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  1. Scott Berman (1996). Plato's Explanation of False Belief in the "Sophist&Quot;. Apeiron 29 (1):19 - 46.
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  2. Nicolas Bullot (2007). A Study in the Cognition of Individuals' Identity: Solving the Problem of Singular Cognition in Object and Agent Tracking. Consciousness and Cognition 16 (2):276-293.
    This article compares the ability to track individuals lacking mental states with the ability to track intentional agents. It explains why reference to individuals raises the problem of explaining how cognitive agents track unique individuals and in what sense reference is based on procedures of perceptual-motor and epistemic tracking. We suggest applying the notion of singular-files from theories in perception and semantics to the problem of tracking intentional agents. In order to elucidate the nature of agent-files, three views of the (...)
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  3. Sean Crawford (2013). Object-Dependent Thought. In Pashler Harold (ed.), Encyclopaedia of the Mind. SAGE.
  4. Sean Crawford (2006). Object-Dependent Thoughts. In Keith Brown (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Language and Linguistics, 2nd ed.
  5. Sean Crawford (1998). In Defence of Object-Dependent Thoughts. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (2):201-210.
    The existence of object-dependent thoughts has been doubted on the grounds that reference to such thoughts is unnecessary or 'redundant' in the psychological explanation of intentional action. This paper argues to the contrary that reference to object-dependent thoughts is necessary to the proper psychological explanation of intentional action upon objects. Section I sets out the argument for the alleged explanatory redundancy of object-dependent thoughts; an argument which turns on the coherence of an alternative 'dual-component' model of explanation. Section II rebuts (...)
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  6. Gareth Evans (1985). Collected Papers. Oxford University Press.
  7. Joseph Levine (1988). Demonstrating in Mentalese. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 69 (September):222-240.
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  8. Guy Longworth (2003). Where Should We Look for the Mind? Think 5 (5):45-50.
    Is your mind in your head? The answer, surprisingly, may be . Guy Longworth sets out the philosophical case for accepting that our minds extend much further into the world than that.
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  9. Teresa Marques (2006). On an Argument of Segal's Against Singular Object-Dependent Thoughts. Disputatio 2 (26):19-37.
    This paper discusses and criticizes Segal’s 1989 argument against singular object-dependent thoughts. His argument aims at showing that object-dependent thoughts are explanatorily redundant. My criticism of Segal’s argument has two parts. First, I appeal to common anti-individualist arguments to the effect that Segal’s type of argument only succeeds in establishing that object-dependent thoughts are explanatorily redundant for those aspects of subjects’ behaviour that do not require reference to external objects. Secondly, Segal’s view on singular thoughts is at odds with his (...)
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  10. John McDowell (1990). Peacocke and Evans on Demonstrative Content. Mind 99 (394):255-266.
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  11. Michelle Montague (2009). The Content of Perceptual Experience. In B. McLaughlin & A. Beckermann (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oup Oxford.
  12. Christopher Peacocke (1991). Demonstrative Content: A Reply to John McDowell. Mind 100 (1):123-133.
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  13. François Récanati (2007). Perspectival Thought: A Plea for (Moderate) Relativism. Oxford University Press.
    Moderate relativism -- The framework -- The distribution of content -- Radical vs. moderate relativism -- Two levels of content -- Branch points for moderate relativism -- The debate over temporalism (1) : do we need temporal propositions? -- Modal vs. extensional treatments of tense -- What is at stake? -- Modal and temporal innocence -- Temporal operators and temporal propositions in an extensional framework -- The debate over temporalism (2) : can we believe temporal propositions? -- An epistemic argument (...)
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  14. Susanna Schellenberg (2010). The Particularity and Phenomenology of Perceptual Experience. Philosophical Studies 149 (1):19 - 48.
    I argue that any account of perceptual experience should satisfy the following two desiderata. First, it should account for the particularity of perceptual experience, that is, it should account for the mind-independent object of an experience making a difference to individuating the experience. Second, it should explain the possibility that perceptual relations to distinct environments could yield subjectively indistinguishable experiences. Relational views of perceptual experience can easily satisfy the first but not the second desideratum. Representational views can easily satisfy the (...)
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