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  1. Shane Andre (1982). Unger's Defense of Skepticism: New Wine in Old Bottles. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 12 (3):453 - 465.
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  2. Stanley Bates (1980). The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy (Review). Philosophy and Literature 4 (2):266-273.
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  3. Jose Benardete (1982). Sceptical Essays. Review of Metaphysics 36 (2):463-464.
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  4. Núria Sara Miras Boronat, Die Welt Als Grund: Wittgenstein, Gadamer Und James. Akten des XXII. Deutscher Kongress für Philosophie.
  5. Aryeh Botwinick (1986). Wittgenstein and Scepticism. Philosophy Research Archives 12:163-176.
    A unifying perspective to bring to bear on Wittgenstein’s thought is that it represents a continual grappling with the problem of formulating a consistent version of scepticism--one that would not succumb to the charge of being self-refuting. His ultimate resolution of this problem hinges upon the precise content to be invested in his famous philosophical doctrine of the priority of Gezeigt (showing) over Gezagt (saying). I shall argue for a democratic participatory gloss of this doctrine as offering the most satisfactory (...)
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  6. M. C. Bradley (1959). Mr. Strawson and Skepticism. Analysis 20 (1):14 - 19.
  7. Thomas O. Buford (1985). Knowledge and Scepticism. Review of Metaphysics 38 (3):671-673.
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  8. Steinar Bøyum (2007). Philosophy and Language Learning. Studies in Philosophy and Education 26 (1):43-56.
    In this paper, I explore different ways of picturing language learning in philosophy, all of them inspired by Wittgenstein and all of them concerned about scepticism of meaning. I start by outlining the two pictures of children and language learning that emerge from Kripke's famous reading of Wittgenstein. Next, I explore how social-pragmatic readings, represented by Meredith Williams, attempt to answer the sceptical anxieties. Finally, drawing somewhat on Stanley Cavell, I try to resolve these issues by investigating what characteristically happens (...)
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  9. Herman Cappelen (2005). Pluralistic Skepticism: Advertisement for Speech Act Pluralism. Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):15–39.
    Even though the lines of thought that support skepticism are extremely compelling, we're inclined to look for ways of blocking them because it appears to be an impossible view to accept, both for intellectual and practical reasons. One goal of this paper is to show that when skepticism is packaged right, it has few problematic implications (or at least fewer than is often assumed). It is, for example, compatible with all the following claims (when these are correctly interpreted).
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  10. Stanley Cavell (2004). Reply to Four Chapters. In Denis McManus (ed.), Wittgenstein and Scepticism. Routledge.
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  11. Stanley Cavell (1988). In Quest of the Ordinary: Lines of Skepticism and Romanticism. University of Chicago Press.
    These lectures by one of the most influential and original philosophers of the twentieth century constitute a sustained argument for the philosophical basis of romanticism, particularly in its American rendering. Through his examination of such authors as Emerson, Thoreau, Poe, Wordsworth, and Coleridge, Stanley Cavell shows that romanticism and American transcendentalism represent a serious philosophical response to the challenge of skepticism that underlies the writings of Wittgenstein and Austin on ordinary language.
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  12. C. Chihara & Jerry A. Fodor (1965). Operationalism and Ordinary Language: A Critique of Wittgenstein. American Philosophical Quarterly 2 (October):281-95.
    This paper explores some lines of argument in wittgenstein's post-Tractatus writings in order to indicate the relations between wittgenstein's philosophical psychology, On the one hand, And his philosophy of language, His epistemology, And his doctrines about the nature of philosophical analysis on the other. The authors maintain that the later writings of wittgenstein express a coherent doctrine in which an operationalistic analysis of confirmation and language supports a philosophical psychology of a type the authors call "logical behaviorism." they also maintain (...)
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  13. Paul Coates (1997). Meaning, Mistake, and Miscalculation. Minds and Machines 7 (2):171-97.
    The issue of what distinguishes systems which have original intentionalityfrom those which do not has been brought into sharp focus by Saul Kripke inhis discussion of the sceptical paradox he attributes to Wittgenstein.In this paper I defend a sophisticated version of the dispositionalistaccount of meaning against the principal objection raised by Kripke in hisattack on dispositional views. I argue that the objection put by the sceptic,to the effect that the dispositionalist cannot give a satisfactory account ofnormativity and mistake, in fact (...)
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  14. Annalisa Coliva (2010). Moore and Wittgenstein: Scepticism, Certainty, and Common Sense. Palgrave Macmillan.
