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  1. Facundo M. Alonso (2009). Shared Intention, Reliance, and Interpersonal Obligations. Ethics 119 (3):444-475.
    Shared agency is of central importance in our lives in many ways. We enjoy engaging in certain joint activities with others. We also engage in joint activities to achieve complex goals. Current approaches propose that we understand shared agency in terms of the more basic phenomenon of shared intention. However, they have presented two antagonistic views about the nature of this phenomenon. Some have argued that shared intention should be understood as being primarily a structure of attitudes of individual participants (...)
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  2. Alfred Archer (2014). Moral Rationalism Without Overridingness. Ratio 27 (1):100-114.
    Moral Rationalism is the view that if an act is morally required then it is what there is most reason to do. It is often assumed that the truth of Moral Rationalism is dependent on some version of The Overridingness Thesis, the view that moral reasons override nonmoral reasons. However, as Douglas Portmore has pointed out, the two can come apart; we can accept Moral Rationalism without accepting any version of The Overridingness Thesis. Nevertheless, The Overridingness Thesis serves as one (...)
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  3. Alfred Archer (2014). Sebastian Schleidgen (Ed.): Should We Act Morally? Essays on Overridingness. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (2):349-350.
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  4. Carla Bagnoli (2000). Value in the Guise of Regret. Philosophical Explorations 3 (2):169 – 187.
    According to a widely accepted philosophical model, agent-regret is practically significant and appropriate when the agent committed a mistake, or she faced a conflict of obligations. I argue that this account misunderstands moral phenomenology because it does not adequately characterize the object of agent-regret. I suggest that the object of agent-regret should be defined in terms of valuable unchosen alternatives supported by reasons. This model captures the phenomenological varieties of regret and explains its practical significance for the agent. My contention (...)
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  5. Edward G. Ballard (1972). On the Phenomenon of Obligation. Tulane Studies in Philosophy 21:139-157.
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  6. Chris Beckett (2007). The Reality Principle: Realism as an Ethical Obligation. Ethics and Social Welfare 1 (3):269-281.
    Although a ?realist? stance is sometimes contrasted with a ?principled? one, this article argues that realism is, of itself, an important ethical principle. Acknowledging the problems that exist in defining ?reality?, and the fact that the nature of reality is contested, the article nevertheless insists on an ?out there? reality. It asserts that the existence of this external reality is, in practice, generally accepted, and indeed must be accepted if we are to make the important distinction between truth and falsehood. (...)
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  7. Camillo Bica (2007). Opposing a War and/or Supporting the Warrior: The Moral Obligations of Citizens in an Immoral War. Journal of Social Philosophy 38 (4):627–643.
  8. Gunnar Björnsson (2014). Essentially Shared Obligations. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 38 (1):103-120.
    This paper lists a number of puzzles for shared obligations – puzzles about the role of individual influence, individual reasons to contribute towards fulfilling the obligation, about what makes someone a member of a group sharing an obligation, and the relation between agency and obligation – and proposes to solve them based on a general analysis of obligations. On the resulting view, shared obligations do not presuppose joint agency.
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  9. Andrew Botterell (2008). In Defence of Infringement. Law and Philosophy 27 (3):269-292.
    According to a familiar and influential view, rights are not absolute. To the contrary, they can sometimes be permissibly interfered with. I find such a view of rights attractive. John Oberdiek thinks otherwise. In a recent paper in this journal, Oberdiek has argued that any account of rights that incorporates a distinction between infringing and violating a right is indefensible. My aim in this paper is to argue that Oberdiek's worries are misplaced. The paper proceeds as follows. After some terminological (...)
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  10. Harry Brighouse (2013). The Altruism Puzzle: The Obligation to Sacrifice One's Life. Journal of Social Philosophy 44 (2):115-117.
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  11. Vanessa Carbonell (2013). What We Know and What We Owe. Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 3.
    Knowledge is necessary for certain moral obligations. In learning something new, one sometimes triggers a moral obligation. This paper argues that the existence of these knowledge-based obligations poses a problem for the view that we are not only free to choose the course of our own lives, including our careers and personal projects, but also free to change our minds and quit at any time to pursue something else. For if our choice of life path has generated knowledge-based moral obligations (...)
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  12. John Christman (2013). Social Practical Identities and the Strength of Obligation. Journal of Social Philosophy 44 (2):121-123.
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  13. Michael Clark (1978). The Meritorious And The Mandatory. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 79:23-33.
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  14. Stephen Darwall (2012). Bi-Polar Obligation. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 7:333.
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  15. Stephen Darwall (2010). Moral Obligation: Form and Substance. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (1):31-46.
