This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.

Norms of Assertion

Related categories
Siblings:
41 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
  1. Matthew A. Benton (forthcoming). Dubious Objections From Iterated Conjunctions. Philosophical Studies:-.
    The knowledge account of assertion—-roughly: one should not assert what one does not know—-can explain a variety of Moorean conjunctions, a fact often cited as evidence in its favor. David Sosa ("Dubious Assertions," Phil Studies, 2009) has objected that the account does not generalize satisfactorily, since it cannot explain the infelicity of certain iterated conjunctions without appealing to the controversial "KK" principle. This essay responds by showing how the knowledge account can handle such conjunctions without use of the KK principle.
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: springerlink.com dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  2. Matthew A. Benton (2012). Assertion, Knowledge and Predictions. Analysis 72 (1):102-105.
    John N. Williams (1994) and Matthew Weiner (2005) invoke predictions in order to undermine the normative relevance of knowledge for assertions; in particular, Weiner argues, predictions are important counterexamples to the Knowledge Account of Assertion (KAA). I argue here that they are not true counterexamples at all, a point that can be agreed upon even by those who reject KAA.
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: analysis.oxfordjournals.org dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  3. Matthew A. Benton (2011). Two More for the Knowledge Account of Assertion. Analysis 71 (4):684-687.
    The Knowledge Account of Assertion (KAA) has received added support recently from data on prompting assertion (Turri 2010) and from a refinement suggesting that assertions ought to express knowledge (Turri 2011). This paper adds another argument from parenthetical positioning, and then argues that KAA’s unified explanation of some of the earliest data adduced in its favor recommends KAA over its rivals.
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: analysis.oxfordjournals.org dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  4. Curtis Brown (1986). What is a Belief State? Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):357-378.
    What we believe depends on more than the purely intrinsic facts about us: facts about our environment or context also help determine the contents of our beliefs. 1 This observation has led several writers to hope that beliefs can be divided, as it were, into two components: a "core" that depends only on the individual?s intrinsic properties; and a periphery that depends on the individual?s context, including his or her history, environment, and linguistic community. Thus Jaegwon Kim suggests that "within (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: blackwell-synergy.com dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  5. Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (2011). Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press.
    Assertion is a fundamental feature of language. This volume will be the place to look for anyone interested in current work on the topic.
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  6. Paolo Casalegno (2009). Reasons to Believe and Assertion. Dialectica 63 (3):231-248.
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  7. Timothy Chan & Guy Kahane (2011). The Trouble with Being Sincere. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (2):215-234.
    Questions about sincerity play a central role in our lives. But what makes an assertion insincere? In this paper we argue that the answer to this question is not as straightforward as it has sometimes been taken to be. Until recently the dominant answer has been that a speaker makes an insincere assertion if and only if he does not believe the proposition asserted. There are, however, persuasive counterexamples to this simple account. It has been proposed instead that an insincere (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: muse.jhu.edu   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  8. Keith DeRose (2002). Assertion, Knowledge, and Context. Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.
    This paper uses the knowledge account of assertion (KAA) in defense of epistemological contextualism. Part 1 explores the main problem afflicting contextualism, what I call the "Generality Objection." Part 2 presents and defends both KAA and a powerful new positive argument that it provides for contextualism. Part 3 uses KAA to answer the Generality Objection, and also casts other shadows over the prospects for anti-contextualism.
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: pantheon.yale.edu phonline.org jstor.org philreview.dukejournals.org dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  9. Keith DeRose (1996). Knowledge, Assertion and Lotteries. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):568 – 580.
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: informaworld.com tandfonline.com dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  10. Julian Dodd (1999). There is No Norm of Truth: A Minimalist Reply to Wright. Analysis 59 (4):291–299.
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: blackwell-synergy.com jstor.org dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  11. Igor Douven (2006). Assertion, Knowledge, and Rational Credibility. Philosophical Review 115 (4):449-485.
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: philreview.dukejournals.org jstor.org dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  12. Pascal Engel (2008). In What Sense is Knowledge the Norm of Assertion? Grazer Philosophische Studien 77 (1):45-59.
    The knowledge account of assertion (KAA) is the view that assertion is governed by the norm that the speaker should know what s/he asserts. It is not the purpose of this article to examine all the criticisms nor to try to give a full defence of KAA, but only to defend it against the charge of being normatively incorrect. It has been objected that assertion is governed by other norms than knowledge, or by no norm at all. It seems to (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  13. Patrick Greenough (2011). Truth-Relativism, Norm-Relativism, and Assertion. In Brown J. & Cappelen H. (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press.
