This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Siblings:See also:
51 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 51
  1. Lauren Ashwell (2013). Review of Transparent Minds: A Study of Self-Knowledge, by Jordi Fernandez. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 8.
  2. David James Barnett (forthcoming). Inferential Justification and the Transparency of Belief. Noûs.
    This paper critically examines currently influential transparency accounts of our knowledge of our own beliefs that say that self-ascriptions of belief typically are arrived at by “looking outward” onto the world. For example, one version of the transparency account says that one self-ascribes beliefs via an inference from a premise to the conclusion that one believes that premise. This rule of inference reliably yields accurate self-ascriptions because you cannot infer a conclusion from a premise without believing the premise, and so (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. J. L. Bermudez (2013). The Opacity of Mind: An Integrative Theory of Self-Knowledge, by Peter Carruthers. Mind 122 (485):263-266.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Reinaldo J. Bernal (2014). Le fossé explicatif dans les énoncés psycho-physiques et la subjectivité de la conscience. In Jean-Marie Chevalier Benoît Gaultier (ed.), Connaître. Questions d'épistémologie contemporaine. Editions d'Ithaque 73-92.
    Kripke [1972] a présenté un argument très influent contre le physicalisme, basé sur l’idée suivante : les énoncés psycho-physiques—ceux qui identifient les phénomènes psychologiques de l’expérience à des phénomènes physiques—sont, s’ils sont vrais, nécessairement vrais. Pourtant, ils semblent être contingents. Par la suite, Levine [1983] a prétendu que l’apparence de contingence était due à un «fossé explicatif » qui se trouve dans ces énoncés : les phénomènes physiques ne semblent pas rendre compte de l’existence et des caractéristiques des phénomènes psychologiques. (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Anthony L. Brueckner (2003). Self-Knowledge Via Inner Observation of External Objects? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):118-122.
    Harold Langsam has recently presented a novel observational account of self-knowledge. I critically discuss this account and argue that it fails to provide a uniform understanding of how we are able to know the contents of our own thoughts.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Jesse Butler (2013). Rethinking Introspection: A Pluralist Approach to the First-Person Perspective. Palgrave MacMillan.
    We seem to have private privileged access to our own minds through introspection, but what exactly does this involve? Do we somehow literally perceive our own minds, as the common idea of a 'mind's eye' suggests, or are there other processes at work in our ability to know our own minds? Rethinking Introspection offers a new pluralist framework for understanding the nature, scope, and limits of introspection. The book argues that, contrary to common misconceptions, introspection does not consist of a (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Jesse Butler (2011). Introspective Knowledge of Experience and its Role in Consciousness Studies. Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (2):128-145.
    In response to Petitmengin and Bitbol's recent account of first-person methodologies in the study of consciousness, I provide a revised model of our introspective knowledge of our own conscious experience. This model, which I call the existential constitution model of phenomenal knowledge, avoids the problems that Petitmengin and Bitbol identify with standard observational models of introspection while also avoiding an underlying metaphorical misconception in their own proximity model, which misconstrues first-person knowledge of consciousness in terms of a dichotomous epistemic relationship. (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Peter Carruthers (2011). The Opacity of Mind: An Integrative Theory of Self-Knowledge. OUP Oxford.
    Do we have introspective access to our own thoughts? Peter Carruthers challenges the consensus that we do: he argues that access to our own thoughts is always interpretive, grounded in perceptual awareness and sensory imagery. He proposes a bold new theory of self-knowledge, with radical implications for understanding of consciousness and agency.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Steven M. Duncan, The Inescapable Self.
    In this paper I discuss the existence of the substantial self and argue against those, like Hume, who deny its reality.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. David H. Finkelstein (1999). On Self-Blindness and Inner Sense. Philosophical Topics 26 (1/2):105-19.
  11. Martin F. Fricke (2014). Transparency or Opacity of Mind? Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society 22:97-99.
    Self-knowledge presents a challenge for naturalistic theories of mind. Peter Carruthers’s (2011) approach to this challenge is Rylean: He argues that we know our own propositional attitudes because we (unconsciously) interpret ourselves, just as we have to interpret others in order to know theirs’. An alternative approach, opposed by Carruthers, is to argue that we do have a special access to our own beliefs, but that this is a natural consequence of our reasoning capacity. This is the approach of transparency (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Martin F. Fricke & Paul Snowdon (2003). Solidity and Impediment. Analysis 63 (279):173–178.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Brie Gertler (2011). Self-Knowledge. Routledge.
