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  1. David Barnett (2008). The Simplicity Intuition and Its Hidden Influence on Philosophy of Mind. Noûs 42 (2):308 - 335.
    Huxley’s Explanatory Gap: There can be no explanation of how states of consciousness arise from interaction among a collection of physical things.
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  2. Alexander Batthyany & Avshalom C. Elitzur (eds.) (2006). Mind and its Place in the World: Non-Reductionist Approaches to the Ontology of Consciousness. Ontos.
    By presenting a wide spectrum of non-reductive theories, the volume endeavors to overcome the dichotomy between dualism and monism that keeps plaguing the debate in favor of new and more differentiated positions.
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  3. George Bealer (1994). The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate. Cambridge: Blackwell.
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  4. George Bealer (1994). The Rejection of the Identity Thesis. In The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate. Cambridge: Blackwell.
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  5. Ned Block (2006). Max Black's Objection to Mind-Body Identity. Oxford Review of Metaphysics 3:3-78.
    considered an objection (Objection 3) that he says he thought was first put to him by Max Black. He says.
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  6. Andrew Botterell (2003). The Property Dualism Argument Against Physicalism. Journal of Philosophical Research 28:223-242.
    Many contemporary philosophers of mind are concerned to defend a thesis called a posteriori physicalism. This thesis has two parts, one metaphysical, and the other epistemological. The metaphysical part of the thesis—the physicalist part—is the claim that the psychological nature of the actual world is wholly physical. The epistemological part of the thesis—the a posteriori part—is the claim that no a priori connection holds between psychological nature and physical nature. Despite its attractiveness, however, a familiar argument alleges that a posteriori (...)
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  7. Leonard J. Clapp (1997). Senses, Sensations and Brain Processes: A Criticism of the Property Dualism Argument. Southwest Philosophy Review 14 (1):139-148.
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  8. Daniel Cohnitz (2012). In Defence of Antecedent Physicalism. In A. Newen & R. van Riel (eds.), Introduction to the Philosophy of John Perry. CSLI.
  9. Nic Damnjanovic (2012). Revelation and Physicalism. Dialectica 66 (1):69-91.
    Revelation is the thesis that having an experience that instantiates some phenomenal property puts us in a position to know the nature or essence of that property. It is widely held that although Revelation is prima facie plausible, it is inconsistent with physicalism, and, in particular, with the claim that phenomenal properties are physical properties. I outline the standard argument for the incompatibility of Revelation and physicalism and compare it with the Knowledge Argument. By doing so, I hope to show (...)
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  10. Richard Double (1983). Nagel's Argument That Mental Properties Are Nonphysical. Philosophy Research Archives 9:217-22.
    One of Thomas Nagel’s premises in his argument for panpsychism (in Mortal Questions) is criticized. The principal criticisms are: (1) Nagel has failed to provide a clear sense in which mental properties are nonphysical. (2) Even within the framework of Nagel’s argumeent, there is no strong reason to think that the psychological lies outside the explanatory web of physical properties. This is because certain reducing properties common to both the psychological and nonpsychological may well be physical.
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  11. Steven M. Duncan, Can I Know What I Am ThInking?
    In this paper, I argue that, if a common form of materialism is true, I cannot know my own thoughts, or even that I am thinking. I conclude that, since I can and do know these things, materialism about mind as I characterize it must be false.
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  12. Brie Gertler (2006). Consciousness and Qualia Cannot Be Reduced. In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science (Contemporary Debates in Philosophy). Blackwell. 202-216.
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  13. Benedikt Paul Göcke (2008). Physicalism Quaerens Intellectum. Philosophical Forum 39 (4):463-468.
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  14. Irwin Goldstein (2004). Neural Materialism, Pain's Badness, and a Posteriori Identities. In Maite Ezcurdia, Robert Stainton & Christopher Viger (eds.), New Essays in the Philosophy of Language and Mind. University of Calgary Press. 261-273.
