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  1. Scott F. Aikin (2006). Contrastive Self-Attribution of Belief. Social Epistemology 20 (1):93 – 103.
    A common argument for evidentialism is that the norms of assertion, specifically those bearing on warrant and assertability, regulate belief. On this assertoric model of belief, a constitutive condition for belief is that the believing subject take her belief to be supported by sufficient evidence. An equally common source of resistance to these arguments is the plausibility of cases in which a speaker, despite the fact that she lacks warrant to assert that p, nevertheless attributes to herself the belief that (...)
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  2. Kent Bach (2008). Applying Pragmatics to Epistemology. Philosophical Issues 18 (1):68-88.
    This paper offers a smattering of applications of pragmatics to epistemology. In most cases they concern recent epistemological claims that depend for their plausibility on mistaking something pragmatic for something semantic. After giving my formulation of the semantic/pragmatic distinction and explaining how seemingly semantic intuitions can be responsive to pragmatic factors, I take up the following topics: 1. Classic Examples of Confusing Meaning and Use 2. Pragmatic Implications of Hedging or Intensifying an Assertion 3. Belief Attributions 4. Knowledge-wh 5. The (...)
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  3. Matthew A. Benton (2013). Dubious Objections From Iterated Conjunctions. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):355-358.
    The knowledge account of assertion—-roughly: one should not assert what one does not know—-can explain a variety of Moorean conjunctions, a fact often cited as evidence in its favor. David Sosa ("Dubious Assertions," Phil Studies, 2009) has objected that the account does not generalize satisfactorily, since it cannot explain the infelicity of certain iterated conjunctions without appealing to the controversial "KK" principle. This essay responds by showing how the knowledge account can handle such conjunctions without use of the KK principle.
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  4. Matthew A. Benton (2012). Assertion, Knowledge and Predictions. Analysis 72 (1):102-105.
    John N. Williams (1994) and Matthew Weiner (2005) invoke predictions in order to undermine the normative relevance of knowledge for assertions; in particular, Weiner argues, predictions are important counterexamples to the Knowledge Account of Assertion (KAA). I argue here that they are not true counterexamples at all, a point that can be agreed upon even by those who reject KAA.
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  5. Matthew A. Benton (2011). Two More for the Knowledge Account of Assertion. Analysis 71 (4):684-687.
    The Knowledge Account of Assertion (KAA) has received added support recently from data on prompting assertion (Turri 2010) and from a refinement suggesting that assertions ought to express knowledge (Turri 2011). This paper adds another argument from parenthetical positioning, and then argues that KAA’s unified explanation of some of the earliest data (from Moorean conjunctions) adduced in its favor recommends KAA over its rivals.
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  6. Martijn Blaauw (2012). Reinforcing the Knowledge Account of Assertion. Analysis 72 (1):105-108.
    Many philosophers are building a solid case in favour of the knowledge account of assertion (KAA). According to KAA, if one asserts that P one represents oneself as knowing that P. KAA has recently received support from linguistic data about prompting challenges, parenthetical positioning and predictions. In this article, I add another argument to this rapidly growing list: an argument from what I will call ‘reinforcing parenthesis’.
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  7. Martijn Blaauw & Jeroen de Ridder (2012). Unsafe Assertions. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):1-5.
    John Turri has recently provided two problem cases for the knowledge account of assertion (KAA) to argue for the express knowledge account of assertion (EKAA). We defend KAA by explaining away the intuitions about the problem cases and by showing that our explanation is theoretically superior to EKAA.
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  8. Tim Black (2008). A Warranted-Assertability Defense of a Moorean Response to Skepticism. Acta Analytica 23 (3):187-205.
    According to a Moorean response to skepticism, the standards for knowledge are invariantly comparatively low, and we can know across contexts all that we ordinarily take ourselves to know. It is incumbent upon the Moorean to defend his position by explaining how, in contexts in which S seems to lack knowledge, S can nevertheless have knowledge. The explanation proposed here relies on a warranted-assertability maneuver: Because we are warranted in asserting that S doesn’t know that p, it can seem that (...)
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  9. Michael Blome-Tillmann (2012). Contextualism and the Knowledge Norms. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (4):89-100.
    Epistemic contextualism is widely believed to be incompatible with the recently popular view that knowledge is the norm of assertion, practical reasoning, or belief. I argue in this article that the problems arising for contextualism from the mentioned normative views are only apparent and can be resolved by acknowledging the fairly widespread phenomenon of non-obvious context-sensitivity (recently embraced by even some of contextualism's most ardent former critics). Building on recent insights about non-obvious context-sensitivity, the article outlines an independently attractive contextualist (...)
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  10. Berit Brogaard (forthcoming). Intellectual Flourishing as the Fundamental Epistemic Norm. In C. Littlejohn & J. Turri (eds.), Epistemic Norms.
    According to the extended knowledge account of assertion, we should only assert and act on what we know. Call this the ‘Knowledge Norm’. Because moral and prudential rules prohibit morally and prudentially unacceptable actions and assertions, they can, familiarly, override the Knowledge Norm. This, however, raises the question of whether other epistemic norms, too, can override the Knowledge Norm. The present paper offers an affirmative answer to this question and then argues that the Knowledge Norm is derived from a more (...)
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  11. Berit Brogaard (forthcoming). Towards a Eudaimonistic Virtue Epistemology. In Abrol Fairweather (ed.), Naturalizing Virtue Epistemology. Synthese Library.
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  12. Jessica Brown (2012). Assertion and Practical Reasoning: Common or Divergent Epistemic Standards? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):123-157.
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  13. Jessica Brown (2010). Knowledge and Assertion. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):549-566.
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  14. Jessica Brown (2008). The Knowledge Norm for Assertion. Philosophical Issues 18 (1):89-103.
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  15. Jessica Brown (2006). Contextualism and Warranted Assertibility Manoeuvres. Philosophical Studies 130 (3):407 - 435.
    Contextualists such as Cohen and DeRose claim that the truth conditions of knowledge attributions vary contextually, in particular that the strength of epistemic position required for one to be truly ascribed knowledge depends on features of the attributor's context. Contextualists support their view by appeal to our intuitions about when it's correct (or incorrect) to ascribe knowledge. Someone might argue that some of these intuitions merely reflect when it is conversationally appropriate to ascribe knowledge, not when knowledge is truly ascribed, (...)
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  16. Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.) (2011). Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press.
    Assertion is a fundamental feature of language. This volume will be the place to look for anyone interested in current work on the topic.
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  17. Christopher Buford (2009). Contextualism, Closure, and the Knowledge Account of Assertion. Journal of Philosophical Research 34:111-121.
    This paper argues that Epistemic Contextualism, Knowledge Closure, and the Knowledge Account of Assertion are inconsistent. The argument is developed by considering an objection to Contextualism that is unsuccessful. Some Contextualist responses are canvassed and rejected. Finally, it is argued that an analogue of the inconsistency arises for those who accept that justification is closed under known entailment.
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  18. Herman Cappelen (2011). Against Assertion. In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press.
    The view defended in this paper - I call it the No-Assertion view - rejects the assumption that it is theoretically useful to single out a subset of sayings as assertions: (v) Sayings are governed by variable norms, come with variable commitments and have variable causes and effects. What philosophers have tried to capture by the term 'assertion' is largely a philosophers' invention. It fails to pick out an act-type that we engage in and it is not a category we (...)
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  19. J. Carter & Emma Gordon (2011). Norms of Assertion: The Quantity and Quality of Epistemic Support. Philosophia 39 (4):615-635.
    We show that the contemporary debate surrounding the question “What is the norm of assertion?” presupposes what we call the quantitative view, i.e. the view that this question is best answered by determining how much epistemic support is required to warrant assertion. We consider what Jennifer Lackey ( 2010 ) has called cases of isolated second-hand knowledge and show—beyond what Lackey has suggested herself—that these cases are best understood as ones where a certain type of understanding , rather than knowledge, (...)
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  20. Paolo Casalegno (2009). Reasons to Believe and Assertion. Dialectica 63 (3):231-248.
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  21. Timothy Chan (2008). Belief, Assertion and Moore's Paradox. Philosophical Studies 139 (3):395 - 414.
    In this article I argue that two received accounts of belief and assertion cannot both be correct, because they entail mutually contradictory claims about Moore’s Paradox. The two accounts in question are, first, the Action Theory of Belief (ATB), the functionalist view that belief must be manifested in dispositions to act, and second, the Belief Account of Assertion (BAA), the Gricean view that an asserter must present himself as believing what he asserts. It is generally accepted also that Moorean assertions (...)
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  22. Timothy Chan & Guy Kahane (2011). The Trouble with Being Sincere. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (2):215-234.
    Questions about sincerity play a central role in our lives. But what makes an assertion insincere? In this paper we argue that the answer to this question is not as straightforward as it has sometimes been taken to be. Until recently the dominant answer has been that a speaker makes an insincere assertion if and only if he does not believe the proposition asserted. There are, however, persuasive counterexamples to this simple account. It has been proposed instead that an insincere (...)
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  23. E. J. Coffman (forthcoming). Does Knowledge Secure Warrant to Assert? Philosophical Studies.
    This paper fortifies and defends the so called Sufficiency Argument (SA) against Classical Invariantism . In Sect. 2, I explain the version of the SA formulated but then rejected by Brown ( 2008a ). In Sect. 3, I show how cases described by Hawthorne ( 2004 ), Brown ( 2008b ), and Lackey (forthcoming) threaten to undermine one or the other of the SA’s least secure premises. In Sect. 4, I buttress one of those premises and defend the reinforced SA (...)
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  24. Stewart Cohen (2004). Knowledge, Assertion, and Practical Reasoning. Philosophical Issues 14 (1):482–491.