    Beginning from an analysis of moral obligation's form that I defend in The Second-Person Standpoint as what we are answerable for as beings with the necessary capacities to enter into relations of mutual accountability, I argue that this analysis has implications for moral obligation's substance. Given what it is to take responsibility for oneself and hold oneself answerable, I argue, it follows that if there are any moral obligations at all, then there must exist a basic pro tanto obligation not (...)
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  16. Stephen Darwall (2007). Moral Obligation and Accountability. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume Ii. Clarendon Press.
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  17. Brendan Dill & Stephen Darwall (2014). Moral Psychology as Accountability. In Justin D'Arms Daniel Jacobson (ed.), Moral Psychology and Human Agency: Philosophical Essays on the Science of Ethics. Oxford University Press. 40-83.
    Recent work in moral philosophy has emphasized the foundational role played by interpersonal accountability in the analysis of moral concepts such as moral right and wrong, moral obligation and duty, blameworthiness, and moral responsibility (Darwall 2006; 2013a; 2013b). Extending this framework to the field of moral psychology, we hypothesize that our moral attitudes, emotions, and motives are also best understood as based in accountability. Drawing on a large body of empirical evidence, we argue that the implicit aim of the central (...)
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  18. Ovadia Ezra (2007). Moral Obligations and Immoral Wars: A Comment on Bica. Journal of Social Philosophy 38 (4):644–653.
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  19. M. Oreste Fiocco (2012). Is There a Right to Respect? Utilitas 24 (04):502-524.
    Many moral philosophers assume that a person is entitled to respect; this suggests that there is a right to respect. I argue, however, that there is no such right. There can be no right to respect because of what respect is, in conjunction with what a right demands and certain limitations of human agency. In this paper, I first examine the nature and ontological basis of rights. I next consider the notion of respect in general; I adduce several varieties of (...)
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  20. Danny Frederick (2010). Why Universal Welfare Rights Are Impossible and What It Means. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 9 (4):428-445.
    Cranston argued that scarcity makes universal welfare rights impossible. After showing that this argument cannot be avoided by denying scarcity, I consider four challenges to the argument which accept the possibility of conflicts between the duties implied by rights. The first denies the agglomeration principle; the second embraces conflicts of duties; the third affirms the violability of all rights-based duties; and the fourth denies that duties to compensate are overriding. I argue that all four challenges to the scarcity argument are (...)
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  21. Helmut P. Gaisbauer, Gottfried Schweiger & Clemens Sedmak (2013). Ethical Obligations of Wealthy People: Progressive Taxation and the Financial Crisis. Ethics and Social Welfare 7 (2):141--154.
    The Financial Crisis in Europe puts pressure on welfare states and its tax systems as well as on considerations of social justice. In this paper, we would like to explore the status of the idea of progressive taxation and its justification (especially the ‘ability-to-pay’ principle) in times of a financial crisis. We will discuss it within a social justice framework following David Miller—using the principles of (i) need, (ii) merit, and (iii) equality. We will conclude that progressive taxation can be (...)
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  22. Margaret Gilbert (1999). Considerations on Obligation. Utilitas 11:143-163.
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  23. Margaret P. Gilbert (2009). Obligation and Joint Commitment. Utilitas 11 (02):143-.
    I argue that obligations of an important type inhere in what I call 'joint commitments'. I propose a joint commitment account of everyday agreements. This could explain why some philosophers believe that we know of the obligating nature of agreements a priori. I compare and contrast obligations of joint commitment with obligations in the relatively narrow sense recommended by H. L. A. Hart, a recommendation that has been influential. Some central contexts in which Hart takes there to be obligations in (...)
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  24. Sven Ove Hansson (2010). Objective or Subjective 'Ought'? Utilitas 22 (1):33-35.
    The prescriptive has both an objective and a subjective interpretation. In the objective sense, what one ought to do depends on what is actually true. In the subjective sense it depends on what one believes to be true. Ordinary usage seems to vacillate between these two interpretations. An example (the indecisive terrorist) is used to show that a subjective ought statement can have a determinate truth-value in situations where the corresponding objective ought statement has no truth-value, not even an unknowable (...)
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  25. John C. Harsanyi (1980). Rule Utilitarianism, Rights, Obligations and the Theory of Rational Behavior. Theory and Decision 12 (2):115-133.
  26. Violetta Igneski (2008). Defending Limits on the Sacrifices We Ought to Make for Others. Utilitas 20 (4):424-446.
    How much are we morally required to do to aid others? After articulating some of the main contributions to this debate, I defend the position that we are sometimes morally permitted to spend our time and resources satisfying our own interests and needs rather than using them to aid others who are in desperate need. I argue that the duty to aid the needy should not always take priority over every other end we have. Whatever else we value, we most (...)
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  27. Shelly Kagan (1984). Does Consequentialism Demand Too Much? Recent Work on the Limits of Obligation. Philosophy and Public Affairs 13 (3):239-254.
