary without any variation in her intrinsic, physical properties. The second is that the meaning of a word in a speaker’s idiolect may vary without any variation in her understanding of its use. I here show (...)
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  11. Andrei Buleandra (2008). Normativity and Correctness: A Reply to Hattiangadi. Acta Analytica 23 (2):177-186.
    In this paper I will present and evaluate Anandi Hattiangadi’s arguments for the conclusion that meaning is not intrinsically normative or prescriptive. I will argue that she misconstrues the way the thesis that meaning is normative is presented in the literature and that there is an important class of semantic rules that she fails to consider and rule out. According to Hattiangadi, defenders of meaning prescriptivity argue that speaking truthfully is a necessary condition for speaking meaningfully. I will maintain that (...)
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  12. Tyler Burge (1986). Intellectual Norms and Foundations of Mind. Journal of Philosophy 83 (December):697-720.
  13. Krister Bykvist & Anandi Hattiangadi (2007). Does Thought Imply Ought? Analysis 67 (296):277–285.
  14. Alex Byrne (2002). Semantic Values? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):201-7.
    Lance and Hawthorne have served up a large, rich and argument-stuffed book which has much to teach us about central issues in the philosophy of language, as well as sports trivia. I shall concentrate, not surprisingly, on points I either disagreed with or found unclear; there are many acute observations, particularly in the second half of the book, that fall into neither of these categories.
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  15. Clotilde Calabi & Alberto Voltolini (2005). Should Pride of Place Be Given to the Norms? Intentionality and Normativity. Facta Philosophica 7 (1):85-98.
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  16. H. G. Callaway (1992). Does Language Determine Our Scientific Ideas? Dialectica 46 (3/4):225-242.
    This paper argues that the influence of language on science, philosophy and other field is mediated by communicative practices. Where communications is more restrictive, established linguistic structures exercise a tighter control over innovations and scientifically motivated reforms of language. The viewpoint here centers on the thesis that argumentation is crucial in the understanding and evaluation of proposed reforms and that social practices which limit argumentation serve to erode scientific objectivity. Thus, a plea is made for a sociology of scientific belief (...)
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  17. Ruth Chang (2009). Voluntarist Reasons and the Sources of Normativity. In David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.), Reasons for Action. Cambridge University Press.
    In virtue of what does a consideration provide a practical reason? Suppose the fact that an experience is painful provides you with a reason to avoid it. In virtue of what does the fact that it’s painful have the normativity of a reason – where, in other words, does its normativity come from? As some philosophers put the question, what is the source of a reason’s normativity?
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  18. Steven G. Crowell (2008). Phenomenological Immanence, Normativity, and Semantic Externalism. Synthese 160 (3):335 - 354.
    This paper argues that transcendental phenomenology (here represented by Edmund Husserl) can accommodate the main thesis of semantic externalism, namely, that intentional content is not simply a matter of what is ‘in the head,’ but depends on how the world is. I first introduce the semantic problem as an issue of how linguistic tokens or mental states can have ‘content’—that is, how they can set up conditions of satisfaction or be responsive to norms such that they can succeed or fail (...)
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  19. Ezequiel A. Di Paolo (2005). Autopoiesis, Adaptivity, Teleology, Agency. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (4).
    A proposal for the biological grounding of intrinsic teleology and sense-making through the theory of autopoiesis is critically evaluated. Autopoiesis provides a systemic language for speaking about intrinsic teleology but its original formulation needs to be elaborated further in order to explain sense-making. This is done by introducing adaptivity, a many-layered property that allows organisms to regulate themselves with respect to their conditions of viability. Adaptivity leads to more articulated concepts of behaviour, agency, sense-construction, health, and temporality than those given (...)
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  20. Reinaldo Elugardo (2008). Review of Anandi Hattiangadi, Oughts and Thoughts: Scepticism and the Normativity of Meaning. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (4).
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  21. Pascal Engel (2002). Intentionality, Normativity, and Community. Facta Philosophica 4:25-49.