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  25. Wayne A. Davis (2007). Knowledge Claims and Context: Loose Use. Philosophical Studies 132 (3):395 - 438.
    There is abundant evidence of contextual variation in the use of “S knows p.” Contextualist theories explain this variation in terms of semantic hypotheses that refer to standards of justification determined by “practical” features of either the subject’s context (Hawthorne & Stanley) or the ascriber’s context (Lewis, Cohen, & DeRose). There is extensive linguistic counterevidence to both forms. I maintain that the contextual variation of knowledge claims is better explained by common pragmatic factors. I show here that one is variable (...)
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  26. Keith DeRose (2002). Assertion, Knowledge, and Context. Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.
    This paper uses the knowledge account of assertion (KAA) in defense of epistemological contextualism. Part 1 explores the main problem afflicting contextualism, what I call the "Generality Objection." Part 2 presents and defends both KAA and a powerful new positive argument that it provides for contextualism. Part 3 uses KAA to answer the Generality Objection, and also casts other shadows over the prospects for anti-contextualism.
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  27. Keith DeRose (2002). ``Assertion, Knowledge, and Context&Quot. Philosophical Review 111:167-203.
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  28. Keith DeRose (1996). Knowledge, Assertion and Lotteries. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):568 – 580.
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  29. Julian Dodd (1999). There is No Norm of Truth: A Minimalist Reply to Wright. Analysis 59 (4):291–299.
  30. Igor Douven (2009). Assertion, Moore, and Bayes. Philosophical Studies 144 (3):361 - 375.
    It is widely believed that the so-called knowledge account of assertion best explains why sentences such as “It’s raining in Paris but I don’t believe it” and “It’s raining in Paris but I don’t know it” appear odd to us. I argue that the rival rational credibility account of assertion explains that fact just as well. I do so by providing a broadly Bayesian analysis of the said type of sentences which shows that such sentences cannot express rationally held beliefs. (...)
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  31. Igor Douven (2006). Assertion, Knowledge, and Rational Credibility. Philosophical Review 115 (4):449-485.
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  32. Lan J. Dove (2005). On Assertion and Robustness. Southwest Philosophy Review 21 (1):85-92.
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  33. Pascal Engel (2008). In What Sense is Knowledge the Norm of Assertion? Grazer Philosophische Studien 77 (1):45-59.
    The knowledge account of assertion (KAA) is the view that assertion is governed by the norm that the speaker should know what s/he asserts. It is not the purpose of this article to examine all the criticisms nor to try to give a full defence of KAA, but only to defend it against the charge of being normatively incorrect. It has been objected that assertion is governed by other norms than knowledge, or by no norm at all. It seems to (...)
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  34. Don Fallis (2012). Lying as a Violation of Grice's First Maxim of Quality. Dialectica 66 (4):563-581.
    According to the traditional philosophical definition, you lie if and only if you assert what you believe to be false with the intent to deceive. However, several philosophers (e.g., Carson 2006, Sorensen 2007, Fallis 2009) have pointed out that there are lies that are not intended to deceive and, thus, that the traditional definition fails. In 2009, I suggested an alternative definition: you lie if and only if you say what you believe to be false when you believe that one (...)
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  35. Mikkel Gerken (2012). Discursive Justification and Skepticism. Synthese 189 (2):373-394.
    In this paper, I consider how a general epistemic norm of action that I have proposed in earlier work should be specified in order to govern certain types of acts: assertive speech acts. More specifically, I argue that the epistemic norm of assertion is structurally similar to the epistemic norm of action. First, I argue that the notion of warrant operative in the epistemic norm of a central type of assertion is an internalist one that I call ‘discursive justification.’ This (...)
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  36. Patrick Greenough (2011). Truth-Relativism, Norm-Relativism, and Assertion. In Brown J. & Cappelen H. (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press.
    The main goal in this paper is to outline and defend a form of Relativism, under which truth is absolute but assertibility is not. I dub such a view Norm-Relativism in contrast to the more familiar forms of Truth-Relativism. The key feature of this view is that just what norm of assertion, belief, and action is in play in some context is itself relative to a perspective. In slogan form: there is no fixed, single norm for assertion, belief, and action. (...)
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  37. Robert Hambourger (1987). Justified Assertion and the Relativity of Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 51 (2):241 - 269.
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  38. John Hawthorne (2004). Knowledge and Lotteries. Oxford University Press.
    Knowledge and Lotteries is organized around an epistemological puzzle: in many cases, we seem consistently inclined to deny that we know a certain class of propositions, while crediting ourselves with knowledge of propositions that imply them. In its starkest form, the puzzle is this: we do not think we know that a given lottery ticket will be a loser, yet we normally count ourselves as knowing all sorts of ordinary things that entail that its holder will not suddenly acquire a (...)
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  39. John Hawthorne & Ofra Magidor (2011). Assertion and Epistemic Opacity. Mind 119 (476):1087-1105.
