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Objects, Misc

Edited by Daniel Z. Korman (University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, Australian National University)
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  1. Andrew M. Bailey (2012). No Bare Particulars. Philosophical Studies 158 (1):31-41.
    There are predicates and subjects. It is thus tempting to think that there are properties on the one hand, and things that have them on the other. I have no quarrel with this thought; it is a fine place to begin a theory of properties and property-having. But in this paper, I argue that one such theory—bare particularism—is false. I pose a dilemma. Either bare particulars instantiate the properties of their host substances or they do not. If they do not, (...)
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  2. Jiri Benovsky (2009). The Self : A Humean Bundle and/or a Cartesian Substance ? European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 5 (1):7 - 19.
    Is the self a substance, as Descartes thought, or is it 'only' a bundle of perceptions, as Hume thought ? In this paper I will examine these two views, especially with respect to two central features that have played a central role in the discussion, both of which can be quickly and usefully explained if one puts them as an objection to the bundle view. First, friends of the substance view have insisted that only if one conceives of the self (...)
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  3. Bernadette Bensaude-Vincent, Sacha Loeve, Alfred Nordmann & Astrid Schwarz (2011). Matters of Interest: The Objects of Research in Science and Technoscience. [REVIEW] Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 42 (2):365-383.
    This discussion paper proposes that a meaningful distinction between science and technoscience can be found at the level of the objects of research. Both notions intermingle in the attitudes, intentions, programs and projects of researchers and research institutions—that is, on the side of the subjects of research. But the difference between science and technoscience becomes more explicit when research results are presented in particular settings and when the objects of research are exhibited for the specific interest they hold. When an (...)
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  4. Paul Bloom (1998). Different Structures for Concepts of Individuals, Stuffs, and Real Kinds: One Mama, More Milk, and Many Mice. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):66-67.
    Although our concepts of “Mama,” “milk,” and “mice” have much in common, the suggestion that they are identical in structure in the mind of the prelinguistic child is mistaken. Even infants think about objects as different from substances and appreciate the distinction between kinds (e.g., mice) and individuals (e.g., Mama). Such cognitive capacities exist in other animals as well, and have important adaptive consequences.
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  5. David A. Denby (2007). A Note on Analysing Substancehood. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (3):473 – 484.
    I propose an analysis of the notion of a substance. I define two 'quasi-logical' independence relations, and state the analysis in terms of the distribution of these relations among substances and properties generally. This analysis treats the categories of substance and property as mutually dependent. To show that it (probably) states a sufficient condition for substance, I argue that it is in a certain kind of equilibrium. This illustrates a promising general approach to analysing fundamental metaphysical notions.
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  6. Jeffrey Goodman (2010). Fictionalia as Modal Artifacts. Grazer Philosophische Studien 80 (1):21-46.
    Th ere is much controversy surrounding the nature of the relation between fictional individuals and possible individuals. Some have argued that no fictional individual is a possible individual; others have argued that (some) fictional individuals just are (merely) possible individuals. In this paper, I off er further grounds for believing the theory of fictional individuals defended by Amie Thomasson,viz., Artifactualism, by arguing that her view best allows one to make sense of this puzzling relation. More specifically, when we realize that (...)
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  7. Jim Higginbotham (1994). Mass and Count Quantifiers. Linguistics and Philosophy 17 (5):447 - 480.
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  8. Avram Hiller (2013). Object-Dependence. Essays in Philosophy 14 (1):33-55.
    There has been much work on ontological dependence in recent literature. However, relatively little of it has been dedicated to the ways in which individual physical objects may depend on other distinct, non-overlapping objects. This paper gives several examples of such object-dependence and distinguishes between different types of it. The paper also introduces and refines the notion of an n-tet. N-tets (typically) occur when there are object-dependence relations between n objects. I claim that the identity (or, rather, what I call (...)
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  9. Aleksandar Kellenberg (2007). Metaphysische Untersuchungen. ontos.
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  10. Gordon Knight (2001). Idealism, Intentionality, and Nonexistent Objects. Journal of Philosophical Research 26:43-52.
