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  1. Facundo M. Alonso (2009). Shared Intention, Reliance, and Interpersonal Obligations. Ethics 119 (3):444-475.
    Shared agency is of central importance in our lives in many ways. We enjoy engaging in certain joint activities with others. We also engage in joint activities to achieve complex goals. Current approaches propose that we understand shared agency in terms of the more basic phenomenon of shared intention. However, they have presented two antagonistic views about the nature of this phenomenon. Some have argued that shared intention should be understood as being primarily a structure of attitudes of individual participants (...)
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  2. Alfred Archer (forthcoming). Moral Obligation, Self-Interest and The Transitivity Problem. Utilitas.
    Is the relation ‘is a morally permissible alternative to’ transitive? The answer seems to be a straightforward yes. If Act B is a morally permissible alternative to Act A and Act C is a morally permissible alternative to B then how could C fail to be a morally permissible alternative to A? However, as both Dale Dorsey and Frances Kamm point out, there are cases where this transitivity appears problematic. My aim in this paper is to provide a solution to (...)
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  3. Alfred Archer (2014). Moral Rationalism Without Overridingness. Ratio 27 (1):100-114.
    Moral Rationalism is the view that if an act is morally required then it is what there is most reason to do. It is often assumed that the truth of Moral Rationalism is dependent on some version of The Overridingness Thesis, the view that moral reasons override nonmoral reasons. However, as Douglas Portmore has pointed out, the two can come apart; we can accept Moral Rationalism without accepting any version of The Overridingness Thesis. Nevertheless, The Overridingness Thesis serves as one (...)
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  4. Alfred Archer (2014). Sebastian Schleidgen (Ed.): Should We Act Morally? Essays on Overridingness. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (2):349-350.
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  5. Carla Bagnoli (2000). Value in the Guise of Regret. Philosophical Explorations 3 (2):169 – 187.
    According to a widely accepted philosophical model, agent-regret is practically significant and appropriate when the agent committed a mistake, or she faced a conflict of obligations. I argue that this account misunderstands moral phenomenology because it does not adequately characterize the object of agent-regret. I suggest that the object of agent-regret should be defined in terms of valuable unchosen alternatives supported by reasons. This model captures the phenomenological varieties of regret and explains its practical significance for the agent. My contention (...)
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  6. Edward G. Ballard (1972). On the Phenomenon of Obligation. Tulane Studies in Philosophy 21:139-157.
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  7. Chris Beckett (2007). The Reality Principle: Realism as an Ethical Obligation. Ethics and Social Welfare 1 (3):269-281.
    Although a ?realist? stance is sometimes contrasted with a ?principled? one, this article argues that realism is, of itself, an important ethical principle. Acknowledging the problems that exist in defining ?reality?, and the fact that the nature of reality is contested, the article nevertheless insists on an ?out there? reality. It asserts that the existence of this external reality is, in practice, generally accepted, and indeed must be accepted if we are to make the important distinction between truth and falsehood. (...)
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  8. Camillo Bica (2007). Opposing a War and/or Supporting the Warrior: The Moral Obligations of Citizens in an Immoral War. Journal of Social Philosophy 38 (4):627–643.
  9. Gunnar Björnsson (2014). Essentially Shared Obligations. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 38 (1):103-120.
    This paper lists a number of puzzles for shared obligations – puzzles about the role of individual influence, individual reasons to contribute towards fulfilling the obligation, about what makes someone a member of a group sharing an obligation, and the relation between agency and obligation – and proposes to solve them based on a general analysis of obligations. On the resulting view, shared obligations do not presuppose joint agency.
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  10. Andrew Botterell (2008). In Defence of Infringement. Law and Philosophy 27 (3):269-292.
    According to a familiar and influential view, rights are not absolute. To the contrary, they can sometimes be permissibly interfered with. I find such a view of rights attractive. John Oberdiek thinks otherwise. In a recent paper in this journal, Oberdiek has argued that any account of rights that incorporates a distinction between infringing and violating a right is indefensible. My aim in this paper is to argue that Oberdiek's worries are misplaced. The paper proceeds as follows. After some terminological (...)