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  28. Miguel Angel Carrillo Lacayo (2008). Let the Beggars Die. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 3:5-10.
    All around the world, but especially in the Third World, we are confronted by beggars who appeal to our sympathy. Most of us have no principled way to deal with the situation. Should we give to them? How much? To what purpose? We are inclined to let our momentary feelings dictate our response. Although applied ethicists have been tackling the general question of poverty in the world and what we ought to do, if anything, to alleviate it, nobody seems to (...)
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  29. Judith Lichtenberg (2010). Oughts and Cans. Philosophical Topics 38 (1):123-142.
    Many philosophers argue that reasonably well-off people have very demanding moral obligations to assist those living in dire poverty. I explore the relevance of demandingness to determining moral obligation, challenging the view that “morality demands what it demands” and that if we cannot live up to its demands that’s our problem, not morality’s. I argue that not only for practical reasons but also for moral-theoretical ones, the language of duty, obligation, and requirement may not be well-suited to express the nature (...)
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  30. Simon Căbulea May (2012). Moral Status and the Direction of Duties. Ethics 123 (1):113-128.
    Gopal Sreenivasan’s “hybrid theory” states that a moral duty is directed toward an individual because her interests justify the assignment of control over the duty. An alternative “plain theory” states that the individual’s interests justify the duty itself. I argue that a strong moral status constraint explains Sreenivasan’s instrumentalization objection to a Razian plain theory but that his own model violates this constraint. I suggest how both approaches can be reformulated to satisfy the constraint, and I argue that a reformulated (...)
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  31. Paul McNamara (1996). Making Room for Going Beyond the Call. Mind 105 (419):415-450.
    In the latter half of this century, there have been two mostly separate <span class='Hi'>threads</span> within ethical theory, one on 'superogation', one on 'common-sense morality'. I bring these <span class='Hi'>threads</span> together by systematically reflecting on doing more than one has to do. A rich and coherent set of concepts at the core of common-sense morality is identified, along with various logical connections between these core concepts. Various issues in common-sense morality emerge naturally, as does a demonstrably productive definition of doing (...)
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  32. Ariel Meirav, Meshi Ori, Avital Pilpel & Daniel Statman (2010). Moral Demands, Moral Pragmatics, and Being Good. Utilitas 22 (3).
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  33. Gregory Mellema (1993). Quasi-Obligation and the Failure to Be Virtuous. Journal of Social Philosophy 24 (2):176-185.
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  34. John Oberdiek (2008). Specifying Rights Out of Necessity. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 28 (1):19.
    It is the purpose of this article to make the positive case for an under-appreciated conception of rights: specified rights. In contrast to rights conceived generally, a specified right can stand against different behaviour in different circumstances, so that what conflicts with a right in one context may not conflict with it in another. The specified conception of rights thus combines into a single inquiry the two questions that must be answered in invoking the general conception of rights, identifying the (...)
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  35. Ii Hart On Obligations (1999). Obligation and Joint Commitment. Utilitas 11 (2).
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  36. Francesco Orsi (2008). Obligations of Nearness. Journal of Value Inquiry 42 (1):1-21.
    Frances Kamm argues that physical distance is per se relevant to our duty to give aid to strangers.
    Her methods, however, fail to bring into light the relevance per se of distance. To understand the claim that
    distance is per se morally relevant, it is helpful to use distinctions devised by Jonathan Dancy among
    different roles a feature may play in the explanation of moral reasons, yielding thus different senses of
    relevance. A feature can directly count in favor of an action, enable another feature (...)
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  37. David Owens (2012). The Value of Duty. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 86 (1):199-215.
    The obligations we owe to those with whom we share a valuable relationship (like friendship) cannot be reduced to the obligations we owe to others simply as fellow persons (e.g. the duty to reciprocate benefits received). Wallace suggests that this is because such valuable relationships are loving relationships. I instead propose that it is because, unlike general moral obligations, such valuable relationships (and their constitutive obligations) serve our normative interests. Part of what makes friendship good for us is that it (...)
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  38. Thomas Pink (2007). Normativity and Reason. Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (3):406-431.
    Moral obligation is a demand of reason—a demanding kind of rational justification. How to understand this rational demand? Much recent philosophy, as in the work of Scanlon, takes obligatoriness to be a reason-giving feature of an action. But the paper argues that moral obligatoriness should instead be understood as a mode of justificatory support—as a distinctive justificatory force of demand. The paper argues that this second model of obligation, the Force model, was central to the natural law tradition in ethics, (...)
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  39. Soran Reader & Gillian Brock (2004). Needs, Moral Demands and Moral Theory. Utilitas 16 (3):251-266.
