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  1. Julia Annas (2008). Virtue Ethics and the Charge of Egoism. In Paul Bloomfield (ed.), Morality and Self-Interest. Oxford University Press.
  2. Nafsika Athanassoulis (2005). Common-Sense Virtue Ethics and Moral Luck. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (3):265 - 276.
    Moral luck poses a problem for out conception of responsibility because it highlights a tension between morality and lack of control. Michael Slote’s common-sense virtue ethics claims to avoid this problem. However there are a number of objections to this claim. Firstly, it is not clear that Slote fully appreciates the problem posed by moral luck. Secondly, Slote’s move from the moral to the ethical is problematic. Thirdly it is not clear why we should want to abandon judgements of moral (...)
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  3. Carla Bagnoli (2006). Review of Virginia Held, The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, Global. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (6).
  4. Marcia Baron (2008). Virtue Ethics, Kantian Ethics, and the One Thought Too Many Objection. In Monika Betzler (ed.), Kant's Ethics of Virtues. Walter De Gruyter.
  5. Jeremy Bendik-Keymer (2010). Species Extinction and the Vice of Thoughtlessness: The Importance of Spiritual Exercises for Learning Virtue. [REVIEW] Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 23 (1-2):61-83.
    In this paper, I present a sample spiritual exercise—a contemporary form of the written practice that ancient philosophers used to shape their characters. The exercise, which develops the ancient practice of the examination of conscience, is on the sixth mass extinction and seeks to understand why the extinction appears as a moral wrong. It concludes by finding a vice in the moral character of the author and the author’s society. From a methodological standpoint, the purpose of spiritual exercises is to (...)
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  6. Patricia Benner (1997). A Dialogue Between Virtue Ethics and Care Ethics. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 18 (1-2).
    A dialogue between virtue and care ethics is formed as a step towards meeting Pellegrino's challenge to create a more comprehensive moral philosophy. It is also a dialogue between nursing and medicine since each practice draws on the Greek Virtue Tradition and the Judeo-Christian Tradition of care differently. In the Greek Virtue Tradition, the point of scrutiny lies in the inner character of the actor, whereas in the Judeo-Christian Tradition the focus is relational, i.e. how virtues are lived out in (...)
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  7. Hilan Bensusan & Manuel De Pinedo García (2007). When My Own Beliefs Are Not First-Personal Enough. Theoria 22 (58):35-41.
    Richard Moran has argued, convincingly, in favour of the idea that there must be more than one path to access our own mental contents. The existence of those routes, one first-personal—through avowal—the other third-personal—no different to the one used to ascribe mental states to other people and to interpret their actions—is intimately connected to our capacity to respond to norms. Moran’s account allows for conflicts between first personal and third personal authorities over my own beliefs; this enable some instances of (...)
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  8. Roberta M. Berry (2009). Pt. 3. The Malleability of Human Nature. Reflections on Secular Foundationalism and Our Human Future / Stephen Erickson ; Nature as Second Nature : Plasticity and Habit / Peter Wake ; The Posthumanist Challenge to a Partly Naturalized Virtue Ethics. [REVIEW] In Mark J. Cherry (ed.), The Normativity of the Natural: Human Goods, Human Virtues, and Human Flourishing. Springer.
  9. Stephen R. Brown (2004). Naturalized Virtue Ethics and the Epistemological Gap. Journal of Moral Philosophy 1 (2):197-209.
    The proponent of the epistemological gap maintains that value claims are justified in a different way than are nonvalue claims. I show that a neo-Aristotelian naturalized virtue ethics does not fall prey to this gap. There are ethical claims concerning human beings that are epistemically justified in a way logically identical to the way in which are justified certain nonethical claims about human and nonhuman organisms. This demonstration (1) lends credibility to naturalized virtue ethics, (2) calls into question the very (...)
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  10. Anne-Marie S. Christensen (2009). Getting It Right in Ethical Experience: John McDowell and Virtue Ethics. [REVIEW] Journal of Value Inquiry 43 (4):493–506.
    Most forms of virtue ethics are characterized by two attractive features. The first is that proponents of virtue ethics acknowledge the need to describe how moral agents acquire or develop the traits and abilities necessary to become morally able agents. The second attractive feature of most forms of virtue ethics is that they are forms of moral realism. The two features come together in the attempt to describe virtue as a personal ability to distinguish morally good reasons for action. It (...)
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  11. Derek Clifford (2013). Limitations of Virtue Ethics in the Social Professions. Ethics and Social Welfare 8 (1):1-18.
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  12. Bradford Cokelet, Virtue is a Great Moral Good.
    According to Aristotelian virtue ethicists, virtue is a great moral good that contributes to, but cannot be reduced to, an agent's welfare. In addition, they hold that the value of virtue is different from, and in some sense greater than, the agent-neutral intrinsic goodness that consequentialists attribute to states of affair. According to Thomas Hurka (1998, 2003, 2011), these fundamental Aristotelian views are indefensible. In this paper, I rebuff Hurka's skepticism and identify an Aristotelian view that stands fast in the (...)
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  13. Bradford Cokelet (forthcoming). Virtue Ethics and the Demands of Social Morality. In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Volume 4. Oxford University Press.
    Building on work by Steve Darwall, I argue that standard virtue ethical accounts of moral motivation are defective because they don't include accounts of social morality. I then propose a virtue ethical account of social morality, and respond to one of Darwall's core objections to the coherence of any such (non-Kantian) account.
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  14. Garrett Cullity (1999). Virtue Ethics, Theory, and Warrant. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2 (3):277-294.
    Are there good grounds for thinking that the moral values of action are to be derived from those of character? This virtue ethical claim is sometimes thought of as a kind of normative ethical theory; sometimes as form of opposition to any such theory. However, the best case to be made for it supports neither of these claims. Rather, it leads us to a distinctive view in moral epistemology: the view that my warrant for a particular moral judgement derives from (...)
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  15. R. Das (2003). Virtue Ethics and Right Action. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (3):324 – 339.
    In this paper I evaluate some recent virtue-ethical accounts of right action [Hursthouse 1999; Slote 2001; Swanton 2001]. I argue that all are vulnerable to what I call the insularity objection : evaluating action requires attention to worldly consequences external to the agent, whereas virtue ethics is primarily concerned with evaluating an agent's inner states. More specifically, I argue that insofar as these accounts are successful in meeting the insularity objection they invite the circularity objection : they end up relying (...)
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  16. Nicholas Everitt (2007). Some Problems with Virtue Theory. Philosophy 82 (2):275-299.
    Abstract: I examine virtue theory, especially as expressed by Rosalind Hursthouse. In its canonical form, the theory claims that living a life of virtue constitutes flourishing, although it also has a possible fall-back claim that a life of virtue is a means to the end of flourishing. I argue that in both interpretations, virtue theory is mistaken. It cannot give any convincing account of how the concepts of wanting, flourishing, and the virtues are connected, nor can it deal adequately with (...)
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  17. Stephen Holland (2010). Scepticism About the Virtue Ethics Approach to Nursing Ethics. Nursing Philosophy 11 (3):151-158.
    Nursing ethics centres on how nurses ought to respond to the moral situations that arise in their professional contexts. Nursing ethicists invoke normative approaches from moral philosophy. Specifically, it is increasingly common for nursing ethicists to apply virtue ethics to moral problems encountered by nurses. The point of this article is to argue for scepticism about this approach. First, the research question is motivated by showing that requirements on nurses such as to be kind, do not suffice to establish virtue (...)
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  18. Yong Huang (2010). The Self-Centeredness Objection to Virtue Ethics. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 84 (4):651-692.
    As virtue ethics has developed into maturity, it has also met with a number of objections. This essay focuses on the self-centeredness objection: since virtue ethics recommends that we be concerned with our own virtues or virtuous characters, it is self-centered. In response, I first argue that, for Zhu Xi’s neo-Confucianism, the character that a virtuous person is concerned with consists largely in precisely those virtues that incline him or her to be concerned with the good of others. While such (...)
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  19. Rosalind Hursthouse (2002). Virtue Ethics Vs. Rule-Consequentialism: A Reply to Brad Hooker. Utilitas 14 (01):41-.
    In On Virtue Ethics I offered a criterion for a character trait's being a virtue according to which a virtuous character trait must conduce to, or at least not be inimical to, four ends, one of which is the continuance of the human species. I argue here that this does not commit me to homosexuality's being a vice, since homosexuality is not a character trait and hence not up for assessment as a virtue or a vice. Vegetarianism is not up (...)
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  20. Jason Kawall (2009). In Defense of the Primacy of the Virtues. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 3 (2):1-21.
    In this paper I respond to a set of basic objections often raised against those virtue theories in ethics which maintain that moral properties such rightness and goodness (and their corresponding concepts) are to be explained and understood in terms of the virtues or the virtuous. The objections all rest on a strongly-held intuition that the virtues (and the virtuous) simply must be derivative in some way from either right actions or good states of affairs. My goal is to articulate (...)
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  21. Simon Keller (2007). Virtue Ethics is Self-Effacing. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):221 – 231.
    An ethical theory is self-effacing if it tells us that sometimes, we should not be motivated by the considerations that justify our acts. In his influential paper 'The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories' [1976], Michael Stocker argues that consequentialist and deontological ethical theories must be self-effacing, if they are to be at all plausible. Stocker's argument is often taken to provide a reason to give up consequentialism and deontology in favour of virtue ethics. I argue that this assessment is a (...)
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  22. Ian James Kidd (forthcoming). Transformative Suffering and the Cultivation of Virtue. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology.
    Anastasia Scrutton offers an attractive account of two Christian theologies of depression and argues, cogently and compellingly, that forms of potentially transformative theologies are therapeutically and philosophically superior. My double aim here is to try to cash out the operative notion of 'transformation' by focusing on two features: first its multimodal character (ethical, aesthetic, existential, spiritual) and, second, the theme of a realisation of 'dependence', 'grounding', or of being 'anchored' in the world. I suggest that these two themes of multimodality (...)
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  23. Roger J. H. King (2001). Virtue and Community in Business Ethics: A Critical Assessment of Solomon's Aristotelian Approach to Social Responsibility. Journal of Social Philosophy 32 (4):487–499.
  24. R. Jo Kornegay (2011). Hursthouse's Virtue Ethics and Abortion: Abortion Ethics Without Metaphysics? [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (1):51-71.
    This essay explicates and evaluates the roles that fetal metaphysics and moral status play in Rosalind Hursthouse’s abortion ethics. It is motivated by Hursthouse’s puzzling claim in her widely anthologized paper Virtue Ethics and Abortion that fetal moral status and (by implication) its underlying metaphysics are in a way, fundamentally irrelevant to her position. The essay clarifies the roles that fetal ontology and moral status do in fact play in her abortion ethics. To this end, it presents and then develops (...)
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  25. Joseph J. Kotva (1994). Christian Virtue Ethics and the 'Sectarian Temptation'. Heythrop Journal 35 (1):35–52.
  26. Mark LeBar (2009). Virtue Ethics and Deontic Constraints. Ethics 119 (4):642-671.
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  27. Robert Lockie (2008). Problems for Virtue Theories in Epistemology. Philosophical Studies 138 (2):169 - 191.
    This paper identifies and criticizes certain fundamental commitments of virtue theories in epistemology. A basic question for virtues approaches is whether they represent a ‘third force’––a different source of normativity to internalism and externalism. Virtues approaches so-conceived are opposed. It is argued that virtues theories offer us nothing that can unify the internalist and externalist sub-components of their preferred success-state. Claims that character can unify a virtues-based axiology are overturned. Problems with the pluralism of virtues theories are identified––problems with pluralism (...)
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  28. Micah Lott (2013). Does Human Nature Conflict with Itself? Human Form and the Harmony of the Virtues. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 87 (4):657-683.
    Does possessing some human virtues make it impossible for a person to possess other human virtues? Isaiah Berlin and Bernard Williams both answered “yes” to this question, and they argued that to hold otherwise—to accept the harmony of the virtues—required a blinkered and unrealistic view of “what it is to be human.” In this essay, I have two goals: (1) to show how the harmony of the virtues is best interpreted, and what is at stake in affirming or denying it; (...)
