The concept of an ecological niche (econiche) has been used in a variety of ways, some of which are incompatible with a relational or functional interpretation of the term. This essay seeks to standardize usage by limiting the concept to functional relations between organisms and their surroundings, and to revise the concept to include epistemic relations. For most organisms, epistemics are a vital aspect of their functional relationships to their surroundings and, hence, a major determinant of their econiche. Rejecting the (...) traditional dualism of organism and environment, an econiche is defined as the reciprocal (dual) of a functionally specified class of organisms (FSTU). From this perspective, an econiche necessarily implies a certain type of organism, and a class of functionally similar organisms implies a special econiche.The econiche concept is also discussed in relation to other ecological terms that reflect the distributional patterns of organisms, such as habitat, and the concept of an empty niche is criticized. (shrink)

In response to the arguments of Bill McKibben and of Stephen Vogel that nature is at an end and that the very concept of nature should be discarded, I argue that, far from this being the case, the concept of nature is indispensable. A third sense of 'nature' besides the two distinguished by Vogel, that of the nature of an organism, is brought to attention and shown, through five arguments, to be indispensable for environmental philosophy and ethics, and for ethics (...) in general (veterinary and medical ethics included). But it is no coincidence that the same term is used for all three senses of'nature' in many languages. The indispensability of 'nature' in the third sense is used to suggest the indispensability of 'nature' in the second sense (things unaffected by human activity, a sense needed if we are to understand species whether wild or domesticated, because of their evolutionary history, and if we are to distinguish social systems from natural systems), and also of 'nature' in the first sense (things that are not supernatural, a sense needed if we are to ask metaphysical questions about whether 'nature' in this sense and in the other two might have a creator). (shrink)

Peculiar to Konrad Lorenz’s view of instinctive behavior is his strong innate-learned dichotomy. He claimed that there are neither ontogenetic nor phylogenetic transitions between instinctive and experience-based behavior components, thus contradicting all former accounts of instinct. The present study discusses how Lorenz came to hold this controversial position by examining the history of Lorenz’s early theoretical development in the crucial period from 1931 to 1937, taking relevant influences into account. Lorenz’s intellectual development is viewed as being guided by four theoretical (...) and practical commitments as to how to study and explain behavior. These four factors, which were part of the general approach of Lorenz but not of other animal psychologists, were crucial in bringing about his specific position on instinctive behavior. (shrink)

The present study discusses the early theoretical development of Konrad Lorenz in the period from 1930 to 1937. In this period Lorenz developed his position on instinct in the first place, and thus his theoretical views were subject to change. Despite this change, the paper points to relatively stable features of Lorenz’s approach, which emerged relatively soon in his scientific career and guided his theoretical development in this and beyond this early phase.