    Idealist philosophers have traditionally tried to defend their views by appealing to the claim that nonmental reality is inconceivable. A standard response to this inconceivability claim is to try to show that it is only plausible if one blurs the fundamental distinction between consciousness and its object. I try to rehabilitate the idealistic argument by presenting an alternative formulation of the idealist’s basic inconceivability claim. Rather than suggesting that all objects are inconceivable apart from consciousness, I suggest that it is (...)
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  11. Henry Laycock (2005). 'Mass Nouns, Count Nouns and Non-Count Nouns'. In Alex Barber (ed.), Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics. Elsevier.
    I present a high-level account of the semantical distinction between count nouns and non-count nouns (concrete non-count nouns sometimes being dubbed 'mass nouns'). The basic idea is that count nouns are semantically either singular (one-one semantic correlation) or plural (one-many semantic correlation) and non-count nouns (one-much semantic correlation) are neither.
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  12. Victor F. Lenzen (1949). Concepts and Reality in Quantum Mechanics. Philosophy of Science 16 (4):279-286.
    A physical theory is a construction of thought which is founded on experience so as to constitute knowledge of the natural world. Propositions in physics are constituted of concepts which express the properties and processes of the physical world. For purposes of record and communication concepts are designated by the terms of a language, such as mathematical symbols, and philosophical discussion may be based on linguistic forms. In this essay, however, the element of discussion will be the concept as a (...)
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  13. Trenton Merricks (2001). Objects and Persons. Oxford University Press.
    Objects and Persons presents an original theory about what kinds of things exist. Trenton Merricks argues that there are no non-living inanimate macrophysical objects -- no statues or rocks or chairs or stars -- because they would have no causal role over and above the causal role of their microphysical parts. Humans do exist: we have non-redundant causal powers. Along the way, Merricks has interesting things to say about mental causation, free will, and various philosophical puzzles. Anyone working in metaphysics (...)
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  14. Matteo Morganti (2007). Resembling Particulars: What Nominalism? Metaphysica 8 (2):165-178.
    This paper examines a recent proposal for reviving so-called resemblance nominalism. It is argued that, although consistent, it naturally leads to trope theory upon examination for reasons having to do with the appeal of neutrality as regards certain non-trivial ontological theses.
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  15. Roy W. Perrett (2004). The Momentariness of Simples. Philosophy 79 (3):435-445.
    Many philosophers have supposed that while most of the objects in our immediate experience are composed of parts, at some point we must come down to those fundamental impartite objects out of which all partite things are composed: the metaphysical simples (usually conceived of as enduring, even eternal, entities). I consider what reason we have to believe that there really are simples, then we also have good reason to believe in their momentariness.
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  16. David H. Sanford (2003). Fusion Confusion. Analysis 63 (277):1–4.
    Two fusions can be in the same place at the same time. So long as a house made of Tinkertoys is intact, the fusion of all its Tinkertoys parts coincides with the fusion of it walls and its roof. If none of the Tinkertoys is destroyed, their fusion persists through the complete disassembly of the house. (So the house is not a fusion of its Tinkertoy parts.) The fusion of the walls and roof does not persist through the complete disassembly (...)
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  17. Thomas Sattig (2010). Compatibilism About Coincidence. Philosophical Review 119 (3):273-313.
    It seems to be a platitude of common sense that distinct ordinary objects cannot coincide, that they cannot fit into the same place or be composed of the same parts at the same time. The paradoxes of coincidence are instances of a breakdown of this platitude in light of counterexamples that are licensed by innocuous assumptions about particular kinds of ordinary object. Since both the anticoincidence principle and the assumptions driving the counterexamples flow from the folk conception of ordinary objects, (...)
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  18. Charles Sayward (1981). The Tree Theory and Isomorphism. Analysis 41 (1):6-11.
    A main thesis of Fred Sommers' type theory, is that an isomorphism exists between any natural language and the categories discriminated by that language. Here the author gives an explanation of what this claim comes to. And then it is argued that, so understood, the claim is incompatible with Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. Finally, it is argued against trying to salvage the isomorphism thesis by appealing to some other set theory.