  15. Craig Stephen Delancey (2007). Meaning Naturalism, Meaning Irrealism, and the Work of Language. Synthese 154 (2):231-257.
    I defend the hypothesis that organisms that produce and recognize meaningful utterances tend to use simpler procedures, and should use the simplest procedures, to produce and recognize those utterances. This should be a basic principle of any naturalist theory of meaning, which must begin with the recognition that the production and understanding of meanings is work. One measure of such work is the minimal amount of space resources that must go into storing a procedure to produce or recognize a meaningful (...)
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  16. Ilham Dilman (2004). Wittgenstein and the Question of Linguistic Idealism. In Denis McManus (ed.), Wittgenstein and Scepticism. Routledge. 162--177.
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  17. Katheryn Doran (1995). Moore's Paradox, Asserting and Skepticism. Southwest Philosophy Review 11 (1):41-48.
  18. Bo Earle (2002). Hegel, Wittgenstein, and the Dialectic of Philosophy and Anthropology. Idealistic Studies 32 (2):101-119.
    The early Hegel and late Wittgenstein alike suggest that the idealism-realism contrast is better understood as a contrast between normative and naturalistic accounts of actions. Building upon parallels between Hegel’s account of the “inverted world” and what Kripke called Wittgenstein’s “skeptical solution to the skeptical paradox,” I suggest that Wittgensteinian rule following may involve not only first personal commitments, as Lear argues, but also something like the specifically historical agency Hegel called Geist, and that, in turn, Hegel’s “Absolute” may be (...)
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  19. Robert J. Fogelin (1981). Wittgenstein and Classical Scepticism. International Philosophical Quarterly 21 (1):3-15.
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  20. Jeff Frank (2010). Imagining Wittgenstein's Adolescent: The Educational Significance of Expression. Educational Philosophy and Theory 44 (4):343-350.
    This paper highlights the philosophical and educational significance of expression in Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. When the role of expression is highlighted, we will be better able to appreciate Stanley Cavell's insistence that: (i) Wittgenstein offers ways of responding to, though not a refutation of, the problem of skepticism concerning other minds, and (ii) Wittgenstein's writing style is an important aspect of his philosophy. The educational implications of this appreciation will be explored with reference to the lives of adolescences.
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  21. Dick Garner (1977). Skepticism, Ordinary Language and Zen Buddhism. Philosophy East and West 27 (2):165-181.
    The goal of tranquility through non-Assertion, Advocated by sextus empiricus, Is examined and his method criticized. His understanding of non-Assertion is compared with that of seng-Chao (383-414) and chi-Tsang (549-623). Zen buddhism shares the quest for tranquility, But offers more than sextus did to help us attain it, And avoids the excessively metaphysical thought of these two chinese buddhists. Wittgenstein, Whose goal was that philosophical problems completely disappear, And austin, Who rejected many standard western dichotomies, Offer a method superior to (...)
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  22. Grant Gillett (1990). An Anti-Sceptical Fugue. Philosophical Investigations 13 (4):304-321.
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  23. Jack Gilroy (1980). Philosophical Skepticism and Ordinary-Language Analysis. By Garrett L. Vander Veer. The Modern Schoolman 57 (2):194-195.
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  24. Hannah Ginsborg (2011). Primitive Normativity and Skepticism About Rules. Journal of Philosophy 108 (5):227-254.
  25. Hans-Johann Glock (1990). Stroud's Defence of Cartesian Scepticism -A 'Linguistic' Response. Philosophical Investigations 13 (1):44-64.
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  26. Irwin Goldstein (2007). Solipsism and the Solitary Language User. Philosophical Papers 36 (1):35-47.
    A person skeptical about other minds supposes it is possible in principle that there are no minds other than his. A person skeptical about an external world thinks it is possible there is no world external to him. Some philosophers think a person can refute the skeptic and prove that his world is not the solitary scenario the skeptic supposes might be realized. In this paper I examine one argument that some people think refutes solipsism. The argument, from Wittgenstein, is (...)
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  27. Nicolas D. Goodman (1981). The Experiential Foundations of Mathematical Knowledge. History and Philosophy of Logic 2 (1-2):55-65.
    A view of the sources of mathematical knowledge is sketched which emphasizes the close connections between mathematical and empirical knowledge. A platonistic interpretation of mathematical discourse is adopted throughout. Two skeptical views are discussed and rejected. One of these, due to Maturana, is supposed to be based on biological considerations. The other, due to Dummett, is derived from a Wittgensteinian position in the philosophy of language. The paper ends with an elaboration of Gödel's analogy between the mathematician and the physicist.