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  11. Harry Brighouse (2013). The Altruism Puzzle: The Obligation to Sacrifice One's Life. Journal of Social Philosophy 44 (2):115-117.
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  12. Wesley Buckwalter & John Turri (2015). Inability and Obligation in Moral Judgment. PLoS ONE 10 (8).
    It is often thought that judgments about what we ought to do are limited by judgments about what we can do, or that “ought implies can.” We conducted eight experiments to test the link between a range of moral requirements and abilities in ordinary moral evaluations. Moral obligations were repeatedly attributed in tandem with inability, regardless of the type (Experiments 1–3), temporal duration (Experiment 5), or scope (Experiment 6) of inability. This pattern was consistently observed using a variety of moral (...)
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  13. Vanessa Carbonell (2015). Sacrifices of Self. Journal of Ethics 19 (1):53-72.
    We emerge from certain activities with an altered sense of self. Whether returning from a warzone or from an experience as common as caring for an aging parent, one might remark, “I’m not the same person I was.” I argue that such transformations are relevant to debates about what morality requires of us. To undergo an alteration in one’s self is to make a special kind of sacrifice, a sacrifice of self. Since projects can be more or less morally obligatory (...)
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  14. Vanessa Carbonell (2013). What We Know and What We Owe. Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 3.
    Knowledge is necessary for certain moral obligations. In learning something new, one sometimes triggers a moral obligation. This paper argues that the existence of these knowledge-based obligations poses a problem for the view that we are not only free to choose the course of our own lives, including our careers and personal projects, but also free to change our minds and quit at any time to pursue something else. For if our choice of life path has generated knowledge-based moral obligations (...)
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  15. Vladimir Chituc, Paul Henne, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Felipe De Brigard (2016). Blame, Not Ability, Impacts Moral “Ought” Judgments for Impossible Actions: Toward an Empirical Refutation of “Ought” Implies “Can”. Cognition 150:20-25.
    Recently, psychologists have explored moral concepts including obligation, blame, and ability. While little empirical work has studied the relationships among these concepts, philosophers have widely assumed such a relationship in the principle that “ought” implies “can,” which states that if someone ought to do something, then they must be able to do it. The cognitive underpinnings of these concepts are tested in the three experiments reported here. In Experiment 1, most participants judge that an agent ought to keep a promise (...)
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  16. John Christman (2013). Social Practical Identities and the Strength of Obligation. Journal of Social Philosophy 44 (2):121-123.
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  17. Michael Clark (1978). The Meritorious And The Mandatory. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 79:23-33.
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  18. Stephen Darwall (2012). Bi-Polar Obligation. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 7:333.
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  19. Stephen Darwall (2010). Moral Obligation: Form and Substance. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (1):31-46.
    Beginning from an analysis of moral obligation's form that I defend in The Second-Person Standpoint as what we are answerable for as beings with the necessary capacities to enter into relations of mutual accountability, I argue that this analysis has implications for moral obligation's substance. Given what it is to take responsibility for oneself and hold oneself answerable, I argue, it follows that if there are any moral obligations at all, then there must exist a basic pro tanto obligation not (...)
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  20. Stephen Darwall (2007). Moral Obligation and Accountability. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Clarendon Press
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  21. Brendan Dill & Stephen Darwall (2014). Moral Psychology as Accountability. In Justin D'Arms Daniel Jacobson (ed.), Moral Psychology and Human Agency: Philosophical Essays on the Science of Ethics. Oxford University Press 40-83.
    Recent work in moral philosophy has emphasized the foundational role played by interpersonal accountability in the analysis of moral concepts such as moral right and wrong, moral obligation and duty, blameworthiness, and moral responsibility (Darwall 2006; 2013a; 2013b). Extending this framework to the field of moral psychology, we hypothesize that our moral attitudes, emotions, and motives are also best understood as based in accountability. Drawing on a large body of empirical evidence, we argue that the implicit aim of the central (...)
