Bookmark and Share

Occasional Identity

Edited by A. P. Taylor (State University of New York, Buffalo)
Related categories
Siblings:
8 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
  1. Ralf M. Bader (2012). The Non-Transitivity of the Contingent and Occasional Identity Relations. Philosophical Studies 157 (1):141-152.
    This paper establishes that the occasional identity relation and the contingent identity relation are both non-transitive and as such are not properly classified as identity relations. This is achieved by appealing to cases where multiple fissions and fusions occur simultaneously. These cases show that the contingent and occasional identity relations do not even satisfy the time-indexed and world-indexed versions of the transitivity requirement and hence are non-transitive relations.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Delia Graff Fara (2008). Relative-Sameness Counterpart Theory. Review of Symbolic Logic 1 (2):167-189.
    Here I propose a coherent way of preserving the identity of material objects with the matter that constitutes them. The presentation is formal, and intended for RSL. An informal presentation is in preliminary draft! -/- Relative-sameness relations—such as being the same person as—are like David Lewis's "counterpart" relations in the following respects: (i) they may hold between objects that aren't identical (I propose), and (ii) there are a multiplicity of them, different ones of which may be variously invoked in different (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. André Gallois (1990). Occasional Identity. Philosophical Studies 58 (3):203 - 224.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Simon Langford & Murali Ramachandran (2013). The Products of Fission, Fusion, and Teletransportation: An Occasional Identity Theorist's Perspective. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (1):105 - 117.
    Advocates of occasional identity have two ways of interpreting putative cases of fission and fusion. One way?we call it the Creative view?takes fission to involve an object really dividing (or being replicated), thereby creating objects which would not otherwise have existed. The more ontologically parsimonious way takes fission to involve merely the ?separation? of objects that were identical before: strictly speaking, no object actually divides or is replicated, no new objects are created. In this paper we recommend the Creative approach (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Simon Langford & Murali Ramachandran (2000). Rigidity, Occasional Identity and Leibniz' Law. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (201):518-526.
    André Gallois (1998) attempts to defend the occasional identity thesis (OIT), the thesis that objects which are distinct at one time may nonetheless be identical at another time, in the face of two influential lines of argument against it. One argument involves Kripke’s (1971) notion of rigid designation and the other, Leibniz’s law (affirming the indiscernibility of identicals). It is reasonable for advocates of (OIT) to question the picture of rigid designation and the version of Leibniz’s law that these arguments (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Murali Ramachandran (2000). Rigidity, Occasional Identity and Leibniz' Law. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (201):518 - 526.
    André Gallois (1998) attempts to defend the occasional identity thesis (OIT), the thesis that objects which are distinct at one time may nonetheless be identical at another time, in the face of two influential lines of argument against it. One argument involves Kripke’s (1971) notion of rigid designation and the other, Leibniz’s law (affirming the indiscernibility of identicals). It is reasonable for advocates of (OIT) to question the picture of rigid designation and the version of Leibniz’s law that these arguments (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Theodore Sider (2001). Occasions of Identity André Gallois. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (2):401-405.
    André Gallois’s Occasions of Identity injects a refreshing new perspective into an old debate. Actually, what is new is the advocacy of the perspective: Gallois takes up a view that many consider a non-starter, and shows this reaction to be premature. The debate is over the right way to understand the traditional puzzles involving two things being in the same place at the same time; the perspective is that identity can hold temporarily (and contingently). Suppose an amoeba, name it AMOEBA, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Tobias Hansson Wahlberg (2008). Can I Be an Instantaneous Stage and yet Persist Through Time? Metaphysica 9 (2):235-239.
    An alternative to the standard endurance/perdurance accounts of persistence has recently been developed: the stage theory (Sider, T. Four-Dimensionalism: an Ontology of Persistence and Time. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001; Hawley, K. How Things Persist. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). According to this theory, a persisting object is identical with an instantaneous stage (temporal part). On the basis of Leibniz's Law, I argue that stage theorists either have to deny the alleged identity (i.e., give up their central thesis) or hold (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation