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  1. Sean Allen-Hermanson (2010). Blindsight in Monkeys: Lost and (Perhaps) Found. Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (1-2): 47-71.
    Stoerig and Cowey’s work is widely regarded as showing that monkeys with lesions in the primary visual cortex have blindsight. However, Mole and Kelly persuasively argue that the experimental results are compatible with an alternative hypothesis positing only a deficit in attention and perceptual working memory. I describe a revised procedure which can distinguish these hypotheses, and offer reasons for thinking that the blindsight hypothesis provides a superior explanation. The study of blindsight might contribute towards a general investigation into animal (...)
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  2. Jami L. Anderson & Simon Cushing (eds.) (2013). The Philosophy of Autism. Rowman & Littlefield.
    The Philosophy of Autism examines autism from the tradition of analytic philosophy, working from the premise that so-called autism spectrum disorders raise interesting philosophical questions that need to be and can be addressed in a manner that is clear, jargon-free, and accessible. The goal of the original essays in this book is to provide a philosophically rich analysis of issues raised by autism and to afford dignity and respect to those living with autism by placing it at the center of (...)
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  3. Bruce Aune (1963). On Thought and Feeling. Philosophical Quarterly 13 (January):1-12.
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  4. Jeremy J. Benton (1969). The Problem of Other Minds. Kinesis 2:26-38.
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  5. Akeel Bilgrami (1994). Other Minds. In J. Dancy & Ernest Sosa (eds.), A Companion to Epistemology. Blackwell.
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  6. Vivian Bohl & Alan P. Fiske (2014-02). In and Out of Each Other's Bodies: Theory of Mind, Evolution, Truth, and the Nature of the Social. Maurice Bloch. Boulder, CO: Paradigm, 2012. 161 Pp. [REVIEW] American Ethnologist 41 (1):214-215.
  7. Vivian Bohl & Wouter van den Bos (2012). Toward an Integrative Account of Social Cognition: Marrying Theory of Mind and Interactionism to Study the Interplay of Type 1 and Type 2 Processes. [REVIEW] Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 6.
    Traditional theory of mind (ToM) accounts for social cognition have been at the basis of most studies in the social cognitive neurosciences. However, in recent years, the need to go beyond traditional ToM accounts for understanding real life social interactions has become all the more pressing. At the same time it remains unclear whether alternative accounts, such as interactionism, can yield a sufficient description and explanation of social interactions. We argue that instead of considering ToM and interactionism as mutually exclusive (...)
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  8. Arindam Chakrabarti (2011). Troubles with a Second Self: The Problem of Other Minds in 11th Century Indian and 20th Century Western Philosophy. ARGUMENT 1 (1):23-35.
    In contemporary Western analytic philosophy, the classic analogical argument explaining our knowledge of other minds has been rejected. But at least three alternative positive theories of our knowledge of the second person have been formulated: the theory-theory, the simulation theory and the theory of direct empathy. After sketching out the problems faced by these accounts of the ego’s access to the contents of the mind of a “second ego”, this paper tries to recreate one argument given by Abhinavagupta (Shaiva philosopher (...)
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  9. Trevor Cohen (1974). Chihara on Cook on Other Minds. Philosophical Studies 26 (November):299-300.
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  10. John R. Cook (2009). Mindblindness and Radical Interpretation in Davidson. Analecta Hermeneutica 1 (1):15-34.
    This paper reviews some of the arguments put forward by some psychologists in which they come to the conclusion that autistic individuals suffer from mindblindness, and also looks at one particular implication these sorts of individuals pose for Donald Davidson’s theory of radical interpretation. It has been claimed that a particular manifestation of mindblindness in autistic people serves as a counter example to claims Davidson has made about the relation between belief and intention in linguistic competence.
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  11. Amy Coplan & Peter Goldie (eds.) (2011). Empathy: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives. Oxford University Press.
    Empathy has for a long time, at least since the eighteenth century, been seen as centrally important in relation to our capacity to gain a grasp of the content of other people's minds, and predict and explain what they will think, feel, and do; and in relation to our capacity to respond to others ethically. In addition, empathy is seen as having a central role in aesthetics, in the understanding of our engagement with works of art and with fictional characters. (...)
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  12. Sam C. Coval (1959). Exceptives and Other Minds. Analysis 19 (June):138-142.
    The article addresses the sceptics who claim there is only one mind. the author contends that the statement 'there is only one mind' is not solipsistic and does not account for a plurality of minds. (staff).