  22. Pascal Engel (2002). The Norms of Thought: Are They Social? Mind and Society 2 (3):129-148.
    A commonplace in contemporary philosophy is that mental content has normative properties. A number of writers associate this view to the idea that the normativity of content is essentially connected to its social character. I agree with the first thesis, but disagree with the second. The paper examines three kinds of views according to which the norms of thought and content are social: Wittgenstein’s rule following considerations, Davidson’s triangulation argument, and Brandom’s inferential pragmatics, and criticises each. It is argued that (...)
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  23. Pascal Engel (2000). Wherein Lies the Normative Dimension in Meaning and Mental Content? Philosophical Studies 100 (3):305-321.
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  24. Michael Esfeld, Inferentialism and the Normativity Trilemma.
    It is common to base an inferential semantics on a social, normative pragmatics, thus conceiving meaning as consisting in certain normative relations (Wittgenstein, Sellars, Brandom). This position faces a trilemma, which is of wider application, concerning all normative statements: (1) Normative statements are true or false. Regarding a certain normative statement as true does not imply that it is true, not even if a whole community takes the statement in question to be true (cognitivism). (2) There are no normative entities (...)
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  25. John Fennell (2000). Davidson on Meaning Normativity: Public or Social. European Journal of Philosophy 8 (2):139–154.
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  26. M. Jamie Ferreira (2001). Normativity and Reference in a Wittgensteinian Philosophy of Religion. Faith and Philosophy 18 (4):443-464.
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  27. Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest Lepore (1993). Is Intentional Ascription Intrinsically Normative? In B. Dahlbom (ed.), Dennett and His Critics. Blackwell.
    In a short article called “Mid-Term Examination: Compare and Contrast” that epitomizes and concludes his book The Intentional Stance, D. C. Dennett (1987) provides a sketch of what he views as an emerging Interpretivist consensus in the philosophy of mind. The gist is that Brentano’s thesis is true (the intentional is irreducible to the physical) and that it follows from the truth of Brentano’s thesis that: strictly speaking, ontologically speaking, there are no such things as beliefs, desires, or other intentional (...)
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  28. Graeme Forbes (1989). Biosemantics and the Normative Properties of Thought. Philosophical Perspectives 3:533-547.
  29. Ragnar Francén Olinder (2012). Rescuing Doxastic Normativism. Theoria 78 (4):293–308.
    According to doxastic normativism, part of what makes an attitude a belief rather than another type of attitude is that it is governed by a truth-norm. It has been objected that this view fails since there are true propositions such that if you believed them they would not be true, and thus the obligation to believe true propositions cannot hold for these. I argue that the solution for doxastic normativists is to find a norm that draws the right distinction between (...)
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  30. Maarten Franssen (2006). The Normativity of Artefacts. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 37 (1):42-57.
  31. Eric H. Gampel (1997). The Normativity of Meaning. Philosophical Studies 86 (3):221-42.
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  32. Christopher Gauker (2007). The Circle of Deference Proves the Normativity of Semantics. Rivista di Estetica 34:181-198.
    The question whether semantics is a normative discipline can be formulated as a question about the meaning of the word “means”. If I assert, “The word ‘gatto’ in Italian means cat,” what have I done? The naturalist about meaning claims that I have asserted that a certain natural relation obtains between Italian speakers’ tokens of “gatto” and cats. Or at least, I have asserted something about the way Italian speakers use the word “gatto”, which way presumably has something to do (...)
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  33. Christopher Gauker (1995). A New Skeptical Solution. Acta Analytica 113 (14):113-129.
    Kripke's puzzle about rule-following is a form of the traditional problem of the nature of linguistic meaning. A skeptical solution explains not what meaning is but the role that talk of meaning plays in the linguistic community. Contrary to what some have claimed, the skeptical approach is not self-refuting. However, Kripke's own skeptical solution is inadequate. He has not adequately explained the conditions under which we are justified in attributing meanings or the utility of the practice of attributing meanings. An (...)
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  34. Mikkel Gerken (2012). Univocal Reasoning and Inferential Presuppositions. Erkenntnis 76 (3):373-394.
