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  1. Robert Merrihew Adams (2003). Anti-Consequentialism and the Transcendence of the Good. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (1):114–132.
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  2. Richard Arneson, Consequentialism and its Critics.
    Consequentialism broadly speaking is the idea that the moral rightness and wrongness of a thing (an act, a policy, an institution) is determined by the quality of its consequences. A prominent version is act consequentialism, which holds one morally always ought to do an act whose outcome is no worse than the outcome of any other act one might have done instead. This doctrine has little content—no commitment is involved as to how one should evaluate consequences—but is still highly controversial. (...)
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  3. Gustaf Arrhenius, Desert as Fit: An Axiomatic Analysis.
    Total Utilitarianism is the view that an action is right if and only if it maximizes the sum total of people’s well-being. A common objection to Total Utilitarianism is that it is insensitive to matters of distributive justice. For example, for a given amount of well-being, Total Utilitarianism is indifferent between an equal distribution and any unequal distribution, and if there would be a tiny gain in well-being by moving from an equal distribution to an unequal, we have a duty (...)
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  4. Richard Boyd (2003). Finite Beings, Finite Goods: The Semantics, Metaphysics and Ethics of Naturalist Consequentialism, Part I. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):505–553.
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  5. Richard Boyd (2003). Finite Beings, Finite Goods: The Semantics, Metaphysics and Ethics of Naturalist Consequentialism, Part II. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (1):24–47.
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  6. David O. Brink (2001). Impartiality and Associative Duties. Utilitas 13 (02):152-.
    Consequentialism is often criticized for failing to accommodate impersonal constraints and personal options. A common consequentialist response is to acknowledge the anticonsequentialist intuitions but to argue either that the consequentialist can, after all, accommodate the allegedly recalcitrant intuitions or that, where accommodation is impossible, the recalcitrant intuition can be dismissed for want of an adequate philosophical rationale. Whereas these consequentialist responses have some plausibility, associational duties represent a somewhat different challenge to consequentialism, inasmuch as they embody neither impersonal constraints nor (...)
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  7. Robert F. Card (2004). Consequentialism, Teleology, and the New Friendship Critique1. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (2):149-172.
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  8. Sarah Conly (1983). Utilitarianism and Integrity. The Monist 66 (2):298-311.
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  9. John Cottingham (1998). The Presidential Address: The Ethical Credentials of Partiality. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (1):1–21.
    Although an impartial perspective is often regarded as integral to the moral outlook, this paper argues that adopting such a perspective is neither (i) sufficient nor (ii) necessary for supporting the principle of respect for all human beings. (i) An impartial spectator aiming to maximize human welfare could well decide that 'low grade' individuals should be eliminated or enslaved; (ii) a theory of virtue based on frankly partialistic principles can find good reasons (based on the interconnectedness of the dispositions required (...)
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  10. G. Cullity, Demandingness and Arguments From Presupposition.
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  11. Garrett Cullity (2003). Asking Too Much. The Monist 86 (3):402 - 418.
    Most of us think that it can be wrong not to help someone in chronic need — someone whose life you could easily save, say. And many of us find it hard to see how the remoteness of needy people, either physical, social or psychological, should make a difference to this. Maybe it makes a difference to how wrong it is not to help, but it is hard to see how it can make a difference to whether not helping is (...)
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  12. Garrett Cullity, Brad Hooker & Tim Mulgan (2011). Intuitions and the Demands of Consequentialism. Utilitas 23 (1).
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  13. Gordon F. Davis (2008). Engaging with the Paradoxes of Consequentialism. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 8:73-81.
    In the nineteenth century, Henry Sidgwick struggled with the apparent paradox that utilitarians might only attain their goal if they renounced utilitarianism in practice; he also noticed a parallel problem that anticipated what has been called the ‘paradox of desire’ in Buddhist ethics – the paradox that desiring desirelessness is self-defeating. In fact, he regarded only the latter as a genuine paradox. I consider three approaches that might mitigate the problematicimplications for Buddhist ethics and certain forms of consequentialism. One approach (...)
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  14. Yan Deng, Does Friendship Present a Problem for Consequentialism?
    The problem I address in this paper concerns the compatibility between friendship and consequentialism. My goal is to prove that consequentialism is not compatible with end friendship because it cannot solve the alienation problem, not even in the framework of sophisticated consequentialism, which is supposed to be the best candidate to accommodate friendship. My plan can be divided into the following stages: first I conceptualize some of the most significant terms in the context, with particular attention to the distinctions between (...)