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  22. Terence Rajivan Edward (2015). Unintentional Consent. Kritike: An Online Journal of Philosophy 9 (1):86-95.
    Some political philosophers have judged that it is absurd to think that there can be unintentional consent. In this paper, I present an example of unintentional consent, which I refer to as the adapted boardroom example. I consider reasons for denying that this is an example of unintentional consent, but find that these reasons are unconvincing.
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  23. Ovadia Ezra (2007). Moral Obligations and Immoral Wars: A Comment on Bica. Journal of Social Philosophy 38 (4):644–653.
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  24. M. Oreste Fiocco (2012). Is There a Right to Respect? Utilitas 24 (04):502-524.
    Many moral philosophers assume that a person is entitled to respect; this suggests that there is a right to respect. I argue, however, that there is no such right. There can be no right to respect because of what respect is, in conjunction with what a right demands and certain limitations of human agency. In this paper, I first examine the nature and ontological basis of rights. I next consider the notion of respect in general; I adduce several varieties of (...)
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  25. Danny Frederick (2010). Why Universal Welfare Rights Are Impossible and What It Means. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 9 (4):428-445.
    Cranston argued that scarcity makes universal welfare rights impossible. After showing that this argument cannot be avoided by denying scarcity, I consider four challenges to the argument which accept the possibility of conflicts between the duties implied by rights. The first denies the agglomeration principle; the second embraces conflicts of duties; the third affirms the violability of all rights-based duties; and the fourth denies that duties to compensate are overriding. I argue that all four challenges to the scarcity argument are (...)
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  26. Kyle Fruh (2014). Moral Heroism and the Requirement Claim. Southwest Philosophy Review 30 (1):93-104.
    Acts of moral heroism are often described by heroes as having been in some sense or another required. Here I elaborate two rival strategies for accounting for what I call the requirement claim. The first, originating with J.O. Urmson, attempts to explain away the phenomenon. The second and more popular among moralists is to treat the requirement claim as a moment of moral insight and to make sense of it in terms of moral duty. I argue that both of these (...)
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  27. Helmut P. Gaisbauer, Gottfried Schweiger & Clemens Sedmak (2013). Ethical Obligations of Wealthy People: Progressive Taxation and the Financial Crisis. Ethics and Social Welfare 7 (2):141--154.
    The Financial Crisis in Europe puts pressure on welfare states and its tax systems as well as on considerations of social justice. In this paper, we would like to explore the status of the idea of progressive taxation and its justification (especially the ‘ability-to-pay’ principle) in times of a financial crisis. We will discuss it within a social justice framework following David Miller—using the principles of (i) need, (ii) merit, and (iii) equality. We will conclude that progressive taxation can be (...)
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  28. Margaret Gilbert (1999). Joint Commitment and Obligation. Utilitas 11:143-163.
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  29. Margaret P. Gilbert (2009). Obligation and Joint Commitment. Utilitas 11 (2):143.
    I argue that obligations of an important type inhere in what I call 'joint commitments'. I propose a joint commitment account of everyday agreements. This could explain why some philosophers believe that we know of the obligating nature of agreements a priori. I compare and contrast obligations of joint commitment with obligations in the relatively narrow sense recommended by H. L. A. Hart, a recommendation that has been influential. Some central contexts in which Hart takes there to be obligations in (...)
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  30. Sven Ove Hansson (2010). Objective or Subjective 'Ought'? Utilitas 22 (1):33-35.
    The prescriptive has both an objective and a subjective interpretation. In the objective sense, what one ought to do depends on what is actually true. In the subjective sense it depends on what one believes to be true. Ordinary usage seems to vacillate between these two interpretations. An example (the indecisive terrorist) is used to show that a subjective ought statement can have a determinate truth-value in situations where the corresponding objective ought statement has no truth-value, not even an unknowable (...)
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  31. John C. Harsanyi (1980). Rule Utilitarianism, Rights, Obligations and the Theory of Rational Behavior. Theory and Decision 12 (2):115-133.
