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  1. David Alm (2008). Consequentialism and the Autonomy of the Deontic. Utilitas 20 (2):199-216.
    I distinguish between two forms of consequentialism: reductionist and anti-reductionist. Reductionist consequentialism holds that the deontic properties of rightness and wrongness are identical with the axiological properties of optimality and suboptimality, respectively. Anti-reductionist consequentialism denies this identification, hence accepting what I call the autonomy of the deontic. In this article I ignore reductionist consequentialism. Instead I argue that anti-reductionist consequentialism is deeply problematic or even incoherent. Simply put, the main point is that the criterion of rightness of any ethical theory (...)
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  2. Vuko Andrić (2014). Ein Plädoyer für den Rechtsnormen-Konsequentialismus. Archiv für Rechts- Und Sozialphilosophie 140:87-98.
  3. G. E. M. Anscombe (1958). Modern Moral Philosophy. Philosophy 33 (124):1 - 19.
    The author presents and defends three theses: (1) "the first is that it is not profitable for us at present to do moral philosophy; that should be laid aside at any rate until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology." (2) "the second is that the concepts of obligation, And duty... And of what is morally right and wrong, And of the moral sense of 'ought', Ought to be jettisoned if this is psychologically possible...." (3) "the third thesis is that (...)
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  4. Joseph Boyle (2004). Medical Ethics and Double Effect: The Case of Terminal Sedation. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 25 (1):51-60.
    The use of terminal sedation to control theintense discomfort of dying patients appearsboth to be an established practice inpalliative care and to run counter to the moraland legal norm that forbids health careprofessionals from intentionally killingpatients. This raises the worry that therequirements of established palliative care areincompatible with moral and legal opposition toeuthanasia. This paper explains how thedoctrine of double effect can be relied on todistinguish terminal sedation from euthanasia. The doctrine of double effect is rooted inCatholic moral casuistry, but (...)
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  5. Michael Cholbi (2014). Agents, Patients, and Obligatory Self-Benefit. Journal of Moral Philosophy 11 (2):159-184.
  6. Adam Cureton (forthcoming). Making Room for Rules. Philosophical Studies:1-23.
    Kantian moral theories must explain how their most basic moral values of dignity and autonomy should be interpreted and applied to human conditions. One place Kantians should look for inspiration is, surprisingly, the utilitarian tradition and its emphasis on generally accepted, informally enforced, publicly known moral rules of the sort that help us give assurances, coordinate our behavior, and overcome weak wills. Kantians have tended to ignore utilitarian discussions of such rules mostly because they regard basic moral principles as a (...)
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  7. Paul Hurley (2014). Comments on Douglas Portmore's Commonsense Consequentialism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):225-232.
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  8. Paul Hurley (2013). Consequentializing and Deontologizing: Clogging the Consequentialist Vacuum&Quot;. Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 3:123-153.
    That many values can be consequentialized – incorporated into a ranking of states of affairs – is often taken to support the view that apparent alternatives to consequentialism are in fact forms of consequentialism. Such consequentializing arguments take two very different forms. The first is concerned with the relationship between morally right action and states of affairs evaluated evaluator-neutrally, the second with the relationship between what agents ought to do and outcomes evaluated evaluator-relatively. I challenge the consequentializing arguments for both (...)
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  9. Matthew H. Kramer (1996). How Not to Oppugn Consequentialism. Philosophical Quarterly 46 (183):213-220.
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  10. Elinor Mason (2004). Consequentialism and the Principle of Indifference. Utilitas 16 (3):316-321.
    James Lenman argues that consequentialism fails as a moral theory because it is impossible to predict the long-term consequences of our actions. I agree that it is impossible to predict the long-term consequences of actions, but argue that this does not count as a strike against consequentialism. I focus on the principle of indifference, which tells us to treat unforeseeable consequences as cancelling each other out, and hence value-neutral. I argue that though we cannot defend this principle independently, we cannot (...)
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  11. Nikil Mukerji (2014). Consequentialism, Deontology and the Morality of Promising. In Johanna Jauernig & Christoph Lütge (eds.), Business Ethics and Risk Management. Springer. 111--126.