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  15. N. J. H. Dent (1996). Jonathan Harrison Ethical Essays, Volumes I-III. Journal of Applied Philosophy 13:221-223.
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  16. Dale Dorsey (2015). How Not to Argue Against Consequentialism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (1):20-48.
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  17. Tom Dougherty (2013). Aggregation, Beneficence and Chance. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 7 (2):1-19.
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  18. Julia Driver (2005). Consequentialism and Feminist Ethics. Hypatia 20 (4):183-199.
    : This essay attempts to show that sophisticated consequentialism is able to accommodate the concerns that have traditionally been raised by feminist writers in ethics. Those concerns have primarily to do with the fact that consequentialism is seen as both too demanding of the individual and neglectful of the agent's special obligations to family and friends. Here, I argue that instrumental justification for partiality can be provided, for example, even though an attitude of partiality is not characterized itself in instrumental (...)
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  19. Lisa A. Eckenwiler (2001). Dale Jamieson (Ed.), Singer and His Critics, Oxford, Blackwell, 1999, Pp. V + 368. Utilitas 13 (03):376-.
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  20. Rem B. Edwards (1986). The Rejection of Consequentialism. International Studies in Philosophy 18 (3):90-92.
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  21. M. Oreste Fiocco (2013). Consequentialism and the World in Time. Ratio 26 (2):212-224.
    Consequentialism is a general approach to understanding the nature of morality that seems to entail a certain view of the world in time. This entailment raises specific problems for the approach. The first seems to lead to the conclusion that every actual act is right – an unacceptable result for any moral theory. The second calls into question the idea that consequentialism is an approach to morality, for it leads to the conclusion that this approach produces a theory whose truth (...)
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  22. J. L. A. Garcia & Mark T. Nelson (1994). The Problem of Endless Joy: Is Infinite Utility Too Much for Utilitarianism? Utilitas 6 (02):183-.
    What if human joy (more technically, utility) went on endlessly? Suppose, for example, that each human generation were followed by another, or that the Western religions are right when they teach that each human being lives eternally after death. If any such possibility is true in the actual world, then an agent might sometimes be so situated that more than one course of action would produce an infinite amount of utility (or of disutility, or of both). Deciding whether to have (...)
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  23. Joshua Gert (2014). Perform a Justified Option. Utilitas 26 (2):206-217.
    In a number of recent publications, Douglas Portmore has defended consequentialism, largely on the basis of a maximizing view of practical rationality. I have criticized such maximizing views, arguing that we need to distinguish two independent dimensions of normative strength: justifying strength and requiring strength. I have also argued that this distinction helps to explain why we typically have so many rational options. Engaging with these arguments, Portmore has (a) developed his own novel maximization-friendly method of explaining the ubiquity of (...)
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  24. D. Goldstick (2002). The 'Two Hats' Problem in Consequentialist Ethics. Utilitas 14 (01):108-.
    A largely deontological conscience will probably optimize consequences. But Bernard Williams objects to the , if one therefore embraces indirect consequentialism, of . Admittedly the strategy is painful, and a counsel of imperfection at best. But it need not be psychologically impossible, inconsistent, or even self-deceptive, given ethical cognitivism.
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  25. Christopher Goodmacher (2007). Partiality and World Poverty. Philosophy in the Contemporary World 14 (2):74-85.
    This paper begins with Peter Singer’s argument from utilitarianism that we should sacrifice anything we don’t need to relatively cheaply save lives in the Third World. It responds by arguing that utilitarianism is an incomplete moral system, for it requires us to view the world impartially and see each being as equally important, when we are necessarily partial to certain others (family, for example) because, among other things, we learn how to care for a starving boy thousands of miles away (...)
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  26. Germain Grisez (2000). Against Consequentialism. In Christopher Robert Kaczor (ed.), Proportionalism: For and Against. Marquette University Press 21-72.
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  27. Robert Guay (2005). A Refutation of Consequentialism. Metaphilosophy 36 (3):348-362.
    The thesis of this paper is that consequentialism does not work as a comprehensive theory of right action. This paper does not offer a typical refutation, in that I do not claim that consequentialism is self-contradictory. One can with perfect consistency claim that the good is prior to the right and that the right consists in maximizing the good. What I claim, however, is that it is senseless to make such a claim. In particular, I attempt to show that the (...)