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  13. Michael H. de Armey (1982). William James and the Problem of Other Minds. Southern Journal of Philosophy 20 (3):325-336.
    William james's views on the other minds problem are a serious lacuna in jamesian scholarship. this essay systematically collects together and examines his encounter with this problem. james consistently held to a teleological criterion for mindedness, which appeals to certain eidetic features which living things manifest. the essay also examines the implications of this view for james's ethical theory, especially his 'privacy defense' of democracy.
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  14. Ezequiel Di Paolo & Hanne De Jaegher (2012). The Interactive Brain Hypothesis. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 6.
    Enactive approaches foreground the role of interpersonal interaction in explanations of social understanding. This motivates, in combination with a recent interest in neuroscientific studies involving actual interactions, the question of how interactive processes relate to neural mechanisms involved in social understanding. We introduce the Interactive Brain Hypothesis (IBH) in order to help map the spectrum of possible relations between social interaction and neural processes. The hypothesis states that interactive experience and skills play enabling roles in both the development and current (...)
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  15. Ray H. Dotterer (1940). Our Certainty of Other Minds. Philosophy of Science 7 (October):442-450.
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  16. Alfred Duhrssen (1963). Philosophic Alienation and the Problem of Other Minds. Philosophical Review 69 (2):211-220.
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  17. Steven Duncan, A Plea for Cardiognosis.
    In this paper, a follow-up to my "Seeing Other Minds," I encourage philosophers to explore the notion of cardiognosis - "knowledge of hearts" - as a unique, irreducible form of knowledge, and suggest some applications for this notion.
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  18. Brian Ellis (1976). Avowals Are More Corrigible Than You Think. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 55 (August):201-5.
  19. M. Engel (1993). The Problem of Other Minds: A Reliable Solution. Acta Analytica 11 (11):87-109.
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  20. Eva-Maria Engelen & Birgitt Röttger-Rössler (2012). Current Disciplinary and Interdisciplinary Debates on Empathy. Emotion Review 4 (1):3-8.
    Empathy as “Feelingly Grasping” Perhaps the central question concerning empathy is if and if so how it combines aspects of thinking and feeling. Indeed, the intellectual tradition of the past centuries has been marked by a dualism. Roughly speaking, there have been two pathways when it comes to understanding each other: 1) thinking or mind reading and 2) feeling or empathy. Nonetheless, one of the ongoing debates in psychology and philosophy concerns the question whether these two abilities, namely, understanding what (...)
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  21. Eva-Maria Engelen & Birgitt Röttger-Rössler (2012). Current Disciplinary and Interdisciplinary Debates on Empathy. Emotion Review 4 (1):3-8.
    Empathy as “Feelingly Grasping” Perhaps the central question concerning empathy is if and if so how it combines aspects of thinking and feeling. Indeed, the intellectual tradition of the past centuries has been marked by a dualism. Roughly speaking, there have been two pathways when it comes to understanding each other: 1) thinking or mind reading and 2) feeling or empathy. Nonetheless, one of the ongoing debates in psychology and philosophy concerns the question whether these two abilities, namely, understanding what (...)
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  22. Thomas Fuchs & Hanne de Jaegher (2009). Enactive Intersubjectivity: Participatory Sense-Making and Mutual Incorporation. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (4):465-486.
    Current theories of social cognition are mainly based on a representationalist view. Moreover, they focus on a rather sophisticated and limited aspect of understanding others, i.e. on how we predict and explain others’ behaviours through representing their mental states. Research into the ‘social brain’ has also favoured a third-person paradigm of social cognition as a passive observation of others’ behaviour, attributing it to an inferential, simulative or projective process in the individual brain. In this paper, we present a concept of (...)
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  23. Edward Fullbrook & Margaret A. Simons (2009). Commentary. Beauvoir and Sartre: The Problem of the Other; Corrected Notes. In An Unconventional History of Western Philosophy. 509-523.
    Simone de Beauvoir and Jean-Paul Sartre struggled for the whole of their philosophical careers against one of modern Western philosophy's most pervasive concepts, the Cartesian notion of self. A notion of self is always a complex of ideas; in the case of Beauvoir and Sartre it includes the ideas of embodiment, temporality, the Other, and intersubjectivity. This essay will show the considerable part that gender, especially Beauvoir's position as a woman in twentieth-century France, played in the development, presentation and reception (...)
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  24. Irwin Goldstein (1985). Communication and Mental Events. American Philosophical Quarterly 22 (October):331-338.
    How do the young learn names for feelings? After criticizing Wittgensteinian explanations, I formulate and defend an explanation very different from Wittgensteinians embrace.