    I pursue an answer to the psychological question “what is it for S to presuppose that p?” I will not attempt a general answer. Rather, I will explore a particular kind of presuppositions that are constituted by the mental act of reasoning: Inferential presuppositions. Indeed, I will consider a specific kind of inferential presuppositions—one that is constituted by a specific reasoning competence: The univocality competence. Roughly, this is the competence that reliably governs the univocal thought-components’ operation as univocal in a (...)
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  35. Allan Gibbard (1994). Meaning and Normativity. Philosophical Issues 5:95-115.
    The concepts of meaning and mental content resist naturalistic analysis. This is because they are normative: they depend on ideas of how things ought to be.
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  36. Allan F. Gibbard (2003). Thoughts and Norms. Philosophical Issues 13 (1):83-98.
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  37. Allan F. Gibbard (1996). Thoughts, Norms, and Discursive Practices: Commentary on Brandom. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (3):699-717.
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  38. Hannah Ginsborg (2012). Meaning, Understanding and Normativity. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 86 (1):127-146.
    I defend the normativity of meaning against recent objections by arguing for a new interpretation of the ‘ought’ relevant to meaning. Both critics and defenders of the normativity thesis have understood statements about how an expression ought to be used as either prescriptive (indicating that speakers have reason to use the expression in a certain way) or semantic (designating certain uses as correct in a sense explicable in terms of truth). I propose an alternative view of the ‘ought’ as conveying (...)
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  39. Hannah Ginsborg (2011). Inside and Outside Language: Stroud's Nonreductionism About Meaning. In Jason Bridges, Niko Kolodny & Wai-Hung Wong (eds.), The Possibility of Philosophical Understanding: Essays for Barry Stroud. Oxford University Press.
    I argue that Stroud's nonreductionism about meaning is insufficiently motivated. First, given that he rejects the assumption that grasp of an expression's meaning guides or instructs us in its use, he has no reason to accept Kripke's arguments against dispositionalism or related reductive views. Second, his argument that reductive views are impossible because they attempt to explain language “from outside” rests on an equivocation between two senses in which an explanation of language can be from outside language. I offer a (...)
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  40. Hannah Ginsborg (2011). Review of Oughts and Thoughts: Rule-Following and the Normativity of Content, by Anandi Hattiangadi. [REVIEW] Mind 119 (476):1175-1186.
    Anandi Hattiangadi packs a lot of argument into this lucid, well-informed and lively examination of the meaning scepticism which Kripke ascribes to Wittgenstein. Her verdict on the success of the sceptical considerations is mixed. She concludes that they are sufficient to rule out all accounts of meaning and mental content proposed so far. But she believes that they fail to constitute, as Kripke supposed they did, a fully general argument against the possibility of meaning or content. Even though we are (...)
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  41. Hannah Ginsborg (2011). Primitive Normativity and Skepticism About Rules. Journal of Philosophy 108 (5).
    In his Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Saul Kripke develops a skeptical argument against the possibility of meaning. [...] My aim in this paper is to propose a solution to the skeptical puzzle which offers a middle way between these two approaches. This solution attempts to do justice to the way in which meaning and rule-following resemble dispositional states, while still accommodating what Kripke calls the normativity of meaning. While my approach is partly reductionist, in that it aims to (...)
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  42. Gl, Against Content Normativity.
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  43. K. Gluer & A. Wikforss (2009). Against Content Normativity. Mind 118 (469):31-70.
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  44. Kathrin Gluer (1999). Sense and Prescriptivity. Acta Analytica 14 (23):111-128.
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  45. Kathrin Glüer & Asa Wikforss, The Normativity of Meaning and Content. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    There is a long tradition of thinking of language as conventional in its nature, dating back at least to Aristotle De Interpretatione ). By appealing to the role of conventions, it is thought, we can distinguish linguistic signs, the meaningful use of words, from mere natural ‘signs’. During the last century the thesis that language is essentially conventional has played a central role within philosophy of language, and has even been called a platitude (Lewis 1969). More recently, the focus has (...)