    The problem of self-knowledge is one of the most fascinating in all of philosophy and has crucial significance for the philosophy of mind and epistemology. Gertler assesses the leading theoretical approaches to self-knowledge, explaining the work of many of the key figures in the field: from Descartes and Kant, through to Bertrand Russell and Gareth Evans, as well as recent work by Tyler Burge, David Chalmers, William Lycan and Sydney Shoemaker. -/- Beginning with an outline of the distinction between self-knowledge (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Brie Gertler (2009). Introspection. In Patrick Wilken, Timothy J. Bayne & Axel Cleeremans (eds.), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Oxford University Press 76-111.
    Alas, things are not quite so simple. As James implies, the term ‘introspection’ literally means ‘looking within’, but of course we do not visually inspect the interiors of our crania. What unites proponents of introspection is the claim that we can recognize our own mental states through some sort of attention—a non-visual ‘looking’—whose immediate objects are thoughts or sensations within oneself, in a non-spatial sense of ‘within’. (The term ‘introspection’ is occasionally given an ecumenical gloss, to refer to any method (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Amy Kind (2003). Shoemaker, Self-Blindness and Moore's Paradox. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):39-48.
    I show how the 'innersense' (quasiperceptual) view of introspection can be defended against Shoemaker's influential 'argument from selfblindness'. If introspection and perception are analogous, the relationship between beliefs and introspective knowledge of them is merely contingent. Shoemaker argues that this implies the possibility that agents could be selfblind, i.e., could lack any introspective awareness of their own mental states. By invoking Moore's paradox, he rejects this possibility. But because Shoemaker's discussion conflates introspective awareness and selfknowledge, he cannot establish his conclusion. (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (12 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Stan Klein (2014). Sameness and the Self: Philosophical and Psychological Considerations. Frontiers in Psychology -- Perception:1-15.
    In this paper I examine the concept of cross-temporal personal identity (diachronicity). This particular form of identity has vexed theorists for centuries -- e.g.,how can a person maintain a belief in the sameness of self overtime in the face of continual psychological and physical change? I first discuss various forms of the sameness relation and the criteria that justify their application. I then examine philosophical and psychological treatments of personal diachronicity (for example,Locke's psychological connectedness theory; the role of episodic memory) (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Stan Klein (2014). The Two Selves: Their Metaphysical Commitments and Functional Independence. Oxford University Press.
    The Two Selves takes the position that the self is not a "thing" easily reduced to an object of scientific analysis. Rather, the self consists in a multiplicity of aspects, some of which have a neuro-cognitive basis (and thus are amenable to scientific inquiry) while other aspects are best construed as first-person subjectivity, lacking material instantiation. As a consequence of their potential immateriality, the subjective aspect of self cannot be taken as an object and therefore is not easily amenable to (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Stan Klein (2012). The Self and its Brain. Social Cognition 30 (4):474-518.
    In this paper I argue that much of the confusion and mystery surrounding the concept of "self" can be traced to a failure to appreciate the distinction between the self as a collection of diverse neural components that provide us with our beliefs, memories, desires, personality, emotions, etc (the epistemological self) and the self that is best conceived as subjective, unified awareness, a point of view in the first person (ontological self). While the former can, and indeed has, been extensively (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Stan Klein, Leda Cosmides, John Tooby & Sarah Chance (2002). Decisions and the Evolution of Memory: Multiple Systems, Multiple Functions. Psychological Review 109:306-329.
    Memory evolved to supply useful, timely information to the organism’s decision-making systems. Therefore, decision rules, multiple memory systems, and the search engines that link them should have coevolved to mesh in a coadapted, functionally interlocking way. This adaptationist perspective suggested the scope hypothesis: When a generalization is retrieved from semantic memory, episodic memories that are inconsistent with it should be retrieved in tandem to place boundary conditions on the scope of the generalization. Using a priming paradigm and a decision task (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Stan Klein & Cynthia Gangi (2010). The Multiplicity of Self: Neuropsychological Evidence and its Implications for the Self as a Construct in Psychological Research. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1191:1-15.
