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  1. Miguel Alzola (2012). The Possibility of Virtue. Business Ethics Quarterly 22 (2):377-404.
    To have a virtue is to possess a certain kind of trait of character that is appropriate in pursuing the moral good at which the virtue aims. Human beings are assumed to be capable of attaining those traits. Yet, a number of scholars are skeptical about the very existence of such character traits. They claim a sizable amount of empirical evidence in their support. This paper is concerned with the existence and explanatory power of character as a way to assess (...)
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  2. Judith Andre (2008). Burdened Virtues Virtue Ethics for Liberatory Struggles (Review). Hypatia 23 (2):pp. 193-196.
  3. Nafsika Athanassoulis, Virtue Ethics. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  4. Kurt Baier (1988). Radical Virtue Ethics. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 13 (1):126-135.
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  5. Macalester Bell (2006). Review of Lisa Tessman, Burdened Virtues: Virtue Ethics for Liberatory Struggles. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (6).
  6. S. Bolsin (2005). Practical Virtue Ethics: Healthcare Whistleblowing and Portable Digital Technology. Journal of Medical Ethics 31 (10):612-618.
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  7. Michael S. Brady (2004). Against Agent-Based Virtue Ethics. Philosophical Papers 33 (1):1-10.
    Abstract Agent-based virtue ethics is a unitary normative theory according to which the moral status of actions is entirely dependent upon the moral status of an agent's motives and character traits. One of the problems any such approach faces is to capture the common-sense distinction between an agent's doing the right thing, and her doing it for the right (or wrong) reason. In this paper I argue that agent-based virtue ethics ultimately fails to capture this kind of fine-grained distinction, and (...)
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  8. Kimberley Brownlee (2010). Moral Aspirations and Ideals. Utilitas 22 (3):241-257.
    My aim is to vindicate two distinct and important moral categories – ideals and aspirations – which have received modest, and sometimes negative, attention in recent normative debates. An ideal is a conception of perfection or model of excellence around which we can shape our thoughts and actions. An aspiration, by contrast, is an attitudinal position of steadfast commitment to, striving for, or deep desire or longing for, an ideal. I locate these two concepts in relation to more familiar moral (...)
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  9. J. Budziszewski (1991). The Pincovian Persuasion: Six Problems in Virtue Ethics (a Free Response to Seung). Social Theory and Practice 17 (2):251-271.
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  10. Philip Cafaro & Ronald L. Sandler (eds.) (2004). Environmental Virtue Ethics. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
  11. David Carr (2007). Review of Rebecca L. Walker, Philip J. Ivanhoe (Eds.), Working Virtue: Virtue Ethics and Contemporary Moral Problems. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (10).
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  12. Michelle Ciurria (2012). A New Mixed View of Virtue Ethics, Based on Daniel Doviak's New Virtue Calculus. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (2):259-269.
    In A New Form of Agent-Based Virtue Ethics , Daniel Doviak develops a novel agent-based theory of right action that treats the rightness (or deontic status) of an action as a matter of the action’s net intrinsic virtue value (net-IVV)—that is, its balance of virtue over vice. This view is designed to accommodate three basic tenets of commonsense morality: (i) the maxim that “ought” implies “can,” (ii) the idea that a person can do the right thing for the wrong reason, (...)
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  13. Christopher Miles Coope (2006). Modern Virtue Ethics. In T. D. J. Chappell (ed.), Values and Virtues: Aristotelianism in Contemporary Ethics. Oxford University Press.
  14. David Copp & David Sobel (2004). Morality and Virtue: An Assessment of Some Recent Work in Virtue Ethics. Ethics 114 (3):514-554.
  15. Roger Crisp (2010). Virtue Ethics and Virtue Epistemology. Metaphilosophy 41 (1):22-40.
    Abstract: The aim of this essay is to test the claim that epistemologists—virtue epistemologists in particular—have much to learn from virtue ethics. The essay begins with an outline of virtue ethics itself. This section concludes that a pure form of virtue ethics is likely to be unattractive, so the virtue epistemologist should examine the "impure" views of real philosophers. Aristotle is usually held up as the paradigm virtue ethicist. His doctrine of the mean is described, and it is explained how (...)