    In this article we argue that the concept of need is as vital for moral theory as it is for moral life. In II we analyse need and its normativity in public and private moral practice. In III we describe simple cases which exemplify the moral demandingness of needs, and argue that the significance of simple cases for moral theory is obscured by the emphasis in moral philosophy on unusual cases. In IV we argue that moral theories are inadequate if (...)
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  40. Massimo Renzo (2014). Fairness, Self-Deception and Political Obligation. Philosophical Studies 169 (3):467-488.
    I offer a new account of fair-play obligations for non-excludable benefits received from the state. Firstly, I argue that non-acceptance of these benefits frees recipients of fairness obligations only when a counterfactual condition is met; i.e. when non-acceptance would hold up in the closest possible world in which recipients do not hold motivationally-biased beliefs triggered by a desire to free-ride. Secondly, I argue that because of common mechanisms of self-deception there will be recipients who reject these benefits without meeting the (...)
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  41. Luke Robinson (2014). Obligating Reasons, Moral Laws, and Moral Dispositions. Journal of Moral Philosophy 11 (1):1-34.
  42. Luke Robinson (2013). A Dispositional Account of Conflicts of Obligation. Noûs 47 (2):203-228.
    I address a question in moral metaphysics: How are conflicts between moral obligations possible? I begin by explaining why we cannot give a satisfactory answer to this question simply by positing that such conflicts are conflicts between rules, principles, or reasons. I then develop and defend the “Dispositional Account,” which posits that conflicts between moral obligations are conflicts between the manifestations of obligating dispositions (obligating powers, capacities, etc.), just as conflicts between physical forces are conflicts between the manifestations of (certain) (...)
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  43. Luke Robinson (2011). Moral Principles As Moral Dispositions. Philosophical Studies 156 (2):289-309.
    What are moral principles? In particular, what are moral principles of the sort that (if they exist) ground moral obligations or—at the very least—particular moral truths? I argue that we can fruitfully conceive of such principles as real, irreducibly dispositional properties of individual persons (agents and patients) that are responsible for and thereby explain the moral properties of (e.g.) agents and actions. Such moral dispositions (or moral powers) are apt to be the metaphysical grounds of moral obligations and of particular (...)
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  44. Frederick Rosen (1973). Obligation and Friendship in Plato's Crito. Political Theory 1 (3):307-316.
  45. Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, On the Relevance of Ignorance to the Demands of Morality.
    In Morality, Bernard Gert argues that the fundamental demands of morality are well articulated by ten distinct, and relatively simple, rules. These rules, he holds, are such that any person, no matter what her circumstances or interests, would be rational in accepting, and guiding her choices by, them. The rules themselves are comfortably familiar (e.g. “Do not kill,” “Do not deceive,” “Keep your promises”) and sit well as intuitively plausible. Yet the rules are not, Gert argues, to be accepted merely (...)
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  46. Marco F. H. Schmidt, Hannes Rakoczy & Michael Tomasello (2011). Young Children Attribute Normativity to Novel Actions Without Pedagogy or Normative Language. Developmental Science 14 (3):530-539.
    Young children interpret some acts performed by adults as normatively governed, that is, as capable of being performed either rightly or wrongly. In previous experiments, children have made this interpretation when adults introduced them to novel acts with normative language (e.g. ‘this is the way it goes’), along with pedagogical cues signaling culturally important information, and with social-pragmatic marking that this action is a token of a familiar type. In the current experiment, we exposed children to novel actions with no (...)
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  47. Anne Schwenkenbecher (2014). Joint Moral Duties. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 38 (1):58-74.
  48. Anne Schwenkenbecher (2013). Joint Duties and Global Moral Obligations. Ratio 26 (3):310-328.
    In recent decades, concepts of group agency and the morality of groups have increasingly been discussed by philosophers. Notions of collective or joint duties have been invoked especially in the debates on global justice, world poverty and climate change. This paper enquires into the possibility and potential nature of moral duties individuals in unstructured groups may hold together. It distinguishes between group agents and groups of people which – while not constituting a collective agent – are nonetheless capable of performing (...)
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  49. Christian Seidel (2008). Stephen Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint. [REVIEW] Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 62 (4):609-614.
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  50. Theodore Sider (1995). Sorensen on Unknowable Obligations. Utilitas 7 (02):273-279.
    is an important principle, worthy of serious scrutiny. Its truth or falsity bears on the question of whether moral rightness, obligatoriness, etc., are a matter of factors “internal” to an agent (such as motives and beliefs), or whether “external” factors (such as consequences) are relevant to determining the moral normative status of acts. Moreover, Access enjoys considerable intuitive support. If I destroy Greensboro in professor Sorensen’s example by pushing the wrong button, I seem to have a good excuse to give (...)
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