    This paper examines the issue ofwhat the self is by reviewing neuropsychological research,which converges on the idea that the selfmay be more complex and differentiated than previous treatments of the topic have suggested. Although some aspects of self-knowledge such as episodic recollection may be compromised in individuals, other aspects—for instance, semantic trait summaries—appear largely intact. Taken together, these findings support the idea that the self is not a single, unified entity. Rather, it is a set of interrelated, functionally independent systems. (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Stan Klein & Cynthia Gangi (2010). The Multiplicity of Self: Neuropsychological Evidence and its Implications for the Self as a Construct in Psychological Research. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1191:1-15.
    This paper examines the issue of what the self is by reviewing neuropsychological research,which converges on the idea that the self may be more complex and differentiated than previous treatments of the topic have suggested. Although some aspects of self-knowledge such as episodic recollection may be compromised in individuals, other aspects—for instance, semantic trait summaries—appear largely intact. Taken together, these findings support the idea that the self is not a single, unified entity. Rather, it is a set of interrelated, functionally (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Stan Klein & Shaun Nichols (2012). Memory and the Sense of Personal Identity. Mind 121 (483):677-702.
    Memory of past episodes provides a sense of personal identity — the sense that I am the same person as someone in the past. We present a neurological case study of a patient who has accurate memories of scenes from his past, but for whom the memories lack the sense of mineness. On the basis of this case study, we propose that the sense of identity derives from two components, one delivering the content of the memory and the other generating (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Franz Knappik (2015). Self-Knowledge About Attitudes: Rationalism Meets Interpretation. Philosophical Explorations 18 (2):183-198.
    Recently influential “rationalist” views of self-knowledge about our rational attitudes hold that such self-knowledge is essentially connected to rational agency, and therefore has to be particularly reliable, immediate, and distinct from third-personal access. This approach has been challenged by “theory theory” or “interpretationist” views of self-knowledge: on such views, self-knowledge is based on the interpretation of information about ourselves, and this interpretation involves the same mindreading mechanisms that we use to access other persons’ mental states. Interpretationist views are usually dismissed (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Peter Langland-Hassan (2015). Introspective Misidentification. Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1737-1758.
    It is widely held that introspection-based self-ascriptions of mental states are immune to error through misidentification , relative to the first person pronoun. Many have taken such errors to be logically impossible, arguing that the immunity holds as an “absolute” necessity. Here I discuss an actual case of craniopagus twins—twins conjoined at the head and brain—as a means to arguing that such errors are logically possible and, for all we know, nomologically possible. An important feature of the example is that (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Peter Langland‐Hassan (2014). Inner Speech and Metacognition: In Search of a Connection. Mind and Language 29 (5):511-533.
    Many theorists claim that inner speech is importantly linked to human metacognition (thinking about one's own thinking). However, their proposals all rely upon unworkable conceptions of the content and structure of inner speech episodes. The core problem is that they require inner speech episodes to have both auditory-phonological contents and propositional/semantic content. Difficulties for the views emerge when we look closely at how such contents might be integrated into one or more states or processes. The result is that, if inner (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. William S. Larkin, A Broad Perceptual Model of Privileged Introspective Judgments.
  27. Eric Lormand (2000). Shoemaker and "Inner Sense". Philosophical Topics 28 (2):147-170.
    In the last of his three Royce Lectures called "Self‑Knowledge and 'Inner Sense'", Sydney Shoemaker attempts to reconcile two commitments: (1) that experiences have "qualia", nonrepresentational features that constitute what it is like to have the experiences, and (2) that perceptual experiences seem "diaphanous", yielding to introspection only the way they represent the environment, not intrinsic or otherwise nonrepresentational qualia. On the idea that we internally sense qualia�that we sense what our experiences are like�one way to explain apparent diaphanousness is (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Eric Lormand, Inner Sense Until Proven Guilty.
    Can one sense one’s own mind, as one senses nonmental entities in one’s environment and body? According to many contemporary philosophers of mind, the fraudulent commonsense idea of a "mind’s eye" obstructs clearheaded attempts to explain introspection and consciousness. I concede that inner sense cannot directly explain consciousness and introspection in all their forms, but I do think a carefully specified kind of inner sense can account for one very special kind of introspective consciousness. It is special because it is (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Cynthia Macdonald (2014). In My ‘Mind’s Eye’: Introspectionism, Detectivism, and the Basis of Authoritative Self-Knowledge. Synthese (15):1-26.