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  16. Roger Crisp & Michael A. Slote (eds.) (1997). Virtue Ethics. Oxford University Press.
    This volume brings together much of the most influential work undertaken in the field of virtue ethics over the last four decades. The ethics of virtue predominated in the ancient world, and recent moral philosophy has seen a revival of interest in virtue ethics as a rival to Kantian and utilitarian approaches to morality. Divided into four sections, the collection includes articles critical of other traditions; early attempts to offer a positive vision of virtue ethics; some later criticisms of the (...)
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  17. Stephen Darwall (2005). Virtue Ethics. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (4):589 – 597.
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  18. Stephen L. Darwall (ed.) (2003). Virtue Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell.
    "Virtue Ethics" is a major approach to normative ethical theory that takes the consideration of character as fundamental to ethical reflection.
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  19. Daniel Doviak (2011). A New Form of Agent-Based Virtue Ethics. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (3):259-272.
    In Morals From Motives, Michael Slote defends an agent-based theory of right action according to which right acts are those that express virtuous motives like benevolence or care. Critics have claimed that Slote’s view— and agent-based views more generally— cannot account for several basic tenets of commonsense morality. In particular, the critics maintain that agent-based theories: (i) violate the deontic axiom that ought implies can , (ii) cannot allow for a person’s doing the right thing for the wrong reason, and (...)
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  20. J. Driver (2002). On Virtue Ethics. Philosophical Review 111 (1):122-127.
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  21. Julia Driver (1995). Monkeying with Motives: Agent-Basing Virtue Ethics. Utilitas 7 (02):281-.
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  22. S. F. (2003). Christine Swanton Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). Pp. XI+312. £35.00 (Hbk). ISBN 0 119 9253888. [REVIEW] Religious Studies 39 (4):502-503.
  23. Qun Gong (2010). Virtue Ethics and Modern Society—a Response to the Thesis of the Modern Predicament of Virtue Ethics. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 5 (2):255-265.
    The revival of modern Western virtue ethics presents the question of whether or not virtue ethics is appropriate for modern society. Ethicists believe that virtue ethics came from traditional society, to which it conforms so well. The appearance of the market economy and a utilitarian spirit, together with society’s diversification, is a sign that modern society has arrived. This also indicates a transformation in the moral spirit. But modern society has not made virtues less important, and even as modern life (...)
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  24. Pamela M. Hall (2008). Virtue Ethics Old and New (Review). Journal of the History of Philosophy 46 (2):pp. 332-332.
  25. Raja Halwani (2003). Care Ethics and Virtue Ethics. Hypatia 18 (3):161-192.
    : The paper argues that care ethics should be subsumed under virtue ethics by construing care as an important virtue. Doing so allows us to achieve two desirable goals. First, we preserve what is important about care ethics (for example, its insistence on particularity, partiality, emotional engagement, and the importance of care to our moral lives). Second, we avoid two important objections to care ethics, namely, that it neglects justice, and that it contains no mechanism by which care can be (...)
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  26. Stephen Holland (2011). The Virtue Ethics Approach to Bioethics. Bioethics 25 (4):192-201.
    This paper discusses the viability of a virtue-based approach to bioethics. Virtue ethics is clearly appropriate to addressing issues of professional character and conduct. But another major remit of bioethics is to evaluate the ethics of biomedical procedures in order to recommend regulatory policy. How appropriate is the virtue ethics approach to fulfilling this remit? The first part of this paper characterizes the methodology problem in bioethics in terms of diversity, and shows that virtue ethics does not simply restate this (...)
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  27. Brad Hooker (2002). The Collapse of Virtue Ethics. Utilitas 14 (01):22-.