    In Hawthorne and Magidor 2009, we presented an argument against Stalnaker’s meta-semantic framework. In this paper we address two critical responses to our paper: Stalnaker 2009, and Almotahari and Glick 2010. Sections 1–4 are devoted to addressing Stalnaker’s response and sections 5–8 to addressing Almotahari and Glick’s. We pay special attention (Sect. 2) to an interesting argument that Stalnaker offers to bolster the transparency of presupposition (an argument that, if successful, could also form the basis of a defence of the (...)
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  40. A. Hazlett, R. McKenna & J. Pollock (2012). Assertion: New Philosophical Essays, Edited by Jessica Brown and Herman Cappelen. Mind 121 (483):784-788.
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  41. Allan Hazlett, Robin McKenna & Joey Pollock (forthcoming). Review of Brown and Cappelen, Assertion (Oxford University Press). Mind.
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  42. Jeffrey Hershfield (2012). Missed It By That Much: Austin on Norms of Truth. Philosophia 40 (2):357-363.
    A principal challenge for a deflationary theory is to explain the value of truth: why we aim for true beliefs, abhor dishonesty, and so on. The problem arises because deflationism sees truth as a mere logical property and the truth predicate as serving primarily as a device of generalization. Paul Horwich, attempts to show how deflationism can account for the value of truth. Drawing on the work of J. L. Austin, I argue that his account, which focuses on belief, cannot (...)
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  43. Christopher S. Hill & Joshua Schechter (2007). Hawthorne's Lottery Puzzle and the Nature of Belief. Philosophical Issues 17 (1):1020-122.
    In the first chapter of his Knowledge and Lotteries, John Hawthorne argues that thinkers do not ordinarily know lottery propositions. His arguments depend on claims about the intimate connections between knowledge and assertion, epistemic possibility, practical reasoning, and theoretical reasoning. In this paper, we cast doubt on the proposed connections. We also put forward an alternative picture of belief and reasoning. In particular, we argue that assertion is governed by a Gricean constraint that makes no reference to knowledge, and that (...)
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  44. Edward Hinchman (forthcoming). Assertion, Sincerity, and Knowledge. Noûs.
    The oddities in lottery cases and Moore’s paradox appear to support the knowledge account of assertion, according to which one should assert only what one knows. This paper preserves an emphasis on epistemic norms but presents grounds for an alternative explanation. The alternative divides the explanandum, explaining the error in lottery and Moorean assertions with one move and their deeper incoherence with another. The error derives from a respect in which the assertions are uninformative: the speaker is not being appropriately (...)
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  45. Frank Hindriks (2007). The Status of the Knowledge Account of Assertion. Linguistics and Philosophy 30 (3):393-406.
    According to the increasingly popular knowledge account, assertion is governed by the rule that speech acts of that kind require knowledge of their content. Timothy Williamson has argued that this knowledge rule is the constitutive rule of assertion. It is argued here that it is not the constitutive rule of assertion in any sense of the term, as it governs only some assertions rather than all of them. A (qualified) knowledge rule can in fact be derived from the traditional analysis (...)
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  46. Leo Iacono (2008). Warranted Assertability Maneuvers and the Rules of Assertion. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (4):460-469.
    Abstract: In responding to the cases that motivate epistemic contextualism, invariantists sometimes use a warranted assertability maneuver (WAM), according to which we mistakenly judge an assertion to be true because we confuse conversational propriety with truth. I argue that no invariantist WAM against Stewart Cohen's Airport Case can succeed. The problem is that such a WAM is inconsistent with the known ways of accounting for the evidence that motivates the knowledge account of assertion.
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  47. Alexander Jackson (2011). Two Ways to Put Knowledge First. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (2):353 - 369.
    This paper distinguishes two ways to ?put knowledge first?. One way affirms a knowledge norm. For example, Williamson [2000] argues that one must only assert that which one knows. Hawthorne and Stanley [2008] argue that one must only treat as a reason for action that which one knows. Another way to put knowledge first affirms a determination thesis. For example, Williamson [2000] argues that what one knows determines what one is justified in believing. Hawthorne and Stanley [2008] argue that what (...)
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  48. Frank Jackson (1979). On Assertion and Indicative Conditionals. Philosophical Review 88 (4):565-589.
  49. Christoph Jäger (2012). Contextualism and the Knowledge Norm of Assertion. Analysis 72 (3):491-498.
    Keith DeRose has argued that ‘the knowledge account of assertion – according to which what one is in a position to assert is what one knows – ... provides a ... powerful positive argument in favor of contextualism’ (2009: 80). The truth is that it yields a powerful argument against contextualism, at least against its most popular, anti-sceptical versions. The following argument shows that, if we conjoin (such versions of) epistemic contextualism with an appropriate meta-linguistic formulation of the knowledge account (...)
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  50. Ronald Jager (1970). Truth and Assertion. Mind 79 (314):161-169.
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  51. O. R. Jones (1991). Moore's Paradox, Assertion and Knowledge. Analysis 51 (4):183 - 186.
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  52. Christoph Kelp (forthcoming). A Practical Explication of the Knowledge Rule of Informative Speech Acts. European Journal of Philosophy.
    : This paper defends the knowledge rule of informative speech acts. It is argued that Edward Craig's insightful practical explication of the concept of knowledge can be extended to motivate the knowledge rule. A number of problem cases for the knowledge rule are addressed and accommodated.
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  53. John Koethe (2009). Knowledge and the Norms of Assertion. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):625-638.
    An account of the norms of assertion is proposed which is supported by the same considerations that motivate the familiar knowledge account of those norms, but does not have a problematic consequence of the latter. This alternative account is defended against others to be found in the literature, and some larger epistemological issues it raises are considered briefly.
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  54. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2010). ``Norms of Assertion&Quot. In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappellan (eds.), Assertion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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  55. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2009). ``Knowledge, Assertion, and Lotteries&Quot. In Duncan Pritchard & Patrick Greenough (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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  56. Jennifer Lackey, Assertion and Isolated Secondhand Knowledge.
    A common view in the recent philosophical literature is that knowledge is the norm governing proper assertion. Thus, according to Keith DeRose, “…one is positioned well-enough to assert that P iff one knows that P” (DeRose 2002, p. 180). Let us call the thesis expressed here the Knowledge Norm of Assertion, or the KNA, and formulate it as follows.
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  57. Jennifer Lackey (2007). Norms of Assertion. Noûs 41 (4):594–626.
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  58. Adam Leite (2007). How to Link Assertion and Knowledge Without Going Contextualist: A Reply to DeRose's "Assertion, Knowledge, and Context". Philosophical Studies 134 (2):111 - 129.
    Keith DeRose has recently argued that the contextual variability of appropriate assertion, together with the knowledge account of assertion, yields a direct argument that ’knows’ is semantically contextsensitive. The argument fails because of an equivocation on the notion of warranted assertability. Once the equivocation is removed, it can be seen that the invariantist can retain the knowledge account of assertion and explain the contextual variability of appropriate assertion by appealing to Williamson’s suggestion that practical and conversational considerations can influence the (...)
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  59. Janet Levin (2008). Assertion, Practical Reason, and Pragmatic Theories of Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (2):359–384.
    Defenders of pragmatic theories of knowledge (such as contextualism and sensitive invariantism) argue that these theories, unlike those that invoke a single standard for knowledge, comport with the intuitively compelling thesis that knowledge is the norm of assertion and practical reason. In this paper, I dispute this thesis, and argue that, therefore, the prospects for both “high standard” approach, and contend that if one abandons the thesis that knowledge is the norm of assertion and practical reason, the most serious arguments (...)
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  60. Janet Levin (2008). Assertion, Practical Reason, and Pragmatic Theories of Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (2):359-384.
    Defenders of pragmatic theories of knowledge (such as contextualism and sensitive invariantism) argue that these theories, unlike those that invoke a single standard for knowledge, comport with the intuitively compelling thesis that knowledge is the norm of assertion and practical reason. In this paper, I dispute this thesis, and argue that, therefore, the prospects for both “high standard” approach, and contend that if one abandons the thesis that knowledge is the norm of assertion and practical reason, the most serious arguments (...)
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  61. Clayton Littlejohn (2012). Justification and the Truth-Connection. Cambridge University Press.
  62. Clayton Littlejohn (2010). Moore's Paradox and Epistemic Norms. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):79 – 100.
    We shall evaluate two strategies for motivating the view that knowledge is the norm of belief. The first draws on observations concerning belief's aim and the parallels between belief and assertion. The second appeals to observations concerning Moore's Paradox. Neither of these strategies gives us good reason to accept the knowledge account. The considerations offered in support of this account motivate only the weaker account on which truth is the fundamental norm of belief.
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  63. Clayton Littlejohn & John Turri (eds.) (forthcoming). Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief and Assertion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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  64. John MacFarlane (2011). What Is Assertion? In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion.
    To assert something is to perform a certain kind of act. This act is different in kind both from other speech acts, like questions, requests, commands, promises, and apologies, and from acts that are not speech acts, like toast buttering and inarticulate yodeling. My question, then is this: what features of an act qualify it as an assertion, and not one of these other kinds of act? To focus on a particular example: in uttering “Bill will close the window,” one (...)
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  65. B. J. C. Madison (2010). Is Justification Knowledge? Journal of Philosophical Research 35:173-191.
    Analytic epistemologists agree that, whatever else is true of epistemic justification, it is distinct from knowledge. However, if recent work by Jonathan Sutton is correct, this view is deeply mistaken, for according to Sutton justification is knowledge. That is, a subject is justified in believing that p iff he knows that p. Sutton further claims that there is no concept of epistemic justification distinct from knowledge. Since knowledge is factive, a consequence of Sutton’s view is that there are no false (...)