    It is widely accepted that knowledge of certain of one’s own mental states is authoritative in being epistemically more secure than knowledge of the mental states of others, and theories of self-knowledge have largely appealed to one or the other of two sources to explain this special epistemic status. The first, ‘detectivist’, position, appeals to an inner perception-like basis, whereas the second, ‘constitutivist’, one, appeals to the view that the special security awarded to certain self-knowledge is a conceptual matter. I (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Cynthia Macdonald (1999). Shoemaker on Self-Knowledge and Inner Sense. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):711-38.
    What is introspective knowledge of one's own intentional states like? This paper aims to make plausible the view that certain cases of self-knowledge, namely the cogito-type ones, are enough like perception to count as cases of quasi-observation. To this end it considers the highly influential arguments developed by Sydney Shoemaker in his recent Royce Lectures. These present the most formidable challenge to the view that certain cases of self-knowledge are quasi-observational and so deserve detailed examination. Shoemaker's arguments are directed against (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Cynthia Macdonald (1998). Self-Knowledge and the "Inner Eye". Philosophical Explorations 1 (2):83-106.
    What is knowledge of one's own current, consciously entertained intentional states a form of inner awareness? If so, what form? In this paper I explore the prospects for a quasi-observational account of a certain class of cases where subjects appear to have self-knowledge, namely, the so-called cogito-like cases. In section one I provide a rationale for the claim that we need an epistemology of self-knowledge, and specifically, an epistemology of the cogito-like cases. In section two I argue that contentful properties (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Kourken Michaelian (2015). Stanley B. Klein: The Two Selves—Their Metaphysical Commitments and Functional Independence. Minds and Machines 25 (1):119-122.
    The main claim of this relatively brief but unusually ambitious book is, as the title suggests, that the self is not one but two. On the one hand, there is the epistemological self, which has a definite neurocognitive basis. On the other hand, there is the ontological self, which, in Klein’s view, is a matter of first-person subjectivity and may lack a material basis, in which case it may, in contrast to the epistemological self, not be amenable to investigation by (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Gerald E. Myers (1986). Introspection and Self-Knowledge. American Philosophical Quarterly 23 (April):199-207.
    Since locke, introspection has been generally defined as a form of observation. this is true, for example, of the classical tradition in psychology exemplified by wundt and titchener. recent experimental work by cognitive psychologists continues to treat introspection as a mode of observation while denying its alleged success in identifying cognitive processes. besides psychologists, philosophers such as james, ryle, and quinton are discussed, and they, too, define introspection as a type of observation analogous to perception. the present article calls attention (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Albert Newen & Gottfried Vosgerau (2007). A Representational Account of Self-Knowledge. Erkenntnis 67 (2):337 - 353.
    Self-knowledge is knowledge of one’s own states (or processes) in an indexical mode of presentation. The philosophical debate is concentrating on mental states (or processes). If we characterize self-knowledge by natural language sentences, the most adequate utterance has a structure like “I know that I am in mental state M”. This common sense characterization has to be developed into an adequate description. In this investigation we will tackle two questions: (i) What precisely is the phenomenon referred to by “self-knowledge” and (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Anne Newstead (2006). Evans's Anti-Cartesian Argument: A Critical Evaluation. Ratio 19 (June):214-228.
    In chapter 7 of The Varieties of Reference, Gareth Evans claimed to have an argument that would present "an antidote" to the Cartesian conception of the self as a purely mental entity. On the basis of considerations drawn from philosophy of language and thought, Evans claimed to be able to show that bodily awareness is a form of self-awareness. The apparent basis for this claim is the datum that sometimes judgements about one’s position based on body sense are immune to (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Natika Newton (1988). Introspection and Perception. Topoi 7 (March):25-30.
    Sydney Shoemaker argues that introspection, unlike perception, provides no identification information about the self, and that knowledge of one''s mental states should be conceived as arising in a direct and unmediated fashion from one''s being in those states. I argue that while one does not identify aself as the subject of one''s states, one does frequently identify and misidentify thestates, in ways analogous to the identification of objects in perception, and that in discourse about one''s mental states the self plays (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Uwe Peters (2013). Indirect Sensory-Access Theory and Conscious Intentions. Philosophical Psychology (4):1-13.