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  28. Rosalind Hursthouse (1999/2001). On Virtue Ethics. Oxford University Press.
    Virtue ethics is perhaps the most important development within late twentieth-century moral philosophy. Rosalind Hursthouse, who has made notable contributions to this development, here presents a full exposition and defense of her neo-Aristotelian version of virtue ethics. She shows how virtue ethics can provide guidance for action, illuminate moral dilemmas, and bring out the moral significance of the emotions.
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  29. Daniel Jacobson (2002). An Unsolved Problem for Slote's Agent-Based Virtue Ethics. Philosophical Studies 111 (1):53 - 67.
    According to Slote's ``agent-based'' virtue ethics, the rightness orwrongness of an act is determined by the motive it expresses. Thistheory has a problem with cases where an agent can do her duty onlyby expressing some vicious motive and thereby acting wrongly. In sucha situation, an agent can only act wrongly; hence, the theory seemsincompatible with the maxim that `ought' implies `can'. I argue thatSlote's attempt to circumvent this problem by appealing to compatibilism is inadequate. In a wide range of psychologically (...)
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  30. Jason Kawall (2002). Virtue Theory and Ideal Observers. Philosophical Studies 109 (3):197 - 222.
    Virtue theorists in ethics often embrace the following characterizationof right action: An action is right iff a virtuous agent would performthat action in like circumstances. Zagzebski offers a parallel virtue-basedaccount of epistemically justified belief. Such proposals are severely flawedbecause virtuous agents in adverse circumstances, or through lack ofknowledge can perform poorly. I propose an alternative virtue-based accountaccording to which an action is right (a belief is justified) for an agentin a given situation iff an unimpaired, fully-informed virtuous observerwould deem the (...)
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  31. Simon Keller, Self-Effacement in Ethical Theory.
    A longer version of the virtue ethics paper. I go on to argue that virtue ethics faces special problems in explaining why self-effacement (even if inevitable) is regrettable, and say that the real worries about self-effacement can be navigated quite nicely by a certain form of consequentialism.
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  32. John Kultgen (1998). The Vicissitudes of Common-Sense Virtue Ethics, Part I: From Aristotle to Slote. Journal of Value Inquiry 32 (3):325-341.
  33. John Kultgen (1998). The Vicissitudes of Common-Sense Virtue Ethics, Part II: The Heuristic Use of Common Sense. Journal of Value Inquiry 32 (4):465-478.
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  34. Robert B. Louden (1990). Virtue Ethics and Anti-Theory. Philosophia 20 (1-2):93-114.
  35. Robert B. Louden (1984). On Some Vices of Virtue Ethics. American Philosophical Quarterly 21 (3):227 - 236.
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  36. Joel Martinez (2011). Is Virtue Ethics Self-Effacing? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):277-288.
    Virtue ethicists argue that modern ethical theories aim to give direct guidance about particular situations at the cost of offering artificial or narrow accounts of ethics. In contrast, virtue ethical theories guide action indirectly by helping one understand the virtues?but the theory will not provide answers as to what to do in particular instances. Recently, this had led many to think that virtue ethical theories are self-effacing the way some claim consequentialist and deontological theories are. In this paper I defend (...)
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  37. Elinor Mason (2005). Christine Swanton, Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2003), Pp. XI + 312. Utilitas 17 (2):231-233.
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  38. Elinor Mason (2003). Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999, Pp. X + 275. Utilitas 15 (02):250-.
  39. Michelle Mason (2005). Christine Swanton, Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View. [REVIEW] Ethics 115 (2):430-434.
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  40. Bernard Mayo (2009). Virtue Ethics. In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), Exploring Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology. Oxford University Press.
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  41. Glen Pettigrove (2011). Is Virtue Ethics Self-Effacing? Journal of Ethics 15 (3):191-207.
    Thomas Hurka, Simon Keller, and Julia Annas have recently argued that virtue ethics is self-effacing. I contend that these arguments are rooted in a mistaken understanding of the role that ideal agency and agent flourishing (should) play in virtue ethics. I then show how a virtue ethical theory can avoid the charge of self-effacement and why it is important that it do so.
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  42. Ronald Sandler (2003). Culture and the Specification of Environmental Virtue. Philosophy in the Contemporary World 10 (2):63-68.
    One concern about a virtue ethics approach to environmental ethics is that virtue ethics lack the theoretical resources to provide a specification of environmental virtue that does not pander to obtaining cultural practices and conceptions of the human-nature relationship. In this paper I argue that this concern is unfounded.
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  43. Christopher Toner (2010). Virtue Ethics and the Nature and Forms of Egoism. Journal of Philosophical Research 35:275-303.
    Virtue ethics is often alleged to be egoistic, based upon its linking of virtue and happiness. Virtue ethicists often respond that their approach to the moral life is only “formally egoistic” and therefore not objectionable. This paper develops a clear, non-arbitrary definition of egoism (often lacking in these exchanges) as systematic pursuit of one’s own welfare, and then catalogues four broad egoistic strategies for achieving it. I identify “formal foundational egoism” as the one mostplausibly attributed to virtue ethics (its subtlety (...)
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  44. Z. Y. L. van (2011). Right Action and the Non-Virtuous Agent. Journal of Applied Philosophy 28 (1):80-92.
    According to qualified-agent virtue ethics, an action is right if and only if it is what a virtuous agent would characteristically do in the circumstances. I discuss two closely related objections to this view, both of which concern the actions of the non-virtuous. The first is that this criterion sometimes gives the wrong result, for in some cases a non-virtuous agent should not do what a virtuous person would characteristically do. A second objection is it altogether fails to apply whenever (...)
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  45. Jonathan Webber (2013). Character, Attitude and Disposition. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (1).
    Recent debate over the empirical psychological presuppositions of virtue ethics has focused on reactive behavioural dispositions. But there are many character traits that cannot be understood properly in this way. Such traits are well described by attitude psychology. Moreover, the findings of attitude psychology support virtue ethics in three ways. First, they confirm the role of habituation in the development of character. Further, they show virtue ethics to be compatible with the situation manipulation experiments at the heart of the recent (...)
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Applicability of Virtue Ethics
  1. Anna Abram (2007). Virtue Ethics and Professional Roles. By Justin Oakley and Dean Cocking. Heythrop Journal 48 (1):137–140.
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  2. Carla Bagnoli (2006). Review of Virginia Held, The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, Global. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (6).
  3. Damian Cox (2006). Agent-Based Theories of Right Action. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (5):505 - 515.
    In this paper, I develop an objection to agent-based accounts of right action. Agent-based accounts of right action attempt to derive moral judgment of actions from judgment of the inner quality of virtuous agents and virtuous agency. A moral theory ought to be something that moral agents can permissibly use in moral deliberation. I argue for a principle that captures this intuition and show that, for a broad range of other-directed virtues and motives, agent-based accounts of right action fail to (...)
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  4. Garrett Cullity (1999). Virtue Ethics, Theory, and Warrant. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2 (3):277-294.
    Are there good grounds for thinking that the moral values of action are to be derived from those of character? This virtue ethical claim is sometimes thought of as a kind of normative ethical theory; sometimes as form of opposition to any such theory. However, the best case to be made for it supports neither of these claims. Rather, it leads us to a distinctive view in moral epistemology: the view that my warrant for a particular moral judgement derives from (...)
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  5. Simon Keller (2007). Virtue Ethics is Self-Effacing. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):221 – 231.
    An ethical theory is self-effacing if it tells us that sometimes, we should not be motivated by the considerations that justify our acts. In his influential paper 'The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories' [1976], Michael Stocker argues that consequentialist and deontological ethical theories must be self-effacing, if they are to be at all plausible. Stocker's argument is often taken to provide a reason to give up consequentialism and deontology in favour of virtue ethics. I argue that this assessment is a (...)