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  66. Ishani Maitra, Assertion, Norms and Games.
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  67. Ishani Maitra & Brian Weatherson (forthcoming). Assertion, Knowledge and Action. Philosophical Studies 149 (1).
    We argue against the knowledge rule of assertion, and in favour of integrating the account of assertion more tightly with our best theories of evidence and action. We think that the knowledge rule has an incredible consequence when it comes to practical deliberation, that it can be right for a person to do something that she can’t properly assert she can do. We develop some vignettes that show how this is possible, and how odd this consequence is. We then argue (...)
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  68. Matthew McGrath (2003). Deflationism and the Normativity of Truth. Philosophical Studies 112 (1):47 - 67.
    This paper argues, in response to Huw Price, that deflationism has the resources to account for the normativity of truth. The discussion centers on a principle of hyper-objective assertibility, that one is incorrect to assert that p if not-p. If this principle doesn't state a fact about truth, it neednt be explained by deflationists. If it does,, it can be explained.
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  69. Conor McHugh (2010). What Assertion Doesn't Show. European Journal of Philosophy 20 (3):407-429.
    Abstract: Some recent arguments against the classical invariantist account of knowledge exploit the idea that there is a ‘knowledge norm’ for assertion. It is claimed that, given the existence of this norm, certain intuitions about assertability support contextualism, or contrastivism, over classical invariantism. In this paper I show that, even if we accept the existence of a knowledge norm, these assertability-based arguments fail. The classical invariantist can accommodate and explain the relevant intuitions about assertability, in a way that retains the (...)
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  70. Rachel McKinnon (2013). The Supportive Reasons Norm of Assertion. American Philosophical Quarterly.
    In this paper I present my proposal for the central norm governing the practice of assertion, which I call the Supportive Reasons Norm of Assertion (SRNA). The critical features of this norm are that it's highly sensitive to the context of assertion, such that the requirements for warrantedly asserting a proposition shift with changes in context, and that truth is not a necessary condition for warrantedly asserting. In fact, I argue that there are some cases where a speaker may warrantedly (...)
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  71. Rachel McKinnon (2012). What I Learned in the Lunch Room About Assertion and Practical Reasoning. Logos and Episteme 3 (4):565-569.
    It is increasingly argued that there is a single unified constitutive norm of both assertion and practical reasoning. The most common suggestion is that knowledge is this norm. If this is correct, then we would expect that a diagnosis of problematic assertions should manifest as problematic reasons for acting. Jennifer Lackey has recently argued that assertions epistemically grounded in isolated second-hand knowledge (ISHK) are unwarranted. I argue that decisions epistemically grounded in premises based on ISHK also seem inappropriate. I finish (...)
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  72. Rachel McKinnon & Paul Simard Smith (forthcoming). Sure the Emperor Has No Clothes, but You Shouldn't Say That. Philosophia.
    In the norms of assertion literature there has been continued focus on a wide range of odd-sounding assertions that have been collected under the umbrella of Moore's Paradox. The precise nature of Moorean absurdity has long been a contested topic. Our aim in these brief remarks is not to attempt to settle that question decisively, but rather to present some new data bearing on it, and to argue that this new data is best explained by a new account of Moorean (...)
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  73. Rachel McKinnon & John Turri (forthcoming). Irksome Assertions. Philosophical Studies.
    The Knowledge Account of Assertion (KAA) says that knowledge is the norm of assertion: you may assert a proposition only if you know that it's true. The primary support for KAA is an explanatory inference from a broad range of linguisitic data. The more data that KAA well explains, the stronger the case for it, and the more difficult it is for the competition to keep pace. In this paper we critically assess a purported new linguistic datum, which, it has (...)
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  74. Rhys McKinnon (2012). How Do You Know That 'How Do You Know?' Challenges a Speaker's Knowledge? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (1):65-83.
    It is often argued that the general propriety of challenging an assertion with ‘How do you know?’ counts as evidence for the Knowledge Norm of Assertion (KNA). Part of the argument is that this challenge seems to directly challenge whether a speaker knows what she asserts. In this article I argue for a re-interpretation of the data, the upshot of which is that we need not interpret ‘How do you know?’ as directly challenging a speaker's knowledge; instead, it's better understood (...)
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  75. Martin Montminy (2012). Why Assertion and Practical Reasoning Must Be Governed By the Same Epistemic Norm. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (4):57-68.
    I argue that assertion and practical reasoning must be governed by the same epistemic norm. This is because the epistemic rule governing assertion derives from the epistemic rule governing practical reasoning, together with a plausible rule regarding assertion, according to which assertion must manifest belief.
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  76. Sebastiano Moruzzi (2008). Assertion, Belief and Disagreement: A Problem for Truth-Relativism. In Manuel García-Carpintero & Max Kölbel (eds.), Relative Truth. Oxford University Press.