    In normative ethics there has been a long-standing debate between consequentialists and deontologists. To settle this dispute moral theorists have often used a selective approach. They have focused on particular aspects of our moral practice and have teased out what consequentialists and deontologists have to say about it. One of the focal points of this debate has been the morality of promising. In this paper I review arguments on both sides and examine whether consequentialists or deontologists offer us a more (...)
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  12. Matthew B. O'Brien & Robert C. Koons (2012). Objects of Intention: A Hylomorphic Critique of the New Natural Law Theory. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 86 (4):655-703.
    The “New Natural Law” Theory (NNL) of Germain Grisez, John Finnis, Joseph Boyle, and their collaborators offers a distinctive account of intentional action, which underlies a moral theory that aims to justify many aspects of traditional morality and Catholic doctrine. -/- In fact, we show that the NNL is committed to premises that entail the permissibility of many actions that are irreconcilable with traditional morality and Catholic doctrine, such as elective abortions. These consequences follow principally from two aspects of the (...)
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  13. David S. Oderberg (2000). Moral Theory: A Non-Consequentialist Approach. Blackwell.
    While this is a welcome development, it is also true that the discipline has been dominated by one particular ethical theory, namely consequentialism.
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  14. Douglas W. Portmore, Consequentialism and Coordination Problems.
    Imagine both that (1) S1 is deliberating at t about whether or not to x at t' and that (2) although S1’s x-ing at t' would not itself have good consequences, good consequences would ensue if both S1 x's at t' and S2 y's at t", where S1 may or may not be identical to S2 and where t < t' ≤ t". In this paper, I consider how consequentialists should treat S2 and the possibility that S2 will y at (...)
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  15. Ryan Preston-Roedder (2014). A Better World. Philosophical Studies 168 (3):629-644.
    A number of moral philosophers have endorsed instances of the following curious argument: it would be better if a certain moral theory were true; therefore, we have reason to believe that the theory is true. In other words, the mere truth of the theory—quite apart from the results of our believing it or acting in accord with it—would make for a better world than the truth of its rivals, and this fact provides evidence of the theory’s truth. This form of (...)
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  16. Jason Rogers (2010). In Defense of a Version of Satisficing Consequentialism. Utilitas 22 (2):198-221.
    In this paper, I develop, motivate and offer a qualified defense of a version of satisficing consequentialism (SC). I develop the view primarily in light of objections to other versions of SC recently posed by Ben Bradley. I motivate the view by showing that it (1) accommodates the intuitions apparently supporting those objections, (2) is supported by certain ‘common sense’ moral intuitions about specific cases, and (3) captures the central ideas expressed by satisficing consequentialists in the recent literature. Finally, I (...)
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  17. Joakim Sandberg (2011). &Quot;my Emissions Make No Difference&Quot;. Environmental Ethics 33 (3):229-48.
    “Since the actions I perform as an individual only have an inconsequential effect on the threat of climate change,” a common argument goes, “it cannot be morally wrong for me to take my car to work everyday or refuse to recycle.” This argument has received a lot of scorn from philosophers over the years, but has actually been defended in some recent articles. A more systematic treatment of a central set of related issues (moral mathematics, collective action, side effects, green (...)
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  18. S. Andrew Schroeder (2011). You Don't Have to Do What's Best! (A Problem for Consequentialists and Other Teleologists). In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, vol. 1. Oxford University Press.
    Define teleology as the view that requirements hold in virtue of facts about value or goodness. Teleological views are quite popular, and in fact some philosophers (e.g. Dreier, Smith) argue that all (plausible) moral theories can be understood teleologically. I argue, however, that certain well-known cases show that the teleologist must at minimum assume that there are certain facts that an agent ought to know, and that this means that requirements can't, in general, hold in virtue of facts about value (...)
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  19. Jussi Suikkanen (2014). Consequentialist Options. Utilitas 26 (3):276-302.
    According to traditional forms of act-consequentialism, an action is right if and only if no other action in the given circumstances would have better consequences. It has been argued that this view does not leave us enough freedom to choose between actions which we intuitively think are morally permissible but not required options. In the first half of this article, I will explain why the previous consequentialist responses to this objection are less than satisfactory. I will then attempt to show (...)
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  20. T. Zamir (2001). One Consequence of Consequentialism: Morality and Overdetermination. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 55 (2):155-168.
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