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  28. Ross Harrison (1998). Rosen's Sacrifice of Utility. Utilitas 10 (02):159-.
    The note claims that Rosen's arguments about distribution and aggregation do not support his central claim, either in their own terms or as a reading of Bentham; and suggests a different account of the relation of the objective to the subjective in Bentham.
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  29. Sefa Hayibor (2007). Cluelessness About Cluelessness About Ethics. Proceedings of the International Association for Business and Society 18:50-51.
    Kruger and Dunning (1999) presented evidence that metacognitive deficiencies in three “domains” (humour, logic, and grammar) are related to individuals’ perceptions that they are “above average” in terms of their competence in those domains. This paper documents a presentation and ensuing discussion concerning the possibility of extending the work of Kruger and Dunning to the domain of ethics.
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  30. Daniel Holbrook (1991). Consequentialism: The Philosophical Dog That Does Not Bark? Utilitas 3 (01):107-.
    By consequentialism, I mean the position that actions are right or wrong insofar as they affect the happiness, preferences, etc., of some class of sentient beings, usually humans. Consequentialism specifies a fairly narrow range of properties as being the determining factors in regard to actions being right or wrong. Each action has properties other than how it affects the happiness preferences, etc., of humans. According to consequentialism, the kind of action it is, the motivation behind the action, and other consequences (...)
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  31. Donald C. Hubin (2008). The Limits of Consequentialism. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 10:167-176.
    Modern consequentialism is a very broad theory. Consequentialists can invoke a distribution sensitive theory of value to address the issues of distributive justice that bedeviled utilitarianism. They can attach intrinsic moral value to such acts truth-telling and promise-keeping and, so, acknowledge the essential moral significance of such acts in a way that classical utilitarianism could not. It can appear that there are no limits to consequentialism’s ability to respond to the criticisms against utilitarian theories by embracing a sophisticated theory of (...)
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  32. Thomas Hurka (2014). Sidgwick on Consequentialism and Deontology: A Critique. Utilitas 26 (2):129-152.
    In The Methods of Ethics Henry Sidgwick argued against deontology and for consequentialism. More specifically, he stated four conditions for self-evident moral truth and argued that, whereas no deontological principles satisfy all four conditions, the principles that generate consequentialism do. This article argues that both his critique of deontology and his defence of consequentialism fail, largely for the same reason: that he did not clearly grasp the concept W. D. Ross later introduced of a prima facie duty or duty other (...)
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  33. Thomas Hurka (1984). The Rejection of Consequentialism Samuel Scheffler Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 1982. Pp. Viii, 129. Dialogue 23 (01):165-167.
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  34. De I'esprit (1993). Helvetius and the Problems of Utilitarianism. Utilitas 5 (2).
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  35. David Kiron (1999). A Defense of Moral Rigor. Dissertation, The University of Rochester
    My dissertation is an extended discussion of the nature of morality's demands. The foil for my discussion is the consequentialist claim that it is always right to do what is best overall . I critically assess two radically different attempts to demonstrate that CR is false; that CR fails to adequately reflect the nature of morality's demands. I consider efforts to justify moral permissions to do less than what is best and moral requirements to do less than what is best (...)
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  36. Rob Lawlor (2009). Shades of Goodness: Gradability, Demandingness and the Structure of Moral Theories. Palgrave Macmillan.
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  37. Judith Lichtenberg (2010). Oughts and Cans. Philosophical Topics 38 (1):123-142.
    Many philosophers argue that reasonably well-off people have very demanding moral obligations to assist those living in dire poverty. I explore the relevance of demandingness to determining moral obligation, challenging the view that “morality demands what it demands” and that if we cannot live up to its demands that’s our problem, not morality’s. I argue that not only for practical reasons but also for moral-theoretical ones, the language of duty, obligation, and requirement may not be well-suited to express the nature (...)
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  38. Andrew Linklater (1995). Richard Norman, Ethics, Killing and War, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995, Pp. X + 256. Utilitas 7 (02):337-.
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  39. James Loughran (1984). The Rejection of Consequentialism. International Philosophical Quarterly 24 (2):208-210.
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  40. John Marshall (1987). The Rejection of Consequentialism. Review of Metaphysics 40 (4):790-792.