  77. Peter Pagin, Against Normative Accounts of Assertion.
    According to the knowledge account of assertion, an assertion that p is correct just in case the speaker knows that p. This is so because of a norm that governs assertion and uniquely characterizes it. Recent opposition to the knowledge account accepts that assertion is governed by a norm, but proposes alternatives to the knowledge norm. In this paper I focus on some difficulties for normative accounts of assertion.
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  78. Peter Pagin, Assertion. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    An assertion is a speech act in which something is claimed to hold, e.g. that there are infinitely many prime numbers, or, with respect to some time t, that there is a traffic congestion on Brooklyn Bridge at t, or, of some person x with respect to some time t, that x has a tooth ache at t. The concept of assertion has often occupied a central place in the philosophy of language, since it is often thought that making assertions (...)
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  79. C. Pelling (2011). A Self-Referential Paradox for the Truth Account of Assertion. Analysis 71 (4):688-688.
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  80. Charlie Pelling (forthcoming). Paradox and the Knowledge Account of Assertion. Erkenntnis.
    Abstract In earlier work, I have argued that self-referential assertions of the form ‘this assertion is improper’ are paradoxical for the truth account of assertion. In this paper, I argue that such assertions are also paradoxical, though in a different way, for the knowledge account of assertion. Content Type Journal Article Category Original Paper Pages 1-2 DOI 10.1007/s10670-012-9360-0 Authors Charlie Pelling, Birkbeck, University of London, London, UK Journal Erkenntnis Online ISSN 1572-8420 Print ISSN 0165-0106.
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  81. Charlie Pelling (2013). Assertion and The Provision of Knowledge. Philosophical Quarterly 63 (251):293-312.
    Epistemic relationism in the theory of assertion is the view that an assertion's epistemic propriety depends purely on the relation between the asserter and the proposition asserted. Many accounts of assertion are relationist in this sense, including the familiar knowledge, belief, and justification accounts. A notable feature of such accounts is that they give no direct importance to the role of hearer: as far as such accounts are concerned, we need make no mention of hearers in characterising an assertion's propriety (...)
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  82. H. Price (1998). Three Norms of Assertibility. Philosophical Perspectives 12:41-54.
  83. Huw Price (1998). Three Norms of Assertibility, or How the Moa Became Extinct. Noûs 32 (S12):241 - 254.
    holds for all central declarative sentences. According to deflationists, the key to an understanding of truth lies in an appreciation of the grammatical advantages of a predicate satisfying DS. As Paul Horwich puts it, “our truth predicate is merely a logical device enabling simple formulations of certain sorts of generalization.” (1996, p. 878; see also Horwich 1990).
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  84. Michael Rescorla (2009). Epistemic and Dialectical Regress. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):43 – 60.
    Dialectical egalitarianism holds that every asserted proposition requires defence when challenged by an interlocutor. This view apparently generates a vicious 'regress of justifications', since an interlocutor can challenge the premises through which a speaker defends her original assertion, and so on ad infinitum . To halt the regress, dialectical foundationalists such as Adler, Brandom, Leite, and Williams propose that some propositions require no defence in the light of mere requests for justification. I argue that the putative regress is not worrisome (...)
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  85. Michael Rescorla (2009). Assertion and its Constitutive Norms. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):98-130.
    Alston, Searle, and Williamson advocate the restrictive model of assertion , according to which certain constitutive assertoric norms restrict which propositions one may assert. Sellars and Brandom advocate the dialectical model of assertion , which treats assertion as constituted by its role in the game of giving and asking for reasons. Sellars and Brandom develop a restrictive version of the dialectical model. I explore a non-restrictive version of the dialectical model. On such a view, constitutive assertoric norms constrain how one (...)
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  86. Michael Rescorla (2007). A Linguistic Reason for Truthfulness. In Dirk Greimann & Geo Siegwart (eds.), Truth and Speech Acts. Routledge.
    This paper further develops the non-restrictive dialectical perspective. Many philosophers hold that truthfulness is somehow constitutive of assertion. I argue against this view while simultaneously attempting to ground truthfulness in assertion’s essential features. I argue that truthfulness is the prima facie best way to avoid decisive counter-arguments against what one says. Moreover, avoiding decisive counter-arguments is a constitutive goal of rational dialectic. Thus, while truthfulness is not constitutive of assertion, it is the rational default strategy for achieving a goal that (...)
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  87. Charles Sayward (1971). More on Assertion and Belief. Philosophical Studies 22 (1-2):20 - 24.
    In an earlier paper Sayward argued that a speaker could not make an assertion by uttering a sentence of form “p, but I believe not-p” given that the speaker spoke honestly and literally. Robert Imlay criticized some things said in that earlier paper. This paper responds to those criticisms.
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  88. Charles Sayward (1966). Assertion and Belief. Philosophical Studies 17 (5):74 - 78.