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  6. Daryl Koehn (1998). Virtue Ethics, the Firm, and Moral Psychology. Business Ethics Quarterly 8 (3):497-513.
    Business ethicists have increasingly used Aristotelian “virtue ethics” to analyze the actions of business people and to explore the question of what the standard of ethical behavior is. These analyses have raised many important issues and opened up new avenuesfor research. But the time has come to examine in some detail possible limitations or weaknesses in virtue ethics. This paper arguesthat Aristotelian virtue ethics is subject to many objections because the psychology implicit within the ethic is not well-suited for analyzing (...)
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  7. Liezl van Zyl (2011). Right Action and the Non-Virtuous Agent. Journal of Applied Philosophy 28 (1):80-92.
    According to qualified-agent virtue ethics, an action is right if and only if it is what a virtuous agent would characteristically do in the circumstances. I discuss two closely related objections to this view, both of which concern the actions of the non-virtuous. The first is that this criterion sometimes gives the wrong result, for in some cases a non-virtuous agent should not do what a virtuous person would characteristically do. A second objection is it altogether fails to apply whenever (...)
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Virtue Ethics and Moral Relativism
  1. Joseph J. Kotva (1994). Christian Virtue Ethics and the 'Sectarian Temptation'. Heythrop Journal 35 (1):35–52.
  2. Desh Raj Sirswal (2010). Educational Philosophy of Sri Aurobindo. Centre for Sri Aurobindo Studies, Ambala City.
    I have translated the book on Sri Aurobindo's philosophy of education. it is a short title and describe basics of Sri Aurobindo's ideas.
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Objections to Virtue Ethics, Misc
  1. Julia Annas (2008). Virtue Ethics and the Charge of Egoism. In Paul Bloomfield (ed.), Morality and Self-Interest. Oxford University Press.
  2. Nafsika Athanassoulis (2005). Common-Sense Virtue Ethics and Moral Luck. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (3):265 - 276.
    Moral luck poses a problem for out conception of responsibility because it highlights a tension between morality and lack of control. Michael Slote’s common-sense virtue ethics claims to avoid this problem. However there are a number of objections to this claim. Firstly, it is not clear that Slote fully appreciates the problem posed by moral luck. Secondly, Slote’s move from the moral to the ethical is problematic. Thirdly it is not clear why we should want to abandon judgements of moral (...)
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  3. Carla Bagnoli (2006). Review of Virginia Held, The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, Global. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (6).
  4. Marcia Baron (2008). Virtue Ethics, Kantian Ethics, and the One Thought Too Many Objection. In Monika Betzler (ed.), Kant's Ethics of Virtues. Walter De Gruyter.
  5. Patricia Benner (1997). A Dialogue Between Virtue Ethics and Care Ethics. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 18 (1-2).
    A dialogue between virtue and care ethics is formed as a step towards meeting Pellegrino's challenge to create a more comprehensive moral philosophy. It is also a dialogue between nursing and medicine since each practice draws on the Greek Virtue Tradition and the Judeo-Christian Tradition of care differently. In the Greek Virtue Tradition, the point of scrutiny lies in the inner character of the actor, whereas in the Judeo-Christian Tradition the focus is relational, i.e. how virtues are lived out in (...)
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  6. Hilan Bensusan & Manuel De Pinedo García (2007). When My Own Beliefs Are Not First-Personal Enough. Theoria 22 (58):35-41.
    Richard Moran has argued, convincingly, in favour of the idea that there must be more than one path to access our own mental contents. The existence of those routes, one first-personal—through avowal—the other third-personal—no different to the one used to ascribe mental states to other people and to interpret their actions—is intimately connected to our capacity to respond to norms. Moran’s account allows for conflicts between first personal and third personal authorities over my own beliefs; this enable some instances of (...)