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  25. Anil Gomes (forthcoming). Testimony and Other Minds. Erkenntnis:1-11.
    In this paper I defend the claim that testimony can serve as a basic source of knowledge of other people’s mental lives against the objection that testimonial knowledge presupposes knowledge of other people’s mental lives and therefore can’t be used to explain it.
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  26. Anil Gomes (2011). McDowell's Disjunctivism and Other Minds. Inquiry 54 (3):277-292.
    John McDowell’s original motivation of disjunctivism occurs in the context of a problem regarding other minds. Recent commentators have insisted that McDowell’s disjunctivism should be classed as an epistemological disjunctivism about epistemic warrant, and distinguished from the perceptual disjunctivism of Hinton, Snowdon and others. In this paper I investigate the relation between the problem of other minds and disjunctivism, and raise some questions for this interpretation of McDowell.
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  27. Mitchell S. Green (2009). Speech Acts, the Handicap Principle and the Expression of Psychological States. Mind and Language 24 (2):139-163.
    Abstract: One oft-cited feature of speech acts is their expressive character: Assertion expresses belief, apology regret, promise intention. Yet expression, or at least sincere expression, is as I argue a form of showing: A sincere expression shows whatever is the state that is the sincerity condition of the expressive act. How, then, can a speech act show a speaker's state of thought or feeling? To answer this question I consider three varieties of showing, and argue that only one of them (...)
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  28. Mitchell S. Green (2008). Expression, Indication and Showing What's Within. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 137 (3):389 - 398.
    This essay offers a constructive criticism of Part I of Davis’ Meaning, Expression and Thought. After a brief exposition, in Sect. 2, of the main points of the theory that will concern us, I raise a challenge in Sect. 3 for the characterization of expression that is so central to his program. I argue first of all that a sincere expression of a thought, feeling, or mood shows it. Yet attention to this fact reveals that it does not go without (...)
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  29. Stevan Harnad (1984). Verifying Machines' Minds. [REVIEW] Contemporary Psychology 29:389 - 391.
    he question of the possibility of artificial consciousness is both very new and very old. It is new in the context of contemporary cognitive science and its concern with whether a machine can be conscious; it is old in the form of the mind/body problem and the "other minds" problem of philosophy. Contemporary enthusiasts proceed at their peril if they ignore or are ignorant of the false starts and blind alleys that the older thinkers have painfully worked through.
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  30. Joel Krueger (2012). Seeing Mind in Action. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):149-173.
    Much recent work on empathy in philosophy of mind and cognitive science has been guided by the assumption that minds are composed of intracranial phenomena, perceptually inaccessible and thus unobservable to everyone but their owners. I challenge this claim. I defend the view that at least some mental states and processes—or at least some parts of some mental states and processes—are at times visible, capable of being directly perceived by others. I further argue that, despite its initial implausibility, this view (...)
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  31. M. Moskopp Kurthen, Linke D. & Reuter D. B. (1991). The Locked-in Syndrome and the Behaviorist Epistemology of Other Minds. Theoretical Medicine 12 (March):69-79.
    In this paper, the problem of correct ascriptions of consciousness to patients in neurological intensive care medicine is explored as a special case of the general philosophical other minds problem. It is argued that although clinical ascriptions of consciousness and coma are mostly based on behavioral evidence, a behaviorist epistemology of other minds is not likely to succeed. To illustrate this, the so-called total locked-in syndrome, in which preserved consciousness is combined with a total loss of motor abilities due to (...)
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  32. James Lenman (1994). Beliefs About Other Minds: A Pragmatic Justification. American Philosophical Quarterly 31 (3):223-34.
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  33. Benjamin McMyler (2011). Believing What the Man Says About His Own Feelings. In Martin Gustafsson Richard Sorli (ed.), The Philosophy of J. L. Austin. Oxford University Press.
  34. Anne H. Narveson (1966). Evidential Necessity and Other Minds. Mind 75 (January):114-121.
  35. Henry Nelson Wieman (1922). Knowledge of Other Minds. Journal of Philosophy 19 (22):605-611.
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  36. Sanjida O'Connell (1998). Mindreading: An Investigation Into How We Learn to Love and Lie. Doubleday.
    "I know what you're thinking," we say, but how do we know what others are thinking or feeling? Because evolution has granted us what has come to be known as "Theory of Mind," the ability not only to be self-aware but aware of others' consciousness. Theory of Mind develops slowly-and in some cases, such as autism, develops little or not at all. Theory of Mind allows us to interact socially, to care about others, to manage our behavior in groups, to (...)