    This paper is written in opposition of various antecedent discussions of Moore’s paradox. It concludes that one cannot make an honest and primary truth-claim by producing ‘p, but I believe not-p’.
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  89. Maria Schaar (2011). Assertion and Grounding: A Theory of Assertion for Constructive Type Theory. Synthese 183 (2):187-210.
    Taking Per Martin-Löf’s constructive type theory as a starting-point a theory of assertion is developed, which is able to account for the epistemic aspects of the speech act of assertion, and in which it is shown that assertion is not a wide genus. From a constructivist point of view, one is entitled to assert, for example, that a proposition A is true, only if one has constructed a proof object a for A in an act of demonstration. One thereby has (...)
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  90. Jonathan Schaffer (2008). Knowledge in the Image of Assertion. Philosophical Issues 18 (1):1-19.
    How must knowledge be formed, if made in the image of assertion? That is, given that knowledge plays the normative role of governing what one may assert, what can be inferred about the structure of the knowledge relation from this role? I will argue that what one may assert is sensitive to the question under discussion, and conclude that what one knows must be relative to a question. In short, knowledge in the image of assertion is question-relative knowledge.
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  91. A. Sennet (2013). Assertion: New Philosophical Essays * Edited by Jessica Brown and Herman Cappelen. Analysis 73 (1):177-180.
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  92. Michael J. Shaffer (2012). Moorean Sentences and the Norm of Assertion. Logos and Episteme 3:653-658.
    In this paper Timothy Williamson’s argument that the knowledge norm of assertion is the best explanation of the unassertability of Morrean sentences is challenged and an alternative account of the norm of assertion is defended.
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  93. Joseph Shieber (2009). Epistemological Contextualism and the Knowledge Account of Assertion. Philosophia 37 (1):169-181.
    In this paper, I take up an argument advanced by Keith DeRose (Philosophical Review, 111:167–203, 2002) that suggests that the knowledge account of assertion provides the basis of an argument in favor of contextualism. I discuss the knowledge account as the conjunction of two theses—a thesis claiming that knowledge is sufficient to license assertion KA and one claiming that knowledge is necessary to license assertion AK. Adducing evidence from Stalnaker’s account of assertion, from conversational practice, and from arguments often raised (...)
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  94. Deborah C. Smith (2005). Warranted Assertibility and the Norms of Assertoric Practice: Why Truth and Warranted Assertibility Are Not Coincident Norms. Ratio 18 (2):206–220.
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  95. Martin Smith (2012). Some Thoughts on the JK-Rule1. Noûs 46 (4):791-802.
    In ‘The normative role of knowledge’ (2012), Declan Smithies defends a ‘JK-rule’ for belief: One has justification to believe that P iff one has justification to believe that one is in a position to know that P. Similar claims have been defended by others (Huemer, 2007, Reynolds, forthcoming). In this paper, I shall argue that the JK-rule is false. The standard and familiar way of arguing against putative rules for belief or assertion is, of course, to describe putative counterexamples. My (...)
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  96. Declan Smithies (2012). The Normative Role of Knowledge. Noûs 46 (2):265-288.
    What is the normative role of knowledge? I argue that knowledge plays an important role as a norm of assertion and action, which is explained and unified by its more fundamental role as a norm of belief. Moreover, I propose a distinctive account of what this normative role consists in. I argue that knowledge is the aim of belief, which sets a normative standard of correctness and a corresponding normative standard of justification. According to my proposal, it is correct to (...)
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  97. David Sosa (2009). Dubious Assertions. Philosophical Studies 146 (2):269 - 272.
    The knowledge account of assertion—roughly: one should not assert what one does not know—aspires to identify the norm distinctive of assertion. One main argument given in support of the knowledge account has been the success with which it explains a variety of Moore-paradoxical assertion. But that explanation does not generalize satisfactorily.
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  98. Ernest Sosa (2010). Value Matters in Epistemology. Journal of Philosophy 107 (4):167-190.
    In what way is knowledge better than merely true belief? That is a problem posed in Plato’s Meno. A belief that falls short of knowledge seems thereby inferior. It is better to know than to get it wrong, of course, and also better than to get it right by luck rather than competence. But how can that be so, if a true belief will provide the same benefits? In order to get to Larissa you do not need to know the (...)
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  99. Jim Stone (2007). Contextualism and Warranted Assertion. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (1):92–113.
    Contextualists offer "high-low standards" practical cases to show that a variety of knowledge standards are in play in different ordinary contexts. These cases show nothing of the sort, I maintain. However Keith DeRose gives an ingenious argument that standards for knowledge do go up in high-stakes cases. According to the knowledge account of assertion (Kn), only knowledge warrants assertion. Kn combined with the context sensitivity of assertability yields contextualism about knowledge. But is Kn correct? I offer a rival account of (...)
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  100. Roger Teichmann (1995). Truth, Assertion and Warrant. Philosophical Quarterly 45 (178):78-84.
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