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  29. David McPherson (2012). To What Extent Must We Go Beyond Neo-Aristotelian Ethical Naturalism? American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 86 (4):627-654.
    In this essay I discuss the limits of recent attempts to develop a neo-Aristotelian virtue ethic on the basis of a commitment to ‘ethical naturalism.’ By ‘ethical naturalism’ I mean the view that ethics can be founded on claims about what it is for human beings to flourish qua member of the human species, which is analogous to what it is for plants and other animals to flourish qua member of their particular species. Drawing on Charles Taylor’s account of ‘strong (...)
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  30. Martha C. Nussbaum (1999). Virtue Ethics: A Misleading Category? [REVIEW] Journal of Ethics 3 (3):163-201.
    Virtue ethics is standardly taught and discussed as a distinctive approach to the major questions of ethics, a third major position alongside Utilitarian and Kantian ethics. I argue that this taxonomy is a confusion. Both Utilitarianism and Kantianism contain treatments of virtue, so virtue ethics cannot possibly be a separate approach contrasted with those approaches. There are, to be sure, quite a few contemporary philosophical writers about virtue who are neither Utilitarians nor Kantians; many of these find inspiration in ancient (...)
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  31. Justin Oakley (2001). Virtue Ethics and Professional Roles. Cambridge University Press.
    Professionals, it is said, have no use for simple lists of virtues and vices. The complexities and constraints of professional roles create peculiar moral demands on the people who occupy them, and traits that are vices in ordinary life are praised as virtues in the context of professional roles. Should this disturb us, or is it naive to presume that things should be otherwise? Taking medical and legal practice as key examples, Justin Oakley and Dean Cocking develop a rigorous articulation (...)
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  32. Justin Oakley (1996). Varieties of Virtue Ethics. Ratio 9 (2):128-152.
  33. Daniel Putman (1997). The Intellectual Bias of Virtue Ethics. Philosophy 72 (280):303 - 311.
  34. William Ransome (2010). Is Agent-Based Virtue Ethics Self-Undermining? Ethical Perspectives 17 (1):41-57.
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  35. William Rehg & Darin Davis (2003). Conceptual Gerrymandering? The Alignment of Hursthouse's Naturalistic Virtue Ethics with Neo-Kantian Non-Naturalism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (4):583-600.
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  36. Daniel C. Russell (2008). That “Ought” Does Not Imply “Right”: Why It Matters for Virtue Ethics. Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (2):299-315.
    Virtue ethicists sometimes say that a right action is what a virtuous person would do, characteristically, in the circumstances. But some have objected recently that right action cannot be defined as what a virtuous person would do in the circumstances because there are circumstances in which a right action is possible but in which no virtuous person would be found. This objection moves from the premise that a given person ought to do an action that no virtuous person would do, (...)
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  37. Carla Saenz (2010). Virtue Ethics and the Selection of Children with Impairments: A Reply to Rosalind McDougall. Bioethics 24 (9):499-506.
    In ‘Parental Virtues: A New Way of Thinking about the Morality of Reproductive Actions’ Rosalind McDougall proposes a virtue-based framework to assess the morality of child selection. Applying the virtue-based account to the selection of children with impairments does not lead, according to McDougall, to an unequivocal answer to the morality of selecting impaired children. In ‘Impairment, Flourishing, and the Moral Nature of Parenthood,’ she also applies the virtue-based account to the discussion of child selection, and claims that couples with (...)
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  38. R. Sandler & P. Cafaro (eds.) (2005). Environmental Virtue Ethics. Rowman & Littlefield.
    The first on the topic of environmental virtue ethics, this book seeks to provide the definitive anthology that will both establish the importance of ...
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  39. Ronald Sandler (2005). A Response to Martin Calkins's “How Casuistry and Virtue Ethics Might Break the Ideological Stalemate Troubling Agricultural Biotechnology”. Business Ethics Quarterly 15 (2):319-327.