  32. Violetta Igneski (2008). Defending Limits on the Sacrifices We Ought to Make for Others. Utilitas 20 (4):424-446.
    How much are we morally required to do to aid others? After articulating some of the main contributions to this debate, I defend the position that we are sometimes morally permitted to spend our time and resources satisfying our own interests and needs rather than using them to aid others who are in desperate need. I argue that the duty to aid the needy should not always take priority over every other end we have. Whatever else we value, we most (...)
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  33. Shelly Kagan (1984). Does Consequentialism Demand Too Much? Recent Work on the Limits of Obligation. Philosophy and Public Affairs 13 (3):239-254.
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  34. Daniel Koltonski (forthcoming). A Good Friend Will Help You Move a Body: Friendship and the Problem of Moral Disagreement. Philosophical Review 125 (4).
    On the shared-­ends account of close friendship, proper care for a friend as an agent requires seeing yourself as having important reasons to accommodate and promote the friend’s valuable ends for her own sake. However, that friends share ends doesn't inoculate them against disagreements about how to pursue those ends. This paper defends the claim that, in certain circumstances of reasonable disagreement, proper care for a friend as a practical and moral agent sometimes requires allowing her judgment to decide what (...)
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  35. Miguel Angel Carrillo Lacayo (2008). Let the Beggars Die. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 3:5-10.
    All around the world, but especially in the Third World, we are confronted by beggars who appeal to our sympathy. Most of us have no principled way to deal with the situation. Should we give to them? How much? To what purpose? We are inclined to let our momentary feelings dictate our response. Although applied ethicists have been tackling the general question of poverty in the world and what we ought to do, if anything, to alleviate it, nobody seems to (...)
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  36. Sadeq Larijani (2007). Rational and Moral Obligations. Topoi 26 (2):231-245.
    An analysis and criticism of the views of Isfahani, Ha’iri, Tabataba’i and Misbah Yazdi on rational and moral obligations is presented. Each of these authors has offered a different theory about the source of the concept of such obligations, and the relation of obligations to prescriptive statements. The author follows his criticisms of these views with his own theory of rational and moral obligations, according to which obligations are realities that the mind grasps through intuitions on the basis of which (...)
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  37. Holly Lawford-Smith (forthcoming). Climate Matters Pro Tanto, Does It Matter All-Things-Considered? Midwest Studies in Philosophy.
    In Climate Matters (2012), John Broome argues that individuals have private duties to offset all emissions for which they are causally responsible, grounded in the general moral injunction against doing harm. Emissions do harm, therefore they must be neutralized. I argue that individuals' private duties to offset emissions cannot be grounded in a duty to do no harm, because there can be no such general duty. It is virtually impossible in our current social context―for those in developed countries at least―to (...)
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  38. Holly Lawford-Smith (2015). What 'We'? Journal of Social Ontology 1 (2):225-250.
    The objective of this paper is to explain why certain authors - both popular and academic - are making a mistake when they attribute obligations to uncoordinated groups of persons, and to argue that it is particularly unhelpful to make this mistake given the prevalence of individuals faced with the difficult question of what morality requires of them in a situation in which there's a good they can bring about together with others, but not alone. I'll defend two alternatives to (...)
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  39. Mark LeBar (2013). The Value of Living Well. OUP Usa.
    In this book, Mark LeBar develops Virtue Eudaimonism, which brings the philosophy of the ancient Greeks to bear on contemporary problems in metaethics, especially the metaphysics of norms and the nature of practical rationality.
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  40. Judith Lichtenberg (2010). Oughts and Cans. Philosophical Topics 38 (1):123-142.
    Many philosophers argue that reasonably well-off people have very demanding moral obligations to assist those living in dire poverty. I explore the relevance of demandingness to determining moral obligation, challenging the view that “morality demands what it demands” and that if we cannot live up to its demands that’s our problem, not morality’s. I argue that not only for practical reasons but also for moral-theoretical ones, the language of duty, obligation, and requirement may not be well-suited to express the nature (...)