    Orthodox neural materialists think mental states are neural events or orthodox material properties of neutral events. Orthodox material properties are defining properties of the “physical”. A “defining property” of the physical is a type of property that provides a necessary condition for something’s being correctly termed “physical”. In this paper I give an argument against orthodox neural materialism. If successful, the argument would show at least some properties of some mental states are not orthodox material properties of neural events. Opposing (...)
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  15. Irwin Goldstein (1994). Identifying Mental States: A Celebrated Hypothesis Refuted. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1):46-62.
    Functionalists think an event's causes and effects, its 'causal role', determines whether it is a mental state and, if so, which kind. Functionalists see this causal role principle as supporting their orthodox materialism, their commitment to the neuroscientist's ontology. I examine and refute the functionalist's causal principle and the orthodox materialism that attends that principle.
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  16. Laurence Goldstein (1980). The Reasons of a Materialist. Philosophy 55 (April):249-252.
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  17. William Hasker (2003). How Not to Be a Reductivist. Progress in Complexity, Information, and Design 2.
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  18. J. S. Kelly (1989). On Neutralizing Introspection: The Data of Sensuous Awareness. Southern Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):29-53.
  19. Ran Lahav (1994). A New Challenge for the Physicalist: Phenomenal Indistinguishabilty. Philosophia 24 (1-2):77-103.
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  20. Joe Levine (2007). Anti-Materialist Arguments and Influential Replies. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. 371--380.
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  21. P. Van Loocke (ed.) (2001). The Physical Nature of Consciousness. John Benjamins.
  22. William G. Lycan (2006). Consciousness and Qualia Can Be Reduced. In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science (Contemporary Debates in Philosophy). Blackwell. 189-201.
  23. Geoffrey C. Madell (2003). Materialism and the First Person. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Minds and Persons. Cambridge University Press. 123-139.
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  24. Geoffrey C. Madell (1988). Mind and Materialism. Edinburgh University Press.
  25. Nicholas Maxwell (1968). Understanding Sensations. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 46 (August):127-146.
    My aim in this paper is to defend a version of the brain process theory, or identity thesis, which differs in one important respect from the theory put forward by J.J.C. Smart. I shall argue that although the sensations which a person experiences are, as a matter of contingent fact, brain processes, nonetheless there are facts about sensations which cannot be described or understood in terms of any physical theory. These 'mental' facts cannot be described by physics for the simple (...)
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  26. Colin McGinn (2001). What is It Not Like to Be a Brain? In P. Loockvane (ed.), The Physical Nature of Consciousness. John Benjamins. 157.
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  27. Michael McKinsey (2005). A Refutation of Qualia Physicalism. In Michael O'Rourke & Corey G. Washington (eds.), Situating Semantics: Essays on the Philosophy of John Perry. Mit Press.
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  28. Ben L. Mijuskovic (1976). The Simplicity Argument Versus a Materialist Theory of Consciousness. Philosophy Today 20:292-305.
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  29. Martine Nida-Rumelin (2004). Phenomenal Essentialism: A Problem for Identity Theorists. In Ralph Schumacher (ed.), Perception and Reality: From Descartes to the Present. Mentis.
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  30. Michael O'Rourke & Corey G. Washington (eds.) (2005). Situating Semantics: Essays on the Philosophy of John Perry. MIT Press.
    15 Situating Semantics: A Response John Perry Introduction I am very grateful to Michael O'Rourke and Corey Washington for envisaging and putting together ...
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  31. Adam Pautz, Is Physicalism Simpler Than Dualism?
    The problems with Physicalism that have most exercised its defenders are.
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  32. Adam Pautz, The Relational Structure of Sensory Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem.
    I am going to develop an argument against Physicalism concerning qualitative mental properties. Unlike most arguments against Physicalism, it is not based on the usual a priori considerations, such as what Mary learns when she comes out of her black and white room or the apparent conceivability of Zombies. Rather, it is based on two broadly a posteriori premises about the structure of experience and its physical basis.
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  33. Adam Pautz (2010). A Simple View of Consciousness. In Bealer and Koons (ed.), The Waning of Materialism. Oxford. 25--66.