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  37. A. Pap (1951). Other Minds and the Principle of Verifiability. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 5:280-306.
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  38. Jack Reynolds (forthcoming). Direct Perception, Inter-Subjectivity, and Social Cognition: Why Phenomenology is a Necessary but Not Sufficient Condition. The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Research.
    In this paper I argue that many of the core phenomenological insights, including the emphasis on direct perception, are a necessary but not sufficient condition for an adequate account of inter-subjectivity today. I take it that an adequate account of inter-subjectivity must involve substantial interaction with empirical studies, notwithstanding the putative methodological differences between phenomenological description and scientific explanation. As such, I will need to explicate what kind of phenomenology survives, and indeed, thrives, in a milieu that necessitates engagement with (...)
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  39. Jack Reynolds (2010). Problems of Other Minds: Solutions and Dissolutions in Analytic and Continental Philosophy. Philosophy Compass 5 (4):326-335.
    While there is a great diversity of treatments of other minds and inter-subjectivity within both analytic and continental philosophy, this article specifies some of the core structural differences between these treatments. Although there is no canonical account of the problem of other minds that can be baldly stated and that is exhaustive of both traditions, the problem(s) of other minds can be loosely defined in family resemblances terms. It seems to have: (1) an epistemological dimension (How do we know that (...)
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  40. Jack Reynolds (2008). Deleuze's Other-Structure: Beyond the Master-Slave Dialectic, But at What Cost? Symposium 12 (1):67-88.
    Deleuze suggests that his work grounds a new conception of the Other–the Other as expression of a possible world, as a structure that precedes any subsequent dialectical mediation, including the master-slave dialectic of social relations. I will argue, however, that the ethico-political injunction that Deleuze derives from his analysis of the 'other-structure' confronts a different problem. It commits Deleuze to either tacitly prescribing a romantic morality of difference that valorizes expressive encounters without 'relations of explication' and any kind of pre-understanding (...)
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  41. Jack Reynolds (2004). Merleau-Ponty and Derrida: Intertwining Embodiment and Alterity. Ohio.
    While there have been many essays devoted to comparing the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty with that of Jacques Derrida, there has been no sustained book-length treatment of these two French philosophers. Additionally, many of the essays presuppose an oppositional relationship between them, and between phenomenology and deconstruction more generally. -/- Jack Reynolds systematically explores their relationship by analyzing each philosopher in terms of two important and related issues—embodiment and alterity. Focusing on areas with which they are not commonly associated (e.g., (...)
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  42. Gabriel Riera (2006). Intrigues: From Being to the Other. Fordham University Press.
    Intrigues: From Being to the Other examines the possibility of writing the other, explores whether an ethical writing that preserves the other as such is possible, and discusses what the implications are for an ethically inflected criticism. Emmanuel Levinas and Maurice Blanchot, whose works constitute the most thorough contemporary exploration of the question of the other and of its relation to writing, are the main focus of this study. The book's horizon is ethics in the Levinasian sense: the question of (...)
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  43. William L. Rowe (1969). God and Other Minds. Noûs 3 (3):259-284.
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  44. Matheson Russell & Jack Reynolds (2011). Transcendental Arguments About Other Minds and Intersubjectivity. Philosophy Compass 6 (5):300-11.
    This article describes some of the main arguments for the existence of other minds, and intersubjectivity more generally, that depend upon a transcendental justification. This means that our focus will be largely on ‘continental’ philosophy, not only because of the abiding interest in this tradition in thematising intersubjectivity, but also because transcendental reasoning is close to ubiquitous in continental philosophy. Neither point holds for analytic philosophy. As such, this essay will introduce some of the important contributions of Edmund Husserl, Martin (...)
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  45. Sydney Shoemaker (1965). Ziff's Other Minds. Journal of Philosophy 62 (October):587-89.
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  46. Edoardo Zamuner (ed.) (2004). Wittgenstein on the Fallacy of the Argument From Pretence. Contributions of the Austrian Wittgenstein Society.
    This paper is concerned with the answer Wittgenstein gives to a specific version of the sceptical problem of other minds. The sceptic claims that the expressions of feelings and emotions can always be pretended. Wittgenstein contrasts this idea with two arguments. The first argument shows that other-ascriptions of psychological states are justified by experience of the satisfaction of criteria. The second argument shows that if one accepts the conclusion of the first argument, then one is compelled to accept the idea (...)
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