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  46. Kathrin Glüer & Åsa Wikforss (2009). Against Content Normativity. Mind 118 (469):31 - 70.
    As meaning's claim to normativity has grown increasingly suspect the normativity thesis has shifted to mental content. In this paper, we distinguish two versions of content normativism: 'CE normativism', according to which it is essential to content that certain 'oughts' can be derived from it, and 'CD normativism', according to which content is determined by norms in the first place. We argue that neither type of normativism withstands scrutiny. CE normativism appeals to the fact that there is an essential connection (...)
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  47. Michael Gorman (2003). Subjectivism About Normativity and the Normativity of Intentional States. International Philosophical Quarterly 43 (1):5-14.
    Subjectivism about normativity (SN) is the view that norms are never intrinsic to things but are instead always imposed from without. After clarifying what SN is, I argue against it on the basis of its implications concerning intentionality. Intentional states with the mind-to-world direction of fit are essentially norm-subservient, i.e., essentially subject to norms such as truth, coherence, and the like. SN implies that nothing is intrinsically an intentional state of the mind-to-world sort: its being such a state is only (...)
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  48. Michael Gorman (2002). Intentionality, Normativity, and a Problem for Searle. Dialogue 42 (4):703-714.
    Au cœur de la philosophic de John Searle se trouve une compréhension biologique de l'esprit. Mais il y a une tension dans saposition. D'un côté, la biologiemoderne, telle quit la comprend, requiert une certaine conception de la normativité. D'un autre côte, la façon dont Searle lui-même comprend I'intentionnalité requiert une conception très différente de la normativité. Pour résoudre la difficulté, Searle devrait à la fois modifier sa compréhension de la biologie et nuancer son idée que l'esprit est un phénomène biologique (...)
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  49. Mark Greenberg (2005). A New Map of Theories of Mental Content: Constitutive Accounts and Normative Theories. Philosophical Issues 15 (1):299-320.
    In this paper, I propose a new way of understanding the space of possibilities in the field of mental content. The resulting map assigns separate locations to theories of content that have generally been lumped together on the more traditional map. Conversely, it clusters together some theories of content that have typically been regarded as occupying opposite poles. I make my points concrete by developing a taxonomy of theories of mental content, but the main points of the paper concern not (...)
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  50. Mark Greenberg (2005). A New Map of Theories of Mental Content. Noûs 39 (1):299-320.
  51. L. E. Hahn (ed.) (2007). Library of Living Philosphers: The Philosophy of Michael Dummett. Open Court.
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  52. Anandi Hattiangadi (2009). Some More Thoughts on Semantic Oughts: A Reply to Daniel Whiting. Analysis 69 (1):54-63.
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  53. Anandi Hattiangadi (2009). Semantic Normativity in Context. In Sarah Sawyer (ed.), New Waves in Philosophy of Language. Palgrave Macmillan.
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  54. Anandi Hattiangadi (2007). Oughts and Thoughts: Rule-Following and the Normativity of Content. Oxford University Press.
    In Oughts and Thoughts, Anandi Hattiangadi provides an innovative response to the argument for meaning skepticism set out by Saul Kripke in Wittgenstein on ...
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  55. Anandi Hattiangadi (2006). Is Meaning Normative? Mind and Language 21 (2):220-240.
    Many people claim that semantic content is normative, and that therefore naturalistic theories of content face a potentially insuperable difficulty. The normativity of content allegedly undermines naturalism by introducing a gap between semantic 'ought's and the explanatory resources of naturalism. I argue here that this problem is not ultimately pressing for naturalists. The normativity thesis, I maintain, is ambiguous; it could mean either that the content of a term prescribes a pattern of use, or that it merely determines which pattern (...)
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  56. Anandi Hattiangadi (2003). Making It Implicit: Brandom on Rule-Following. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):419-31.
    In Making it Explicit, Brandom aims to articulate an account of conceptual content that accommodates its normativity--a requirement on theories of content that Brandom traces to Wittgenstein's rule following considerations. It is widely held that the normativity requirement cannot be met, or at least not with ease, because theories of content face an intractable dilemma. Brandom proposes to evade the dilemma by adopting a middle road--one that uses normative vocabulary, but treats norms as implicit in practices. I argue that this (...)