    Phenomenal intentionality is irreducible. Empirical investigation shows it is internally-dependent. So our usual externalist (causal, etc.) theories do not apply here. Internalist views of phenomenal intentionality (e. g. interpretationism) also fail. The resulting primitivist view avoids Papineau's worry that terms for consciousness are highly indeterminate: since conscious properties are extremely natural (despite having unnatural supervenience bases) they are 'reference magnets'.
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  34. Adam Pautz (2010). Do Theories of Consciousness Rest on a Mistake? Philosophical Issues 20 (1):333-367.
    Using empirical research on pain, sound and taste, I argue against the combination of intentionalism about consciousness and a broadly ‘tracking’ psychosemantics of the kind defended by Fodor, Dretske, Hill, Neander, Stalnaker, Tye and others. Then I develop problems with Kriegel and Prinz's attempt to combine a Dretskean psychosemantics with the view that sensible properties are Shoemakerian response-dependent properties. Finally, I develop in detail my own 'primitivist' view of sensory intentionality.
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  35. John Perry (2006). Mary and Max and Jack and Ned. In Dean W. Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Volume 2. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 79.
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  36. John Perry (2004). Pr. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):172-181.
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  37. John Perry (2004). Replies. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):207-229.
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  38. Howard M. Robinson (ed.) (1993). Objections to Physicalism. Oxford University Press.
    Physicalism has, over the past twenty years, become almost an orthodoxy, especially in the philosophy of mind. Many philosophers, however, feel uneasy about this development, and this volume is intended as a collective response to it. Together these papers, written by philosophers from Britain, the United States, and Australasia, show that physicalism faces enormous problems in every area in which it is discussed. The contributors not only investigate the well-known difficulties that physicalism has in accommodating sensory consciousness, but also bring (...)
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  39. Howard M. Robinson (1982). Matter and Sense: A Critique of Contemporary Materialism. Cambridge University Press.
    The assumption of materialism (in its many forms) Howard Robinson believes is false.
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  40. Gregg H. Rosenberg (2004). The Argument Against Physicalism. In , A Place for Consciousness. Oup.
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  41. Ralph Schumacher (ed.) (2004). Perception and Reality: From Descartes to the Present. Mentis.
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  42. Roy Wood Sellars (1922). Is Consciousness Physical? Journal of Philosophy 19 (25):690-694.
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  43. Wilfrid S. Sellars (1981). Foundations for a Metaphysics of Pure Process, III: Is Consciousness Physical? The Monist 64 (January):66-90.
  44. A. D. Smith (1993). Non-Reductive Physicalism? In Howard M. Robinson (ed.), Objections to Physicalism. Oxford University Press.
  45. Robert J. Stainton (ed.) (2006). Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science. Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing.
  46. Daniel Stoljar (2009). The Argument From Revelation. In Robert Nola & David Braddon Mitchell (eds.), Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism. MIT Press.
    1. Introduction The story of Canberra, the capital of Australia, is roughly as follows. In 1901, when what is called.
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  47. Daniel Stoljar (2000). Physicalism and the Necessary A Posteriori. Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):33-55.
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  48. Scott Sturgeon (1999). Conceptual Gaps and Odd Possibilities. Mind 108 (430):377-380.
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  49. Max Velmans (1998). Goodbye to Reductionism. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), [Book Chapter]. Mit Press. 2--45.
    To understand consciousness we must first describe what we experience accurately. But oddly, current dualist vs reductionist debates characterise experience in ways which do not correspond to ordinary experience. Indeed, there is no other area of enquiry where the phenomenon to be studied has been so systematically misdescribed. Given this, it is hardly surprising that progress towards understanding the nature of consciousness has been limited.
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  50. Max Velmans (1998). Goodbye to Reductionism: Complementary First and Third-Person Approaches to Consciousness. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press. 2--45.
    This chapter argues that dualist vs. reductionist debates adopt an implicit description of consciousness that does not resemble ordinary experience. If one adopts an accurate description of conscious phenomenology along with an understanding of the fundamental differences between correlation, causation and ontological identity, reductionism cannot succeed. However the alternative is not a dualism that places consciousness beyond science. Rather, it is a nonreductionist science of consciousness.
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