    Martin Calkins proposes the “combined use of casuistry and virtue ethics as a way for both sides to move ahead on [the] pressing issue [of agricultural biotechnology].” However, his defense of this methodology relies on a set of mistaken, albeit familiar, claims regarding the normative resources of virtue ethics: (1) virtue ethics is egoistic; (2) virtue ethics cannot defend any particular account of the virtues as the objectively correct ones and is therefore inextricably relativistic; (3) virtue ethics cannot supply a (...)
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  40. Erick W. Schmidt (2011). A Virtue Ethics Response to Henley on Hume, Aristotle and the Situationist Challenge. Southwest Philosophy Review 27 (2):27-32.
  41. Michael Slote (1995). Agent-Based Virtue Ethics. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 20 (1):83-101.
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  42. David Sobel (2011). The Limits of the Explanatory Power of Developmentalism. Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (4):517-527.
    Richard Kraut's neo-Aristotelian account of well-being, Developmentalism, aspires to explain not only which things are good for us but why those things are good for us. The key move in attempting to make good on this second aspiration involves his claim that our ordinary intuitions about what is good for a person can be successfully explained and systematized by the idea that what benefi ts a living thing develops properly that living thing's potentialities, capacities, and faculties. I argue that Kraut's (...)
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  43. David Solomon (1988). Internal Objections to Virtue Ethics. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 13 (1):428-441.
  44. Rebecca Stangl (2010). Asymmetrical Virtue Particularism. Ethics 121 (1):37-57.
    In this essay, I defend an account of right action that I shall call “asymmetrical virtue particularism.” An action, on this account, is right just insofar as it is overall virtuous. But the virtuousness of an action in any particular respect, X, is deontically variant; it can fail to be right-making, either because it is deontically irrelevant or because it is wrong-making. Finally, the account is asymmetrical insofar as the viciousness of actions is not deontically variant; if any action is (...)
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  45. Rebecca Stangl (2008). A Dilemma for Particularist Virtue Ethics. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233):665-678.
    There is an obvious affinity between virtue ethics and particularism. Both stress the complexify of the moral life, the inadequacy of rule-following as a guide to moral deliberation, and the importance of judgement in discerning the morally relevant features of particular situations. Yet it remains an open question how deep the affinity goes. I argue that the radical form of particularism defended by Jonathan Dancy has surprisingly strong implications for virtue ethics. Adopting such a view would require the virtue theorist (...)
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  46. Frans Svensson (2010). Virtue Ethics and the Search for an Account of Right Action. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (3):255 - 271.
    Conceived of as a contender to other theories in substantive ethics, virtue ethics is often associated with, in essence, the following account or criterion of right action: VR: An action A is right for S in circumstances C if and only if a fully virtuous agent would characteristically do A in C. There are serious objections to VR, which take the form of counter-examples. They present us with different scenarios in which less than fully virtuous persons would be acting rightly (...)
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  47. Frans Svensson (2008). Virtue Ethics and Elitism. Philosophical Papers 37 (1):131-155.
    Because of its reliance on a basically Aristotelian conception of virtue, contemporary virtue ethics is often criticised for being inherently elitist. I argue that this objection is mistaken. The core of my argument is that we need to take seriously that virtue, according to Aristotle, is something that we acquire gradually, via a developmental process. People are not just stuck with their characters once and for all, but can always aspire to become better (more virtuous). And that is plausibly the (...)
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  48. Christine Swanton (1997). Virtue Ethics and the Problem of Indirection: A Pluralistic Value-Centred Approach. Utilitas 9 (02):167-.
    Many forms of virtue ethics, like certain forms of utilitarianism, suffer from the problem of indirection. In those forms, the criterion for status of a trait as a virtue is not the same as the criterion for the status of an act as right. Furthermore, if the virtues for example are meant to promote the nourishing of the agent, the virtuous agent is not standardly supposed to be motivated by concern for her own flourishing in her activity. In this paper, (...)
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  49. Christopher Toner (2006). The Self-Centredness Objection to Virtue Ethics. Philosophy 81 (4):595-618.
  50. Candace Upton (2008). Virtue Ethics, Character, and Normative Receptivity. Journal of Moral Philosophy 5 (1):77-95.
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