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  57. Jussi Haukioja (2005). Normativity and Mental Content. In Intentionality: Past and Future (Value Inquiry Book Series, Volume 173). New York: Rodopi NY.
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  58. Jussi Haukioja (2005). Intentionality: Past and Future (Value Inquiry Book Series, Volume 173). New York: Rodopi NY.
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  59. Jakob Hohwy (2001). Semantic Primitivism and Normativity. Ratio 14 (1):1-17.
  60. Terence E. Horgan & Mark Timmons (1993). Metaphysical Naturalism, Semantic Normativity, and Meta-Semantic Irrealism. In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Philosophical Issues. Atascadero: Ridgeview.
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  61. Terry Horgan & Matjaž Potrč (2006). Particularist Semantic Normativity. Acta Analytica 21 (1):45-61.
    We sketch the view we call contextual semantics. It asserts that truth is semantically correct affirmability under contextually variable semantic standards, that truth is frequently an indirect form of correspondence between thought/language and the world, and that many Quinean commitments are not genuine ontological commitments. We argue that contextualist semantics fits very naturally with the view that the pertinent semantic standards are particularist rather than being systematizable as exceptionless general principles.
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  62. Henry Jackman, Charity and the Normativity of Meaning.
    It has frequently been suggested that meaning is, in some important sense, normative. However, precisely what is particularly normative about it is often left without any satisfactory explanation, and the ‘normativity thesis’ has thus, justly, been called into question. That said, it will be argued here that the intuition that meaning is ‘normative’ is on the right track, even if many of the purported explanations for meaning’s normativity are not. In particular, rather that being particularly social, the normativity of meaning (...)
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  63. Mark Jago (2012). The Content of Deduction. Journal of Philosophical Logic 42:317-334.
    For deductive reasoning to be justified, it must be guaranteed to preserve truth from premises to conclusion; and for it to be useful to us, it must be capable of informing us of something. How can we capture this notion of information content, whilst respecting the fact that the content of the premises, if true, already secures the truth of the conclusion? This is the problem I address here. I begin by considering and rejecting several accounts of informational content. I (...)
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  64. Matthias Kiesselbach (2011). Constructing Commitment: Brandom's Pragmatist Take on Rule-Following. Philosophical Investigations 35 (2):101-126.
    According to a standard criticism, Robert Brandom's “normative pragmatics”, i.e. his attempt to explain normative statuses in terms of practical attitudes, faces a dilemma. If practical attitudes and their interactions are specified in purely non-normative terms, then they underdetermine normative statuses; but if normative terms are allowed into the account, then the account becomes viciously circular. This paper argues that there is no dilemma, because the feared circularity is not vicious. While normative claims do exhibit their respective authors' practical attitudes (...)
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  65. Jaegwon Kim (1993). Naturalism and Semantic Normativity. In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Philosophical Issues. Atascadero: Ridgeview.
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  66. Tim Kraft (2009). Oughts and Thoughts: Rule-Following and the Normativity of Content, by Anandi Hattiangadi. European Journal of Philosophy 17 (2):336-341.
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  67. Uriah Kriegel (2010). Intentionality and Normativity. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):185-208.
    One of the most enduring elements of Davidson’s legacy is the idea that intentionality is inherently normative. The normativity of intentionality means different things to different people and in different contexts, however. A subsidiary goal of this paper is to get clear on the sense in which Davidson means the thesis that intentionality is inherently normative. The central goal of the paper is to consider whether the thesis is true, in light of recent work on intentionality that insists on an (...)
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  68. Mark Norris Lance (2002). Pr�Cis of The Grammar of Meaning: Normativity and Semantic Content. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):177-185.
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  69. Mark Norris Lance (2002). Pr�Cis of The Grammar of Meaning: Normativity and Semantic Content. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):177-185.
