Perhaps the answers to ontological questions turn on facts about our conventions—how we have collectively decide to think and talk about reality. Some even think of ontological questions as being answerable only relative to a given conceptual, linguistic, or theoretical framework. (Both views come in limited forms as well, applied to specific ontological questions-- like whether there are fictional entities, possible worlds, or even macro-sized objects.) This category covers a range of metaontological views in the vicinity.
|Key works||Carnap 1950 Goodman 1978 Putnam 1981 Putnam 1987 Sidelle 1992 Sosa 1999 Hirsch 2005 Chalmers 2009 Thomasson 2007|
|Introductions||Classic works in themselves, there is enough introductory material in the following papers that they may serve as useful beginning points: Sidelle 1992 Sosa 1999 Hirsch 2005 Chalmers 2009 Thomasson 2007. Views of this sort are also surveyed in the introduction to Chalmers et al 2009.|
- Metaontology, Misc (72)
- Ontological Commitment (113)
- Ontological Disagreement (36)
- Ontological Fictionalism (48)
- Ontological Pluralism (31)
- Ontological Realism (126)
- Quantification and Ontology (122)
- Methodology in Metaphysics (66)
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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