  41. Sean Mcaleer (2008). Pettit's Non-Iteration Constraint. Utilitas 20 (1):59-64.
    I discuss Philip Pettit’s argument that appreciation is not a proper response to value because it fails to satisfy the non-iteration constraint, according to which, where V is a value and R is a response to value, R-ing V must not be distinct from R-ing R-ing V. After motivating the non-iteration constraint and conceding that appreciation fails to satisfy the constraint, I argue that the consequentialist’s preferred response to value, promotion, also violates the constraint, leaving Pettit with a dilemma: if (...)
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  42. Nikil Mukerji (2013). The Case Against Consequentialism: Methodological Issues. In Miguel Holtje, Thomas Spitzley & Wolfgang Spohn (eds.), GAP.8 Proceedings. GAP (2013). Gesellschaft Für Analytische Philosophie 654-665.
    Over the years, consequentialism has been subjected to numerous serious objections. Its adherents, however, have been remarkably successful in fending them off. As I argue in this paper, the reason why the case against consequentialism has not been more successful lies, at least partly, in the methodological approach that critics have commonly used. Their arguments have usually proceeded in two steps. First, a definition of consequentialism is given. Then, objections are put forward based on that definition. This procedure runs into (...)
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  43. Tim Mulgan (2002). The Reverse Repugnant Conclusion. Utilitas 14 (03):360-.
    Total utilitarianism implies Parfit's repugnant conclusion. For any world (A) containing ten billion very happy people, there is a better world (Z) where a vast number of people have lives barely worth living. One common response is to claim that life in Parfit's Z is better than he suggests, and thus that his conclusion is not repugnant. This paper shows that this strategy cannot succeeed. Total utilitarianism also implies a reverse repugnant conclusion. For any world (A-minus) where ten billion people (...)
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  44. Tim Mulgan (1997). A Non-Proportional Hybrid Moral Theory. Utilitas 9 (03):291-.
    A common objection to consequentialism is that it makes unreasonable demands upon moral agents, by failing to allow agents to give special weight to their own personal projects and interests. A prominent recent response to this objection is that of Samuel Scheffler, who seeks to make room for moral agents by building agent-centred prerogatives into a consequentialist moral theory. In this paper, I present a new objection to Scheffler's account. I then sketch an improved prerogative, which avoids this objection by (...)
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  45. Tim Mulgan (1993). The Unhappy Conclusion and the Life of Virtue. Philosophical Quarterly 44 (172):357-359.
  46. David S. Oderberg, Why I Am Not a Consequentialist.
    This is an introductory talk on why I am not a consequentialist. I am not going to go into the details of consequentialist theory, or to compare and contrast different versions of consequentialism. Nor am I going to present all the reasons I am not a consequentialist, let alone all the reasons why you should not be one. All I want to do is focus on some key problems that in my view, and the view of many others, make consequentialism (...)
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  47. Peter Olsthoorn (2011). Intentions and Consequences in Military Ethics. Journal of Military Ethics 10 (2):81-93.
    Utilitarianism is the strand of moral philosophy that holds that judgment of whether an act is morally right or wrong, hence whether it ought to be done or not, is primarily based upon the foreseen consequences of the act in question. It has a bad reputation in military ethics because it would supposedly make military expedience override all other concerns. Given that the utilitarian credo of the greatest happiness for the greatest number is in fact agent-neutral, meaning that the consequences (...)
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  48. Toby Ord (2015). A New Counterexample to Prioritarianism. Utilitas 27 (3):298-302.
    Prioritarianism is the moral view that a fixed improvement in someone's well-being matters more the worse off they are. Its supporters argue that it best captures our intuitions about unequal distributions of well-being. I show that prioritarianism sometimes recommends acts that will make things more unequal while simultaneously lowering the total well-being and making things worse for everyone ex ante. Intuitively, there is little to recommend such acts and I take this to be a serious counterexample for prioritarianism.
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  49. David Phillips (2003). Thomson and the Semantic Argument Against Consequentialism. Journal of Philosophy 100 (9):475 - 486.
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  50. Gilbert Plumer (1991). Kant's Neglected Argument Against Consequentialism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 29 (4):501-520.
    The paper interprets Kant’s neglected argument at FOUNDATIONS 401 as consisting of these two premises and conclusion: (1) It follows from consequentialism that in a natural paradise people would not be obligated to be morally good. (2) But this is absurd; one ought to be morally good no matter what. Therefore, consequentialism is false. It is shown that this argument is a powerful one, mainly by showing that independent grounds support (2) and that (1) may survive a number of strong (...)
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