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  41. Bryan Lueck (forthcoming). A Fact, As It Were: Obligation, Indifference, and the Question of Ethics. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy.
    According to Immanuel Kant, the objective validity of obligation is given as a fact of reason, which forces itself upon us and which requires no deduction of the kind that he had provided for the categories in the Critique of Pure Reason. This fact grounds a moral philosophy that treats obligation as a good that trumps all others and that presents the moral subject as radically responsible, singled out by an imperatival address. Based on conceptions of indifference and facticity that (...)
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  42. Bryan Lueck (2014). Exposition and Obligation: A Serresian Account of Moral Sensitivity. Symposium: The Canadian Journal of Continental Philosophy 18 (1):176-193.
    In The Troubadour of Knowledge, Michel Serres demonstrates, by means of an extended discussion of learning, that our capacity to adopt a position presupposes a kind of disorienting exposure to a dimension of pure possibility that both subtends and destabilizes that position. In this paper I trace out the implications of this insight for our understanding of obligation, especially as it is articulated in the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant. Specifically, I argue that obligation is given along with a dimension (...)
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  43. Tony Manela (forthcoming). Obligations of Gratitude and Correlative Rights. Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 5.
    This article investigates a puzzle about gratitude—the proper response, in a beneficiary, to an act of benevolence from a benefactor. The puzzle arises from three platitudes about gratitude: 1) the beneficiary has certain obligations of gratitude; 2) these obligations are owed to the benefactor; and 3) the benefactor has no right to the fulfillment of these obligations. These platitudes suggest that gratitude is a counterexample to the “correlativity thesis” in the moral domain: the claim that strict moral obligations correlate to (...)
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  44. Tony Manela (2015). Gratitude. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2015 (Spring).
    Gratitude is the proper or called-for response in a beneficiary to benefits or beneficence from a benefactor. It is a topic of interest in normative ethics, moral psychology, and political philosophy, and may have implications for metaethics as well. Despite its commonness in everyday life, there is substantive disagreement among philosophers over the nature of gratitude and its connection to other philosophical concepts. The sections of this article address five areas of debate about what gratitude is, when it is called (...)
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  45. Simon Căbulea May (2012). Moral Status and the Direction of Duties. Ethics 123 (1):113-128.
    Gopal Sreenivasan’s “hybrid theory” states that a moral duty is directed toward an individual because her interests justify the assignment of control over the duty. An alternative “plain theory” states that the individual’s interests justify the duty itself. I argue that a strong moral status constraint explains Sreenivasan’s instrumentalization objection to a Razian plain theory but that his own model violates this constraint. I suggest how both approaches can be reformulated to satisfy the constraint, and I argue that a reformulated (...)
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  46. Paul McNamara (1996). Making Room for Going Beyond the Call. Mind 105 (419):415-450.
    In the latter half of this century, there have been two mostly separate threads within ethical theory, one on 'superogation', one on 'common-sense morality'. I bring these threads together by systematically reflecting on doing more than one has to do. A rich and coherent set of concepts at the core of common-sense morality is identified, along with various logical connections between these core concepts. Various issues in common-sense morality emerge naturally, as does a demonstrably productive definition of doing more than (...)
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  47. Ariel Meirav, Meshi Ori, Avital Pilpel & Daniel Statman (2010). Moral Demands, Moral Pragmatics, and Being Good. Utilitas 22 (3).
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  48. Gregory Mellema (1993). Quasi-Obligation and the Failure to Be Virtuous. Journal of Social Philosophy 24 (2):176-185.
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  49. John Oberdiek (2008). Specifying Rights Out of Necessity. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 28 (1):19.
    It is the purpose of this article to make the positive case for an under-appreciated conception of rights: specified rights. In contrast to rights conceived generally, a specified right can stand against different behaviour in different circumstances, so that what conflicts with a right in one context may not conflict with it in another. The specified conception of rights thus combines into a single inquiry the two questions that must be answered in invoking the general conception of rights, identifying the (...)
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  50. Ii Hart On Obligations (1999). Obligation and Joint Commitment. Utilitas 11 (2).
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