    The main goal in this paper is to outline and defend a form of Relativism, under which truth is absolute but assertibility is not. I dub such a view Norm-Relativism in contrast to the more familiar forms of Truth-Relativism. The key feature of this view is that just what norm of assertion, belief, and action is in play in some context is itself relative to a perspective. In slogan form: there is no fixed, single norm for assertion, belief, and action. (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: docs.google.com   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  14. Patrick Greenough (2001). Free Assumptions and the Liar Paradox. American Philosophical Quarterly 38 (2):115 - 135.
    A new solution to the liar paradox is developed using the insight that it is illegitimate to even suppose (let alone assert) that a liar sentence has a truth-status (true or not) on the grounds that supposing this sentence to be true/not-true essentially defeats the telos of supposition in a readily identifiable way. On that basis, the paradox is blocked by restricting the Rule of Assumptions in Gentzen-style presentations of the sequent-calculus. The lesson of the liar is that not all (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: st-andrews.ac.uk jstor.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  15. Christopher S. Hill & Joshua Schechter (2007). Hawthorne's Lottery Puzzle and the Nature of Belief. Philosophical Issues 17 (1):1020-122.
    In the first chapter of his Knowledge and Lotteries, John Hawthorne argues that thinkers do not ordinarily know lottery propositions. His arguments depend on claims about the intimate connections between knowledge and assertion, epistemic possibility, practical reasoning, and theoretical reasoning. In this paper, we cast doubt on the proposed connections. We also put forward an alternative picture of belief and reasoning. In particular, we argue that assertion is governed by a Gricean constraint that makes no reference to knowledge, and that (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: interscience.wiley.com blackwell-synergy.com dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  16. Edward Hinchman (forthcoming). Assertion, Sincerity, and Knowledge. Noûs.
    The oddities in lottery cases and Moore’s paradox appear to support the knowledge account of assertion, according to which one should assert only what one knows. This paper preserves an emphasis on epistemic norms but presents grounds for an alternative explanation. The alternative divides the explanandum, explaining the error in lottery and Moorean assertions with one move and their deeper incoherence with another. The error derives from a respect in which the assertions are uninformative: the speaker is not being appropriately (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: pantherfile.uwm.edu   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  17. Frank Hindriks (2007). The Status of the Knowledge Account of Assertion. Linguistics and Philosophy 30 (3):393-406.
    According to the increasingly popular knowledge account, assertion is governed by the rule that speech acts of that kind require knowledge of their content. Timothy Williamson has argued that this knowledge rule is the constitutive rule of assertion. It is argued here that it is not the constitutive rule of assertion in any sense of the term, as it governs only some assertions rather than all of them. A (qualified) knowledge rule can in fact be derived from the traditional analysis (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: rug.nl jstor.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  18. Leo Iacono (2008). Warranted Assertability Maneuvers and the Rules of Assertion. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (4):460-469.
    Abstract: In responding to the cases that motivate epistemic contextualism, invariantists sometimes use a warranted assertability maneuver (WAM), according to which we mistakenly judge an assertion to be true because we confuse conversational propriety with truth. I argue that no invariantist WAM against Stewart Cohen's Airport Case can succeed. The problem is that such a WAM is inconsistent with the known ways of accounting for the evidence that motivates the knowledge account of assertion.
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: blackwell-synergy.com dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  19. Ronald Jager (1970). Truth and Assertion. Mind 79 (314):161-169.
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: jstor.org mind.oxfordjournals.org dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  20. Adam Leite (2007). How to Link Assertion and Knowledge Without Going Contextualist: A Reply to DeRose's "Assertion, Knowledge, and Context". Philosophical Studies 134 (2):111 - 129.
    Keith DeRose has recently argued that the contextual variability of appropriate assertion, together with the knowledge account of assertion, yields a direct argument that ’knows’ is semantically contextsensitive. The argument fails because of an equivocation on the notion of warranted assertability. Once the equivocation is removed, it can be seen that the invariantist can retain the knowledge account of assertion and explain the contextual variability of appropriate assertion by appealing to Williamson’s suggestion that practical and conversational considerations can influence the (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: jstor.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  21. B. J. C. Madison (2010). Is Justification Knowledge? Journal of Philosophical Research 35:173-191.