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  19. Charles Sayward (1978). Are There Infinitely Many Sorts of Things? Philosophia 8 (1):17-30.
    An argument is given for Fred Sommers's thesis that the number of sorts of things, that is, the number of types or categories, discriminated by any natural language is always infinite.
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  20. Charles Sayward (1976). A Defense of Sommers. Philosophical Studies 29 (5):343 - 347.
    Jon Fjeld wrote a paper that he begins by nicely outlining why various criticisms of Fred Sommers theory of types and categories fail. Fjeld puts forth a criticism that avoids the problems with these other criticisms. But, it is argued, his criticism also fails.
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  21. Charles Sayward & Stephen H. Voss (1972). Absurdity and Spanning. Philosophia 2 (3):227-238.
    On the basis of observations J. J. C. Smart once made concerning the absurdity of sentences like 'The seat of the bed is hard', a plausible case can be made that there is little point to developing a theory of types, particularly one of the sort envisaged by Fred Sommers. The authors defend such theories against this objection by a partial elucidation of the distinctions between the concepts of spanning and predicability and between category mistakenness and absurdity in general. The (...)
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  22. Barry Smith (2001). Objects and Their Environments: From Aristotle to Ecological Ontology. In The Life and Motion of Socio-Economic Units. Taylor and Francis.
    What follows is a contribution to the theory of space and of spatial objects. It takes as its starting point the philosophical subfield of ontology, which can be defined as the science of what is: of the various types and categories of objects and relations in all realms of being. More specifically, it begins with ideas set forth by Aristotle in his Categories and Metaphysics, two works which constitute the first great contributions to ontological science. Because Aristotle’s ontological ideas were (...)
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  23. Barry Smith (1989). The Primacy of Place: An Investigation in Brentanian Ontology. Topoi 8 (1):43-51.
    What follows is an investigation of the ontology of Franz Brentano with special reference to Brentano's later and superficially somewhat peculiar doctrine to the effect that the substances of the material world are three dimensional places. Taken as a whole, Brentano's philosophy is marked by three, not obviously compatible, trait. In the first place, his work is rooted in the metaphysics of Aristotle, above all in Aristotle's substance/accident ontology and in the Aristotelian theory of categories. In the second place, Brentano (...)
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  24. Gabriel Uzquiano (2006). Receptacles. Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):427–451.
    This paper looks at the question of what regions of space are possibly exactly occupied by a material object.
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  25. Gabriel Uzquiano (2004). The Supreme Court and the Supreme Court Justices: A Metaphysical Puzzle. Noûs 38 (1):135–153.
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  26. Jessica Wilson M. (forthcoming). Essence and Dependence. In Mircea Dumitru (ed.), Metaphysics, Meaning and Modality: Themes from Kit Fine. Oxford.
    I first discuss Kit Fine's distinctive 'schema-based' approach to metaphysical theorizing, which aims to identify general principles accommodating any intelligible application of the notion(s), by attention to his accounts of essence and dependence. I then raise some specific concerns about the general principles Fine takes to schematically characterize these notions. In particular, I present various counterexamples to Fine's essence-based account of ontological dependence. The problem, roughly speaking, is that Fine supposes that an object's essence makes reference to just what it (...)
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  27. Katherine Yoshida, Mijke Rhemtulla & Athena Vouloumanos (2012). Exclusion Constraints Facilitate Statistical Word Learning. Cognitive Science 36 (5):933-947.
    The roles of linguistic, cognitive, and social-pragmatic processes in word learning are well established. If statistical mechanisms also contribute to word learning, they must interact with these processes; however, there exists little evidence for such mechanistic synergy. Adults use co-occurrence statistics to encode speech–object pairings with detailed sensitivity in stochastic learning environments (Vouloumanos, 2008). Here, we replicate this statistical work with nonspeech sounds and compare the results with the previous speech studies to examine whether exclusion constraints contribute equally to the (...)
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