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  70. Mark Norris Lance (1997). The Grammar of Meaning: Normativity and Semantic Discourse. Cambridge University Press.
    What is the function of concepts pertaining to meaning in socio-linguistic practice? In this study, the authors argue that we can approach a satisfactory answer by displacing the standard picture of meaning talk as a sort of description with a picture that takes seriously the similarity between meaning talk and various types of normative injunction. In their discussion of this approach, they investigate the more general question of the nature of the normative, as well as a range of important topics (...)
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  71. Daniel Lassiter (2010). Semantic Normativity and Coordination Games. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 10 (3):209-228.
    Individualists and externalists about language take themselves to be disagreeing about the basic subject matter of the study of language. Are linguistic facts are really facts about individuals, or really facts about language use in a community?The right answer to this question, I argue, is ‘Yes’. Both individualistic and social facts are crucial to a complete understanding of human language. The relationship between the theories inspired by these facts is analogous to the relationship between anatomy and ecology, or between micro- (...)
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  72. David Lauer (2012). Expressivism and the Layer Cake Picture of Discursive Practice. Philosophia 40 (1):55-73.
    Robert Brandom defends the intelligibility of the notion of a fully discursive practice that does not include any kind of logical vocabulary. Logical vocabulary, according to his account, should be understood as an optional extra to discursive practice, not as a necessary ingredient. Call this the Layer Cake Picture of the relation of logical to non-logical discursive practices. The aim pursued in this paper is to show, by way of an internal critique, that the Layer Cake Picture is in fact (...)
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  73. David Lauer (2009). Genuine Normativity, Expressive Bootstrapping, and Normative Phenomenalism. Etica and Politica / Ethics & Politics 11 (1):321-350.
    In this paper, I offer a detailed critical reading of Robert Brandom’s project to give an expressive bootstrapping account of intentionality, cashed out as a normative-phenomenalist account of what I will call genuine normativity. I claim that there is a reading of Making It Explicit that evades the predominant charges of either reductionism or circularity. However, making sense of Brandom’s book in the way proposed here involves correcting Brandom’s own general account of what he is doing in it, and thus (...)
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  74. Ronald Loeffler (2005). Normative Phenomenalism: On Robert Brandom's Practice-Based Explanation of Meaning. European Journal of Philosophy 13 (1):32-69.
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  75. Diego Marconi (2012). Semantic Normativity, Deference and Reference. Dialectica 66 (2):273-287.
    I discuss Paolo Casalegno's objections to my views about semantic normativity as presented in my book Lexical Competence (MIT Press, 1997) and in a later paper. I argue that, contrary to Casalegno's claim, the phenomenon of semantic deference can be accounted for without having to appeal to an “objective” notion of reference, i.e. to the view that words have the reference they have independently of whatever knowledge or ability is available to or within the linguistic community. Against both Casalegno and (...)
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  76. Johann Marek & Maria Reicher (eds.) (2004). Papers of the 27th International Wittgenstein Symposium: Experience and Analysis.
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  77. Joseph Margolis, A Response to a Question Regarding “Normative Functionalism”. Normative Functionalism and the Pittsburgh School.
  78. Alan Millar (2002). The Normativity of Meaning. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Logic, Thought, and Language. Cambridge University Press.
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  79. Alexander Miller, The Argument From Queerness and the Normativity of Meaning.
    In his book Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (Kripke 1982), Saul Kripke develops a famous argument that purports to show that there are no facts about what we mean by the expressions of our language: ascriptions of meaning, such as “Jones means addition by ‘+’” or “Smith means green by ‘green’”, are according to Kripke’s Wittgenstein neither true nor false. Kripke’s Wittgenstein thus argues for a form of non- factualism about ascriptions of meaning: ascriptions of meaning do not (...)
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  80. Bruno Mölder (2008). Normativity and Deflationary Theories of Truth. Studia Philosophica Estonica 1:179-193.
    It has been argued that deflationary theories of truth stumble over the normativity of truth. This paper maintains that the normativity objection does not pose problems to at least one version of deflationism, minimalism. The rest of the paper discusses truth-related norms, showing that either they do not hold or they are not troublesome for deflationism.