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  7. Roberta M. Berry (2009). Pt. 3. The Malleability of Human Nature. Reflections on Secular Foundationalism and Our Human Future / Stephen Erickson ; Nature as Second Nature : Plasticity and Habit / Peter Wake ; The Posthumanist Challenge to a Partly Naturalized Virtue Ethics. [REVIEW] In Mark J. Cherry (ed.), The Normativity of the Natural: Human Goods, Human Virtues, and Human Flourishing. Springer.
  8. Stephen R. Brown (2004). Naturalized Virtue Ethics and the Epistemological Gap. Journal of Moral Philosophy 1 (2):197-209.
    The proponent of the epistemological gap maintains that value claims are justified in a different way than are nonvalue claims. I show that a neo-Aristotelian naturalized virtue ethics does not fall prey to this gap. There are ethical claims concerning human beings that are epistemically justified in a way logically identical to the way in which are justified certain nonethical claims about human and nonhuman organisms. This demonstration (1) lends credibility to naturalized virtue ethics, (2) calls into question the very (...)
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  9. Anne-Marie S. Christensen (2009). Getting It Right in Ethical Experience: John McDowell and Virtue Ethics. Journal of Value Inquiry 43 (4):493–506.
    Most forms of virtue ethics are characterized by two attractive features. The first is that proponents of virtue ethics acknowledge the need to describe how moral agents acquire or develop the traits and abilities necessary to become morally able agents. The second attractive feature of most forms of virtue ethics is that they are forms of moral realism. The two features come together in the attempt to describe virtue as a personal ability to distinguish morally good reasons for action. It (...)
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  10. Garrett Cullity (1999). Virtue Ethics, Theory, and Warrant. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2 (3):277-294.
    Are there good grounds for thinking that the moral values of action are to be derived from those of character? This virtue ethical claim is sometimes thought of as a kind of normative ethical theory; sometimes as form of opposition to any such theory. However, the best case to be made for it supports neither of these claims. Rather, it leads us to a distinctive view in moral epistemology: the view that my warrant for a particular moral judgement derives from (...)
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  11. R. Das (2003). Virtue Ethics and Right Action. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (3):324 – 339.
    In this paper I evaluate some recent virtue-ethical accounts of right action [Hursthouse 1999; Slote 2001; Swanton 2001]. I argue that all are vulnerable to what I call the insularity objection : evaluating action requires attention to worldly consequences external to the agent, whereas virtue ethics is primarily concerned with evaluating an agent's inner states. More specifically, I argue that insofar as these accounts are successful in meeting the insularity objection they invite the circularity objection : they end up relying (...)
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  12. Nicholas Everitt (2007). Some Problems with Virtue Theory. Philosophy 82 (2):275-299.
    Abstract: I examine virtue theory, especially as expressed by Rosalind Hursthouse. In its canonical form, the theory claims that living a life of virtue constitutes flourishing, although it also has a possible fall-back claim that a life of virtue is a means to the end of flourishing. I argue that in both interpretations, virtue theory is mistaken. It cannot give any convincing account of how the concepts of wanting, flourishing, and the virtues are connected, nor can it deal adequately with (...)
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  13. Stephen Holland (2010). Scepticism About the Virtue Ethics Approach to Nursing Ethics. Nursing Philosophy 11 (3):151-158.
    Nursing ethics centres on how nurses ought to respond to the moral situations that arise in their professional contexts. Nursing ethicists invoke normative approaches from moral philosophy. Specifically, it is increasingly common for nursing ethicists to apply virtue ethics to moral problems encountered by nurses. The point of this article is to argue for scepticism about this approach. First, the research question is motivated by showing that requirements on nurses such as to be kind, do not suffice to establish virtue (...)
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  14. Yong Huang (2010). The Self-Centeredness Objection to Virtue Ethics. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 84 (4):651-692.