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  28. Andrea Guardo (2012). Kripke's Account of the Rule-Following Considerations. European Journal of Philosophy 20 (3):366-388.
    This paper argues that most of the alleged straight solutions to the sceptical paradox which Kripke (1982) ascribed to Wittgenstein can be regarded as the first horn of a dilemma whose second horn is the paradox itself. The dilemma is proved to be a by-product of a foundationalist assumption on the notion of justification, as applied to linguistic behaviour. It is maintained that the assumption is unnecessary and that the dilemma is therefore spurious. To this end, an alternative conception of (...)
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  29. Riccardo Guastini (2011). Rule-Scepticism Restated. In Leslie Green & Brian Leiter (eds.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law. Oxford University Press.
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  30. Ingemund Gullv (1964). Scepticism and Absurdity. Inquiry 7 (1-4):163 – 190.
    Analytic rejections of extreme traditional views, especially scepticism, as 'absurd' in some sense of violating 'rules' of discourse, arc considered. References to linguistic and pragmatic rules are discussed and found inadequate as bases for rejecting scepticism. References to logical principles alone are found to lead into scepticism. The claim that epistemology and scepticism take for granted an inadequate theory of words like 'know', or 'knowledge', as descriptive predicates, is considered. Alternatives, construing such words as appraisive or performative, are discussed, but (...)
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  31. Ingemund Gullvåg (1964). Scepticism and Absurdity. Inquiry 7 (1-4):163-190.
    Analytic rejections of extreme traditional views, especially scepticism, as ?absurd? in some sense of violating ?rules? of discourse, arc considered. References to linguistic and pragmatic rules are discussed and found inadequate as bases for rejecting scepticism. References to logical principles alone are found to lead into scepticism. The claim that epistemology and scepticism take for granted an inadequate theory of words like ?know?, or ?knowledge?, as descriptive predicates, is considered. Alternatives, construing such words as appraisive or performative, are discussed, but (...)
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  32. Martin Gustafsson & Richard Sørli (eds.) (2011). The Philosophy of J. L. Austin. Oxford University Press.
    These new essays on J. L. Austin's philosophy constitute the first major study of his thought in decades.
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  33. Ian Hacking (1985). Rules, Scepticism, Proof, Wittgenstein. In , Exercises in Analysis: Essays by Students of Casimir Lewy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  34. Adrian Haddock (2012). Meaning, Justification, and'Primitive Normativity'. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 86 (1):147-174.
    I critically discuss two claims which Hannah Ginsborg makes on behalf of her account of meaning in terms of ‘primitive normativity’(2011; 2012): first, that it avoids the sceptical regress articulated by Kripke's Wittgenstein; second, that it makes sense of the thought—central to Kripke's Wittgenstein—that ‘meaning is normative’, in a way which shows this thought not only to be immune from recent criticisms but also to undermine reductively naturalistic theories of content. In the course of the discussion, I consider and attempt (...)
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  35. Rudolf Haller (1988). Justification and Praxeological Foundationalism. Inquiry 31 (3):335 – 345.
    At least since Descartes the epistemological turn derived its impetus from the sceptical challenge to provide a justification for all knowledge claims. According to a foundational view, a claim to know something is justified only when the justification refers to ultimate grounds in the form of self?supporting propositions. This paper's title suggests that justification may be seen from a different perspective, namely that of acting. Wittgenstein's examples show that the sceptic's maxim ? doubt everything ? breaks down because some beliefs (...)
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  36. Stuart Hampshire (1950). Scepticism and Meaning. Philosophy 25 (94):235 - 246.
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  37. Nat Hansen (forthcoming). Contemporary Ordinary Language Philosophy. Philosophy Compass.
    There is a widespread assumption that ordinary language philosophy was killed off sometime in the 1960s or 70s by a combination of Gricean pragmatics and the rapid development of systematic semantic theory. Contrary to that widespread assumption, however, contemporary versions of ordinary language philosophy are alive and flourishing, but going by various aliases—in particular (some versions of) "contextualism" and (some versions of) "experimental philosophy". And a growing group of contemporary philosophers are explicitly embracing the methods as well as the title (...)
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  38. Rom Harré (1995). Skepticism, Rules, and Private Languages. International Studies in Philosophy 27 (2):141-143.