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  81. Friederike Moltmann (forthcoming). 'Truth Predicates' in Natural Language. In Dora Achourioti, Henri Galinon & José Martinez (eds.), Volume on Truth. Springer.
    This takes a closer look at the actual semantic behavior of apparent truth predicates in English and re-evaluates the way they could motivate particular philosophical views regarding the formal status of 'truth predicates' and their semantics. The paper distinguishes two types of 'truth predicates' and proposes semantic analyses that better reflect the linguistic facts. These analyses match particular independently motivated philosophical views.
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  82. Martin Montminy (2005). Meaning Skepticism and Normativity. Journal of Philosophical Research 30:215-235.
    Saul Kripke has raised a powerful skeptical objection to an account of meaning based on dispositions. He argues that attempts to explain meaning on the basis of dispositions, no matter how sophisticated, are bound to fail because meaning is normative, whereas dispositions are descriptive. I provide a clear account of the normativity objection, which has often been seen as obscure or been conflated with other objections Kripke raises. I offer a straight solution to the skeptical paradox based on a dispositional (...)
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  83. Kevin Mulligan (1999). Justification, Rule-Breaking and the Mind. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (2):123-139.
    The view that psychological episodes have a physical nature (physicalism) and the view that they have a mental nature (Cartesian dualism) can be distinguished from the view that they have a purely normative nature. I explore some strands of a distinct, fourth view: psychological episodes are what they are because of the actual and possible relations of defeasible justification in which they stand; defeasible justification is an internal relation; it is not at bottom a normative matter; rule-following presupposes such internal (...)
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  84. Anthony O'Hear (ed.) (2002). Logic, Thought, and Language. Cambridge University Press.
    Original essays by leading philosophers on topics of logic, thought and language.
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  85. Peter Pagin (2002). Rule-Following, Compositionality and the Normativity of Meaning. In D. Prawitz (ed.), Meaning and Interpretation. Konferenser.
    However, if Wittgenstein’s so called rule-following considerations are correct, then this reason for believing in the validity of (C), is mistaken. The conclusion of those considerations is that we must reject the idea that rules are things which determine possible cases of application before those cases are actually encountered and decided by speakers. If this is right, then there is no rule which determines the meanings of new sentences, i.e. before those sentences have actually been used. Therefore, it might seem (...)
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  86. Peter Pagin (1998). Rules of Meaning and Practical Reasoning. Synthese 117 (2):207 - 227.
    Can there be rules of language which serve both to determine meaning and to guide speakers in ordinary linguistic usage, i.e., in the production of speech acts? We argue that the answer is no. We take the guiding function of rules to be the function of serving as reasons for actions, and the question of guidance is then considered within the framework of practical reasoning. It turns out that those rules that can serve as reasons for linguistic utterances cannot be (...)
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  87. David Papineau (1999). Normativity and Judgment. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 73 (73):16-43.
    It is widely assumed that the normativity of conceptual judgement poses problems for naturalism. Thus John McDowell urges that 'The structure of the space of reasons stubbornly resists being appropriated within a naturalism that conceives nature as the realm of law' (1994, p 73). Similar sentiments have been expressed by many other writers, for example Robert Brandom (1994, p xiii) and Paul Boghossian (1989, p 548).
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  88. Christopher Peacocke (1990). Content and Norms in a Natural World. In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Information, Semantics, and Epistemology. Blackwell.
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  89. Carlo Penco (2007). Idiolect and Context. In L. E. Hahn (ed.), Library of Living Philosphers: the Philosophy of Michael Dummett. Open Court.
    In this paper I will compare some of Dummett and Davidson’s claims on the problem of communication and idiolects: how can we understand each other if we use different idiolects? First I define the problem, giving the alternative theses of (I) the priority of language over idiolects and (II) the priority of idiolects over language. I then present Dummett's claims supporting (I) and Davidson's claims supporting (II).
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  90. Michael J. Pendlebury (1998). Intentionality and Normativity. South African Journal of Philosophy 17 (2):142-151.