    Indirect sensory-access theory and conscious intentions. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2012.749560.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Steven L. Reynolds (1992). Self-Recognition. Philosophical Quarterly 42 (167):182-190.
  39. Michael Roche (2013). A Difficulty for Testing the Inner Sense Theory of Introspection. Philosophy of Science 80 (5):1019-1030.
    A common way of testing the inner sense theory of introspection exploits the possibility of damage to inner sense. Such damage is expected to lead to first-personal deficits/impairments of one kind or another. I raise various problems for this way of testing the theory. The main difficulty, I argue, stems from the existence of the method subserving confabulation.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Jay F. Rosenberg (2000). Perception Vs. Inner Sense: A Problem About Direct Awareness. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 101 (2-3):143-160.
  41. Gilbert Ryle (1949/2002). The Concept of Mind. Hutchinson and Co.
    This now-classic work challenges what Ryle calls philosophy's "official theory," the Cartesians "myth" of the separation of mind and matter. Ryle's linguistic analysis remaps the conceptual geography of mind, not so much solving traditional philosophical problems as dissolving them into the mere consequences of misguided language. His plain language and esstentially simple purpose place him in the traditioin of Locke, Berkeley, Mill, and Russell.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Sydney Shoemaker (2004). Identity, Cause, and Mind: Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press.
    Since the appearance of a widely influential book, Self-Knowledge and Self-ldentity, Sydney Shoemaker has continued to work on a series of interrelated issues in the philosophy of mind and metaphysics. This volume contains a collection of the most important essays he has published since then. The topics that he deals with here include, among others, the nature of personal and other forms of identity, the relation of time to change, the nature of properties and causality and the relation between the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Sydney Shoemaker (1994). Lecture III: The Phenomenal Character of Experience -- Self Knowledge and Inner Sense. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (2):291-314.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Sydney Shoemaker (1994). Self-Knowledge and "Inner Sense". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54:249-314.
    Two kinds of epistemological sceptical paradox are reviewed and a shared assumption, that warrant to accept a proposition has to be the same thing as having evidence for its truth, is noted. 'Entitlement', as used here, denotes a kind of rational warrant that counterexemplifies that identification. The paper pursues the thought that there are various kinds of entitlement and explores the possibility that the sceptical paradoxes might receive a uniform solution if entitlement can be made to reach sufficiently far. Three (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Sydney Shoemaker (1994). Self-Knowledge and "Inner Sense": Lecture I: The Object Perception Model. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (2):249-269.
  46. Sydney Shoemaker (1994). Self-Knowledge and "Inner Sense": Lecture II: The Broad Perceptual Model. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (2):271 - 290.
  47. Will Small (2013). Self-Knowledge, Edited by Anthony Hatzimoysis. Mind 122 (488):1091-1095.
  48. Amie L. Thomasson (2005). First-Person Knowledge in Phenomenology. In David Woodruff Smith & Amie L. Thomasson (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press 115--138.
    An account of the source of first-person knowledge is essential not just for phenomenology, but for anyone who takes seriously the apparent evidence that we each have a distinctive access to knowing what we experience. One standard way to account for the source of first-person knowledge is by appeal to a kind of inner observation of the passing contents of one’s own mind, and phenomenology is often thought to rely on introspection. I argue, however, that Husserl’s method of phenomenological reduction (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Tillmann Vierkant (2015). How Do You Know That You Settled a Question? Philosophical Explorations 18 (2):199-211.
    It is commonly assumed in the philosophical literature that in order to acquire an intention, the agent has to settle a question of what to do in practical deliberation. Carruthers, P. has recently used this to argue that the acquisition of intentions can never be conscious even in cases where the agent asserts having the intention in inner speech. Because of that Carruthers also believes that knowledge of intentions even in first person cases is observational. This paper explores the challenge (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Patrick Wilken, Timothy J. Bayne & Axel Cleeremans (eds.) (2009). The Oxford Companion to Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    Five years in the making and including over 250 concise entries written by leaders in the field, the volume covers both fundamental knowledge as well as more recent advances in this rapidly changing domain.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 51