  39. Jussi Haukioja (2007). A Sceptical Guide to Meaning and Rules: Defending Kripke's Wittgenstein – Martin Kusch. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (229):688–690.
  40. Jussi Haukioja (2006). Hindriks on Rule-Following. Philosophical Studies 126 (2):219-239.
    This paper is a reply to Frank Hindriks.
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  41. Frank A. Hindriks (2004). A Modest Solution to the Problem of Rule-Following. Philosophical Studies 121 (1):65-98.
    A modest solution to the problem(s) of rule-following is defended against Kripkensteinian scepticism about meaning. Even though parts of it generalise to other concepts, the theory as a whole applies to response-dependent concepts only. It is argued that the finiteness problem is not nearly as pressing for such concepts as it may be for some other kinds of concepts. Furthermore, the modest theory uses a notion of justification as sensitivity to countervailing conditions in order to solve the justification problem. Finally, (...)
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  42. John Humphrey, Brief Overview of Key Parts and Key Notions in Kripke's Book.
    The alleged paradox begins with a sceptical inquiry about my right to claim that my past usage of '+' (i.e., my past usage of the plus sign) was used to denote the function plus rather than the function quus. The definition of quus is: x quus y = x + y, if x, y < 57; otherwise, x quus y = 5. (Kripke uses an encircled plus sign to represent the quus sign. I can't reproduce that sign here so I'll (...)
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  43. John Humphrey, Some Oddities in Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language.
    Oddity One : Kripke claims that Wittgenstein has invented "a new form of scepticism", one which inclines Kripke "to regard it as the most radical and original sceptical problem that philosophy has seen to date, one that only a highly unusual cast of mind could have produced" (K, p. 60). However, Kripke also claims that there are analogies (and sometimes the analogies look very much like identities) between Wittgenstein's sceptical argument and the work of at least three and maybe four (...)
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  44. John Humphrey, With Factualist Friends, Kripke's Wittgenstein Needs No Enemies: On Byrne's Case for Kripke's Wittgenstein Being a Factualist About Meaning Attributions.
    _Private Language_ is that it almost universally sees KW as offering, in his sceptical solution, an account of meaning attributions (i.e., statements of the form, "X means such-and-so by 's'"; hereafter, MAs) which takes their legitimate attribution to be a function of something other than facts or truth conditions. KW is almost universally read as having rejected any account of meaning attributions which takes them to be stating facts or corresponding to facts. In a word, KW is understood as offering (...)
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  45. Robin Jeshion (2001). Donnellan on Neptune. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):111-135.
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  46. Mark Kaplan (2011). Tales of the Unknown: Austin and the Argument From Ignorance. In Martin Gustafson & Richard Sørli (eds.), The Philosophy of J.L. Austin. Oxford University Press.
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  47. Mark Kaplan (2008). Austin's Way with Skepticism. In John Greco (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism. Oxford University Press.
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  48. Robert Kowalenko (2003). The Goodman-Kripke Paradox. Dissertation, King's College London
    The Kripke/Wittgenstein paradox and Goodman’s riddle of induction can be construed as problems of multiple redescription, where the relevant sceptical challenge is to provide factual grounds justifying the description we favour. A choice of description or predicate, in turn, is tantamount to the choice of a curve over a set of data, a choice apparently governed by implicitly operating constraints on the relevant space of possibilities. Armed with this analysis of the two paradoxes, several realist solutions of Kripke’s paradox are (...)
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  49. Daniel Laurier, The Publicity of Thought and Language.
    The sceptical problem of Kripkenstein pertains to both the notions of content of thought and linguistic meaning in such a way that if the sceptical solution allowed us to conclude that language is essentially public, then we should also be able to conclude that thought is essentially public. But, when addressing the question of the way in which one could, under this hypothesis, reach the conclusion that thought is essentially public, there would seem to be two possible types of answers. (...)
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  50. Catherine Legg (2003). This is Simply What I Do. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):58–80.
    Wittgenstein's discussion of rule-following is widely regarded to have identified what Kripke called "the most radical and original sceptical problem that philosophy has seen to date". But does it? This paper examines the problem in the light of Charles Peirce's distinctive "scientific hierarchy". Peirce identifies a phenomenological inquiry which is prior to both logic and metaphysics, whose role is to identify the most fundamental philosophical categories. His third category, particularly salient in this context, pertains to general predication. Rule-following scepticism, the (...)
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