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  91. Jaroslav Peregrin, Holistické Pojetí Jazyka.
    Zdá se, že není nic přirozenějšího, než se spolu s Russellem domnívat, že „máme-li smysluplně hovořit a ne pouze vydávat zvuky, musíme slovům, která užíváme, dávat nějaký význam; a významem, který svým slovům dáváme, musí být něco, s čím jsme přišli do styku“. Naše slova přece musí, aby byla skutečně smysluplná, něco představovat! Od toho se odvíjí běžná poučka, která nám říká, že slova jazyka jsou symboly, to jest (podle Encyklopedie Britannica), „prvky komunikace, které mají představovat osobu, předmět, skupinu, proces (...)
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  92. Jaroslav Peregrin (2012). Inferentialism and the Normativity of Meaning. Philosophia 40 (1):75-97.
    There may be various reasons for claiming that meaning is normative, and additionally, very different senses attached to the claim. However, all such claims have faced fierce resistance from those philosophers who insist that meaning is not normative in any nontrivial sense of the word. In this paper I sketch one particular approach to meaning claiming its normativity and defend it against the anti-normativist critique: namely the approach of Brandomian inferentialism. However, my defense is not restricted to inferentialism in any (...)
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  93. Adam C. Podlaskowski (2010). Unbelievable Thoughts and Doxastic Oughts. Theoria 76 (2):112-118.
    From the dictum ought implies can , it has been argued that no account of belief's normativity can avoid the unpalatable result that, for unbelievable propositions such as "It is raining and nobody believes that it is raining", one ought not to believe them even if true. In this article, I argue that this move only succeeds on a faulty assumption about the conjunction of doxastic "oughts.".
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  94. D. Prawitz (ed.) (2002). Meaning and Interpretation. Konferenser.
  95. Consuelo Preti (2002). Normativity and Meaning: Kripke's Skeptical Paradox Reconsidered. Philosophical Forum 33 (1):39-62.
  96. Andrew Reisner (2013). Prima Facie and Pro Tanto Oughts. In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Blackwells.
    There are many uses in English of the word “ought” (see Ought). This essay concerns the normative uses and the concepts or properties denoted thereby. In particular, it concerns two nonfinal oughts commonly used in the philosophical literature: prima facie oughts and pro tanto oughts.
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  97. Georges Rey (2007). Resisting Normativism in Psychology. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
    “Intentional content,” as I understand it, is whatever serves as the object of “propositional” attitude verbs, such as “think,” “judge,” “represent,” “prefer” (whether or not these objects are “propositions”). These verbs are standardly used to pick out the intentional states invoked to explain the states and behavior of people and many animals. I shall take the “normativity of the intentional,” or “Normativism,” to be the claim that any adequate theory of intentional states involves considerations of value not essentially involved in (...)
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  98. Gideon Rosen (2001). Brandom on Modality, Normativity, and Intentionality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (3):611-23.
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  99. Frank Scalambrino, Tales of the Mighty Tautologists? Normative Funtionalism and the Pittsburgh School.
    There is supposed to be deep agreement among the work of Wilfrid Sellars, Robert Brandom, and John McDowell in regard to normativity. As a result, according to Robert Brandom (2008), and echoed by Chauncey Maher (2012), “normative functionalism” (NF) may refer to a position held by Sellars, Brandom, and McDowell, i.e., “The Pittsburgh School” of philosophy. The standard criticism of the various forms of this normative functionalist position points out the inconsistency in the commitment of normative functionalists to both metaphysical (...)
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  100. Evan Selinger & Kyle Powys Whyte (2010). Competence and Trust in Choice Architecture. Knowledge, Technology and Policy 23 (3-4):461-482.
    Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein’s Nudge advances a theory of how designers can improve decision-making in various situations where people have to make choices. We claim that the moral acceptability of nudges hinges in part on whether they can provide an account of the competence required to offer nudges, an account that would serve to warrant our general trust in choice architects. What needs to be considered, on a methodological level, is whether they have clarified the competence required for choice (...)
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