The thesis that meaning is normative is the thesis that the fact that an expression is meaningful entails that certain uses of it are permissible or required while others are not. Kripke famously used this thesis as an explicit standard for evaluation of views of meaningfulness in his Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1982). A standard argument in favor of it goes as follows: first, certain uses of an expression are intuitively semantically correct while others are misuses; second, correctness entails permissibility. Anti-Normativists usually grant the first premise, but reject the second, arguing that correctness can be understood in non-normative terms. Interestingly, there’s no universal agreement neither among Normativists nor Anti-Normativists as to what it means to say that uses of an expression are semantically correct. A common view is that it just means to say that they don’t result in making factual mistakes like saying something false. However, an entirely different construal is that it means to say that they are in accordance with the expression’s meaning in a sense which is compatible with making factual mistakes.
|Introductions||Greenberg 2005, Glüer & Wikforss 2010|
- Kripkenstein on Meaning (119)
- Meaning Holism (102)
- Speaker Meaning and Semantic Meaning (23)
- Aspects of Meaning, Misc (19)
- Inferentialist Accounts of Meaning and Content (197)
- Naturalism and Intentionality (64)
- Rule-Following (160)
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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