    Analytic epistemologists agree that, whatever else is true of epistemic justification, it is distinct from knowledge. However, if recent work by Jonathan Sutton is correct, this view is deeply mistaken, for according to Sutton justification is knowledge. That is, a subject is justified in believing that p iff he knows that p. Sutton further claims that there is no concept of epistemic justification distinct from knowledge. Since knowledge is factive, a consequence of Sutton’s view is that there are no false (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: pdcnet.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  22. Matthew McGrath (2003). Deflationism and the Normativity of Truth. Philosophical Studies 112 (1):47 - 67.
    This paper argues, in response to Huw Price, that deflationism has theresources to account for the normativity of truth. The discussioncenters on a principle of hyper-objective assertibility, that one isincorrect to assert that p if not-p. If this principle doesnt statea fact about truth, it neednt be explained by deflationists. If itdoes, it can be explained.
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: jstor.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  23. Peter Pagin, Against Normative Accounts of Assertion.
    According to the knowledge account of assertion, an assertion that p is correct just in case the speaker knows that p. This is so because of a norm that governs assertion and uniquely characterizes it. Recent opposition to the knowledge account accepts that assertion is governed by a norm, but proposes alternatives to the knowledge norm. In this paper I focus on some difficulties for normative accounts of assertion.
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | More options ...
  24. Douglas Eden Patterson (2006). Tarski on the Necessity Reading of Convention T. Synthese 151 (1):1 - 32.
    Tarski’s Convention T is often taken to claim that it is both sufficient and necessary for adequacy in a definition of truth that it imply instances of the T-schema where the embedded sentence translates the mentioned sentence. However, arguments against the necessity claim have recently appeared, and, furthermore, the necessity claim is actually not required for the indefinability results for which Tarski is justly famous; indeed, Tarski’s own presentation of the results in the later Undecidable Theories makes no mention of (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: jstor.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  25. C. Pelling (2011). A Self-Referential Paradox for the Truth Account of Assertion. Analysis 71 (4):688-688.
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: analysis.oxfordjournals.org dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  26. H. Price (1998). Three Norms of Assertibility. Philosophical Perspectives 12:41-54.
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  27. Huw Price (1998). Three Norms of Assertibility, or How the Moa Became Extinct. Noûs 32 (S12):241 - 254.
    holds for all central declarative sentences. According to deflationists, the key to an understanding of truth lies in an appreciation of the grammatical advantages of a predicate satisfying DS. As Paul Horwich puts it, “our truth predicate is merely a logical device enabling simple formulations of certain sorts of generalization.” (1996, p. 878; see also Horwich 1990).
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: jstor.org blackwell-synergy.com sydney.edu.au dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  28. Michael Rescorla (2009). Epistemic and Dialectical Regress. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):43 – 60.
    Dialectical egalitarianism holds that every asserted proposition requires defence when challenged by an interlocutor. This view apparently generates a vicious 'regress of justifications', since an interlocutor can challenge the premises through which a speaker defends her original assertion, and so on ad infinitum . To halt the regress, dialectical foundationalists such as Adler, Brandom, Leite, and Williams propose that some propositions require no defence in the light of mere requests for justification. I argue that the putative regress is not worrisome (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: informaworld.com dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  29. Michael Rescorla (2009). Assertion and its Constitutive Norms. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):98-130.
    Alston, Searle, and Williamson advocate the restrictive model of assertion , according to which certain constitutive assertoric norms restrict which propositions one may assert. Sellars and Brandom advocate the dialectical model of assertion , which treats assertion as constituted by its role in the game of giving and asking for reasons. Sellars and Brandom develop a restrictive version of the dialectical model. I explore a non-restrictive version of the dialectical model. On such a view, constitutive assertoric norms constrain how one (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: interscience.wiley.com blackwell-synergy.com dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  30. Michael Rescorla (2007). A Linguistic Reason for Truthfulness. In Dirk Greimann & Geo Siegwart (eds.), Truth and Speech Acts. Routledge.
    This paper further develops the non-restrictive dialectical perspective. Many philosophers hold that truthfulness is somehow constitutive of assertion. I argue against this view while simultaneously attempting to ground truthfulness in assertion’s essential features. I argue that truthfulness is the prima facie best way to avoid decisive counter-arguments against what one says. Moreover, avoiding decisive counter-arguments is a constitutive goal of rational dialectic. Thus, while truthfulness is not constitutive of assertion, it is the rational default strategy for achieving a goal that (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  31. Jonathan Schaffer (2008). Knowledge in the Image of Assertion. Philosophical Issues 18 (1):1-19.