    As virtue ethics has developed into maturity, it has also met with a number of objections. This essay focuses on the self-centeredness objection: since virtue ethics recommends that we be concerned with our own virtues or virtuous characters, it is self-centered. In response, I first argue that, for Zhu Xi’s neo-Confucianism, the character that a virtuous person is concerned with consists largely in precisely those virtues that incline him or her to be concerned with the good of others. While such (...)
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  15. Rosalind Hursthouse (2002). Virtue Ethics Vs. Rule-Consequentialism: A Reply to Brad Hooker. Utilitas 14 (01):41-.
  16. Jason Kawall (2009). In Defense of the Primacy of the Virtues. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 3 (2):1-21.
    In this paper I respond to a set of basic objections often raised against those virtue theories in ethics which maintain that moral properties such rightness and goodness (and their corresponding concepts) are to be explained and understood in terms of the virtues or the virtuous. The objections all rest on a strongly-held intuition that the virtues (and the virtuous) simply must be derivative in some way from either right actions or good states of affairs. My goal is to articulate (...)
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  17. Simon Keller (2007). Virtue Ethics is Self-Effacing. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):221 – 231.
    An ethical theory is self-effacing if it tells us that sometimes, we should not be motivated by the considerations that justify our acts. In his influential paper 'The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories' [1976], Michael Stocker argues that consequentialist and deontological ethical theories must be self-effacing, if they are to be at all plausible. Stocker's argument is often taken to provide a reason to give up consequentialism and deontology in favour of virtue ethics. I argue that this assessment is a (...)
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  18. R. Jo Kornegay (2011). Hursthouse's Virtue Ethics and Abortion: Abortion Ethics Without Metaphysics? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (1):51-71.
    This essay explicates and evaluates the roles that fetal metaphysics and moral status play in Rosalind Hursthouse’s abortion ethics. It is motivated by Hursthouse’s puzzling claim in her widely anthologized paper Virtue Ethics and Abortion that fetal moral status and (by implication) its underlying metaphysics are in a way, fundamentally irrelevant to her position. The essay clarifies the roles that fetal ontology and moral status do in fact play in her abortion ethics. To this end, it presents and then develops (...)
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  19. Joseph J. Kotva (1994). Christian Virtue Ethics and the 'Sectarian Temptation'. Heythrop Journal 35 (1):35–52.
  20. Mark LeBar (2009). Virtue Ethics and Deontic Constraints. Ethics 119 (4):642-671.
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  21. Robert Lockie (2008). Problems for Virtue Theories in Epistemology. Philosophical Studies 138 (2):169 - 191.
    This paper identifies and criticizes certain fundamental commitments of virtue theories in epistemology. A basic question for virtues approaches is whether they represent a ‘third force’––a different source of normativity to internalism and externalism. Virtues approaches so-conceived are opposed. It is argued that virtues theories offer us nothing that can unify the internalist and externalist sub-components of their preferred success-state. Claims that character can unify a virtues-based axiology are overturned. Problems with the pluralism of virtues theories are identified––problems with pluralism (...)
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  22. David Sobel (2011). The Limits of the Explanatory Power of Developmentalism. Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (4):517-527.
    Richard Kraut's neo-Aristotelian account of well-being, Developmentalism, aspires to explain not only which things are good for us but why those things are good for us. The key move in attempting to make good on this second aspiration involves his claim that our ordinary intuitions about what is good for a person can be successfully explained and systematized by the idea that what benefi ts a living thing develops properly that living thing's potentialities, capacities, and faculties. I argue that Kraut's (...)
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  23. Eric Wiland (2010). The Incoherence Objection in Moral Theory. Acta Analytica 25 (3):279-284.
    J.J.C. Smart famously complained that rule utilitarianism is incoherent, and that rule utilitarians are guilty of rule worship . Much has been said about whether Smart’s complaint is justified, but I will assume for the sake of argument that Smart was on to something. Instead, I have three other goals. First, I want to show that Smart’s complaint is a specific instance of a more general objection to a moral theory—what I will call the Incoherence Objection. Second, I want to (...)
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