    How must knowledge be formed, if made in the image of assertion? That is, given that knowledge plays the normative role of governing what one may assert, what can be inferred about the structure of the knowledge relation from this role? I will argue that what one may assert is sensitive to the question under discussion, and conclude that what one knows must be relative to a question. In short, knowledge in the image of assertion is question-relative knowledge.
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: interscience.wiley.com blackwell-synergy.com dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  32. Joseph Shieber (2009). Epistemological Contextualism and the Knowledge Account of Assertion. Philosophia 37 (1):169-181.
    In this paper, I take up an argument advanced by Keith DeRose (Philosophical Review, 111:167–203, 2002) that suggests that the knowledge account of assertion provides the basis of an argument in favor of contextualism. I discuss the knowledge account as the conjunction of two theses—a thesis claiming that knowledge is sufficient to license assertion KA and one claiming that knowledge is necessary to license assertion AK. Adducing evidence from Stalnaker’s account of assertion, from conversational practice, and from arguments often raised (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: springerlink.com dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  33. David Sosa (2009). Dubious Assertions. Philosophical Studies 146 (2):269 - 272.
    The knowledge account of assertion—roughly: one should not assert what one does not know—aspires to identify the norm distinctive of assertion. One main argument given in support of the knowledge account has been the success with which it explains a variety of Moore-paradoxical assertion. But that explanation does not generalize satisfactorily.
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: jstor.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  34. Roger Teichmann (1995). Truth, Assertion and Warrant. Philosophical Quarterly 45 (178):78-84.
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: jstor.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  35. John Turri (forthcoming). Knowledge Guaranteed. Noûs:no-no.
    What is the relationship between saying ‘I know that Q’ and guaranteeing that Q? John Austin, Roderick Chisholm and Wilfrid Sellars all agreed that there is some important connection, but disagreed over what exactly it was. In this paper I discuss each of their accounts and present a new one of my own. Drawing on speech-act theory and recent research on the epistemic norms of speech acts, I suggest that the relationship is this: by saying ‘I know that Q’, you (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: onlinelibrary.wiley.com dx.doi.org doi.wiley.com   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  36. John Turri (forthcoming). Pyrrhonian Skepticism Meets Speech-Act Theory. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism.
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  37. John Turri (2011). The Express Knowledge Account of Assertion. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):37-45.
    Many philosophers favour the simple knowledge account of assertion, which says you may assert something only if you know it. The simple account is true but importantly incomplete. I defend a more informative thesis, namely, that you may assert something only if your assertion expresses knowledge. I call this 'the express knowledge account of assertion', which I argue better handles a wider range of cases while at the same time explaining the simple knowledge account's appeal. §1 introduces some new data (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: informaworld.com tandf.informaworld.com dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  38. John Turri (2010). Epistemic Invariantism and Speech Act Contextualism. Philosophical Review 119 (1):77-95.
    This paper shows how to reconcile epistemic invariantism with the knowledge account of assertion. My basic proposal is that we can comfortably combine invariantism with the knowledge account of assertion by endorsing contextualism about speech acts. My demonstration takes place against the backdrop of recent contextualist attempts to usurp the knowledge account of assertion, most notably Keith DeRose’s influential argument that the knowledge account of assertion spells doom for invariantism and enables contextualism’s ascendancy. The paper’s plan: Section 1 explains contextualism (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: philreview.dukejournals.org dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  39. John Turri (2010). Prompting Challenges. Analysis 70 (3):456-462.
    I consider a serious objection to the knowledge account of assertion and develop a response. In the process I introduce important new data on prompting assertion, which all theorists working in the area should take note of.
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: analysis.oxfordjournals.org dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  40. Matthew Weiner (2005). Must We Know What We Say? Philosophical Review 114 (2):227-251.
    The knowledge account of assertion holds that it is improper to assert that p unless the speaker knows that p. This paper argues against the knowledge account of assertion; there is no general norm that the speaker must know what she asserts. I argue that there are cases in which it can be entirely proper to assert something that you do not know. In addition, it is possible to explain the cases that motivate the knowledge account by postulating a general (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: mattweiner.net philreview.dukejournals.org jstor.org dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  41. Timothy Williamson (1996). Knowing and Asserting. Philosophical Review 105 (4):489-523.
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: jstor.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...